Plans and Preparations Planning for the seizure of Woodlark and Kiriwina (designated Operation CHRONICLE) had started at General Krueger's Sixth Army headquarters near Brisbane in early May. General MacArthur had directed Allied Air and Naval Forces to support ALAMO Force and had made Krueger responsible for the co- ordination of ground, air, and naval planning.' (GHQ SWPA 01 33, 7 May 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jul, 8 MaY 43; CC, Sixth Anny, Hist of CHRONICLE Opn, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jul, 30 Aug 43.) Krueger, Kenney, Carpender, Barbey, and staff and liaison officers participated. Krueger's authority to co-ordinate planning gave him a pre-eminent position; he was first among equals. Planning had not proceeded far before a hitch developed. When Admiral Halsey suggested the seizure of Woodlark and Kiriwina he offered to provide part of the invasion force, an offer that had been cheerfully accepted. Brig. Gen. Nathan F. Twining, left, Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, and Col. Glen C. Jamison examining a map of the South Pacific area. Photograph taken October 1942. Thus in midmonth Generals Harmon and Twining and Vice Adm. Aubrey W. Fitch, who commanded all South Pacific aircraft, flew to Brisbane to discuss details of the transfer of forces to the Southwest Pacific. On the way over from Noumea Harmon and Twining made an air reconnaissance of Woodlark, and on arriving at Brisbane offered their opinion that Woodlark would be of little use in providing air support for the South Pacific's invasion of southern Bougainville. But Kenney, Carpender, Brig. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin, G-3 Of GHQ and Brig. Gen. Hugh J. Casey, the chief engineer of GHQ explained how difficult it would be for Kenney's aircraft to support that invasion without the additional airfield that Woodlark would provide. The South Pacific representatives then agreed to go on with the operation, and the details whereby ground force units, a fighter squadron, naval construction units, and six motor torpedo boats would be transferred, and destroyer-transports (APD's) and tank landing ships (LST's) would be lent to the Southwest Pacific, were arranged. (Rad [apparently from Twining] to Comdr AdVon 5AF, 16 May 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 16 May 43; Notes of Conf Between Reps of SOPAC and SWPA, Brisbane, 17 May 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 17 May 43.) First Amphibious Movement The invasion of the two islands was the first real amphibious movement undertaken in MacArthur's area. Planning was so thorough and comprehensive that the plans for movement of troops, supplies, and equipment in amphibious shipping became standing operating procedure for future invasions. Kiriwina, a narrow, north-south island twenty-five miles long, lies within fighter and medium bomber range of Rabaul, Buin in southern Bougainville, and Lae, and 60 miles from the nearest Allied base at Goodenough Island in the D'Entrecasteaux group. From Rabaul to 44-mile-long Woodlark is 300 nautical miles, from Buin 225, from Lae 380, and from Goodenough 160. Neither island was occupied by the Japanese. MacArthur had ordered Allied Naval Forces to support the ALAMO Force by carrying troops and supplies, destroying Japanese forces, and protecting the lines of communication. To carry out these orders Admiral Carpender organized several task forces of which the most important were Task Forces 74 and 76. (Chart 4) The first, commanded by Rear Adm. V. A. C. Crutchley, RN, and consisting of Australian and American cruisers and destroyers, was to destroy enemy ships in the Coral and Arafura Seas and be prepared to co-operate with South Pacific forces in the event of a major Japanese naval offensive. Task Force 76 was the Amphibious Force which had been organized in January 1943 under Admiral Barbey. Barbey's ships--4 APD's, 4 APC's, 12 LST's, 18 LCI's, and 18 LCT's with io destroyers, 8 subchasers, 4 minesweepers and I tug as escortwould transport and land the attacking troops. As ships at Kiriwina would be vulnerable to submarine attack, Barbey assigned 4 destroyers to cover Kiriwina until all defenses were in, and ordered PT boats to patrol at each island. (ANF Opn Plan 4-43, 19 May 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jul, 21 May 43; CTF 76 Opn Plan 1-43, 14 Jun 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jul, 16 June 43; CTF 74 Opn Order 2-43, IS Jun 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 24 Jun 43; Ltr, CTF 76 to COMINCH, 1Oct 43, sub: Rpt on Opn CHRONICLE, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 5 Aug 43.) Kenney's orders directed Air Vice Marshal Bostock's Royal Australian Air Force Command to protect the lines of communication along the east coast of Australia and to support the defense of forward bases, but assigned the support of the Woodlark-Kiriwina operation to the Fifth Air Force as a primary mission. The V Bomber Command, under Col. Roger M. Ramey, was to attempt the destruction of Japanese air power at Rabaul, using one heavy bomb group nightly from 25 through 30 June, weather permitting, and to attack Japanese ships, continue its reconnaissance missions, provide antisubmarine patrols during daylight within two hundred miles of the Allied bases in New Guinea, and render close support to the ground troops as needed. Since there were no Japanese on the islands support bombardment was not necessary. To Brig. Gen. Paul B. Wurtsmith's V Fighter Command went the main burden of providing fighter escort and cover for convoys and landing operations from the airfields at Dobodura, Port Moresby, and Goodenough Island. Wurtsmith was also directed to be prepared to station fighters on Woodlark and Kiriwina once the airstrips were ready. The 1st Air Task Force and No. 9 Operational Group of the RAAF1 respectively commanded by Col. Frederic H. Smith and Air Commodore J. E. Hewitt, were ordered to destroy Japanese ships and aircraft threatening th( operation, and to provide antisubmarine escort and reconnaissance. No fighter umbrella was provided for the convoys, a lack which the naval commanders protested vigorously but unsuccessfully. Fighter squadrons were maintained on ground alert at Dobodura, Milne Bay, and Goodenough Island, ready to fly if hostile aircraft attacked the shipping. (AAF SWPA 01 36, 14 May 43, and Fifth AF 01 3, 15 May 43. Both in GHQ SWPA G-3 jnl, 15 May 43. AdVon 5AF FO 83, 27 Jun 43; Ltr, CofS V Fighter Comd to CG ESCALATOR, 22 Jun 43, sub: Protection of Shipg; Rad, CTF 76 to Comdr Seventh Flt, 23 Jun 43; Rad, CG AdVOn 5 to CG ESCALATOR, 24 Jun 43; Rad, CG ESCALATOR to CTF 76, 26 Jun 43. Last five in Sixth Army G-3 jnl and File NO. 4, 23 Jun-1 Jul 43. CG Sixth Army, Hist Of CHRONICLF Opn, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 3o Aug 43; Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 164-65. The 1st Air Task Force consisted of a headquarters based at Dobodura which had operational control of units temporarily assigned by General Whitehead. The additional headquarters was considered necessary because the towering Owen Stanleys rendered radio communication between Port Moresby and Dobodura somewhat temperamental. The Fifth Air Force thus had three headquarters as well as those of the bomber and fighter commands. See Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 164-65.) The 112th Cavalry Regiment, Col. Julian W. Cunningham commanding, and the 158th Infantry, a separate regiment led by Col. J. Prugh Herndon, plus substantial supporting arms and services, had been allotted to the ALAMO Force. Krueger organized the troops that had come from the South Pacific-the 112th Cavalry (a dismounted two-squadron unit serving as infantry), the 134th Field Artillery Battalion (105- mm. howitzers), the 12th Marine Defense Battalion, plus quartermaster, port, ordnance, medical, and engineer units, a naval base unit and a construction battalion-into the Woodlark Task Force and ordered it to seize and defend Woodlark and build an airfield.(A Marine Corps defense battalion consisted of antiaircraft batteries (90- mm., 40-mm., and 2o-mm. antiaircraft guns, and searchlights) and coast artillery (155-mm. guns). A few defense battalions also included tank platoons.) The Kiriwina Task Force, under Herndon's command, consisted of the 158th Infantry (less the 2d Battalion), the 148th Field Artillery Battalion (105nim. howitzers), plus additional 155-mmgun units and engineer, ordnance, medical, antiaircraft, and quartermaster troops. It was to capture and hold Kiriwina and construct an airdrome. The first echelon of the Woodlark Force would be carried on 6 APD's, 6 LCI's, and 6 LST's, that of the Kiriwina Force on 2 APD's and 12 LCI's. (ESCALATOR FO'S 1 and 2, 2 Jun 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jul, 12 and 10 Jun 43. Like Task Force 76's plans these orders included so much detail as to constitute standing operating procedure.) Doctrine Doctrine regarding unity of command and the passage of command from ground to naval officers on embarkation, and back to ground officers on landing, was not clearly set forth in the plans. For the relationship between naval and ground commanders, the principle of unity of command rather than co-operation seems to have been followed, but it would have been sounder to have prescribed the exact command relationships in the orders. In contrast with the practice of the South Pacific Area, where naval doctrine prevailed, no air units were placed under naval or ground commanders. The ultimate authority common to air, naval, and ground units was GHQ itself. Air liaison and support parties, however, were set up at ALAMO Force headquarters and at Dobodura. Krueger from the first had planned to establish ALAMO headquarters at Milne Bay. When reconnaissance showed that development of the bay into a satisfactory base would constitute a sizable operation, he and his staff pitched in to do the job. Assembly of the invasion force was complicated by the fact that the Kiriwina Force was scattered from Port Moresby to Australia. (The Woodlark Force had come virtually intact from the South Pacific, and was, except for naval and air elements, concentrated at Townsville). Movement schedules were carefully worked out, and the first elements of the Kiriwina Force reached their staging area at Milne Bay in early June. It was soon apparent that assembly of the forces could not be completed before the third week in June. For this reason D Day for CHRONICLE, which would also be D Day for Nassau Bay and New Georgia, had been set for 30 June. (Rpt of Com Appointed by Gen Krueger, 25 May 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 27 May 43; GHQ SWPA 01 33/10, 17 Jun 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jul, 8 May 43.) On 20 June Krueger's ALAMO headquarters opened at Milne Bay, and MacArthur and Barbey arrived shortly afterward. Within a few days all elements of Herndon's Kiriwma Force reached the bay. Final training of this regimental combat team in loading and unloading landing craft and in beach organization was inhibited by the necessity for unloading ships and developing the base. On the other hand the 112th Cavalrymen at Townsville were able to make good use of the opportunity to train uninterruptedly. Barbey's amphibious force, Task Force 76, was also able to train effectively, an activity that had begun in early May. (CG Sixth Army, Hist Of CHRONICLE Opn, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 30 Aug 43; BYPRODUCT [Kiriwina] TF Jnl and Hist of Kiriwina TF; CTF 76 Rpt on CHRONICLE.) At Townsville and Milne Bay, soldiers and sailors marked "loading slots" or deck-plan layouts of LST's and LCT's on the beaches with tape, then assembled loads in the slots to test the cargo space allotted against the cargo assigned. All units agreed the technique worked very well. During the last days of June bad weather prevented the planned air attacks against Rabaul, but B-25's and A20'S made about seventy sorties against Lae and Salamaua. On 3o June the weather cleared and eight B-17's and three B-24's attacked Vunakanau airstrip at Rabaul. Bombing on this small scale, which was all the resources in the area would permit, continued for the next few days while the ground troops consolidated themselves at Woodlark and Kiriwina. (Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, p. 166.) The Advance Parties In early May two small engineer reconnaissance parties headed by the Sixth Army's deputy engineer had slipped ashore on Woodlark and Kiriwina to gather data on airfield sites, beach conditions, and defense positions. (This and the next two subsections are based on Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, Ch. IX; Office of the Chief Engineer, General Headquarters Army Forces Pacific [GHQ AFPAC] Engineers of the Southwest Pacific: 1941-1945, 1, Engineers in Theater Operations (Washington, 1947), 100-102; CG Sixth Army, Hist Of CHRONICLE Opn, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 30 Aug 43; Ltr, CTG 76.1 to CTF 76, 24 Jun 43, sub: Adv Landing LEATHFRBACK [Woodlark], in Sixth Army G-3 Jnl and File No. 4, 23 Jun-1 Jul 43; Ltr, Col Cunningham to CG ESCALATOR, 3 Jul 42, sub: Current Opns LEATHERBACK TF, in Sixth Army G-3 Jnl and File No. 4, 2 Jul-10 Jul 43; CTF 76 Rpt on CHRONICLE; Sixth Army G-3 Jnl and File for the period covered; Woodlark TF [112th Cav RCT] Opns Diary; BYPRODUCT TF Jnl and Hist of Kiriwina TF.) Their reports, coupled with the fact that there were no Japanese troops present, indicated that it would be advisable and possible to send in parties to prepare beaches and roads in advance of the main landings. Thus CHRONICLE was unusual among amphibious operations, for the shore party landed ahead of the assault troops. At 0400, 21 June, the APD's Brooks and Humphreys left Townsville carrying almost two hundred men of the 112th Cavalry. They stopped at Milne Bay to pick up more men the next day, and at 1600 left Milne Bay at high speed to make the night run to Woodlark. The trip was timed to keep the ships within range of fighter cover until dusk on the outgoing trip, and after dawn on the return voyage. The APD's reached Woodlark without incident, and at 0032 Of 23 June the advance party, under Maj. D. M. McMains, started landing at Guasopa Harbor in six LCP(R)'s. Rough seas and high winds slowed the landings, which were not completed until 0400, when the APD's shoved off for Milne Bay. The Australian coastwatcher had not been informed before the landing. When told that troops were coming ashore he formed his native guerrillas in skirmish line and got ready to fight. Fortunately before anything tragic happened he heard the invaders speaking the American variety of English and joined them. The Brooks and Humphreys reached Milne Bay during daylight Of 23 June and took aboard the 158th Regimental Combat Team's shore party, a part of the 59th Combat Engineer Company and the 158th Infantry's communication platoon, under command of Lt. Col. Floyd G. Powell. Departing Milne Bay at 1810, four hours behind schedule, they reached Kiriwina at midnight. (Col Herndon's comments on draft MS of this volume, attached to his 1st Ind, 16 Nov 53, to Ltr, Gen Smith, Chief of Mil Hist, to Col Herndon, 6 Oct 53, no sub, OCMH.) The island is almost entirely surrounded by a coral reef, with a five-mile-long channel winding through the reef to a 200-yard-wide beach at Losuia on the south coast of the main part of the island. Unloading of the APD's went very slowly as the LCP (R)'s threaded their way through the channel. The tide was low, and the landing craft ran aground several times in the darkness. Admiral Barbey also blamed the 158th's inadequate training for part of the delay. Daylight came before the ships were emptied; they departed with part of their loads still on board. Three nights later they returned to unload heavy communication and engineer equipment that had been left in their holds. This led Barbey to recommend that APD's carry no item of equipment that could not readily be carried by one man. At Woodlark the advance party reconnoitered, established outposts and beach defenses, dug wells, blasted coral obstructions out of the channels, cleared trails and dispersal and bivouac areas, prepared six beaching points for LST's, and installed signs, markers, and lights to mark channels and beaches for the main body, which would be landing in darkness to avoid Japanese air attacks. Similar efforts by the Kiriwina party were not as successful, partly because of the delay in landing engineer equipment. A good deal of effort was expended in building a coral causeway, 7 feet high and 300 yards long, across the reef on the north coast to permit a landing there. Natives aided in this work by lugging basketloads of coral. The Japanese were unaware of, or indifferent to the advance parties; they launched neither surface nor air attacks against them. More Cartwheel Begins: The Southwest Pacific Introduction Operation Chronicle; Woodlark-Kiriwina The Landings: June 30, 1943 Invasion of Nassau Bay Landing of the MacKechnie Force Back to Table of Contents -- Operation Cartwheel Back to World War Two: US Army List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by Coalition Web, Inc. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com