On receiving the instructions from the joint Chiefs of Staff, General MacArthur and his subordinates turned to the job of preparing plans and issuing orders to carry out the directive Of 28 March. The task was not difficult. All that was needed was a revamping of the two previous ELKTON plans. MacArthur's headquarters issued its plan for South and Southwest Pacific Area operations for 194.3 on 26 April, and followed it the next month with warning orders and operations instructions. The warning orders covered the whole ELKTON plan; the operations instructions dealt specifically with the opening phases. The 26 April plan, designated ELKTON III, was issued after a personal conference in Brisbane between Admiral Halsey and General MacArthur. This was the first meeting of the wellknown admiral and the even more famous general. Halsey was deeply impressed by MacArthur; speaking of their wartime conferences, he wrote: I have seldom seen a man who makes a quicker, stronger, more favorable impression. . . . On the few occasions when I disagreed with him, I told him so, and we discussed the issue until one of us changed his mind. My mental picture poses him against the background of these discussions; he is pacing his office, almost wearing a groove between his large, bare desk and the portrait of George Washington that faced it; his corncob pipe is in hi-S hand (I rarely saw him smoke it) ; and he is making his points in a diction I have never heard surpassed. (Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halseys Story, p. 155) At this meeting, timing and co-ordination of the advance in New Guinea with the invasion of New Georgia were discussed. (COMSOPAC War Diary, 25 Apr 43 entry; Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, pp. 154-55.) Halsey carried some of his points with MacArthur; they a-reed that the initial invasion of New Georgia would take place at the same time as the seizure of Woodlark and Kiriwina instead of after the establishment of Southwest Pacific forces on the Huon Peninsula, as the Southwest Pacific leaders had been advocating. ELKTON III specified that the New Georgia and Woodlark-Kiriwina operations would be simultaneous, but that major forces were not to be committed. (Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, p. 155; GHQ SWPA, ELKTON III, Plan for the Seizure of the Lae-Salamaua-New Britain- Solonions Areas, 26 Apr 43.) The Cartwheel Operations The plan of maneuver decided on by MacArthur was the same as that set forth in previous plans-mutually supporting advances along two axes, converging finally on Rabaul. The general concept underlying these operations characterized most Allied operations in both South and Southwest Pacific Areas. Despite its stiff brand of English, the warning instruction that expressed this concept is worth noting: The general scheme of maneuver is to advance our bomber line towards Rabaul; first by improvement of presently occupied forward bases; secondly, by the occupation and implementation of air bases which can be secured without committing large forces-, and then, by the seizure and implementation of successive hostile airdromes. By destructive air attack soften up and gain air superiority over each attack objective along the two axes of advance. Neutralize with appropriate aviation supporting hostile air bases and destroy hostile naval forces and shipping within range. Prevent reinforcement o., supply of objectives under attack. Move land forces forward, covered by air and naval forces, to seize and consolidate each successive objective. Displace aviation forward onto captured airdronies. Repeat this process to successive objectives, neutralizing by air action, or by air, land, and sea action, intermediate hostile installations which are not objectives of immediate attack. The entire movement will be covered by air attack on Japanese air and sea bases along the general perimeter BUKA- RABAUL KAVIENG-WEWAK, with the object of denying supply and reinforcement of objectives under attack. (GHQ SWPA Warning Instns 2, 6 May 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jul, 6 May 43.) The operations planned for ELKTON III were jumped under the code name CARTWHEEL, and were arranged according to a complicated but flexible schedule that provided for about thirteen invasions or captures in eight months, and also provided for maximum mutual support by South and Southwest Pacific Areas. CARTWHEEL would start With amphibious movements by the Southwest Pacific into Woodlark and Kiriwina. Simultaneously the South Pacific, using "diversionary" and "aggressive" infiltration, Would move into New Georgia and/or" Santa Isabel without committing major forces to action . (GHQ SWPA, ELKTON III . . . . 26 Apr. 43.) Woodlark and Kiriwina were not held by either belligerent. Kiriwina is 270 nautical miles from Rabaul, and southern Bougainville is 300 miles away. Thus Allied fighters and medium bombers would be brought within range of these enemy areas, and Allied control over the Solomon and Bismarck Seas would be intensified. During the seizure of Woodlark and Kiriwina (designated Operation I in ELKTON III), heavy bombers would strike southern Bougamville, Buka, and Rabaul. The South Pacific would support the move by its ground operations In the Solomons (Operation A) in addition to providing strategic naval support and pinning down Japanese aircraft in the Solomons. In accordance With Halsey's original suggestion, the South Pacific would furnish the occupation force and an air squadron for Woodlark. The timetable included in ELKTON III allotted two months for Operations I and A. (Chart 2) When Operation A ended, South Pacific forces would not undertake any large-scale movements, but would continue air and sea operations to support the Southwest Pacific. This area would execute Operation II, the seizure of Lae (IIa), Salamaua and Finschhafen (IIb), and Madang (IIc). Lae was to be seized two months after the initiation of the CARTWHEEL operations, Salamaua and Finschhafen six weeks after Lae, and Madang two weeks after Salamaua. The Madang operation, including the consolidation phase, would probably require two months. During Operation II aircraft from both areas would keep striking the Japanese in the Solomons, New Ireland, New Britain, and New Guinea. Airfields at Lae and in the Markham Valley behind Lae would support the advance against Madang as well as the South Pacific's thrust against southern Bougainville. Five and one-half months after the start of CARTWHEEL, and one month after the move against Lae, the South Pacific would complete the seizure of New Georgia, and move forward to capture the Japanese bases at Faisi in the Shortland Islands and Buin in southern Bougainville (Operation B) . (This feature of ELKTON III was not closely followed by Halsey. References to the New Georgia operations in ELKTON III are rather vague. They probably were included after the Halsey-MacArthur conference.) Allied aircraft from Woodlark, Kiriwina, and the Huon Peninsula would support and cover these movements. It Was expected that Operation B would require six weeks. The next two sets of operations by the Southwest and South Pacific Areas would be practically concurrent. At the beginning of the seventh month, the South Pacific was to seize Kieta, a Japanese base on the east coast of Bougainville, and beg-in neutralizing the airfields on and near Buka (Operation C). In the middle of the sixth month, the Southwest Pacific would cross Vitiaz Strait to take Cape Gloucester and Arawe (Operation IIIa), then occupy Gasmata and neutralize Talasea (Operation IIIb). With the New Guinea and New Britain bases in Allied hands, Wewak could be neutralized, and the operations against western New Britain could be supported. Finally, with the execution of Operations III and C, light bombers and fighters could easily attack Rabaul and Kavieng, and the South and Southwest Pacific Areas could begin to neutralize them in advance of an amphibious assault on Rabaul. This entire set of operations, it was estimated, would last for eight months. For planning purposes, ELKTON III assumed that the CARTWHEEL operations would begin about the first of June. The arrangements for mutual support of the two areas during these operations were more detailed and exact than those for the Guadalcanal and Papua Campaigns. ELKTON III and subsequent orders, besides specifying the time and place of the CARTWHEEL operations, also provided for direct communication between South and Southwest Pacific Areas. Starting on 15 May, daily operational and intelligence summaries would be exchanged. Instructions stressed particularly the necessity for a common radio frequency for fighter planes and a radio circuit connecting all major Allied air headquarters and bases. Beginning with Operations I and A, Southwest Pacific planes would conduct regular defensive reconnaissance over the Solomon and Bismarck Seas and the land areas west of longitude 155 degrees east and southwest of the line Buka Passage-New Ireland. South Pacific aircraft would be responsible for defensive reconnaissance to the east and northeast of 155 degrees east and the Buka Passage-New Ireland line, with a one-degree overlap granted to both areas. Offensive reconnaissance would be conducted without regard to any boundaries. MacArthur was to be notified well in advance of any movements by air or sea, and all further arrangements for co-ordination and mutual support would be made by him. (CHQ SWPA, ELKTON III . . . . 26 Apr 43; GHQ SWIIA Warning Instns 2, 6 May 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 6 May 43) Forces and Missions MacArthur mainly used the existing headquarters in his area, but set up one new task force, primarily American, directly under GHQ. This organization, known at first as New Britain Force but from July on as ALAMO Force, was commanded by General Krueger, who retained his command of Sixth Army. (ALAMO was the code name in clear; the secret Code name was ESCALATOR Force.) ALAMO Force headquarters was virtually the same as Sixth Army headquarters, and placing ALAMO Force directly under GHQ had the effect of removing most American troops engaged in tactical operations from General Blamey's control. The plans called for New Guinea Force, with General Blarney in command, also to operate directly under GHQ. Roughly speaking, New Guinea Force would conduct the operations in New Guinea while ALAMo Force ran those in Woodlark, Kiriwina, and New Britain. (GHQ SWPA Warning Instris 2, 6 May 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 6 May 43.) All operations would be supported and protected by Allied Air Forces and Allied Naval Forces. Logistical responsibilities would be divided between American and Australian supply services. General Marshall's U.S. Army Services of Supply was assigned responsibility for the immediate movement of supplies for American ground forces by water (excluding naval movements) from rear bases in Australia to the intermediate bases at Port Moresby and Milne Bay, the advanced base at Oro Bay near Buna, and other bases when established. Marshall's command was to enlarge, stock, and operate ports and bases for the ALAMO Force, and would be responsible for completing airdromes then under construction on New Guinea and Goodenough Island. Australian Line of Communications units were to move supplies from rear bases to Cape York Peninsula, Port Moresby, and Milne Bay. In amphibious assaults Allied Naval Forces would carry supplies forward from intermediate and advanced bases to the combat areas. When those areas were secured the regular American and Australian supply agencies would take over. In addition, Admiral Carpender's command would assist in the movement of supplies forward from Australia. After some postponements caused by delays in assembling the troops for Kiriwina, D Day for Woodlark, Kiriwina, Nassau Bay in New Guinea, and New Georgia in the Solomons was set for 30 June. The Intelligence Estimate ELKTON III's estimate of Japanese strength in the Bismarck Archipelago, Solomons, and New Guinea reflected the recent changes in Japanese strength and like the 28 February estimate was fairly accurate. With the Japanese in control of all sea and air routes leading from their rearward island fortresses to Rabaul, MacArthur and his staff clearly recognized that the enemy might quickly strengthen his forces. They expected at strong naval units from Truk, including 6 battleships, 2 carriers, 3 auxiliary carriers, 8 seaplane tenders, 15 cruisers, about 4o destroyers, and 27 submarines as well as about 50 merchant vessels of over 3,000 tons displacement might be made available at once. Within thirty days, about four divisions could arrive, as well as 277 airplanes and fleet units from the Netherlands Indies and the Philippines. By the end of six months, the Japanese in the Bismarck Archipelago-Solomons-New Guinea area might be able to muster ten to fifteen divisions and 755 aircraft, but not much more in the way of fleet strength. just as on the Allied side, the crux of the matter would be shipping. The availability of troopships would govern the size of the ground combat forces that could be sent to and maintained in the area. About 300,000 gross tons of shipping, half consisting of ships over 3,000 tons, was immediately available, and to that 100,000 to 125,000 gross tons might be added. No mention was made of possible Japanese offensives against positions held by the Allies. Enemy capabilities were considered to be entirely defensive. The Japanese were believed able to attempt the following: defense of Lae and Salamaua while reinforcing western New Britain and north New Guinea; air attacks against the Allied communication lines as well as in tactical support of ground defenses; naval interception of Allied amphibious movements; and diversions against northwest Australia and southeastern Papua. Specifically, it was anticipated that the Japanese would attempt to hold LaeSalamau while rushing about 25,000 reinforcements to Madang and Finschhafen by sea. Once the Allied offensives got under way, reasoned MacArthur's planners, the Japanese would probably be -unable to reinforce Lae or Salamaua. Enemy soldiers might be sent overland from Wewak through the Markham Valley to Lae, but would hardly be fit to fight on arrival. At the same time the Japanese could be expected to increase their garrisons at Cape Gloucester, Gasmata, and Arawe in western New Britain. The enemy was expected to mount a maximum air effort in an attempt to defeat or delay the advancing Allies. Both daylight sorties and harassing night attacks would probably be used. If the Japanese could keep half their planes in serviceable condition, they could send out at least a hundred fighters and eighty-five bombers in the initial attacks. By draining the Solomons, they could attack on the second day with at least twenty four fighters and ten bombers in addition to whatever aircraft were left from the first day, and by then more planes would be arriving from outside the area. The naval surface units at Rabaul could get to Lae in not more than eighteen hours, and strong forces could steam from Truk to Lae in a few days' time. (G-2 Estimate of Enemy Strength and Reinforcement Rate in the New Guinea-Bismarcks Area, Annex A to ELKTON III. A map showing enemy dispositions is appended to Annex A, and differs in certain minor respects from the order of battle data in the text of the annex.) More Elkton III: The Plan for Cartwheel The Southwest Pacific Area A Plan of Maneuver Large Map (slow: 95K) Jumbo Map (monstrously slow: 609K) Back to Table of Contents -- Operation Cartwheel Back to World War Two: US Army List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by Coalition Web, Inc. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com