A Discussion about Tanks
Part 1

Sir Basil Liddell-Hart Interview

Prologue

by Sgt K Chadwick

(In May, 1967, Sgt K Chadwick obtained an interview with Sir Basil Liddell-Hart. These are Sgt Chadwick's notes of that interview).

Prologue

On November 20, 1917 at Cambrai, the Tank Corps was given its first opportunity to prove whether the tank was to be retained as a weapon of war when employed under suitable conditions. Some 500 tanks of all types went into action against the Hindenburg Line and made one of the most successful attacks of The Great War and the Tank was established as a weapon of war and the Corps had won the first of its many successful actions against the enemy. This major victory is now commemorated throughout the world by all units and members of the Royal Tank Regiment. And, I might say, remembered by all armoured forces in all the other nations of the world.

You, Sir Basil, although not in the tanks during their development in the war, wrote a paper in February 1919 to the journal of the Royal United Service Institution and in the paper your flare for manoeuvre and high-speed strategy became evident.

From then on Sir, you have been closely associated with the Tank idea and you have been consulted by the commanders of my Regiment throughout the whole of our development since that time. Did you ever volunteer to join the Tanks?

    Sir B L-H

    Yes, my first connection with the Tank Corps was during 1920 when I sent a draft of some sections of an infantry training manual of mine to Col . J F C Fuller the chief general staff officer in the War Office SD7 and who was one of the guiding minds of the wartime Tanks Corps. His comment was "I think your system will work well" and with this encouraging remark helped me to produce my articles in which I had urged the need for developing mechanised cross-country transport to free the exploiting troops from a cramping dependence on the use of roads. However, the real opportunity for me to join the Tank Corps came in 1923 when the wartime units were at last established as a permanent part of the Army--and subsequently became the Royal Tank Corps. I promptly applied for a transfer to it, and in August was notified by the War Office that I had been selected for it, but, while I was waiting orders to move the RTC Depot at Bovington Camp in Dorset, another branch of the War Office disinterred the earlier medical reports on me, and as a sequel my posting was cancelled. After a further medical board I was placed on half-pay and eventually invalicled out.

KC

What did Col Fuller have to say? What was your reaction?

    Sir B L-H

    Fuller was convinced that the manceuvres to stifle my writing, was really due to a growing objection in the War Office to both my military opinions and his, especially in urging the importance of mechanised forces in the future and the need to start developing them.

    Although I considered that the decision was merely the natural reaction of a conventional soldier to physical fitness, I was in an awkward situation 'out of work' and with a wife and son to keep. Militarily it seemed to be the guillotine blade destined to cut short my opportunity of spreading the new gospel of tactics, and my belief that mechanised mobility was the key to success in future warfare.

KC

The renaissance of armour in the Middle East last week has been a fulgent example of the true purpose of my Regiment's existence. The employemployment of 'our' tanks and armoured tactics has been, once again, a fulfilment of your tactical theories. What is your opinion of the events of the high-speed war in the Sinai, did the Israelis ever consult you?

    Sir B L-H

    The power of magnetic personality in creating a public image and myth has been shown in the way that most of the commentators and reporters have given the primary credit for victory to Dayan instead of to Rabin. When visiting Israel in 1960 as a guest of the Government I was particularly impressed with Rabin, who was then Vice-Chief of Staff, and we had lengthy discussions, some on the map, about their plan in any future campaign--and one that might arise with Jordan as well as Egypt.

    What struck me most in this latest campaign, compared with 1956, was the significant development of the Israeli plan and operations in combining a strategical offensive with a tactical defence -- in getting round the back of the Egyptians after the opening penetration and, by blocking their line of retreat to the Suez Canal, forcing them to attack in trying to escape. I discussed this point with Rabin in 1960.

More Liddell-Hart Interview

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© Copyright 1974 by Donald Featherstone.
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