The German attack at Sedan in 1940 is considered a classic example of blitzkrieg, but reality needs to be differentiated from myth.

The 1940 campaign really began in 1914, as WWI experience drives the planning process for both sides over the course of the next 25 years. In WWI, the Schlieffen Plan with its famed right hook failed, ostensibly because too German troops were committed to the straight up fight on the Franco-German border and too few to the hook through Belgium.

With that in mind, the idea that the building the Maginot Line on the Franco-German border in Alsace-Lorraine seems less stupid than conventional wisdom seems to indicate. The Maginot Line was constructed from 1929 to 1936 at a cost of 5 billion francs, which in today's dollar, amounts to about $500 billion. It was placed smack in the way of the shortest distance between Germany and Paris, and was intended to provide time for the French to mobilize in the event of an attack by Germany.

In the 1920s, the collective consciousness of the French military leaders suffered from a collective nightmare. Germany was limited to a 100,000-man army by the Treaty of Versailles. However, Germany made its small army the cream of the crop, so the French figured that this small but well-drilled and efficient army could smash through convention garrisons and border forces and be in Paris before a complete French mobilization could occur.

The French army was not ready for any war. In 1928, military service was only for 10 months, which is enough to possibly train a soldier, but not long enough to train units to act together. hence, if the Maginot Line could stop the 100,000-man force, then the French could mobilize and soldier for soldier, would roughly be equal to new German recruits.

However, the Maginot Line's lines of concrete and steel fortresses and underground bunkers ended roughly at the point where the French border met the Belgian border. Why did construction halt there, and not continue all the way to the English channel?

Economic realities meant France could not afford to fight in Northern France, where 75% of their coal mines and 90% of their iron mines were located. They wanted to fight in Belgium, and since they expected another Schlieffen Plan, they felt extending the Line was inappropriate.

So, they concentrated their best mechanized forces along the Franco-Belgian border with the idea that they could wheel into Belgium and to the German border and anchor their line at Breda in the Netherlands.

However, the Belgians refused to cooperate with France -- or Britain. The country reverted to neutrality and vowed to defend itself against all invaders. Worse, the French plan ran into additional problems, some that should have been anticipated, some not.

• The distance from the French border to Breda is 175 kilometers. However, the distance from the French order to the German border is only 90 kilometers.
• The Dutch, when attacked, withdrew their forces away from Breda, essentially leaving a hole.
• The French were slow to move in accordance with their plan, and
• The French did not count on a stream of refugees fleeing the Germans towards rear areas and thus clogging up the roads.

Thus, the French committed their best mechanized and strategic assets to the far left flank, with no reserves anywhere else in case the Germans hit the "hinge" of the French line at Sedan, just above where the Maginot line stops, although during the winter of 1939-40, the French built small field fortifications in three lines of depth in an effort to extend the Line.

There was also another problem that occurred with the Maginot Line. It was defensive in nature, and troops manning such a formidable position were psychologically unprepared to leave it and attack. Thus, while Germany invaded Poland, only a weak French offensive ever was launched, and it soon retreated back into and behind the safety of the Line. While the Germans though of the offensive, the French went into the war with a defensive mindset.

The German point of view in pre-war planning postulated another Schlieffen Plan in 1939, but weather forced the delay of operations back into 1940. Worse, on January 17, 1940, a Luftwaffe staff officer with the full plan, lands his light plane in Belgium. When captured, he tried to burn the plan in a potbelly stove, but a quick-thinking French soldier reached in and grabbed the plan before it could burn. The Germans think the war plan is compromised, and so look elsewhere for the offensive route. That's when they settle on the Ardennes for their main effort, concentrating seven of 10 Panzer divisions and four of five mechanized divisions. As fate would have it, this armored pincer would break the line at the hinge of the French defensive plans and cut the Allied army in two, separating its mechanized forces from the Maginot Line static forces.

Opposing Forces

PanzerGruppe Kleist consisted of the 19th (Guderian's 1st, 2nd, and 10th Panzer Divisions), 41st (6th and 8th Panzer Divisions), and 14th Panzer Corps (four motorized divisions). Guderian would lead the way, and many command post exercises (i.e. wargames) were held in February, March, and April to see how the attack would run.

A panzer division consisted of 1 armored brigade of two regiments of two battalions each (about 160 tanks) and a panzer grenadier brigade of 1 regiment of three battalions and 1 motorcycle battalion. It also had an armored recon battalion, three battalions of artillery (either 12 105mm or 12 150mm guns), an Anti-Tank battalion of 40 guns, an Anti-aircraft battalion (20mm) of 33 guns, and an Engineering battalion. Addition support units were also attached.

Guderian's troops had trained together for four to five years working out operational procedures. The majority of their tanks (84%) were the Pz Mk I and II (armed with either MGs or 20mm cannons), the rest were the Pz Mk III and IV. Some divisions, mostly Hoth's 41st Corp) included the Czechoslovakian 35t and 38t tanks.

The Germans were up against two echelons of Allied troops: two cavalry divisions backed by the 2nd French Army. The main unit was the 5th cavalry division of 10,000 men and 50 armored vehicles. A cavalry brigade consisted of two regiments.

An armored infantry brigade consisted of one armor regiment (15 armored cars, 35 MG-equipped tanks, and 14 medium tanks such as the Hotchkiss 35) and one motorized infantry regiment of mostly recon, light infantry, and some heavy weapons troops.

An artillery regiment had two battalions, one of 12 75mm guns and one of 12 105mm guns. There was also one Anti-Tank company with 28 25mm AT guns, which were inadequate to cover 35-40 kilometers of front.

The 2nd Army contained the 3rd Colonial division, 41st Infantry division, 3rd North African division, 55th Infantry division, and 71st Infantry division. The 3rd and 41st covered the right flank, the 3rd and 55th the left, and the 71st was a reserve. These were five rather poorly equipped and trained divisions. Indeed, the 55th division was probably the worst division in the French army, made up mostly of the oldest reservists--one-third had done their basic training from 1918-25, and many of the NCOs were released for incompetence. And sure enough, the 55th was stationed right at the hinge at Sedan, defending 17 kilometers of front with only 50 AT guns and no AT mines..

The 55th consisted of the 147th Fortress Regiment (designed to occupy the field fortifications and thus had more than normal number of machine guns), the 295th Regt, 331st Regt, one MG bttn, 1 artillery regt, and two companies of AT guns. The real problem was that every regiment and battalion was NOT consistently TO&E. Indeed, it was more of a task force than division, with a constantly changing organizational structure as it "trained" by pulling sub-units from each unit and then creating a new unit instead of re-integrating them back into existing units. The numbers of the regiments may have been the same, but the troops inside were re-arranged and re-re-arranged. For example, when the Germans crossed the river, one company had platoons from four different companies from three different battalions! There was absolutely no cohesion inside a unit. As for its leadership, considering the state of its troops, the commanders were probably not the most competent--to be polite, probably ranked in the bottom third of the French army.

Ardennes Attack

From the 10th to 12th of May, the German troops pierced the Ardennes. They led with motorized infantry, not armor, so the French initial reports that no tanks were visible meant that higher command identified the thrust as a diversion. For example, the 1st Panzer division led with motorcycles and then truck-mounted infantry, in an effort to follow up 125 commandos, some in French and belgian uniforms, that tried to seize five important road junctions.

Not all German operations were raging successes. Operation Niwi took a battalion of the Grossdeutchland Regiment, broke it down, and transported it via Fiesler Storch aircraft in an effort to perform air mobile operations. The operation included 98 aircraft, each carrying one pilot and two soldiers, to seize two villages along the Franco-Belgian border. It somewhat worked towards blocking French counter moves, but Belgian resistance to French incursions over the border did more for the germans than Operation Niwi.

Other German mishaps included:

• Two companies of belgian "Forest Rangers" held up an entire Panzer division for an entire day, the 10th of May.
• Commanders kept cutting other comanders off on the forest roads. Kleist eventually had to issue orders to stop that under penalty of death.
• The Luftwaffe bombed German troops.
• Due to German doctrine that said lead from the front, 10th Panzer lost critical regimental commanders early and lost time until Guderian redirected its operations.

However, the French had their share of mishaps as well:

• Belgians blew up all the bridges in front of the French.
• Germans hit the right flank of the 5th Cavalry division unexpectedly, and the French pulled the unit back into France by 12th May, leaving Belgium unoccupied.
• French planning believed the Germans could cross the Ardennes in no fewer than 10 or 11 days. Guderian did it in just over four. The French were oblivious to operational reality of the fluid situation.

By the 13th of May, the Germans tried an improvised river crossing at Sedan, with two crossing points for each of the three Panzer divisions. The French repelled three of the six and delayed a fourth, but the other two, by 1st Panzer in the middle of the German line, succeeded.

The Luftwaffe commander provided a continuous trickle of aircraft for tactical support. It was not very significant, but it was very psychologically effective. Some French units pulled back without telling adjacent units, in part because the bombing severed land lines strung back to HQs. Since the TO&E had been constantly changing as mentioned before, there was no coordination or cohesion of movements.

In addition, French artillery doctrine mandated that artillery crews take cover in the trenches during an air raid. With a constant presence overhead, the French artillery was neutralized.

In addition, the Germans ignored the traditional doctrine of consolidating the bridgehead during a river crossing. Instead, like the 1st regiment of 1st Panzer, they continued to move westward, spreading more confusion in the French areas.

The French did some things right. The 2nd battalion commander Capt. Caribou ignored the doctrine that the commander leads from the rear, and sweeping up bits and pieces of many formations, successfully held off the Germans for most of the day, until he was only left with 50 men. The German 2nd Panzer completely failed to cross, and the 10th Panzer had limited number of units cross as French artillery, sans Luftwaffe pressure, crushed crossing with accurate fire.

The Germans bested the French in part to their own heroic efforts. Sgt. Rubarth of the 49th Combat Engineers took one squad backed by one squad of regular infantry, and singlehandedly tossed satchel charges into so many fortifications and bunkers, he managed to clear two of the three French lines.

By the evening of the 13th, the French units were in a paneic and sometimes spontaneously routing and retreating from the area. By 1920 hrs, the 1st Panzer had its first vehicle across. By 2300 hrs, its only bridge (floating) was up for traffic to cross--and there were no spare bridges, either.

The French counterattacked ineffectively on the 14th, and while that slowed the Germans, indeed, 1st PanzerGrenadier were stalled in the hills around Stonne, it did not stop them.

Guderian Resigns

By the 15th, Kleist called a halt. Only 25% of German tanks were still operational, causing High Command back in Berlin to become cautious. Guderian started to scream about maintaining pressure and was allowed to continue the advance on the 16th. The French thought the Germans would head south and east to roll up the Maginot Line, but Guderian headed due west. The only force in the way of 1st Panzer was the 3rd Spahis North African Cavalry Division. It was hardly a speed bump.

Still, Kleist called a halt again on the 17th, not knowing there are no French reserves. In another acrimonious argument, Guderian offered his resignation, and it was accepted. later, Guderian is reinstated, and allowed to "recon." Guderian then "reconned" 60-70 kilometers, breaking out at Sedan and exploiting the dearth of Allied forces.

German Victory

That the Germans won the battle of Sedan is not in doubt. They did it with audacity, frontline leadership, and excellent conventional infantry attacks. The armored blitzkrieg occurred after the successful attack as exploitation. Poland was in some resptecs a training ground, for there, German attacks were more deliberate and less risky. In the process, units received valuable experience and staffs began to think more aggressively and take more risks. A German victory was not a sure thing by any means.

Lectures

WWII Soviet Units Raised by Charles Sharp
Panel Discussion: 1944-45 by all
Sedan, France 1940 by Jon House

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