by Rudy Scott Nelson
This is the introductory article on the Hessians in the American Revolution. The articles are designed to provide basic information to the wargamer and novice researcher. This article focuses on the German Auxiliary units deployed by the British Crown in the Americas during the American Revolutionary War. To endorse the Patriot propaganda machine of the war by classifying the Germans as Mercenaries is an injustice and basically incorrect. Most mercenaries of the war were actually employed by the Patriot forces. The individuals employed by the Patriots were often experts in various fields of warfare and were mercenaries, being paid for individual services rendered, in every sense of the word. The German troops employed by the British Crown were hired from the German rulers who loaned actual military units to the British. An objective examination of the British strategic policy shows that the use of German manpower to assist in military campaigns was a common practice during the 1700s and lasted into the 1800s. During a war, British manpower was strained keeping both its naval and merchant fleets fully manned. Another consideration was the problems of transporting and supplying a large British force on the European mainland. These facts combined with the fact that the monarch still had close ties with and relatives among the rulers of the minor German states, leads to the use of German troops as the most logical solution to the British manpower shortage problem. During the American Revolution the first German troops employed were Hanoverians who replaced British units at garrison posts so the British troops could be redeployed to America. Much has been said about the quality of the German troops with many beleiving that they were very poor troops. This is a misconception drawn by those readers who are unfamiliar with the training and deployment of troops during the 1700s, a practice that extended into the 1800s. It was common practice to assign newly formed units to garrison duty where they would continue their training. This allowed for better trained, due mostly to the drilling they received while on garrison duty, units to be used on campaigns. Another practice was to leave new, unfit (sick and wounded) and older soldiers in garrison, while taking the remaining men to the field as an ad hoc unit. This practice did not reduce the unit's capability, since they did not operate as distinct companies. They were always deployed as ad hoc firing platoons. The statements that their training only allowed them to be good for garrison and assault troops against fixed locations is also a narrow view. The Patriot goal was to match the German and British in proficency during a formal battle. So how can you degrade the Germans for being good at it. In regards to the poor evaluations of Jagers, the basic problem seems to be that they were outgunned (Their rifles were only accurate up to 60-70 yards, due to being much shorter than the common Patriot rifles) and had to fight in unfamiliar terrain against locals. Anyone who has had to do any scouting in the miltary understands how important these two factors are to contrbuting to a successful operation. In summary German troops performed at a level which was the same as the other combatants. Some units and operations were more successful than others. Desertion rates were also comparable to other force types employed. Since they were employed as units, it was a noted fact that the German commanders did not like the policy of parceling out the units under various British commands and would have preferred operating them as a body under a German commander. This is a common problem faced by any multi-national force. French and Patriot commanders also resented serving under a commander of a different nationality. Clearing Up Confusions The study of German forces can often become confusing due to a number of factors. While I cannot ensure a lack of confusion, I can try to provide additonal guidelines and data. The largest number of units came from the state of Hesse-Casel, followed by Brunswich, Anspach, Anhalt, Waldeck and Hesse-Hanau. The large number of Hesse troops resulted in the Patriot press referring to all Germans as Hessians regardless of their origin. These units received some replacements as the war progressed and received ex-POWs from exchanges which caused their strengths remained steady over the years. Additonal units were also sent but mainly small units, such as Jagers, which explains why units are referred to in later accounts but who were not part of initial deployments. The previously mentioned use of ad hoc, temporary, formations also causes confusion. It was common for the Grenadier companies to be stripped from the parent regiment and converged with other grenadier companies to form a converged battalion. The Brunswich Chasseur (Light) companies were converged in the same way plus independent jager units were also attached to the battalion for administrative purposes. On campaign these light troops operated in small detachments with specific assignments. Also depleted regiments, like the survivors of Trenton and the Brunswick remnants after Saratoga, would be formed into a combined battalion until they could be brought back up to strength. In regards to the artillery detachments, these were the gunners,matrosses, normally attached to a regiment. German doctrine was to deploy 2 guns per regiment and none with combined battalions. The gunners of a garrison unit may be ordered to go on campaign in support of a converged battalion or other unit despite the parent unit remaining behind. The British maintained the armory concept, where the gunners were assigned cannon based the on operation. Larger guns, howitzers and mortars were deployed during a seige. On campaign the 3 pounder gun was the most common with an occasional field mortar or 6 pounder being found on the battlefield. The final common and confusing practice was the naming of regiments and battalions after its commander rather than giving it a numerical designation. When a commander was replaced, the unit's designation in various reports also changed. Other unit organization and table notes. 1. The Hesse-Casel Converged Grenadier Battalion von Linsingen contained two companies of Hessian Guards. 2. AKA: Also known as. Due to changes in command or administrative records 3. (Name) : Due to translation variations in commanders names or other records. 4. N/A: The unit was not deployed yet or had been disbanded for various reasons. 5. Conv : Refers to a converged unit made up of elements from different regiments 6. After Trenton the remanent of Knyphausen, Lossburg and von Rall were combined into the Converged battalions of Loos and Woelwarth for the year 1777. 7. After Saratoga the remnants of the Brunswick Musketeer Regiments were converged into a single battalion under Ehenkrook. 8. *### indicates an estimated unit strength based on administrative and previous strength. Back to Time Portal Passages Table of Contents Back to Time Portal Passages List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1999 by Rudy Scott Nelson This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |