Rules tend to treat Peltasts as troops that can throw javelins, evade, fight under the most desperate circumstances. They also seem ideal for taking on cavalry. However, I say that is not the case.

Peltasts seem to go through several changes throughout history, but war game rules do not reflect that. First, they are no different than Psiloi, light armed, with perhaps the exception the light armed are not shielded while the peltast is. War game rules tend to overvalue light armed. It appears that 35,000 javelin armed skirmishers would have a major impact in most rules and even if all were killed while skirmishing their point loss would be negligible. I am talking about Plataia where the Lakedaimonians had dragged 35,000 helots along to act as attendants for the 10,000 hoplites of the army. (Hist. book X. 10.)

If one gives this force skirmishing ability, the Persians are really in trouble. In many a re-fight I have seen helots skirmish a Sparabara to pieces and even give the Ten Thousand problems. And ifthey are shot down or driven off by morale, their cost is so unimportant to the main army the Greek commanders do not care.

Yet at the battle they are not mentioned at all as taking part in the battle line. In fact their failure to guard a well against enemy cavalry excursions causes the Greek army to lose its water supply, and forces a retreat. This does not sound much like motivated troops to me. In addition they had a clear function in the army, they carried the shield and armor of the Lakedaimonian heavy armed. One would think that the average Spartiate might get a little huffy about hauling his own hardware. After all his job was to be in peak condition when he fought, not to be debilitated from being his own porter. Therefore it would be doubtful he would want his body servant out on the lines skirmishing where there was a chance he would be a casualty.

All in all, psiloi come across from the writings of the golden age of the hoplite like a bunch of timid servants, not very surprising since that was what they were. After all, these hoplite warriors were their betters. They would not close with a phalanx not even to the flanks or rear unless the phalanx was fleeing the field, or were in unfavorable ground.

The Lakedaimonians, being scared of slave insurrection, encouraged this relationship and continued to put the fear of the Gods into their helots. Even after the earthquake of 466 B.C.E. the revolting helots could not face the Spartiates in the field even though Spartiate numbers had been reduced. They instead holed up in the mountains where the heavy infantry was helpless. Sparta was finally reduced to requesting help from her old Hellenic League allies to suppress the revolt.

It likely wasn't lost on those observers of the revolt that light troops in rough terrain were formidable adversaries. The following Peloponnesian Wars saw light armed becoming more involved in Greek tactical strategy. If hoplites were going to be operating in unfavorable terrain they needed their own psiloi for protection. Demosthenes, the Athenian Strategos, had citizen archers with his phalanx when he invaded Aetolia in 426 B.C.E. The Aetolians kept their distance until the archers ran out of ammo. Then they closed in and broke up the phalanx with javelin fire and rocks. Eventually part of the phalanx was isolated and destroyed. (Thuc. 3.97-98) This made a strong impression on Demosthenes since he became a major proponent of light troops in future use during Athenian operations.

Based on the above we can make the following assumptions for the early period:

1. Psiloi in the earlier periods were fairly useless against formed heavy infantry.

2. Psiloi effectiveness rose if they were operating in unfavorable terrain for heavy armed.

3. Psiloi were ineffective against cavalry.

So how do these assumptions effect our rules? For the early period, perhaps it would be safe to say that only a certain proportion of psiloi can be used as skirmishing infantry. If we have one psiloi per hoplite, no skirmishing infantry is allowed, if two per hoplite, than 50% of the total. But recall these troops are timid, so they are not going to be very effective; they may throw javelins, but they should subtract 1 to their toss, in addition to any other modifiers.

They were easily routed, so any contact by formed heavy infantry or any horse in any ground causes these light troops to be routed. If they are forced to evade, they must pass a morale test to stay on the field.

To cover the changes in the later period:

1. Psiloi in the later period were better at operating against formed heavy infantry.

2. Psiloi effectiveness, if they were operating in unfavorable terrain for heavy armed, was very good.

3. Psiloi were still ineffective against cavalry.

Beginning with the later period we see an increase in skirmishing infantry, especially in the north part of Greece. Now roughly 30% of that of the heavy armed could be light armed. Still these are timid troops. They may throw javelins, but that they must subtract 1 to their toss, in addition to any other modifiers, except when in rough terrain. They still have low morale. They were still routed by any contact with formed heavy infantry or any horse in favorable ground (I.E. not rough). If the lights are in unfavorable ground to heavies they must melee first. If the lights lose, they are routed. If they are forced to evade, they must pass a morale test to stay on the field.

Peltast Modifications

Peltasts have no fear of heavy armed. But they must be careful they do not get too close or they could be caught and destroyed by the ekdromi, who were trained to leave the phalanx for this purpose.

Peltasts were deadly if they could continue to harass heavy armed. They had a number of successes. The Italian Oscan tribe of Lucanians even destroyed a Spartan force of mercenaries with peltast tactics. Then there was Iphikrates at Corinth, his Corinthian campaigns and his successes against the Peloponnesians all with his mercenary peltasts. .

Peltasts are difficult to represent on the wargame table because most wargame rule writers tend to lump Peltasts together with light armed (such as psiloi) as one type. The nimble fellows shooting down Gauls in Greece are no different than Aetolian armored men fighting Seleucid phalangites in Egyptian service. Obviously this is not the case. Yet we find it over and over again in rules.

Based on literature and archaeological findings, it is apparent Peltasts went through three changes:

1. Shielded Psiloi. Early peltasts have a shield while the psiloi do not. These had to increase their confidence some what.

2. Drill and training. The reason for the ekdromoi is obvious; against undisciplined peltasts such controlled charges were highly effective. Once peltasts were scattered, they couldn't reform. (However once peltasts were taught Spartan-like discipline, they became more efficient. Simple charges did not scatter them anymore, they simply reformed and attacked once more.)

3. Replacement for hoplites. Demosthenes' and Iphikrates' successes came against enemy hoplite formations through the use of combined tactics. There was a allied phalanx always threatening the enemy one. (This was to keep the enemy hoplites from locking shields as protection from javelin fire as then they would be at the mercy of the enemy's advance.)

It was only matter of time before the peltast itself became the offensive weapon. Peltasts adopted Celtic shields to give them more melee ability. (The oftthought increase in missile protection was just an added asset, but the melee protection had to be the reason.) In the second century we read of Peltasts carrying shields shaped like doors. Later these peltasts now being supported by armored peltasts (Thorokites). This is a continued use of combined arms doctrine pioneered by the two Athenians. These types of troops became so popular during the late 300s and wars of the Successors that word mercenary and peltast became of the same meaning.

Rules

Early Peltasts

These are better than psiloi in the fact they are shielded. So they were bolder. They should be allowed javelin throws with no subtraction for timidity. They may melee heavy infantry or horse in unfavorable terrain. They were easily routed, so any contact by formed heavy infantry or any horse in level terrain should cause the peltasts to be routed. If they are forced to evade, they must pass a morale test to stay on the field.

Later Peltasts

In the later period they were better at operating against formed heavy infantry. Allow them to reform after evading with no morale test. If the troops were operating in unfavorable terrain for heavy armed allow them to melee. They were still easily routed, so any contact by formed heavy infantry or any horse in level terrain should cause the peltasts to be routed.

Successor Period

In this period they were at their best operating against formed heavy infantry. Allow them to melee disordered heavy infantry. Allow them to reform after evading. If the troops were operating in unfavorable terrain for heavy armed allow them to melee. They were not easily routed, so any contact by formed heavy infantry or any horse in level terrain no longer should cause the peltasts to be routed. However both enemies should have a bonus in melee against them and if the horse wins the peltasts should be broken.