This piece is not going to add any thing new to the work already done, by Barker, Head, Pichard, and Bickermann. What I wish to do is explore the relationship between the military men, their leaders and their government.

A Nation of Diplomats

Like other mercantile empires Carthaginian political policy was set to enable her merchant class to acquire wealth. We know this since all recorded agreements with other nations had to do with commercial relations. For those who argue the conquest of Spain and of West Africa was out of this pattern one answers that they were the direct result of an war that had removed revenue from the nation. Carthage was simply following her tenets, to acquire wealth by seeking untouched elements from which to gain revenue.

As Semitics from Tyre their diplomacy goes right back to the origins of the that city. For years, the kings of Tyre survived wars between the Hittites and the Egyptians, beat off Assyria, before finally becoming an ally of the Persians. Alexander III finally sacked the place, but only after a great physical effort. Tyre's fall only increased the New City's importance.

Carthaginians' diplomacy was based on the relationship of one State to another. If Carthage felt one was an equal, one was treated that way. Carthage also depended on allies; Sicilian Greeks polis who disliked Syrakuse, barbarian levies from Spain, and Africa. Carthage, like Tyre, had founded cities and these were daughter States, although they were still expected to supply troops to aid the mother city.

As an example of superb Phoenician diplomacy they formed the great Alliance with Persia and the Etruscans against the Greeks. That they lost was not the fault of theirs, but is laid at the door of the army which was unprepared for the struggle. Ambassadors won the assistance of the Gauls during the first Punic War. They encouraged the attack against Rome, in 222 B.C.E., and may have supported it with money. During the second Punic War they again gained the support of the Gauls, Ligurians, and the Caupans which was a major coup. Clever bargaining won the sympathy of Phillip V of Macedonia for Hannibal, and Syrakuse, a lifelong enemy joined Carthage in 215 B.C.E.

Diodoros XX 40. relates a anecdote about how charming Carthaginian ambassadors could be. It seems that during Agathokles Tyrant of Syrakuse's invasion of Africa (310 B.C.E.) he needed more troops. He sent a trusted lieutenant, one Ophelas, to Greece to recruit an army of mercenaries, in particular from Attica. Ophelias had a good relationship with Athens since he got know the city fairly well. In his youth he had married an a girl of noble birth who was descended from the victor of Marathon, the great Miltiades.

Word of this filtered back to the Carthaginians and they sent to Athens two ambassadors, Synalos and Bodmelkart, to convince Athens not to support Ophelias. In a series of flowery speeches before the Assembly, they attempted sway Athens into expelling Ophelias. The Athenian statesmen were so impressed with the quality of the rhetoric, that in their honor, the Assembly passed a decree doing that, but since the recruitment was almost done, it was too late. Still to get democratic Greeks to support a middle east oligarchy is nothing short of amazing and reflects greatly on the skills of the two Carthaginians.

The Carthaginians went to war only after all channels of diplomacy was exhausted. Carthage in fact disliked war. Its main war god, Hadad, is minor deity, secondary in importance, for this reason. War could have results that were all bad for the State, and if history is any example, usually did.

The Inconsequential General

Whenever a Government military force uses mercenaries there is a good chance the mercenary leader will take over using his men to support and back his claim. The Carthaginian government avoided such chances by concentrating the command in the hands of its aristocracy, feeling that they had a stake in maintaining the status quo. The minor captains were selected from the mercenaries themselves. Good results would take place if the officers had sufficient authority and prestige. Yet this rarely happened. The Carthaginian ruling council, the Sophet or Hundred Magistrates, seemed to make it their special task to strip their officers of both if they were perceived to amassing too much power. Especially during the First Punic War, deliberately baited traps were set to catch ambitious officers.

The harshness of the Carthaginian government towards its generals was well-known. Roman historians considered it to be the one big cause of the deterioration of their opponents. Roman leaders could have more chances to learn the art of war. Carthaginian Generals were under the most rigid rules of what we called today "engagement." Since the generalship was a political office the council could "fire" a general by the most hideous means, usually death by impaling or crucifixion. This encouraged Generals to fall on the field or come up with the most ingenious excuses if they lost.

Admiral Hanno, Livius tell us, considered himself fortunate to get off with only a fine of 6,000 gold pieces, after being twice defeated by the Roman navy. (Bet he hated corvuses! sfp) At the commencement of the war, Hanno, of the garrison of Messina, was crucified for allowing himself to be surprised by the Romans and taken. Still another fellow officer, Hannibal, who was favored by the council managed to keep his command after being beaten by C. Duilius, in the first naval clash, but defeat later that year near Sardinia caused his captains to take it upon themselves to crucify him. In 253 B.C.E. after he had been defeated, the council had Hasdrubal, who had commanded with Xanthippios when they beat M. Atilius Regulus, crucified because he failed to recapture Panormous with the Xanthippian army, and in 241 B.C.E., that lucky admiral Hanno, because he had been defeated in the Aegates Islands ending the war, his luck ran out.

It would appear, the fate of an unsuccessful commander depended much on politics. While much of internal politics in Carthage is clouded it seems that Generals were sometimes chosen outside the ranks of the ruling council. This may explain why even after fall of the Magonid dynasty, members were given important commands. If they failed they were already in disgrace and easily removed.

The Hellenistic Strategos

By the Second Punic War, Carthage was changing. This may have been a direct result from the Mercenaries War which gave the government their greatest crisis in history, allowing the Barcas their start in political life, or the growing realization that Rome was not going to go away or become benevolent like the Greeks. At any rate the Barcas, father Hamilcar, and his four sons Hannibal, Hasdrubal, Hanno, and Mago (the lion's brood) did much to calm the fears of military domination and sent Carthage on a military quest to equal their enemies.

Much of this may have been because the Carthaginians were becoming Romanized, but it worth noting there never were any serious conflicts between the Barcid clan and the government. This started after Hamilcar was assigned the subjugation of Spain and continued to the end of Carthaginian military power at Zama (202 B.C.E.). And this seems to be a directly in line in what was happening in the successors states 1000 of miles to the east.

Leadership was no longer was a divine right. Alexander III's successors proved that. It instead was drawn from Fortuna or Tyche, the Latin and Greek spirits of fortune and luck. The real source of their power was in the serried ranks of the Phalanx and the strong hands that wielded the mounted Xystons. In order to have this luck one must have the confidence of the troops, while they in turn trusted their leaders to give them victories. Alexander had promised his illiterate Macedonian farmers the treasures of Persia if they followed him, and by the Gods he had delivered! The test of battle made him the legitimate ruler of the Persian Empire. The conquering leader had assumed the royal diadem as his trophy.

Alexander's successors copied him. If one won, the crown of Thrace, Asia Minor, Egypt, Persia, or Bactria was his. If chance abandoned him and he lost in battle subsequently, he lost his crown as well. The Macedonian power struggle was nothing more than a large family tussle, until Rome put an end to it. If a family had fashioned impressions that it was in some way predestined to victory, like the Ptolemies, dynasties were formed, but the leaders still had to show they were worthy by success in battle. (This explains why Antigonios one eye, and Lysimakchos took the field in their advanced ages. They knew once beaten they could never reclaim their soldiers' devotion.)

If we now look at the Barcas, they were overlords of Spain from 237 to 210 B.C.E. They gained this right by conquest with a mandate from the State. First they broke up hostile tribes by defeating them in battle then enrolling them to support their army. The role of the Carthaginian Assembly was limited to ratifying what treaties the commanders enacted with their Spanish soldiers. Hamilcar's prestige grew and his achievements gave his family increased status. They continued to represent the State of Carthage, however they were becoming self-sufficient. Even after his death, (228) his son-in-law Hasdrubal decided to found a new capital in Spain and to give it the name of Carthage (today called Cartagena).

Carthage did nothing. If anything they encouraged the enterprise. Enemies in the council were quieted by a prophecy. As quoted by Diodoros, starting in the sixth century, Carthage conceived of the prospect of migrating to the West, the fount of so much of their wealth. It seems that the Carthaginians had always sought to gain what is today Madeira, resettling there if they were driven out of Africa by the Libyans. [Diodoros VI. 22]

Hasdrubal managed to use these prophecies to justify his impertinent undertaking and to quiet any suspicion of corruption. He built a splendid Cartagena and married an Iberian princess which made him heir to the tribe's thrones. Many modern historians believe that Iberian tribes awarded the royal title to him. If this was the case he was in conflict with Carthage.

Polybios says he was already planning to make himself ruler of Africa, and use its resources to conquer. "Now Fabius (Q. Fabius Pictor) says that one of the causes of the war was Hasdrubal's ambitious spirit and love of power. He relates that how after assuming the important command in Spain, he arrived in Africa and with his allies, tried overthrow the constitution and the government converting into a monarchy. However, the other political leaders foresaw the plan, united to oppose him. Hasdrubal, suspecting their intentions, left Africa and from that time governed Spain as he chose paying no attention to the Carthaginian government's wishes." [Polybios Book 111 8.] By becoming autonomous from Carthage, Hasdrubal came into direct conflict with Rome.

The Senate, concerned by the growth of Carthaginian power in Spain, sent a deputation there to discuss facts with Hasdrubal. That the Romans did this is testimony to the fact they were willing to deal directly with an appointed Carthaginian general who now handled sovereign powers that were not just confined to the organization of military operations and the administration of conquered territories, but in the political and economic management of a province as well. This was major change from the old Carthage and they way they did things. It follows then that Hasdrubal had the ability to conduct diplomacy on a local and on the highest level. The agreement was reached; Carthage influence would halt at the southern bank of the Ebro. This was to reassure Massalia that Carthage would not interfere with their tin trade. There was no mention a Greek city of Zakynthos, on the south bank of the Ebro. This was to turn out to be an important omission. We are not sure if the council had a hand in his assassination in 221, but Hannibal (Grace of Baal) as the eldest, assumed the Spanish command.

Hannibal

Chenu Bechala, to use his real name, has always been considered one of three "great captains" of antiquity, some consider him greater then Alexander, because he accomplished so much with such small resources. In a story related by Livius taken from the Greek historian Akilius, while on a diplomatic mission to Ephesus, Hannibal Barca and P. Cornelius Scipio met and talked about old times as old campaigners are want to do.

"Finally Scipio had to ask who was the greatest commander in world.

Hannibal answered: "Alexander the Macedonian, with a small force he routed armies of countless numbers and he traversed the remotest lands. Merely to visit such lands transcended human expectations."

When asked who was placed second, he said, "Pyrrhus of Eprios, he was the first to teach the art of laying out a camp. Besides that no one has shown better judgement in choosing their ground or in disposing his forces. He also had the art of winning men so that the Italian peoples preferred the overlordship of a foreign king to that of the Romans who for so long had been the chief power in that country."

When Scipio followed up by asking whom he ranked third, Hannibal unhesitatingly chose himself. Scipio burst out laughing at this and said, "What would you be saying if you had defeated me?" "In that case" replied Hannibal "I should certainly put myself before Alexander and before Pyrrhus, and in fact before all Generals!" [Livius Book XXXV. 14.2.]

Hannibal may have felt Alexander was his hero, but he had none of the Macedonian's distracting vices. Hannibal seems to have encouraged the international character of his armies as Alexander did; Greeks held important positions; as an example, it was Hippocrates and Epicydes who decided the renewal of the campaigns in Sicily. We have many stories of Hannibal sharing his men's risks, making them his companions. We see the same in Alexander.

When Rome became alarmed at the advance of Carthaginian domination in Spain, on the occasion of the siege of Saguntum (Zakynthos), the Roman envoys, as done before with Hasdrubal, petitioned to Hannibal. He, in turn, changed the protocol and sent the matter to the Carthaginian ruling council. The council in turn passed to Hannibal the responsibility for dealing with the situation. This was because in Carthage, magistrates found themselves being basically out of touch. Carthage had abdicated the control of Spain to Hannibal. In this respect, Hannibal was behaving much less like a Carthaginian commander and more than like a Macedonian Successor, but not just over just a nation, but over a world-wide trading empire. Once this fact is realized Hannibal's ensuing moves make a lot of sense.

This one liberty makes the strategy of Hannibal and his clan truly different. While it could be claimed it was started by financial concerns, it had now become one military intentions. This varied greatly from the policy of the Punic oligarchy, in which war was really only a business venture to be managed by disgraced leaders with no real political power. The oligarchy had always put factors of financial sensibility first. War was to be used only as a last resort.

Hannibal was about to change this. Actually without Hasdrubals' control in Spain, Hannibal could have never accomplished what he was setting out to do. But Spain gave him everything he needed to carry his form of diplomacy to the Roman Senate. Such a move could not have been possible in the First War. There, sea control was the primary concern. In this upcoming contest sea control was not needed. Manpower was. The seeds of Rome's destruction were being forged on the Spanish mainland. All he had to do is deliver it.

Hannibal sought to use this war to bring an entirely new political order to Spain, Gaul, and Italy He planned to destroy the Roman Confederation, and replace it with an Italian one. He planned to ring Rome with enemies, the Gauls in the North, the Oscans in the South and the Macedonians in the East. Carthage would complete the circle by reclaiming Sardinia. Even if there wasn't a lasting peace, Rome would be tied up for years fighting her enemies, allowing more than enough time to reform the navy, and make Carthage mistress of the Mediterranean once again.

He intended to use the massive means and manpower of the barbarians to beat the legiones and set the socii free. In turn he assumed they would follow him like they did Pyrrhus. This was his one serious miscalculation. It no longer was 280 BC. It was 218.

Survey of the Carthaginian Army: Army Reforms and Innovations