From the Editor

Disasters: Data and Pearl Harbor

By Stephen Phenow, Cannes



Greetings,

Like most people here in the US, Sept. 11th 2001, turned my life upside down. I cannot go into details, but I was busy for several months in the aftermath. To top it off, I lost my hard drive in Dec. and with it all my ancient research and translations. (Like an idiot I never backed up data.)

Most of Jan. was involved with data recovery operation which was completed off the old drive, painstakingly transferred to a new drive, where a H.C. was printed, and then corruption corrected and changed, and the amended data placed on the new drive, permanently. This was so hard I must inform all you computer equipped readers that if you do not back up your data periodically, you are asking for trouble. A zip drive retails for 120.00 and is worth the expenditure. This is no joke. I got through it, but I never want to go through that again.

On the this the six month anniversary of 9/11, 1 again see the rhetoric in print and on the air, that this attack was comparable to Pearl Harbor. As a military historian and former news producer/writer I can see why this is attractive, Pearl was a defining event to our grandfathers and fathers, and due to a fluke caused by Murphy's law, the Japanese Empire never declared war on the United States before the attack, causing President Roosevelt to utter his famous "day of infamy speech." Yet this comparison fails under comparative analysis.

First, the Japanese did plan a deceleration of war; it was just that the technology of the time was not up to relaying the message with the pinpoint accuracy the Japanese desired.

By the way, Bay's "Pearl Harbor" never mentions this important fact. But enough of that battle-porn.

When you compare Pearl with the WTC, several facts do line up: Both were delivered by aerial assault and both came as a surprise to the United States. Both facilities believed themselves to be protected from air attack. But that is all. WTC casualties were civilian and international, Pearl's were military and national.

WTC's attack was by a miffed Muslim extremist angered by our insensitivity, Pearl's by the Japanese Empire as part of strategy to seize resources for the growing Empire. This extremist had attacked the WTC before, but the van bomb failed to deliver the effect needed. Consequently the defense forces focused on ground penetration defenses. The Japanese had never attacked the US before, (unless you count sinking an American gunboat in China) and the US defense forces were focused sabotage prevention.

But the rallying cry here is "9/11!" Remember 9/11, much like 'Remember Pearl Harbor,' was cried 60 years ago and 'Remember the Maine' screamed 112 years ago!

So what's my point?

Comparative analysis needs to be applied to war gaming systems. The theory that if "it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, it is a duck" no longer applies.

Case in point is the Greek light armed warrior. This herdsman and poor civilian had been told since birth that they could not defeat the heavy armed warrior (hoplite). Yet their equipment becomes heavier so they eventually can do that very thing as a shield bearer type (peltast). And this was just the Greeks. Chinese warfare manuals of same period of Greek light armed inform us that Chinese light armed are "cannon fodder" and are expected to engage enemy's flanks.

So now we have a typical tournament battle match-up with a Greek hoplite army v.s. a Chinese army of the C'hin period. The Greek commander knowing from personal experience that light armed cannot engage his flanks ignore the Chinese lights flanking him, since the rule applies. Imagine his surprise when his flank is swarmed by the ignorant lights. By the Gods! This is against all the teachings of Xenophon!

Yet tactical gaming systems treat all troop types the same. And this after it has been proven historically incorrect. Yet in name of a-historical match-ups the myth persists. If one is going to get soul of the army one has attentively painted to discernable historical accuracy, should it not be allowed to operate as its historical counterpart?

And if this gives a huge advantage to that army, that is why a-historical match-ups should not be allowed.

For example: In 1988 I put on the battle of Liegnitz 1241 in 25mm, Teutonic knights v.s. the Mongols. The Teutons and their allied players had to develop a battle plan, write orders, and follow a standard war game procedure. The Mongols had to develop a battle plan and write orders for the first turn. But that was all. After the first turn the Mongols were allowed to do pretty much anything they wanted without writing orders, hindered only by movement allowance and morale. This was to represent the superior Mongol tactical precepts.

The refight was a slaughter for the Germans. Some German players objected to the fact they "could not win" in their opinion and left the game. When they did, I removed their commands, ruling that they left the field with their levy. Interestingly, this shamed the remaining commanders into staying, dying hard, determined to take as many Mongols with them. Also interestingly the Mongol players realizing that the Germans were putting up a stiff fight even though the odds were hopeless, engaged in psy-ops against them, trying to get them to give up and leave the game.

It made for a much more engrossing game, rather then the usually boring match up where both troop types were similar operating under the same doctrine. It was a historically correct battle where opposing doctrines were reflected in the battle, as well as the personalities engaged against one another. When the Teutons finally broke and left the field, they had caused so many casualties on the Mongols, that I ruled that they could not invade Poland this year, and had to retreat to refit and rearm.

The Teutons had lost the battle but completed what they wanted, to block the Mongol advance It had not been a game with one result, but a many layered battle that had clear winner and victor just not the ones who they thought they were. And is that not what the recreation of battle is all about? Until next time...


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