Compensating for Smaller Forces

Diminished Technology

by Anthony H. Cordesman

Compensating For Diminished Technology as Well as Smaller Forces

Technology is not, however, a panacea and is experiencing at least as many resource problems as the U.S. force structure. As Tables 1 and 2 show, the United States faces a period of massive force cuts and declining resources. Under the Base Force Concept announced in August 1990, the United States will cut its active division strength by at least 33 percent and its active Air Force fighter wings by 38 percent. The United States will also make major cuts in its military manpower, all aspects of its force structure, its basing and logistic capabilities, and many aspects of readiness and sustainability.

These force cuts will probably be sharply accelerated once ihe Congress finishes debating President Bush's FY 93-97 budget requests. Force cuts, however, are only part of the story. During FY 93-97, deployed technology will be cut much more rapidly than forces. The Bush budget request, issued in January 1992, calls for major cuts in defense investment-research, development, procurement, and spares. It tries to preserve the same force structure and readiness as the FY 92 budget, but cuts $63.8 billion out of the FY 92-97 program, virtually all of it from procurement.

The impact this cut in defense investment will have in reducing the amount of technology deployed in the force structure is hard to estimate, but it is scarcely the beginning of a downward trend. A recent estimate by the Congressional Budget Office shows that defense investment has already dropped from a peak of over $170 billion in FY 85, in constant FY 92 dollars, to below $100 billion.

Table 1. Currently Programmed Cuts in U.S. Forces
TypeFY90FY95Change
Army Divisions**
Active1812-33%
Reserve106*-40%
Total2818-36%
Aircraft***
Total1513-8%
Active1312-8%
Carrier Air Wings
Active1311-16%
Reserve220%
Total1512-14%
Battle Force Ships****545451-18%
Tactical Air Wings*****
Active2415-38%
Reserve1211-8%
Total3626-28%
Strategic Bombers******268180-33%

*Plus two cadre divisions

**The Army deactivated the 9th Motorized and two brigades of the 2nd Armored divisions in FY91. It will deactivate the last brigade of the Second Armored Division, the 3rd Armored Division, and the 8th Infantry Division in FY92. It will deactivate the 26th Infantry Division (Reserve) and 50th Armored Division (Reserve) in FY93.

***One carrier was deactivated in FY90, two will be in FY92, and one in FY93, and one will be converted to a training carrier.

****Three battleships and one SSBN were deactivated in FY91; one battleship and four SSBNs will be in FY1992. Six SSBNs will be deactivated in FY93.

*****Five Tactical fighter wings will be deactivated in FY92 and two more will be deactivated in FY93.

******24 FB-111s converted from strategic to tactical missions in 1991. 70 B-52s retire by 1993. 12 13-2s delivered between 1993 and 1995.

Table 2. Changes in Active Military Manpower
TypeFY91FY951997
NumberChangeNumberChange
Army702,000536,000-24%536,000-24%
Navy571,000509,000-11%501,200-13%
Marine Corps194,000170,300-18%158,800-19%
Air Force510,000428,900-15%430,300-15%
Total1,976,0001,644,200-17%1,626,300-18%

Table 2. Changes in Reserve Manpower
TypeFY91FY951997
NumberChangeNumberChange
Army
National Guard457,300338,000-30%338,000-30%
Army Reserve318,700229,400-29%229,4000%
Sub-Total776,000567,400-29%567,400-29%
Navy153,400118,300-23%117,800-23%
Marine Corp43,90034,900-21%34,900-21%
Air Force
National Guard117,035118,800+1%118,200+1%
Air Force Reserve85,59182,600-4%81,800-4%
Sub-Total203,000201,400-1%200,000-1%
Total1,175,926921,800-23%920,100-23%

It was, planned to drop to around $100 billion by FY97, under the Bush Administration budget request for FY 92. It could well drop to $70-$80 billion under the plans now being advocated in the U.S. Congress. [1]

Military capabilities, however, are not measured by investment in RDT&E, but rather by investment in procurement--the equipment and munitions actually deployed with U.S. forces. The Bush Administration has recently put a heavy emphasis on developing systems only to the point where they are production ready, but not funding procurement pending some major change in the threat. As a result, procurement will drop drastically even if the Congress fully funds the Bush FY 93 budget request. While research and development will increase during 1990-93, from $36.5 billion to $38.8 billion in current dollars, procurement will drop from $81.4 billion to $54.4 billion. The supporting text of the Bush request indicates these trends will continue at least through FY 95, which would bring procurement down to half of its FY 90 level in current dollars. Its value in constant dollars would be roughly one-third of the FY 90 level. [2]

Even $35-$45 billion for procurement in constant dollars is still a considerable sum, and total defense investment will still approach the level of defense investment in constant dollars that the United States made in 1980, at the start of the Reagan buildup. These cuts do, however, mean a cumulative cut in defense investment of $105-$198 billion during FY 93-97, when compared with the level spent in FY 92. [3]

Another way of looking at the issue is program terminations. During FY 91 and FY 92, the United States terminated over 100 weapons programs, including major tactical programs like the Apache helicopter, M-1 tank, F-14D, F-15, F-15E, F-16, A-12, and ATA aircraft. As of the FY 93 budget, it will terminate Army programs like the ADATS air defense system, and TOW sight improvement program. It will develop programs like the Comanche RAH-66, and stretch out the Block III tank and LOSAT (line of sight antitank) missile beyond the 1990s. It will terminate Air Force programs like the HARM and AAAM missiles; and Navy programs like the LMAP H landing craft, SQY-1 ASW combat system, vertical launch ASROC. E-2C, and LSD-41 amphibious ship, and probably develop the A-X only to the productibility stage. [4]

These cuts in investment and procurement spending, and termination plans, also understate many aspects of the problem the United States faces. U.S. force and procurement plans do not exist in a vacuum. They take years to shape and have massive momentum in terms of major procurement programs. The current programs for defense technology have often been shaped by decisions made under the Reagan Administration. The last Reagan budget in FY 89, called for an average real increase in defense spending of 1.2 percent per year through FY 94, and would have produced a defense budget of over $330 billion in FY 94. The Bush budgets submitted for FY 91 called for average cuts in real defense spending of 2 percent per year, and total defense spending of about $280 billion in FY 94. The Bush budget submitted for FY 92 came after an 11.9 percent real cut in defense spending during FY 91, and called for average cuts of 3 percent per year. It would produce an FY 94 budget of about $260 billion. [5]

The United States conducted OPERATION DESERT STORM under conditions where it was able to draw down on nearly 40 years of investment in the capability to fight a very different war, and still had the equipment and stocks purchased under the Reagan defense buildup. It is now, however, operating in a climate where it has expended much of its "capital" in DESERT STORM, has already experienced 7 straight years of cuts in real defense spending, and has a procurement program where most large scale procurement programs were shaped at a time when real defense investment was expected to be near 50-100 percent larger than it is likely to be under the coming FYDP.

More than forces are being downsized. In fact, it is questionable whether the levels of investment currently being projected can actually be achieved. They depend, among other things, on the United States having no major combat operations during the next 5 years or a one-for-one increase in its defense budget for all changes to the program. They also depend on Congress smoothly executing major cuts in manpower and the reserves, although Congress refused to do this in shaping the FY92 defense budget. These problems could easily cut defense investment by another $20-$30 billion over the next 5 years.

More arguably, the competition among programs, branches, and services for diminished resources has also mortgaged defense technology and procurement by institutionalizing a "liar's contest" syndrome into many programs. Survival in an era of defense cuts often depends on exaggerating performance, sharply underestimating costs, promising early delivery, and minimizing technical risk and growth. No one can adequately factor the "liar's contest" problem into a quantitative estimate of the additional problems in using defense technology to offset force reductions, but every aircraft program currently in development, or canceled during the last 3 years, has already illustrated the seriousness of the situation.

These difficulties have been further compounded by the tendency to fight for individual weapons or procurement programs, or branch or service R&D and procurement efforts, in isolation from any assessment of how overall resource problems affect overall requirements. The tendency to defend "my toy," "my magic bullet," and "my shopping list" is a natural one, and necessary if programs are to have strong managers and advocates. It often, however, makes funding and program survival a matter of chance, rather than necessity.

Compesating for Smaller Forces Continued

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