1990–91: War on Sand Table and Sand

To a degree, the Gulf War was a fight between Soviet and US wargaming methods. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait followed the pattern of Soviet wargamed operations — a fast start that petered out at the Saudi border. Just prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, CENTCOM played another wargame called Internal Look. In this exercise, only a token US force was sent “to show resolve.”

Iraqi forces drove south, and the United States had trouble getting sufficient forces in-theater to slow the Iraqi advance. On the morning of the Iraqi attack, Mark Herman, the designer of the commercial wargame Gulf Strike and employee of the defense contractor Booz Allen, was approached by the Joint Staff and asked to produce a wargame of the developing situation. He was on contract by lunch. By modifying his commercial wargame Gulf Strike, he was able to begin play of a now classified wargame by midafternoon!

During August, a joint planning cell led by Colonel John Warden and built in the Air Staff’s Checkmate office, produced the Instant Thunder theater air campaign plan. The plan was sent to the Air Force Wargaming Center. The resulting wargame produced no effect, as the software — being designed to model cold war attrition campaigns — did not adjudicate the impact of hitting strategic targets. As time for the coalition counterattack approached, an element of the US government pushed for CENTCOM to occupy western Iraq with the 101st Air Assault Division. It was believed that this would prevent mobile Scuds from getting close enough to launch against Israel. CENTCOM quietly wargamed such an operation and passed on the estimated casualty figures. The suggestion did not come up again.

Many others were wargaming the Gulf War. Although outcomes varied somewhat, most official wargames indicated that coalition casualties would total about 30,000, of which six thousand would be American fatalities. Senator Sam Nunn (D–Ga) decided to oppose the counteroffensive. It was his political judgment that the American people would not accept such high casualties. As the time to attack grew closer, individual units started to wargame their own parts of the plan. At least one Army unit used a commercial wargame. A soldier wrote the publisher stating that a sandstorm had blown their game away and asking that a replacement wargame be sent quickly. The superb training received during live wargames like those conducted at Red Flag and the NTC contributed much to our success. Pilots based in Turkey referred to Northern Iraq as “The Range,” and a number of soldiers were taped saying, “The NTC [training] was much harder.”

However, computer wargames misled commanders. After high casualties were adjudicated in these games, C-130 transport aircraft were configured for medical airlift, not to fly in the fuel that was actually needed. The wargames indicated that the Iraqis would fight to the last man, hence there was little preparation for prisoners of war. As coalition forces moved forward, they uncovered evidence of Iraqi wargaming. From the terrain modeled, it was clear the Iraqis were rehearsing to repel an amphibious invasion.

Though we achieved one of the most overwhelming military victories in history, we did not achieve a proportionately positive state of peace. Why not? It appears the United States never wargamed through to peace. The Marines had planned to conduct such a war game, but military victory came too quickly. Even if it had been conducted, it is doubtful that our attrition models would have anticipated the revolts against Saddam Hussein.

The impact of wargaming on the Gulf War was enormous and mostly positive. Yet casualty predictions were over 20 times too high. These predictions had real political and military consequences. Did this produce yet another eclipse of wargaming? No.

1990s: The Return of Achilles

More money was spent on wargaming in the 1990s than all previous decades. Much of this increased investment is producing excellent value for the cost. Yet, the central problems that caused the bad predictions were pronounced impossible to fix or ignored. A RAND paper, The Base of Sand, captured the problem well. What was needed was a more comprehensive adjudication of armed conflicts. More computing power without a more comprehensive understanding of war would simply produce the wrong answer faster and with more persuasive graphics.

In 1990, the deputy secretary of defense created the Executive Council on Modeling and Simulation (EXCIMS) to take a comprehensive look at wargaming. They saw a maze of adjudication software, most looking at one regime, using different data, and producing different answers to the same questions. Ground and naval surface forces had clearly played an important role during the final days of the Desert Storm campaign, yet no wargame could fully depict such a joint operation.

As a first step to bring order to this chaos, a permanent DOD-level office was established. In 1991, the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO) was established. Next they established an information clearinghouse so that work was not duplicated out of ignorance. Established in 1993, in 1999 it became the Modeling and Simulation Information Analysis Center (MSIAC). As an interim measure, software was developed to allow existing service wargames to talk to each other. Finally, they funded programs to replace many one-service adjudication engines with a few joint ones. The Joint Warfare System (JWARS) was to replace most analytical models, while the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS), using modules developed by each service, was to replace all the models used to train CINC staffs. Increased competition for limited defense dollars and the success of GLOBAL as an analytical and lobbying tool have led all the services to conduct Global-like war games. Collectively called Title Ten war games, the Air Force’s “Global Engagement” and the Army’s “Army after Next” are now held annually.

The 1990s were full of surprises for commercial wargaming. Sales of printed war games continued to decline, falling to 200,000 units a year. The industry then stabilized desktop publishing, allowing lower sales per title to still be profitable. In contrast, the recreational software industry has exploded ($25 billion in worldwide sales in 1997). However, wargaming’s share of those sales has fallen from 25% when personal computers began to about 10% today. (Still, 10% of $25 billion...) Most surprisingly, war gaming with miniatures made a comeback, its proponents saying their painted figures are the ultimate “high-resolution graphics.” Commercial wargaming has also become global, with many US titles selling well overseas and several foreign titles selling well in the United States.

As the 1990s ended, there were some indications that defense wargaming may have reached the millennium early. In October 1999, a well-attended NATO conference on modeling, simulation, and wargaming demonstrated that wargaming had indeed become international again. Earlier in the year a major test of JSIMS by the US Atlantic Command demonstrated that this important $150-million system was approaching operational usefulness. Finally, as a fitting conclusion to a century of achievement, on 28 September 1999, the Naval War College dedicated its new $19-million wargaming facility. Most appropriately, this latest attempt by the Navy to “push the envelope” is named for the selfless individual who started it all — McCarty Little Hall.

Yet, despite a decade of heavy investment and significant innovation, all is not well with defense wargaming. In the spring of 1999, defense wargaming received the acid test when America again sent its people into harm’s way, this time in the skies over Kosovo. How well did wargaming do? Again, wargames failed to provide insights to the types of human effects and system impacts that were the main focus of NATO’s air campaign.

How can these deficiencies be resolved? The history of wargaming provides proof of the importance and persistence of the problem and some clues to the solution. Describing a possible solution will require an article of its own.

Caffrey holds a BS, New Jersey Institute of Technology and a M.A., University of Alabama. He is a professor of wargaming and campaign planning at Air Command and Staff College and a lieutenant colonel in the Air Force Reserve, serving with the Air Staff’s Checkmate organization. He is the coauthor of The Gulf War Fact Book and a frequent speaker at conferences related to wargaming.

Col. Caffrey’s article originally contained well over 100 footnotes. Limited space meant that I couldn’t publish them here. If you want to see the unexpurgated article, arrangements can be made. -ed

Toward a History-Based Doctrine for Wargaming

Introduction
1811-1904: Wargaming Beginnings
1905–18: Wargaming and the Great War
1919–38: Interwar Wargaming: The Visionary and the Blind
1939-1945: World War II
1946-1980s: Decline and Revitalization
1990s: Gulf War and More