USS Salmon (SS 182)

The Silent Service
US Navy Submarine Service

by Chris Wills


USS Salmon [KTB 157]

7-24

In the pump room, damage was quite serious. Auxiliary power forward was lost temporarily when the breaker aft in the maneuvering spaces tripped open. The breaker was quickly reset, however. Water draining from the conning tower and the hull ventilation drain flooded the bilges to a waist-high depth at the after end (20 degrees up angle). The following pump room electrical equipment was flooded out:

  • Nos. 1 and 2 high pressure air compressor motors;
  • SD Radar mast hoist motor;
  • Two circulating water pump motors for air conditioning;
  • The periscope lower limit switches.

The overload relays on Nos. 1 and 2 low pressure blowers tripped and Nos. 2 and 3 I.C. motor generator regulators short-circuited. The stems of sea valves in the circulating water lines to the air conditioning and high pressure air compressors were bent between the bonnets and the valve discs. Various hydraulic system piping and fitting leaks throughout the boat made it necessary to secure the main hydraulic plant until the sources of leakage could be isolated or repaired. The hydraulic plant itself was undamaged. Apparently no misalignment of any auxiliary equipment due to shock occurred in the pump room. The trim and drain pumps continued to run although in some compartments bilge suction strainers became clogged with cork.

7-25

In the forward torpedo room, the bow plane rigging motor panel was deranged and upon surfacing the planes had to be rigged in by hand. The QC sound gear shaft was forced up despite the holding pins, and its hydraulic supply line was torn loose. The pitometer log was found to operate erratically. The diving alarm short circuited. The officer’s watercloset discharge line ruptured inboard of the hull valve.

7-26

No damage occurred in the forward battery compartment with the possible exception of one battery cell. This cell may have been cracked, for reference (A) reports that it had a high ground reading and that the electrolyte level was not visible. No subsequent information on the cell is available.

7-27

In the after battery compartment damage was comparatively minor. In the crew’s mess room both the ship’s supply ventilation hull flapper valve and the No. 2 sanitary tank overboard vent valve leaked heavily. Sea water flooded out the electric ranges in the galley. The battery cells and strongbacks in this compartment were unaffected and the well was dry. Several light bulbs and one mirror were broken and an oxygen bottle was torn loose from its overhead stowage position.

7-28

In the forward engine room, the No. 1 main engine completely flooded through the exhaust piping system. The depth charging caused the outboard exhaust valve to leak and jarred the inboard exhaust valve (gate) partially open. The No. 4 liner of this engine was also fractured. The No. 1 engine air starting line ruptured, causing serious air leakage. The No. 2 main engine also partially flooded through the exhaust system but was otherwise undamaged. The main engine circulating water sea suction and discharge valve bonnets leaked profusely around stems and flange gaskets at deep depths. As previously mentioned, serious leakage occurred at the fuel ballast tank riser inboard vent lines, the vent valves having been torn loose from the hull. Water flooded the bilges and at 20 degrees up angle reached a height of 18 inches on the No. 2 generator. This generator was flooded with a mixture of oil and water but ran well after it was pumped out and wiped down. The forward engine air induction hull flapper valve and the inboard exhaust valve (GATE) for No. 2 main engine jammed closed, the latter due to hull distortion forcing the valve stem brace out of line. Coil leaks developed in both of the Kleinschmidt electric vapor compressor stills and only salted distillate could be produced. The 1MC speaker, diving alarm, fresh water expansion tank, 200 pound service air compressor motor and the fuel and lubricating oil purifiers were dismounted by shock. Several water and hydraulic pipe lines were ruptured or jarred loose at connections. Various non-shock mounted pressure and temperature gauges were broken or put out of calibration. Bilge suctions clogged with cork & debris.

7-29

In the after engine room, although hull deformation was severe, damage to interior equipment was relatively minor. As stated in paragraph 7-9, the hull plating was dished in sufficiently to cause the stern plane hand tilting shaft to bind with the stern planes in ‘HARD DIVE’ position. No. 1 lighting motor generator voltage regulator control was deranged, putting the ship temporarily in darkness. The emergency lighting leads in both engine rooms parted and fixtures were wrecked. Main engines Nos. 3 and 4 (propeller engines) were undamaged although they partially flooded through the exhaust system. Several main engine lube oil lines parted or ruptured. All four main motor plants were undamaged with the exception of the bearing oil supply line nipples to No. 3 main motor which cracked in the housing and a ruptured circulating water supply line to the No. 3 main motor air cooler. The main control cubicle frame & covers were distorted when the hull dished in the overhead and one main motor contactor flash chute was dismounted. However, the entire submerged propulsion plant remained fully operable during and after the depth charging and was a major factor in the survival of the ship since depth control, erratic as it was, was aided by use of fast speeds ahead while submerged. That propulsion power was not lost was due in large measure to the main motor and battery contactor positive locks installed per Shipsalt SS 137 which prevented tripping by overload and shock. Sea water leaked profusely through the fuel ballast tank riser inboard vent lines, as in the forward engine room. The bilges flooded and could not be pumped since cork insulation had clogged drain line suctions. The water level reached the lower casings of the main motors and this was a principal factor in the decision to surface.

7-30

In the after torpedo room, the ‘TEE’ connection in the No. 3 ballast tank vent riser was forced in by the distortion to the pressure hull over head but remained tight. The stern plane tilting drive shaft coupling was shattered and the drive worm gear housing was dismantled. The capstan motor controller panel contactors jarred open and had to be reset by hand. The oil supply line to the steering hydraulic manifold was torn loose, making it necessary to shift to hand power and later to emergency power from the main hydraulic plant. No. 6 torpedo tube shutter moved to the open position. The residual drain piping hull flange for MBT No. 3 was partially sprung with minor leakage resulting.

7-31

When SALMON battle-surfaced at 2030, after seventeen hectic minutes of attempting to remain submerged under conditions which rendered depth control impossible, her situation was still very dangerous. Decks were awash and the boat had a fifteen degree list to starboard. Most of the available high pressure air had been expended due to numerous internal leaks and the large amount of air required to start the boat up from the extreme depth of 578 feet while simultaneously losing much of it through damaged ballast tank risers and leaking vent valves. Air was limited to 1200 pounds in one bank only and no replenishment could be made since both high pressure compressor motors had flooded. Lack of air plus the depleted condition of the storage battery made any further diving for evasive purposed impossible. The low pressure blowers could not be started immediately since the low pressure volume tank had flooded with sea water and the blower motor panel contactors had tripped open and had to be reset. Consequently, no air was available with which to blow tanks in order to correct list and increase freeboard. This in turn rendered gun operations difficult. The feeling of SALMON’s officers and men after the decision was made to surface can be well imagined when it is remembered that there was no information at that time as to the whereabouts of the Japanese anti-submarine vessels and that there was no way of knowing whether the surface diesel engine propulsion plant and the deck guns were in working order, both of which would probably be required in order to make good their escape.

7-32

SALMON found herself up moon from all four escorts, the nearest being about 7,000 yards distant. None of the escorts at this time apparently detected SALMON for they gave no immediate indications of having discovered her presence and were still dropping occasional depth charges near the scene of the original attack. A large oil slick having been left by the loss of oil from FBT No. 7. This delay was invaluable for it enabled SALMON to take damage control measures, man guns, correct list, increase freeboard, obtain partial operation of the surface propulsion plant and repair vital auxiliary machinery before the first escort closed in for an attack.

7-33

At 2032, two minutes after surfacing, the No. 3 main engine and the battery were put on composite drive propulsion. Under this arrangement on SALMON, power could be transmitted to the propeller shafts by direct drive from Nos. 3 or 4 engines through reduction gears and also concurrently by electric motor drive through the same reduction gears by taking current from either the battery or the Nos. 1 and 2 main engine driven generators. By 2050 both Nos. 3 and 4 main engines were on propulsion. Inboard exhaust valves (gates) which had jammed in the closed position were opened by aide of chain falls. By 2100 the low pressure volume tank was dewatered, motor panel contactors reset and the blowers were started. All ballast tanks were immediately blown, removing the list and increasing freeboard. The master vent valves were found to leak badly and therefore the emergency vent valves were slowly closed while air was still being forced into the tanks. The flood gates were then closed.

EDITOR NOTE - Can you imagine the frantic work to keep SALMON afloat and restore her seaworthiness in such a short time, while the Japanese escorts were within striking distance?

7-34

Up until 2100, none of the enemy escorts had made any effort to close. At that time however, the closest escort apparently detected SALMON for the first time. He illuminated SALMON by searchlight from about 5,000 yards and fired a few wild salvoes in her general direction with a deck gun believed to have been three-inch or larger, and several rapid fire guns, believed to have been about 37mm, mounted amidships and forward. The escort at this time however, made no determined effort to shorten the range.

7-35

By 2115, forty-five minutes after surfacing, the No. 2 main engine was started and put on propulsion, reducing the load on the battery to auxiliary purposes only. This made a total of three engines on the line. When an attempt was made to start the completely flooded No. 1 main engine, the drive shaft of the scavenger blower for the engine fractured. Shipboard repairs could not be made and this engine remained out of commission until the ship returned to the west coast of the United States. The best possible speed with three engines was 16 knots. These three propulsion units performed satisfactorily and no reduction gear noise or misalignment of the propeller shafting was noticeable.

Power steering was now in commission and the stern diving planes had been worked back to zero angle. The auxiliary gyrocompass was again in operation. Bilges had been pumped dry. Since the radio, VHF and APR antennae had been knocked off, an emergency wing antenna was rigged for transmitting. The SJ radar had been flooded out by a water spout which rose from the conning tower bilges when the upper conning tower hatch was opened upon surfacing. This was caused by the sudden release of accumulated internal pressure on the boat from numerous air system leaks.

7-36

At 2130, SALMON sent radio notification to TRIGGER and SILVERSIDES of her condition and position. Six U.S. submarines were in the vicinity and several of these opened up with numerous voice radio messages in an attempt to impress the Japanese with the strength of the opposition forces. From about 2115 to about 2400, the first escort, having superior speed, forced SALMON to run in a large circle and fired repeatedly but secured no hits. SALMON conserved ammunition and fired her four-inch deck gun only when hits were fairly well assured. Since the sights had been shattered, the gun was aimed by the first loader coaching the pointer and trainer. At about 2400, with the other three escorts in a line to southward and from 4000 to 8000 yards distant, the first escort became apparently impatient with lack of results so far and made his first determined effort to close the range. He passed SALMON’s port beam at a range of about 2000 yards but the resulting interchange of fire was ineffectual on both sides. As the escort passed abeam, SALMON headed for a rain squall which had formed to southwestward. The enemy then headed to intercept, and SALMON immediately staged a surprise offensive attack. Turning directly toward the patrol craft, SALMON charged in with all available speed and passed at about fifty yards distance on opposite course, raking the escort from end to end with 20mm, 40mm and 50 cal. machine guns and probably killing most of the enemy personnel topside. Damage from enemy light fire was minor. This maneuver knocked all the fight out of the Japanese escort and SALMON once again headed toward the rain squall. The nearest of the three escorts then opened fire and commenced closing but turned away after several small caliber hits and a four-inch near miss had been secured by SALMON at a range of about 2000 yards. At 0045, 31 October, SALMON entered the rain squall and shortly afterwards lost all contact with the enemy escorts.

7-37

SALMON proceeded towards Saipan on three engines, making a speed of about sixteen knots. Her condition at this time was still very dangerous for she was limited to surface operations only, her best speed was less than that of most Japanese anti-submarine escorts, and she was still within easy aircraft bombing distance from the Japanese Home Islands. At 0532, SALMON radioed for assistance from U.S. submarines in the near vicinity and at about midnight on 31 October was joined by TRIGGER, SILVERSIDES and STERLET, about 450 miles southeast of Kyushu. SALMON had been forced to stop in this position in order to repair a serious main engine lube oil leak which developed in a line located in a difficult position to reach. While awaiting rendezvous, several torpedoes were fired at her by a Japanese submarine but all missed and SALMON immediately got underway again. the friendly submarine screen was maintained all the way to Saipan and in addition, starting at dawn on 2 November, continuous daylight air coverage was provided. At 1950 on 3 November, SALMON moored alongside FULTON (AS 11) in Tanapag Harbor, Saipan.

On her return voyage, SALMON received temporary repairs at Saipan and Pearl Harbor and sailed to Hunter’s Point Naval Drydocks. After her inspection by the Board of Inspection and Survey it was decided, that because her damage was so extensive, she would have the minimum repairs required and be used as a school boat. These repairs were never completed by the time the war ended, and SALMON was scrapped as a constructive war loss.

This was a sad ending for a brave warrior. Again we thank CHRIS WILLS (1935-A/LIFE-1991) for compiling this great report. In KTB #159 next month, we will read the war patrols of USS SALMON, and profile another American submarine of the war.

USS Salmon War Patrols [KTB 159]


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