Built by: Electric Boat
Keel laid: 15 April 1936
Launched: 12 June 1937
Sponsor: Miss Hester Laning
Commissioned: 15 March 1938
First Skipper: Lt. Marvin M. Stephens
Decommissioned: 24 September 1945
Final fate: Stricken and sold

USS SALMON made eleven war patrols, but it was on her final patrol where she almost came to an early end. On 30 October 1944 while off Kyushu at about 30º 08’N x 132º 33’E she was depth charged by two or more Japanese escorts while she was running at about 310 feet. She took severe damage and nearly was lost. Here is the minute-by-minute report from the US Navy, thanks to CHRIS WILLS (1935-A/LIFE-1991), US Coast Guard.

USS SALMON (SS-182) was on her eleventh war patrol off the Japanese island of Kyushu. She was operating with USS TRIGGER (SS-237) attacking anything of opportunity that came in their sights. On the evening of 30 October 1944, the two were attempting a coup de grace on a large tanker that the TRIGGER had previously torpedoed and was being screened by four escorts. The SALMON, under command of Lt. Cdr. Harley K. Nauman, pressed in to launch another attack despite badly squealing propeller shafts which further alerted the escorts to his presence. With three of the escorts bearing down on him at full speed, Nauman launched a salvo of four torpedoes, three of which broached and further pinpointed SALMON’s position.

Ringing up standard speed, Nauman turned hard left and started to go deep. SALMON, nominally designed to operate at 250 feet, was passing 310 feet and still going down when the Japanese blasted her with four well placed salvoes of depth charges. SALMON survived the attack and was able to return back to the United States under her own power, but was damaged so severely that she was not worth repairing. The results which follow are abstracted verbatim from war damage Report #58.

A total of about 30 depth charges were dropped, each of the four separate patterns consisting of from six to eight charges. The first and second patterns were received almost simultaneously and one or more of these charges detonated very close aboard over the engine rooms, causing the collapse and flooding of the engine air induction piping and possibly some or all of the pressure hull deformation between the tank tops over the engine rooms. The final two patterns followed a short time later but were not close enough to have serious effects although the boat was shaken up considerably. All of the thirty or so depth charges detonated aft insofar as could be determined on SALMON.

The Commanding Officer reported that several flexural vibrations of the ship as a whole occurred during close detonations, saying that ‘the conning tower vibrated up and down so violently that I thought the ship was going to shake herself apart. I remember bending my knees to ease the shock.’ Damage to the ship was severe and widespread. Unattached hear and many inadequately secured small fixtures were hurled about during close detonations and presented an appreciable missile hazard to personnel in some areas.

The most serious immediate effect of the attack was that depth control was lost. The boat became heavy overall & started to settle rapidly. Several factors contributed to this dangerous situation:

(A) loss of buoyancy due to collapse and flooding of the main engine air induction piping:

(B) added weight due to flooding of three deck access hatch trunks, profuse leakage of sea water into the interior of the hull at various points and the displacement of about 7,000 gallons of fuel oil in FBT No. 7 with heavier sea water through the ruptured vent riser of that tank;

(C) jamming of the stern planes in ‘Hard Dive’ position due to binding of the stern plane hand tilting shafting in the after engine room by a local indentation of the pressure hull and shattering of the stern plane drive shaft coupling in the after torpedo room, and;

(D) the downward flow of water from the overhead depth charge detonations.

Submerged propulsion power was unaffected and was a vital factor in the survival of the boat. Auxiliary power forward was temporarily lost when shock caused the auxiliary power circuit breaker in the after engine room to trip. However, the breaker was reset by hand shortly after it opened and auxiliary power was restored throughout the boat. No. 1 lighting motor generator voltage regulator control was damaged and, since this generator was supplying the standard lighting load, all ship’s service lighting failed and the ship was plunged in darkness. The emergency lighting system was switched on immediately however, and operated satisfactorily although numerous light bulbs throughout the boat were broken. Various IC and auxiliary motor controller panel contactors opened under shock and had to be reset by hand.

7-11

Only one serious air system leak developed, this occurred in the forward engine room at a joint in No. 1 main engine starting line (500 pound). Numerous minor air leaks developed throughout the boat. Power steering control was lost due to disconnection by shock of the supply piping to the steering hydraulic manifold in the after torpedo room. Steering control was not regained until about five minutes later when a shaft was made to hand operation.

7-12

The most serious leakage into the hull was that which occurred in both engine rooms through the fuel ballast tank riser inboard vent lines, the stop valves having torn from their holding studs. The sea water streams resulting at these points were small in cross section but fast, and rapidly filled the bilges. The drain line suction strainers in the engine rooms were clogged with debris rendering it impossible to pump the water flooding into those compartments. The water level eventually neared the main motors and was one of several reasons which soon forced SALMON to surface. Serious leakage also occurred in the conning tower as described in paragraphs 7-23 and 7-25.

7-13

When it was first noticed that SALMON was increasing depth rapidly, emergency speed ahead was rung up, a 20 degree up angle was set on the boat with the bow planes and the auxiliary tanks were pumped. These measures served to check the descent at about 400 feet. The boat then rose to about 300 feet but when an attempt was made to level off and reduce speed to standard, SALMON again settled rapidly. Emergency speed ahead and a 20 degree up angle on the boat were once again resorted to and in addition the safety tank was blown, but this time the descent was not halted until a depth of about 500 feet had been reached. Once more the boat started to rise and reached 150 feet depth but started to drop again when another attempt was made to level off. This time SALMON went quite quickly to about 500 feet depth, in spite of again using emergency speed ahead and a 20 degree up angle, and then gradually settled to a reported 578 feet depth. The situation at this time was as follows: The main batteries were considerably depleted from sustaining high speeds submerged; depth control still had not been restored and was getting more difficult rather than easier; the water level in the engine room was rising and had reached the main motor casing; and pump suction could not be obtained aft to correct trim due to the clogged bilge strainers. As depth was apparently already 578 feet and slowly increasing, the Commanding Officer decided that the only chance of survival for the ship lay in surfacing at once and attempting to fight off the enemy escorts. Therefore, at 2030, seventeen minutes after first being attacked, SALMON started to blow tanks for a battle surface.

7-14

SALMON twice reached depths greater than the maximum indication of her 450 foot depth gauge and on each of these occasions, depth readings were thereafter obtained from a control room sea pressure gauge calibrated in pounds per square inch. This method of determining depth was of course only as reliable as the gauge itself.. No information is available as to whether this particular gauge was later checked for accuracy of calibration. However, it is known that numerous other pressure gauges, meters and instruments were deranged by shock. It should be noted that since the maximum depth apparently reached, 578 feet, was measured at the control room. The approximate 20 degree up angle on the boat at the time still further increased the submergence at the after end of the pressure hull, resulting in a depth of slightly more than 600 feet at the after bulkhead of the after torpedo room. This depth is greater than that at which collapse of the pressure hull would be expected to occur. Although astounding, it cannot be said to be impossible because there is considerable variation in the strength of submarines by reason of variations in the yield strength of the steel used in construction, which varies from heat to heat, and in the thickness of the steel which, by specification tolerances, is not and cannot be required to be exactly the nominal thickness.

7-15

The fact that the stern planes were jammed in full dive position during SALMON’s inadvertent submerged gyrations was a help rather than a hindrance. This was because the boat became heavy overall and heavy aft and the stern planes offered a moderate amount of support tending to hold the stern up. The action of the stern planes on full dive was also beneficial in that it initially permitted some control over the attitude of the boat by use of the bow planes so as to maintain a reasonable up angle in that the hull itself could be utilized as a plane to counteract the effect of being heavy overall. Later, as additional water entered the engine rooms and caused the boat to become progressively heavier aft, the smallest up angle which could be kept on the boat at emergency speed ahead was approximately 20 degrees even though the bow planes were placed in full dive position. It should be noted that had the stern planes been jammed in the rise position, the effect of the planes together with the boat being heavy aft would have resulted in such a large up angle that SALMON would have been forced to surface almost immediately.

7-16

Although structural deformation was extensive, particularly in way of the forward and after engine rooms, in no place were the pressure hull or pressure tanks ruptured or torn and watertight integrity remained intact except for the profuse leakage which occurred at various pressure fittings. From the nature of the deformation of the pressure hull over the engine rooms and the fact that SALMON far exceeded its test depth, particularly aft by reason of the up angle while at great depth, it is believed that there is considerable probability that the pressure hull damage was caused by excessive submergence depth rather than by the depth charge attack.

7-17

The pressure hull plating between tank tops was generally depressed between frames 95 and 170. The indentation lobes in this area were for the most part confined to the pressure hull plating between frames only and were discontinuous with lobes in the adjacent frame spaces. Pressure hull frames within the same area were in some cases slightly tilted or buckled. No frames tore free from the hull plating. The area of heaviest deformation was between frames 130 and 145, with a maximum pressure hull indentation of about two inches between frames 137 and 139. Some distortion also extended a short distance below the tank tops. Forward of frame 95 and aft of frame 170 no structural damage was apparent. The pressure hull plating of the after trim tank was considerably depressed between frames undoubtedly as a direct result of the excessive hydrostatic pressure to which the hull was subjected when SALMON reached a depth of about 620 feet in that area.

7-18

The topside main engine air induction piping leading to the engine rooms completely collapsed and flooded. This collapse action probably occurred in two distinct stages. (A) Initial partial flattening of local areas of the induction piping by depth charge pressure alone and (B) Subsequent complete and longitudinally progressive collapse by direct hydrostatic pressure acting against the weakened unsymmetrical areas caused by (A) Flooding of the induction system alone caused SALMON to be heavy overall by about 13,500 pounds.

7-19

In addition to the collapse of the main induction piping, much other damage was sustained by material located outside or attached to the pressure hull. Wood decking and steel framing of the superstructure deck in the area of pressure hull damage were distorted and broken up, requiring extensive renewals. The master vent valve for MBT No. 1 jammed in the open position and remained so until forced shut by hand from topside after surfacing. The master vent valves for MBT Nos. 2E, 2F, 2G and 2H also jammed open but were closed by use of much leverage on the hand wheels. Due to distortion of structure and displacement of vent riser piping, the master vent valves for safety tank and MBT Nos. 2A, 2C, 2E and 2G could not be completely closed, lacking seating by from one to two inches. The vent risers for FBT No. 7 and MBT Nos. 2C, 2E and 2 G were ruptured. Over 7,000 gallons of fuel oil were lost from FBT No. 7 through the damaged riser and the displacement of this oil by heavier sea water caused an increase in weight aft of about 11,000 pounds. All starboard tank emergency vent valves leaked and operated with difficulty. The low pressure blow lines to FBT Nos. 7 and 9 were ruptured. The line to FBT No. 7 apparently having been pierced by a solid object.

This report reads pretty sterile and unemotional, doesn’t it? But it was written well after the boat was safely out of danger. One can only imagine the emotions, the excitement, the fear and worry in the heart and mind of each man aboard SALMON as this situation was unfolding. Disasters like this occurred aboard unnumbered boats that struggled mightily, but finally succumbed and went down.

7-20

The outboard mushroom valve for the main induction and ship’s ventilation exhaust trunk in the conning tower fairwater as frame 85 was warped slightly, preventing complete seating. No. 1 main engine muffler was dished in considerably and the surrounding decking broken up. All main engine outboard double seal conical type exhaust valves leaked. Safety tank flood valve jammed in the open position and could not be closed. The residual drain piping in MBT No. 2E ruptured inside the tank. The radio antenna trunk system and the four-inch ammunition ready service stowage case, both located in the conning tower fairwater, flooded completely. On the bridge, the target bearing transmitter pressure-proof binoculars cracked, partially flooding, and the transmitter selsyns were deranged. The bridge pressure-proof 7MC speaker forward also flooded. All radio and the APR antennae insulators fractured. The one and one-half inch thick glass in the bridge pressure-proof gyro repeater granulated. The four-inch deck gun sights cracked and flooded, although the gun itself fortunately, remained completely operable. Both periscope head staunching plates fractured and the tubes flooded. No other damage occurred topside.

7-21

Flooding occurred in the deck access trunks to the after battery at frame 90, the forward engine room at frame 125 and after torpedo room at frame 170. All three of these trunks fortunately had been provided with the secondary boiler-type hatches at the lower ends of the trunks as authorized by BuShips Ltr. C-SS/S16-3(515-815) of 28 February 1944. The outer hatches for the after battery and forward engine access trunks were structurally undamaged and remained seated. Leakage was due to gasket damage plus excessive hydrostatic pressure. These two trunks flooded completely but the secondary hatches held and prevented water from entering the pressure hull. The after torpedo room access trunk upper hatch was forced open by the depth charge explosions to about a 30 degree angle and consequently left the trunk wide open to the sea. Here again the secondary hatch at the lower end of the trunk held tight under full sea pressure and without a question saved the boat. To eliminate such a hatch casualty as the above, the installation of emergency securing turnbuckles to prevent the upper hatches from opening momentarily more than about two inches during depth charging was authorized by BuShips dispatch of 1944. The turnbuckles had been installed on all of SALMON’s access hatches but had not been rigged on those which were backed up by secondary hatches.

7-22

In the conning tower, damage due to depth charging caused severe leakage at depths below 200 feet through the stuffing boxes of both periscopes, the steering wheel shaft packing, and around the gasket of the upper hatch. Some leakage is also reported to have occurred through electrical cable stuffing glands at deep depths. The conning tower bilges overflowed, both periscope wells flooded and considerable water drained through the lower hatch to the control and pump rooms. The 1MC announcing system was put out of commission and the station relays were inoperative. The motor controller switch for No. 1 periscope was dismounted and the light switch for the TDC was broken.

7-23

In the control room the damage was relatively minor. The TP-TR panel was dismounted and many indicator bulbs were broken. The main gyrocompass panel short-circuited. The starboard engine order telegraph and telephone ringing circuit junction boxes fractured and short-circuited. About one-half of the pressure gauges were jarred out of calibration. Gauges that were properly shock mounted were reported to have apparently been unharmed. The tank type magnetic compass lost all directivity. Many light bulbs were broken. The fathometer went out of commission due to shock. The 200-pound air valve to the whistle topside and depth gauge sea chest blow valves jarred open. The 220-pound service air distribution manifold leaked at the piping connections.

USS SALMON had taken a terrible pounding and was extremely lucky to have survived. A lot must be said for the skill of her crew to manage the problems and bring the boat home with all her crew alive. They were not all that fortunate. It must also be said that Electric Boat built tough submarines.

The End of the Salmon [KTB 158]