The Future of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Force SSBNs. [KTB 137]

Opponents very often relate the NSNF insufficiencies to the one way and unreliable communications with submarines. This, in their opinion, significantly lowers the possibility of transmitting orders for using strategic weapons.

In our view, such a formulation reflects only the superficiality of the actual situation in controlling the SSBNs and is not an accurate argument in favor of prioritizing the development of land based missiles, even if it is assumed that in critical situations the certainty of carrying out an order to launch land-based missiles is greater than missiles deployed in the ocean.

Regardless of the composition of the system for control over either NSNF or SRF, an absolute guarantee that launch orders are transmitted to all delivery platforms can be achieved only in theory. The actual probability of carrying out this order is always less than one and still depends on several factors:

• How complex the system is
• How well protected the system is from external affects-,
• the specific battle conditions.

One may only raise the reliability of the combat control system by creating a reserve system and using channels which are working on different physical principles that, in the final analysis, lead to increased financial outlays. The question naturally arises - to what degree should the probability of sending orders to strategic weapons platforms be increased?

Obviously, the less vulnerable the platform, the lower will be the demand for reliable communication with them. From this point of view requiring an equally reliable communication system for a landbased silo system and a submarine makes no sense. Providing equal effectiveness requires greater control of a land-based missile silo.

Secondly, within the framework of a systemic approach, stressing the reliability of control is warranted only when it is the weakest link in the chain, associated with the process of making a decision on and carrying out a nuclear attack. For example, if the operational probability for the missile attack warning system (SEWS) is only .5, then difference in reliability of the control system for land-based missiles or .9 or .999 is not important. Under any circumstances the number of missiles fired in a counter attack will differ by not more than 10% due to differences in the control system's reliability. It is logical to suggest that the enemy will consider a retaliatory attack either as unacceptable in both cases or intolerable irrespective of the size of unacceptable losses.

Thirdly, as discussed already, fulfilling the task of deterrence with the existing number of deployed strategic weapons is not at all related to achieving an absolute control of SNF. Even if only a tenth of the strategic potential that Russia intends to have by 2003 survives an enemy preemptive attack and if the reliability of the communications system is only .5, then the enemy risks receiving 150 to 175 nuclear warheads on its territory.

Returning to the reliability of communications from submarines we stress one circumstance. In principle, the system for controlling the NSNF may include two types of tasks. It depends on what role for NSNF is envisaged in the operational plans for using strategic forces. If the operational plan presupposes centralized control over all strategic submarines during a conflict and a continuous exchange of information with the High Command, then the control system must support large flows of information and be highly reliable, efficient and secret during a long period of unfavorable actions on the communications channels. If the task of strategic submarines is simply to survive and be in a constant state of combat readiness during a conflict, then the requirements for the NSNF management system are significantly simplified.

Are efficient and reliable communications with SSBNs, as claimed by opponents of NSNF, necessary for completing the second task? As is known, a strategic submarine, which is on a combat patrol even in peacetime, is instructed to observe radio silence. It may only communicate in an extreme situation or on order from the command center. This type of communications is followed not only by Russian submarines, but also by American, English and French SSBNs.

Is this largely insufficient? Opponents say yes, because the Supreme Command and Russia's General Staff will not know about the actual situation in the NSNF, since in such a situation the location of the submarines will be unknown. A logical counter question arises - can the enemy's commanders monitor the situation? It is hard not to agree with the opinion that in strategic deterrence - the fact that strategic submarines are at sea, not high or low reliability for controlling them, is the decisive factor.

Here it is appropriate to return to the preceding section where we discussed the preemptive destruction of all Russian SSBNs by the enemy in the course of 15 - 20 minutes. Obviously, to carry out this task the potential enemy requires all three types of command and control listed above. The enemy's antisubmarine SSN command and control system must be two-way, efficient, reliable and secretive; most complicated of all, these qualities must be guarantees during the entire conflict right up to carrying out the preemptive attack.

For Russian strategic submarines to fulfill the mission of deterrence it is quite enough to have the second type of operating system. In order to inflict unacceptable losses on the enemy, launch orders needed to be transmitted to only a single strategic submarine and the time frame for doing this will be mild. As noted by N. V. Polyakov:

'A most important thing is that a strategic submarines essentially don't need a warning system. The launch command doesn't have to be sent 10 minutes after detection (of enemy missiles) for that one would have a heart attack. The order can be sent the next day-'

(continued in KTB #139 next month)