The Future of Russia's
Strategic Nuclear Force

SSBNs

by E. V. Miasnikov


(continued firorn KTB #136)

How is it possible to suddenly and completely destroy Russian SSBNs?

Again we propose that the opponents of the NSNF are correct and the enemy is capable of carrying out constant tracking of all Russian strategic submarines. If somehow, in a situation where he sets the goal of carrying out a surprise attack on Russian SSBNs, then in a comparatively short period of time, he must guarantee the destruction of all strategic submarines. Otherwise, as we have discussed earlier, 'the game' doesn't have a point - even one remaining submarine is capable of carrying out an attack on not less than 48 targets.

Questions naturally arise. How reliable and, without betraying the location of its SSBNs, can the enemy's high command know at any specific moment, that all the Russian strategic subs are 'in their sight? All enemy submarines in such a situation will be in constant communication with their command posts. The enemy's two-way communications which take place in the patrol zones of its SSBNs will scarcely go unnoticed by Russian Navy's reconnaissance forces.

It should also be taken into account that there exists several peculiarities of anti-submarine torpedoes, methods and means for defense against them which will reduce their effectiveness below 100%. The torpedoes that are used against Russian submarines have a limited speed which, as a rule, does not exceed 50-60 knots (25-30 meters per second). If the firing distance is sufficiently great (more than 10 kilometers) then the torpedo will reach its target in not less than 5-6 minutes and that is sufficient time for detecting it and taking measures to disorient it. A hydroacoustic decoy which creates noise identical to the noise of the SSBN can be released. A cloud of gaseous bubbles which 'blind' the torpedo's active detection system can be created. And finally, the SSBN can maneuver away from or outrun the torpedo.

Sounds like an updated form of the 'BOLD' and 'PILLENWERFER' that was used in the U-Boats.

The torpedo's range is not more than 40 kilometers if its speed does not exceed 20-25 knots (10-12 1/2 meters per second). Strategic submarines can accelerate to such speeds. At maximum speed a torpedo can go no more than 10 km.

As we already mentioned, it is extremely risky to carry out tracking at a close distance to the SSBN (less than 5- 10 km), particularly because of its inexact localization. But if, for a minute, we allow that the enemy possesses comprehensive information about the environmental conditions during the period of conflict, then that allows him to detennine with sufficient exactness, the target's location which is being registered by the submarine's sonar. (continued next page)

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The explosion of one powerful (not necessarily nuclear) depth charge will be enough to disturb the natural state of the ocean's physical properties within a radius of not less than several tens of kilometers and it deprives the enemy of such an important tactical advantage as knowing the environment.

It will take at least several hours until the environment's physical properties are restored. And what if one disturbs the ocean with a small capacity nuclear charge? The results will be felt for a radius of several hundred kilometers from the epicenter of the explosion over several days. Moreover, after the explosion the background noise will increase to such an extent that it will be impossible to distinguish the noise produced by submarines.

The majority of the enemy's SSNs will 'lose the trail' and the enemy loses all hope of again detecting Russian submarines. Will the Russian armed forces refrain from taking such measures if a real threat to its naval strategic forces anises? Especially as this explosion will not be a threat to any submarines or anyone's territory.

Therefore, it seems unrealistic to neutralize all strategic submarines, even if they are located at sea and they are bemig continuously tracked.

The Future of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Force On Controlling SSBNs. [KTB 138]


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