Kimmel and Short Pearl Harbor Scapegoats [KTB 137]

What really happened to these two officers in the aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and other parts of Hawaii? The US Government might finally correct previous 'errors' in the actions of them and the treatment given them by the military.

It has long been the thinking of many that certain people 'at the top' in the US Government actually knew in advance of the impending Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Whether Roosevelt actually knew of this impending attack in advance, thanks to intelligence reports from the Churchill Government is becoming more and more likely. In fact, there are several works on the market right now that state flatly that Roosevelt did know in advance and deliberately allowed our military establishments to be attacked without warning. Kimmel and Short were definitely made to be the 'fall guys' for that 'date which will live in infamy', to use Roosevelt's own words.

This report was sent by FRANK WEINGART (842-1987) and the opening introduction was by Captain EDWARD L. BEACH (1163- LIFE-1989). The report is written by Under Secretary of Defense Edwin Dorn and it began in KTB #130 if you wish to save the entire piece. We finished the actual Dorn Report on Kimmel and Short in KTB #132; from KTB #133 onward, we've been reading the Staff Report dated 1 December 1995. We continue.

Fifth

Admiral Kimmel and General Short knew that the initial Japanese attack could fall on Pearl Harbor. Although they shared in the conventional wisdom of the era, buttressed by confirmed intelligence reports of Japanese ship movements in the Far East, that the attack would most probably occur in the Far East, the fact that they took vigorous measures to defend against submarine attack and sabotage and conducted drills in repelling invasion testifies to their understanding that the war could come to Pearl Harbor.

Sixth

Admiral Kimmel and General Short knew that an attack on Pearl Harbor could come in the form of an attack from carriers. Shortly after taking command, both Admiral Kimmel and General Short received copies of an assessment by the Secretary of the Navy, in which the Secretary of the Army concurred, that:

"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

The inherent possibility of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the Character mentioned above."

They continue with:

"The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack, (2) Air torpedo attack, (3) Sabotage, (4) Submarine attack, (5) Mining, (6) Bombardment by gunfire

Admiral Kimmel immediately complained to Admiral Stark of the inadequacy of the Army's air defenses at Pearl Harbor, especially interceptor aircraft and antiaircraft guns. Admiral Stark passed these concerns to General Marshall, and General Marshall emphasized to General Short his own concerns about air attack:

"My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us in the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an air attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority."

General Marshall wrote these comments on General Short's first day as Commander of the Army's Hawaiian Department.

Seventh

Admiral Kimmel and General Short knew from their own staffs of the danger of surprise air attack. On March 31, 1941, Admiral Bellinger and General Martin reported to both Admiral Kimmel and General Short that a:

"successful, sudden raid against our ships and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive actions by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period and it appears possible that Orange (Japanese) submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service."

Eighth

Admiral Kimmel and General Short knew from recent events that the idea of a carrier air attack on Pearl Harbor was not new. General Billy Mitchell forecast an assault by carrier launched aircraft on Pearl Harbor after his 1924 Asian tour. The US Navy had fleet exercises and war games involving air strikes on Pearl Harbor in the 1930's. Admiral Kimmel & General Short must have been aware of the enormously successful attack by British carrier based torpedo bombers on the harbor at Taranto in Nov. '40 which destroyed or damaged the Italian Navy's most modem battleships.

HARRY's NOTE - The reader will note that they are using Billy Mitchell's prediction to condemn the actions of Kimmel and Short when in fact, Mitchell was initially condemned and then finally court-martialed for stating many years earlier, that Japan would start the next major war with the United States and that they would initiate this war with an attack on the American forces at Pearl Harbor.

Ninth

Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short made statements prior to December 7 1941 that acknowledged the possibility of an air attack on their forces. Admiral Kimmel, for example, in a letter to Admiral Stark on 18 February 1941, stated:

"I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility.

Similarly, the 14 August 1941 Honolulu ADVERTISER, in an article titled GENERAL SHORT SEES DANGER OF OAHU AIR RAID quoted General Short as saying that:

"an attack upon these (Hawaiian) islands is not impossible and in certain situations it might not be improbable.

Tenth

Admiral Kimmel was briefed on December 2, 1941 that American intelligence had lost track of the Japanese carriers. Despite this mass of evidence, the practical difficulties of conducting an aerial attack may have caused Admiral Kimmel and General Short to minimize its likelihood.

Finally

Admiral Kimmel and General Short knew that the initial attack could occur within weeks or days. Tension had been building between the United States and Japan, and on November 27, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received from the Chief of Naval Operations the following message:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking forward toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Jap(anese) troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. SPENAVO inform British. Continental District Guam Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage.

HARRY's NOTE - SPENAVO is Special Naval Observer.

Admiral Turner, the drafter of this 'war warning' message expected Admiral Kimmel to deploy his forces, that is, to depart the harbor with his fleet. Admiral Kimmel however, did not interpret the phrase execute an appropriate defensive deployment in this way and Admiral Kimmel's interpretation was not unreasonable.

General Short received a similar message on November 27, 1941:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back to offer to continue. Japanese further action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."

Once General Short received the war warning message of 27 November, he was expected to have effected the best possible defense, to include against defending against possible aerial attack.

It has been argued that this 'war warning' language is ambiguous. Yet the actions of all the parties in Pearl Harbor indicate that they took the warning seriously and responded with vigor. Admiral Kimmel issued orders to the fleet to:

"exercise extreme vigilance against submarines in operating areas and to depth bomb all contacts expected to be hostile in the fleet operating areas."

Indeed, the first shots on December 7 were fired not at dawn by Japanese aircraft but well before dawn by Admiral Kimmel's aggressive antisubmarine patrols. Ships in port in Pearl Harbor were required to keep antiaircraft guns at the ready.

After meeting with Admiral Kimmel,Vice Admiral William F. 'Bull' Halsey, then Commander Aircraft Battle Force, placed his carrier task force on a war footing, instituted aircraft patrols with orders to shoot down any plane seen in the air that was not known to be one of our own.

On receiving the Army war warning message, which was ambiguously worded, General Short ordered Alert Number 1 - an alert against sabotage. Thus, the Hawaiian commands on December 7 were ready to meet almost any attack - except one arriving quickly from the air.