What really happened to these two officers in the aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and other parts of Hawaii? The U.S. Government might finally correct previous I errors' in the actions of them and the treatment given to them by the military.

It has long been the thinking of many that certain people 'at the top' in the US Government actually knew in advance of the impending Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Whether Roosevelt actually knew of this impending attack in advance, thanks to intelligence reports from the Churchill Government as is becoming more and more likely. In fact, there are several works on the market now that state flatly that Roosevelt did know in advance and deliberately allowed our military establishments to be attacked without warning.

Kimmel and Short were definitely made to be the 'fall guys' for that 'date which will live in infamy', to use Roosevelt's own words.

This report was sent by FRANK WEINGART (SH 842-1987) and the opening introduction was by Captain EDWARD L. BEACH (SH 1163-LIFE-1989). The report is written by Under Secretary of Defense Edwin Dorn which began in KTB #130 if you wish to save the entire piece. We finished the actual Dorn Report on Kimmel and Short in KTB #132 and since KTB #133 we have been reading the Staff Report dated 1 Dec. 1995. We continue:

The reports of the Navy Court of Inquiry and the Army Pearl Harbor Board, together with the endorsements of the Secretaries, stand as official 'corrections' by the Services of the Roberts Commission's finding of dereliction. The Court and the Board concluded that the evidence was insufficient to warrant courtmartial of Admiral Kimmel or General Short. However, the evidence strongly suggested 'errors of judgment'.

Investigations of events at Pearl Harbor culminated in the lengthy hearings and voluminous publications of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Pearl Harbor Attack. The JCC concluded that the disaster of Pearl Harbor was the failure, with attendant increase in personnel and material losses, of the Army and the Navy to institute measures designed to detect an approaching hostile force, to effect a state of readiness commensurate with the realization that war was at hand, and to employ every facility at their command in repelling the Japanese. The JCC recognized the importance of the failure of the Army and the Navy in Washington to transmit critical information to the Hawaiian Commanders. Nevertheless, it found that:

8. The Hawaiian commands failed:

(a) To discharge their responsibilities in the light of the warnings received from Washington other information possessed by them and the principle of command by mutual cooperation.
(b) To integrate and coordinate their facilities for defense and to alert properly the Army / Navy establishments in Hawaii, particularly in the light of the warnings and intelligence available to them during the period November 27 to December 7, 1941.
(c) To effect liaison on a basis designed to acquaint each of them with the operations of the other, which was necessary to their joint security, and to exchange fully all significant intelligence.
(d) To maintain a more effective reconnaissance within the limits of their equipment.
(e) To effect a state of readiness throughout the Army and Navy establishments designed to meet all possible attacks.
(f) To employ the facilities, materiel and personnel at their command which were adequate at least to have greatly minimized the effects of the attack, in repelling the Japanese raiders.
(g) To appreciate the significance of intelligence and other information available to them.

9. The errors made by the Hawaiian commands were errors of judgment and not derelictions of duty.

Even the minority report, which suggested greater focus on failures by the civilian and military leadership in Washington, 'agreed that the high command in Hawaii was subject to criticism for concluding that Hawaii was not in danger.'

Thus, the final official pronouncements of the government on the responsibility for Pearl Harbor found that Admiral Kimmel and General Short committed errors of judgment, but that those errors did not rise to the level of court-martial offenses. Those official pronouncements make clear that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were by no means solely responsible for what happened at Pearl Harbor, and that others also deserved blame. The balance of this section assesses whether those assessments are still valid.

A CURRENT ASSESSMENT

In the intervening 54 years, there has been a vast outpouring of publications on the events at Pearl Harbor. Much detail has been added to enrich our understanding of those events, and many new interpretive insights have been offered.

An objective reading of the historical record suggests that the story of Pearl Harbor is far from simple. The reasons for the disastrous defeat at Pearl Harbor form a tapestry woven of many threads, including the inevitable advantage of an aggressor free to choose the time, place and form of a surprise attack in a time of minimal peace, and the brilliant planning and flawless execution by a Japanese Navy whose capabilities were seriously underestimated by many Americans.

Two specific failures have been at the center of the historical debate

(1) The failure of officials in Washington, privy to intercepted Japanese diplomatic communications, to appreciate fully and to convey to the commanders in Hawaii the sense of focus and urgency that those communications should have engendered, and

(2) the failure of commanders in Hawaii to make adequate preparations in light of the information they did have. The balance of this review focuses on these two failures.

Given Japanese planning and determination to attack the U.S. fleet in Hawaii and the limited American resources stretched across the Pacific, the attack on Pearl Harbor probably could not have been prevented. Consequently, the failure at Pearl Harbor is not failure to prevent that attack. Rather, the nature of the failure was the disproportionate losses in American lives and materiel when compared with Japanese losses.

2,403 Americans dead and 1,178 wounded. Eight American battleships, three light cruisers, three destroyers and four auxiliary craft sunk or damaged. 13 Navy fighters, 21 scout bombers, 46 patrol bombers, four B-17 heavy bombers, 12 B-18 bombers, 32 P-40 fighters and 20 P-36 fighters were destroyed. The Japanese lost only 29 aircraft, one large submarine and five midget submarines.

This disproportionality resulted principally from the American failure to anticipate and prepare for the possibility of a surprise aerial attack on Pearl Harbor.

It is clear today, as it should have been clear since 1946 to any serious reader of the JCC hearing record that Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short were not solely responsible for the defeat at Pearl Harbor.

To say that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were not solely responsible does not, however, necessarily imply that they were totally blameless. To assess the degree of their responsibility and thus their performance, it is necessary to consider their mission, the information they had, the resources they had, and what they did with that information and those resources.

General Short's mission was to protect the fleet at Pearl Harbor. On February 7, 1941 General Short's first day as Commander of the Hawaiian Department, Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall wrote to him:

'The fullest protection for the Fleet is the rather than a major consideration for us, there can be little question about that.'

And in his closing paragraph reiterated:

'Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentrations.'

Admiral Kimmel had the 'general duty' to 'take all practicable steps to keep the ships of his command ready for battle'. This required drills and exercises done in such a manner as will most conduce to maintaining the fleet in constant readiness for war in all its phases.' In regards to Hawaii, Admiral Kimmel's mission was to provide long-range reconnaissance and to cooperate with the Army in the defense of the fleet.

Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short asserted that information they received from Washington and their own staffs was insufficiently explicit or specific to prompt greater readiness to defend against air attack. Even the November 27, 1941 'war warning' message, testified both commanders, was ambiguous; it provided to warning of an impending surprise attack by aircraft. In light of this claimed lack of information, it is important to examine what information Admiral Kimmel and General Short did have.

First, Admiral Kimmel and General Short knew that their primary mission - - indeed virtually their only mission was to prepare for war with Japan.

Second, Admiral Kimmel and General Short knew that war with Japan was highly likely. throughout 1941, newspapers were full of news of war in Asia and Europe. Japan had been at war in China since 1937, and reportedly had some 75,000 Japanese troops occupying French Indo-China. Tensions between the United States and Japan had been increasing. President Roosevelt had taken steps to freeze Japanese assets in the United States and US oil shipments, accounting for most of Japan's supply, had ceased. Members of both the House and the Senate periodically called upon Roosevelt to declare war on Japan. Japanese aggression in Asia and US determination to stop it made war almost inevitable. Germany, Japan's Axis partner, had occupied Denmark, Norway, Poland and the Low Countries and much of France. Germany had also attacked the Soviet Union that summer, and the Wehrmacht's 'blitzkrieg' had inflicted massive Soviet losses. The United States became increasingly involved in measures short of war. Honolulu newspapers reported the sinking of an American destroyer and an American tanker in the Atlantic in November 1941.

The destroyer was USS REUBEN JAMES, sunk on Halloween night in 1941 by the German submarine 81-552 under command of ERICH TOPP (118-LIFE-1985). He thought it was one of the 50 four-stack destroyers the US gave to England.

Third, Admiral Kimmel and General Short knew that, if war came, Japan would strike the first blow, if only because the United States would not.

Fourth, Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short knew that a surprise attack probably would precede a declaration of war. Japan had begun its war with Russia in 1905 with a successful surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur. Japan's attack on North China in 1937 had not been preceded by a declaration of war either. The March 31, 1941 Martin-Bellinger Report likewise noted that 'in the past Orange (code for Japan) has never preceded hostile action by a declaration of war.'

Additionally, on April 1, 1941, Naval Intelligence in Washington alerted all naval districts - - including Hawaii - that 'past experience shows the Axis Powers often begin attacks on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays.' Admiral Kimmel's standing order to the fleet assumed 'that a declaration of war may be preceded by: (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area, and (3) a combination of these two.'

On February 18, 1941 for example, Admiral Kimmel wrote: "I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility." General Short similarly knew that a surprise attack was likely, given that he had read the MartinBellinger Report.

This interesting history will continue in KTB #138 next month. I am somewhat confused however, that the Under Secretary continues to claim that Admiral Kimmel and General Short should have been ready for a surprise attack. If they knew the attack was coming, then it would not be a surprise. Maybe I'm missing something here, but it just appears to be an oversimplification by the Under Secretary using the knowledge on hand after-the-fact to judge the actions of officers at the time, who were not given this intelligence by their own government. More next month.

More of the Dorn Report

Kimmel and Short Pearl Harbor Scapegoats [KTB 138]