The National Economy

During the depression, precious little funding was available for torpedo testing, for mass torpedo production just to create a stockpile, or for realistic training. BuOrd could not sanction the destruction of a $10,000 torpedo just to see if it worked (after all, torpedoes with exercise sections substituted for the warheads were regularly tested on the torpedo range at Newport).

With the unrealistic training available to them, submarine commanders began exercising extreme caution during Fleet maneuvers in the 1930s. The preferred attack position was from a depth of 100 feet using a fire control solution based solely on the passive sonar hydrophones. This attack posture was based on the commanders’ fear of antisubmarine aircraft. Moreover, being ‘sunk’ during one of these exercises was very hazardous to the career of the commander, which contributed to this culture of caution. At the outset of the war, this cautious nature of officers commanding submarines produced commanders who were entirely too timid in combat.

The limited torpedo testing conducted during the 1920s and 1930s directly led to the high torpedo failure rate early in the war when submarine commanders realized that there was little connection between torpedo presets and torpedo performance. Torpedoes often seemed to either run under the target or run into it, depending upon presets, with no effect. In many cases the torpedoes either failed to explode or exploded prematurely. Although submarine commanders reported frequent torpedo problems in their patrol reports, and obviously believed that torpedo performance was largely responsible for the extremely low percentages of hits and effective explosions, senior officials were reluctant to believe them.

Overconfidence in the Magnetic Exploder Mark 6

Unwarranted faith was placed in the expected effectiveness of the Mark 6 magnetic exploder, after its one and only live fire test. No further testing was done at locations with varying magnetic field strengths or to determine a statistical failure rate. The position taken by BuOrd was that the weapons experts were all in BuOrd, and if the torpedoes they issued to the Fleet were not sinking ships, the fault was not within BuOrd.

Magnetic Exploder Mark 6 Security Policy

Security surrounding the Mark 6 was too tight. The Fleet didn’t begin to receive torpedoes with the Mark 6 until the fall of 1941, and then only in limited quantities. It could be argued that no relaxation of security is ever a good policy, but the lid kept on the Mark 6 Exploder was entirely too tight. Even as negative reports were reaching BuOrd concerning the unreliability, or outright rejection, of magnetic influence detonators by many foreign powers, BuOrd still kept a clamp on its security.

Inaccurate Fleet Feedback

Initial reports reaching BuOrd on the performance of the weapons they issued were mixed, as far as the Mark 14 Torpedo was concerned. Some reports even indicated success with the Mark 6. A few commanders submitted patrol reports indicating successes with the Mark 14 Torpedo all the while concealing the fact that they had to deactivate the influence feature in order to obtain such results (clearly providing misleading information to BuOrd). In the face of this contradictory feedback BuOrd initiated no crash program to rebuild or replace the exploder in the early years of the war. They maintained their faith in the underlying principles of the exploder and in its ultimate success.

More Mark 14 Torpedo

The Silent Service WWII USN Mark 14 Submarine Torpedo. Part 1 [# 120]
The Silent Service WWII USN Mark 14 Submarine Torpedo. Part 2 [# 121]
The Silent Service WWII USN Mark 14 Submarine Torpedo. Part 3 [# 122]
The Silent Service WWII USN Mark 14 Submarine Torpedo. Part 4 [# 123]
The Silent Service WWII USN Mark 14 Submarine Torpedo. Part 5 [# 124]