U.S. Submarines:
A Technical History

Boomers and Fast Attack Submarines
Polaris and Trident

by Charles Gundersen (205-C-1986)


(continued from KTB #116)

Combining the three ingredients of missiles, tear-drop hulls, and nuclear propulsion provides the makings for a strategic deterrence system (read ‘strategic’ to mean ‘nuclear’). What were the factors that led up to the development of the first submarine-based strategic deterrence system?

Some of the major issues at that time were:

    1. The V-2 ballistic missile was introduced by Germany late in WW II. Following the war, the US Army obtained several V-2 missiles along with some of the German engineers and technicians, and conducted tests with the German missiles. These tests demonstrated the reality of ballistic missile attacks and got the US Army started in ballistic missile research.

    2. A 1950 report by the Secretaries of Defense and State warned of ‘dark Soviet intentions’ and the need to ‘thwart the huge threat posed by the expansion-minded Kremlin leadership’. Another warning came in 1953 from the Secretary of State about the beginning of a ‘long-term confrontation with the Soviet Union’. And it introduced the concept of defense through nuclear weapons at the expense of conventional arms. Hence, the beginning of the Cold War atmosphere.

    3. In 1954 the Soviet Union exploded its first Hydrogen bomb.

    4. In 1957 the Soviet Union conducted its first ICBM flight and orbited SPUTNIK, giving them a clear capability to launch a nuclear strike against the United States. This was exposed in the 1960 Presidential campaign as ‘the missile gap’ issue.

    5. In 1958 the Soviet Union deployed the GOLF Class submarine with three ballistic nuclear missiles in the sail.

The Eisenhower Administration perceived these events by the Soviet Union as a dual threat to the United States. The first was from their achievements in space, and the second was the threat of aggression involving a first strike using nuclear warheads delivered by their new rockets. Eisenhower’s response was twofold: NASA was created to compete with the Soviets in space, and he supported the need for a retaliatory strike capability (a system that could survive their first surprise strike). This second response set into motion the nation’s strategic deterrence program. The idea was to develop a system that could provide the maximum deterrence at a bearable cost; a system with great capability to retaliate - instantly. Eisenhower also terminated the air breathing REGULUS missile in favor of the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) program with its more promising ballistic missile technology.

The main ‘weapon’ used to fight the Cold War was deterrence, with the FBM program being the vehicle used by the US Navy to carry this ‘weapon’. Throughout the Cold War period this ‘weapon’ was deployed and used continuously. Deterrence has many facets (the nuclear Triad, summit meetings, arms reductions talks etc.). The FBM program is but one aspect of the US deterrence strategy, helping fulfill a major national security objective of the Defense Department.

Since deterrence is a defense oriented strategy, a primary attribute of the strategy is the need to survive a first strike by the enemy. The FBM program provides this survival capability, and it has other unique advantages as well. It has:

  • Intercontinental capability due to its mobility and the range of its missiles;
  • Invulnerability due to underwater missile launch;
  • Independence from forward stations or foreign bases.

The second Soviet threat caused the FBM program to get the highest priority. A priority its successors enjoy to this date. Plus, to ensure safety and meet the severe operating requirements, the program always sought the highest quality material, state-of-the-art technology, and thorough training. Today safety is a must within the Nuclear Navy.

The Navy’s direct involvement in strategic deterrence began in November 1955 when the Secretary of Defense began a joint Army-Navy program to develop an at-sea launch capability for the Army’s JUPITER missile. The Navy’s side of the program was managed by the new Special Project Office headed by Admiral Raborn. The CNO set a target date of 1965 for initial system operation. Almost immediately the Navy did not like the JUPITER missile because of its size and complex liquid fuel rocket motor. Even after scaling it down from 60 feet to 44 feet by including a solid fuel engine, the missile weighed 80 tons. It would have taken a submarine of 8,500 tons displacement (small by today’s standards) to carry only four such missiles. After two years of work, the idea was scrapped.

Two new technologies were maturing at that time - one was the development of a missile with a solid propellant rocket engine, and the other was the development of a small nuclear warhead (newly developed by the AEC). Hence, an entirely new missile was developed, called POLARIS. The missile could be launched from a submarine built using existing technology. But, since the Navy did not have an extra submarine lying around, it was decided to cut an existing SKIPJACK Class fast attack submarine in half and insert a 130 foot section housing 16 missile. The construction of USS SCORPION (SSN 589) was thus interrupted (two months after her keel was laid in November 1957) for the addition of this new missile section, new fire control gear, missile support equipment, and a new navigation system (Ship’s Internal Navigation System). What emerged was USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (SSBN 598), a 383 foot long submarine of 5,900 tons displacement. Another keel was laid for the ill-fated USS SCORPION.

More U.S. Submarines: A Technical History


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