In the years between the Sikh Wars and
the First World War the British in India launched
over forty expeditions against the tribesmen of
the Northwest frontier. As the British presence
on the frontier increased and their policies
changed so did the nature of frontier expeditions.
By the 1890s due largely to the rapidly expanding railway system, British Field Forces were of divisional and even corps size, fielding tens of thousands of troops in operations designed to inflict massive and impressive punishment on rebellious tribesmen. For added effect these large scale expeditions were often advertised ahead of time complete with intended objectives so as to cow the enemy in advance.
The expeditions of earlier years were of a different nature. Before the advent of railroads on the frontier, troop concentrations were difficult to assemble and maintain. Available forces tended to be dispersed in smaller bodies and to concentrate in one sector meant stripping another. Within these limitations keeping peace on the border evolved into a raid and counter raid form of warfare.
Local commanders dealt with cattle raids, armed outrages and border ruffianism with their own limited resources: launching short, sharp and limited punitive raids. Typically these expeditions consisted of battalion or smaller sized task forces. These small scale excursions usually had limited objectives such as collecting unpaid fines, arresting perpetrators, or punishing a local outrage.
Successful small scale punitive expeditions generally observed three principles: secrecy, speed, and economy of force. These tended to be interrelated. In an area where news proverbially "flew on the wings of the wind" secrecy was the most essential and difficult to maintain.
Secrecy in such operations was necessary to gain surprise and allow a small force to be successful against (or avoid) the potentially large and overwhelming numbers that the natives were capable of assembling. Indeed a small force was easier to keep secret but in turn required more of it and depended on it for success.
Speed or rapidity meant rapid movement and being able to reach the objective quickly. This was necessary to maintain surprise and secrecy once the expedition was underway. Speed was also essential after the raid to ensure a quick getaway before the natives had time to react.
Economy of force was usually dictated by circumstances and meant using just enough force to achieve the objective. This was important on the frontier especially in the early days, when resources were scarce. Economy of force was also a prerequisite to the above principles.
Large forces unlike smaller (and usually
more economical) forces could not easily be
kept secret, did not move very fast and were not
readily available anyway. These three principles
could easily be summed up as "getting there
fastest with the mostest" (sic).
[1]
The 1878 raid on Sapri while an
insignificant event in the annals of NWF military
operations provides an excellent example of a
small scale punitive operation and illustrates the
principles of secrecy, speed, and economy of
force. This raid had its
origins back in December of 1876.
At that time the British had just started
construction of the Swat River Canal. The canal
tapped the River at the point where it crossed
the border near the frontier fort at Abazai,
opposite Utman Khel territory. The local Utman
Khel
[2]
viewed the project with suspicion and
annoyance as it interfered with some of their
cultivated land.
In the early hours of December 9th a
group of about 100 tribesmen surrounded a
work camp of some 65 unarmed coolies.
Around two o'clock in the morning at a given
signal the Pathans rushed the camp and cut the
tent ropes. The defenseless workers were cut
down through the tent cloths or as they tried to
emerge. The camp was plundered and the
raiders escaped back into the hills before troops
could arrive from the nearby Abazai fort. Six
workmen were killed and twenty-seven
wounded.
The British were taken aback by the
attack. They realized that proper precautions or
a proper escort would have deterred an attack
but they never expected an unprovoked attack
on unarmed Moslem workmen. The government
was able to implicate Mian Rakan-ud-din, the
Khan of Sapri as the instigator of the attack.
Sapri was a village lying just across the border
some seven miles from the Abazai fort and
some forty miles northwest of Mardan, the
cantonment of the Corps of Guides.
[3]
The local political officer, captain P.L.N.
Cavagnari, deputy Commissioner of Peshawar,
[4] levied a
fine of money and cattle on Mian Khan and
ordered the actual murderers turned over to
British justice. Mian Khan ignored the demands
and Cavagnari as was his policy planned a
punitive strike. The exigencies of the looming
Afghan crisis interfered and operations were
postponed until 1878.
At the beginning of that year the
government sanctioned a punitive raid on Sapri
to be made by the Guides. To ensure absolute
secrecy Cavagnari told no one but captain
Wigwam Battye of the Guides of his plan.
Captain Battye would command the force while
Cavagnari would accompany as political officer.
Cavagnari plannedarapid night march and a
dawn surprise attack on the village by some 270
Guides followed by a rapid withdrawal via the
Abazai outpost.
Economy of force was determined by the
troops available for the strike, no more could be
spared for the operation. The force would
include 4 British and 10 Native officers; 255
Guides cavalrymen, and 11 Guides Infantry
mounted on mules for rapid movement.
The departure was set for seven o'clock
on the evening of February 14th. So secret were
the preparations that the officers were playing a
game of racquets when ordered to prepare to
start. At evening roll call the fort gates were
shut to prevent anyone from leaving and extra
ammunition was issued to the troops. A cheer went up from old
veterans who knew this meant a raid.
The 255 "sabres", 11 "bayonets", and their
officers set out on their long night march. The
infantry regulated the pace but being mounted
on picked animals were able to keep up. The
planned route would take them along the main
road to Tungi and Abazai but the column was
careful to detour well clear of native villages.
The column skirted around Jalala and on
approaching Tungi near the border left the road.
The force detoured northward and crossed the
Swat Canal into the hills.
As the terrain was now unsuitable the
column halted and dismounted about 2 miles
from Abazai. Here the horses were left with 63
men who had orders to take the mounts at
daybreak to the Abazai fort and await the return
of the column. In some seven hours the Guides
had covered 32 miles and had yet to cover the
remaining 8 miles on foot before dawn.
The dismounted force now proceeded
through some rough plowed land and then along
the north bank of the Swat River for some 4
miles to where a mountain stream entered the
river. They then followed the stream up along a
steep mountain path to a Kotal overlooking the
village of Sapri. It was four o'clock in the
morning and the village was now within easy
rifle range.
An attempt to reconnoiter the village was
abandoned when some of the village dogs began
barking and it was decided to hold back, deploy
and wait until daybreak. Cavagnari's intelligence
indicated that Mian Khan would most likely be
found in the village mosque or in his own tower
both near the center of the village. In the
meantime Captain Battye deployed a piquet on
the spur overlooking the village center.
At daybreak the Guides rushed the village,
achieved complete surprise and easily seized the
mosque. Even as the villagers awoke the
soldiers were standing over
them with sword and bayonet though in the
confusion many warriors were able to escape
into the hills. Securing the mosque but not
finding Mian Khan, the soldiers proceeded to the tower.
The Khan had hidden in a building behind
the mosque which the Guides soon surrounded.
The British demanded his surrender and
threatened to burn him out. Mian Khan stepped
out to surrender but as he was being arrested he
drew a dagger and the Guides shot him dead.
The other defenders of the house quickly gave
up. At this time the only flaw in the operation
became apparent. Cavagnari had intended to
blow up the village tower but the explosives had
not come up in time. Cavagnari decided not to
burn the village.
In the meantime the villagers who had
escaped began sniping at the troops in the village
from the surrounding heights. They had
occupied a hill to the southwest overlooking the
Guides' retreat route. It was time to withdraw.
Captain Battye and a detachment rushed the
position and drove off the Pathans.
The withdrawal was conducted in good
order without huffy or harassment. by 11:00 am
on the 15th the troops had reached Fort Abazai.
They had defeated some 300 enemy in the raid,
killed seven of them and captured six. Casualties
among the Guides were eight wounded.
After this successful raid the government
called ajirga of the Utman Khel to spell out the
terms of their punishment for the Abazai
outrage. These included a general fine and blood
money for each coolie killed or wounded,
restitution or compensation for plundered
property, and hostages to be turned over as a
guarantee for one year's good conduct by the
tribe. These were considered lenient terms for
an offense of such gravity. All but a couple of
the Utman Khel villages agreed to the terms and
the British left well enough alone.
The raid on Sapri like many other small
expeditions proved successful and an example
of good planning and execution. However the
results of such small expeditions proved only
temporary and did not bring about more settled
conditions on the frontier. The tribesmen were
used to losing as much or more in tribal disputes
of their own and came to accept such losses as
the cost of doing business. The result would be
larger and more destructive British invasions in
the future.
Intelligence Branch, Army Headquarters
India, Frontier and Overseas Expeditions
from India Vol. I pt. 1 Tribes North of the
Kabul River, Delhi: Mittal Publications, (1983
reprint)
Nevill, H.L., Campaigns on the Northwest
Frontier, Delhi: Neeraj Publishing House
(1984 reprint of 1912 ed.)
Younghusband G.J. Indian Frontier
Warfare, London: Kegan Paul, Trench,
Tubner & Co. Ltd. 1898
Operations on this scale were not to last
much longer than twenty four hours as supplies
were an issue and in any case stockpiling of any
large amounts would preclude secrecy and
speed. In some cases supplies could be sent to
meet a returning party or a returning party could
detour to a prearranged cache.
NOTES
[1] Attributed to American Confederate
General Nathan Bedford Forrest.
[2]
The Utman Khel were a prominent
Northwest Frontier tribe occupying the hill
region north of Peshawar on both banks of the
Swat River. They numbered about 40,000
people including some 9,300 fighting men.
[3]
The Corps of Guides was perhaps the
preeminent unit of the Punjab Frontier Force.
Raised in 1846 the Corps consisted of both
infantry and cavalry components and was
based at Mardan.
[4]
Pierre Louis Napoleon Cavagnari (1841-79)
was a prominent political officer on the
frontier. He would later head the British
mission to Kabul at the end of the first phase
of the Second Afghan War. He and his escort
of Guides were killed in a heroic last stand at
the residency against rebellious Afghan
troops.
SOURCES
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