Raid on Sapri

Small Operations on the NW Frontier

by Hans Von Stockhausen
Illustrations by Nick Stern

In the years between the Sikh Wars and the First World War the British in India launched over forty expeditions against the tribesmen of the Northwest frontier. As the British presence on the frontier increased and their policies changed so did the nature of frontier expeditions.

By the 1890s due largely to the rapidly expanding railway system, British Field Forces were of divisional and even corps size, fielding tens of thousands of troops in operations designed to inflict massive and impressive punishment on rebellious tribesmen. For added effect these large scale expeditions were often advertised ahead of time complete with intended objectives so as to cow the enemy in advance.

The expeditions of earlier years were of a different nature. Before the advent of railroads on the frontier, troop concentrations were difficult to assemble and maintain. Available forces tended to be dispersed in smaller bodies and to concentrate in one sector meant stripping another. Within these limitations keeping peace on the border evolved into a raid and counter raid form of warfare.

Local commanders dealt with cattle raids, armed outrages and border ruffianism with their own limited resources: launching short, sharp and limited punitive raids. Typically these expeditions consisted of battalion or smaller sized task forces. These small scale excursions usually had limited objectives such as collecting unpaid fines, arresting perpetrators, or punishing a local outrage.

Successful small scale punitive expeditions generally observed three principles: secrecy, speed, and economy of force. These tended to be interrelated. In an area where news proverbially "flew on the wings of the wind" secrecy was the most essential and difficult to maintain.

Secrecy in such operations was necessary to gain surprise and allow a small force to be successful against (or avoid) the potentially large and overwhelming numbers that the natives were capable of assembling. Indeed a small force was easier to keep secret but in turn required more of it and depended on it for success.

Speed or rapidity meant rapid movement and being able to reach the objective quickly. This was necessary to maintain surprise and secrecy once the expedition was underway. Speed was also essential after the raid to ensure a quick getaway before the natives had time to react.

Economy of force was usually dictated by circumstances and meant using just enough force to achieve the objective. This was important on the frontier especially in the early days, when resources were scarce. Economy of force was also a prerequisite to the above principles.

Large forces unlike smaller (and usually more economical) forces could not easily be kept secret, did not move very fast and were not readily available anyway. These three principles could easily be summed up as "getting there fastest with the mostest" (sic). [1]

Operations on this scale were not to last much longer than twenty four hours as supplies were an issue and in any case stockpiling of any large amounts would preclude secrecy and speed. In some cases supplies could be sent to meet a returning party or a returning party could detour to a prearranged cache.

The 1878 raid on Sapri while an insignificant event in the annals of NWF military operations provides an excellent example of a small scale punitive operation and illustrates the principles of secrecy, speed, and economy of force. This raid had its origins back in December of 1876.

At that time the British had just started construction of the Swat River Canal. The canal tapped the River at the point where it crossed the border near the frontier fort at Abazai, opposite Utman Khel territory. The local Utman Khel [2] viewed the project with suspicion and annoyance as it interfered with some of their cultivated land.

In the early hours of December 9th a group of about 100 tribesmen surrounded a work camp of some 65 unarmed coolies. Around two o'clock in the morning at a given signal the Pathans rushed the camp and cut the tent ropes. The defenseless workers were cut down through the tent cloths or as they tried to emerge. The camp was plundered and the raiders escaped back into the hills before troops could arrive from the nearby Abazai fort. Six workmen were killed and twenty-seven wounded.

The British were taken aback by the attack. They realized that proper precautions or a proper escort would have deterred an attack but they never expected an unprovoked attack on unarmed Moslem workmen. The government was able to implicate Mian Rakan-ud-din, the Khan of Sapri as the instigator of the attack. Sapri was a village lying just across the border some seven miles from the Abazai fort and some forty miles northwest of Mardan, the cantonment of the Corps of Guides. [3]

The local political officer, captain P.L.N. Cavagnari, deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, [4] levied a fine of money and cattle on Mian Khan and ordered the actual murderers turned over to British justice. Mian Khan ignored the demands and Cavagnari as was his policy planned a punitive strike. The exigencies of the looming Afghan crisis interfered and operations were postponed until 1878.

At the beginning of that year the government sanctioned a punitive raid on Sapri to be made by the Guides. To ensure absolute secrecy Cavagnari told no one but captain Wigwam Battye of the Guides of his plan. Captain Battye would command the force while Cavagnari would accompany as political officer. Cavagnari plannedarapid night march and a dawn surprise attack on the village by some 270 Guides followed by a rapid withdrawal via the Abazai outpost.

Economy of force was determined by the troops available for the strike, no more could be spared for the operation. The force would include 4 British and 10 Native officers; 255 Guides cavalrymen, and 11 Guides Infantry mounted on mules for rapid movement.

The departure was set for seven o'clock on the evening of February 14th. So secret were the preparations that the officers were playing a game of racquets when ordered to prepare to start. At evening roll call the fort gates were shut to prevent anyone from leaving and extra ammunition was issued to the troops. A cheer went up from old veterans who knew this meant a raid.

The 255 "sabres", 11 "bayonets", and their officers set out on their long night march. The infantry regulated the pace but being mounted on picked animals were able to keep up. The planned route would take them along the main road to Tungi and Abazai but the column was careful to detour well clear of native villages. The column skirted around Jalala and on approaching Tungi near the border left the road. The force detoured northward and crossed the Swat Canal into the hills.

As the terrain was now unsuitable the column halted and dismounted about 2 miles from Abazai. Here the horses were left with 63 men who had orders to take the mounts at daybreak to the Abazai fort and await the return of the column. In some seven hours the Guides had covered 32 miles and had yet to cover the remaining 8 miles on foot before dawn.

The dismounted force now proceeded through some rough plowed land and then along the north bank of the Swat River for some 4 miles to where a mountain stream entered the river. They then followed the stream up along a steep mountain path to a Kotal overlooking the village of Sapri. It was four o'clock in the morning and the village was now within easy rifle range.

An attempt to reconnoiter the village was abandoned when some of the village dogs began barking and it was decided to hold back, deploy and wait until daybreak. Cavagnari's intelligence indicated that Mian Khan would most likely be found in the village mosque or in his own tower both near the center of the village. In the meantime Captain Battye deployed a piquet on the spur overlooking the village center.

At daybreak the Guides rushed the village, achieved complete surprise and easily seized the mosque. Even as the villagers awoke the soldiers were standing over them with sword and bayonet though in the confusion many warriors were able to escape into the hills. Securing the mosque but not finding Mian Khan, the soldiers proceeded to the tower.

The Khan had hidden in a building behind the mosque which the Guides soon surrounded. The British demanded his surrender and threatened to burn him out. Mian Khan stepped out to surrender but as he was being arrested he drew a dagger and the Guides shot him dead. The other defenders of the house quickly gave up. At this time the only flaw in the operation became apparent. Cavagnari had intended to blow up the village tower but the explosives had not come up in time. Cavagnari decided not to burn the village.

In the meantime the villagers who had escaped began sniping at the troops in the village from the surrounding heights. They had occupied a hill to the southwest overlooking the Guides' retreat route. It was time to withdraw. Captain Battye and a detachment rushed the position and drove off the Pathans.

The withdrawal was conducted in good order without huffy or harassment. by 11:00 am on the 15th the troops had reached Fort Abazai. They had defeated some 300 enemy in the raid, killed seven of them and captured six. Casualties among the Guides were eight wounded.

After this successful raid the government called ajirga of the Utman Khel to spell out the terms of their punishment for the Abazai outrage. These included a general fine and blood money for each coolie killed or wounded, restitution or compensation for plundered property, and hostages to be turned over as a guarantee for one year's good conduct by the tribe. These were considered lenient terms for an offense of such gravity. All but a couple of the Utman Khel villages agreed to the terms and the British left well enough alone.

The raid on Sapri like many other small expeditions proved successful and an example of good planning and execution. However the results of such small expeditions proved only temporary and did not bring about more settled conditions on the frontier. The tribesmen were used to losing as much or more in tribal disputes of their own and came to accept such losses as the cost of doing business. The result would be larger and more destructive British invasions in the future.

NOTES


[1] Attributed to American Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest.
[2] The Utman Khel were a prominent Northwest Frontier tribe occupying the hill region north of Peshawar on both banks of the Swat River. They numbered about 40,000 people including some 9,300 fighting men.
[3] The Corps of Guides was perhaps the preeminent unit of the Punjab Frontier Force. Raised in 1846 the Corps consisted of both infantry and cavalry components and was based at Mardan.
[4] Pierre Louis Napoleon Cavagnari (1841-79) was a prominent political officer on the frontier. He would later head the British mission to Kabul at the end of the first phase of the Second Afghan War. He and his escort of Guides were killed in a heroic last stand at the residency against rebellious Afghan troops.

SOURCES

Intelligence Branch, Army Headquarters India, Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India Vol. I pt. 1 Tribes North of the Kabul River, Delhi: Mittal Publications, (1983 reprint)

Nevill, H.L., Campaigns on the Northwest Frontier, Delhi: Neeraj Publishing House (1984 reprint of 1912 ed.)

Younghusband G.J. Indian Frontier Warfare, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Tubner & Co. Ltd. 1898

Uniform Notes: Raid on Sapri


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