The Battle of Ginnis was a small affair notable for three points: it ended the phase of the Sudan campaign that began with Graham's battle of El Teb in 1884, it was the first battle of consequence in which the new Egyptian army took part, it was the last battle in which the British army wore red coats. PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE After the fall of Khartoum, both the Nile and Desert Columns withdrew to Egypt and were disbanded late in 1885. The frontier was garrisoned against a potential Mahdist invasion by a Frontier Field Force composed of units from the British garrison in Egypt and the new Egyptian army. Major-General Grenfell, later Sirdar of the Egyptian army, was commander-in-chief of the Field Force with his headquarters at Asuan. The garrisons were strung along the Nile and the railroad from Asuan to Akasha, with the southern-most fort at Kosha. Brigadier General Butler was in command of the advance posts from Wadi Halfa to Kosha. The Mahdist forces were under the command of Muhamnad al-Khair. They were little more than provincial levies occupying the northern territories as the British forces withdrew. The invasion of Egypt, which was part of the Mahdi's strategy, was delayed by the death of the Mahdi in June, after which various provincial commanders were called back to Omdurman to swear allegiance to the Khalifa. This was followed by consolidation throughout the Sudan as a few remaining Egyptian outposts were subdued and provincial administration was organized. Each side feared an invasion by the other, but neither had the capacity at the end of 1885 to justify their enemy's suspicion. In September, Muhammad al-Khair reported to the Khalifa that the British were encouraged by the Mahdi's death to launch an invasion of Dongala (Holt, p. 142). This was not the case, but the Khalifa increased recruitment of troops, especially from the Gezira, south of Khartoum, to be sent as reinforcements to meet this invasion. These reinforcements were first noted along the frontier in November, and Wingate later claimed that they were an advance force sent to take Wadi Halfa in preparation for Wad al-Nujumi's invasion of Egypt (Wingate, p. 270). Wad al-Nujumi arrived in Berber late in December to organize an army, but documents in the Mahdist archives reveal that his preparations were designed to thwart an expected British Invasion, not to invade Egypt. (Holt, p. 142). The Anglo-Egyptian force on the frontier in November-December 1885 was divided as follows: Wadi Halfa - 500 British, 350 Egyptians; Akasha (railhead) -600 British, 350 Egyptians; Sarkametto and Dal (two villages on opposite banks of the Nile) -200 Egyptians; Kosha-600 British, 300 Egyptians; Mograka-266 Egyptians. There were various smaller detachments of thirty to fifty men in forts overlooking the rail line at Ambigol Wells, Tanjur Road, Murrat Wells and Saras. (Wingate,p. 272). Documentation of the Mahdist force at the frontier is less clear, and it is evident that the Intelligence department, still in its infancy, had only the vaguest idea of Mahdist strength and intentions. Some 4,000 men were reported in front of Kosha at the end of November (Grant, p. 159), and there appear to have been only 5,000 men divided under about 40 flags In late December Grant, p. 162). Wingate later claimed 6000 men were involved (Wingate, p. 279). Muhamnad al-Khair Abd Allah Khugali, a former teacher of the Mahdi and commander of Berber, was in command of the frontier troops. Abd al-flajid Nasr al-Din abd al Khalik, the commander of the Mahdists at Kirbekan, was sent as second-in-comnand. Among the leading amirs in the force were: Abd al-Majid KhuJali, Muharmmad al- Khair's nephew and leader of the Berber contingent at Abu Klea; 'Uthman Azraq, who later captured Charles Neufeld, was one of al-Nujumi's divisional commander at Toski, as Governor of Berber opposed the Anglo-Egyptian advance of 1896, and died at Omdurman; Hassan Abu Qarja who commanded the Khartoum contingent; Mahmud al-Ajami Hamza, a leading Berber amir who had also fought at Abu Klea; Shaikh wad ar-Rahama, commander of the Berber contingent; Wad ar-Rais (sometimes 7isted as Wad Ebrais) who commanded the riflemen and artillery; Bashir who commanded the Rubtab contingent; Umar wad al-fakir, a staff officer; Hamuda Idris who later commanded the Mahdists at Firka. (Cairant 1/11/55,and Hill). It is uncertain how many rifles and cannon the Mahdists had. Four cannons (small brass mountain guns) were later captured at Kosha and Ginnis, and one more was mounted in a fort on the west bank, so at least five cannons were present. Between November 27th, when the Mahdists were first sighted near Kosha, and December 22nd, there were many skirmishes. The amirs 'Uthman Azraq, Hamid az-Zain, and Siwari ad-Dahab were the main leaders of the Mahdist frontier raids. An early skirmish, on November 30th, involved the river boat Lotus (one of the Yarrow-built steamers left over from the Nile campaign), the Egyptian cavalry and the British Mounted Infantry (Grant, p.160). Between December 2nd and 4th Hamid az-Zain led a force of cavalry, camelry, infantry and one gun in raids on the fort at Ambigol Wells and the rail line in that area. On December 12th, he raided Firka and made off with some cattle and money. The Kordofani amir Siwari ad-Dahab raided the fort at Mograka the same night (Wingate, P. 273). During this time the Mahdists set up camp at the village of Ginnis and moved into the village of Kosha, completely investing the fort on its southern side. (Wingate later claimed that this concentration was ordered by Abd al-Majid abd al-Khujali against the Khalifa's orders) (Wingate, p. 279). A continuous fire was poured into the fort from a high black rock directly overlooking the fort's southern wall. Some entrenchments and a gun emplacement were also set up opposite the fort on the west bank. The Mahdist artillery fire became increasingly accurate during the month-long siege, and one shell dismounted the fort's Gardner gun on December 20th. The Anglo-Egyptian forces under the command of Lt.General Stephenson began to concentrate at Firka to meet the supposed invasion. On December 15th the Cameron Highlanders made a sortie from Kosha against the black rock. Brigadier Butler made a stronger reconnaissance to Ginnis on December 22nd with the Mounted Infantry, Egyptian Camel Corps and the 20th Hussars. In this sortie the mounted troops were suddenly attacked and had to fall back. The Mahdist casualties were tight, but the Kordofani amir Badawi al-Azraq was killed. On December 29th, General Stephenson ordered General Grenfell to advance from Firka to Kosha, bivouacking between Mograka and Kosha forts. The Anglo-Egyptian force was divided into two brigades with a semi-independent cavalry command. General Butler commanded the 1st Brigade with the 1st Berkshires, the West Kents, the 2nd Durham Light Infantry, one camel battery (six guns) Egyptian artillery, with a sixty-man escort from the 3rd Egyptians, and the 11th Company R.E. Colonel Huyshe,who commanded the Berkshires at Tofrek, commanded the 2nd Brigade with the Yorkshire Regiment, six companies of the Cameron Highlanders, two companies (152 men) of the IXth Sudanese, 278 men of the 1st Egyptians, the 3rd Company (39 men) of the Egyptian Camel Corps, a detachment of the British Camel Corps (the last time such a unit appeared in the Sudan), one mule battery (screw guns) of the 2nd battery, 1st Brigade, South Irish Division R.A., and two Gardner guns. The mounted troops under Colonel Blake consisted of the 1st Company (11 men) Egyptian Camel Corps, one company Mounted Infantry (referred to in one dispatch as the Royal Highlanders Mounted Infantry), the 20th Hussars, and one squadron of about 57 men) of the Egyptian cavalry. Two companies of the IXth Sudanese were left in Barrow's zariba opposite Fort Kosha on the west bank, 200 men of the 3rd Egyptians were at Mograka Fort, one company of the Camerons in Kosha fort and one company Camerons with one Krupp gun in the redoubt outside the fort (see pp. Wingate 215-278; Haggard, pp. 367-368; and Cairint 1/11/55). The Battle of Ginnis Prelude 1895 The Battle: December 30, 1895 The Aftermath of Battle The British Army Uniform Plate Jumbo Map Back to Table of Contents -- Savage and Soldier Sudan Special Issue Back to Savage and Soldier List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2004 by Milton Soong. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com