Jeff Ball's newly raised Late Crusader army provided Saladin's first test. The Late Crusaders are basically a combination of good, close order infantry -- featuring plenty of crossbows -- and FMC knights, with either Elite or Fanatic Holy Order knights providing plenty of punch. Since much of the Crusader host is relatively slow moving close order foot, one would expect the faster, more nimble Ayyubids to carry the burden of the offensive. Jeff insured that this would be the case by choosing defensive terrain that simultaneously bolstered his defense and inhibited the forward movement of his army, such as linear obstacles -- walls and gullies -- and delaying terrain such as brush.

Thus, the Crusaders set up with their flanks anchored in delaying terrain (including a major water feature on their right), and their left center partially masked by a wall. Their right center was relatively open and provided the only clear channel for an attack; not surprisingly, this approach was well covered by missile fire. The Ayyubid plan of attack was basically a double envelopment. First, a feint by all of the Turkomans and a unit of Mamluks was directed at the extreme left of the Crusader line. Second, the bulk of the Mamluks and all of the heavy cavalry was directed to the opposite flank, along the major water feature, towards some ungarrisoned brush on the Crusader extreme right. All of the Ayyubid foot was advanced on the Crusader center, but little was envisioned other than a potentially dangerous sortie by the fanatical ghazis against the Maronite archers holding an area of brush in the middle of the Crusader line (just to the right of the wall).

Decisions regarding the organization of the Ayyubid army had a nontrivial impact on its performance in this match. The army utilized only two generals, and all the cavalry -- save the Turkomans -- were deployed in units of two stands. Thus, the army totaled seventeen units. Despite the fact that the Ayyubid generals were good quality, being charismatic (CiC) and brave, there simply weren't enough orders to (efficiently) execute the double envelopment plan [it may be noted in hindsight, however, that the Ayyubids did not make use of signals, which may have stretched the limited orders a little further]. Since the attack on the Crusader left was only a feint, the idea was to recall the subordinate general [and his integral unit of Mamluks] back to the Ayyubid left as soon as the Crusader's reacted to the threat. This was done, but the time consumed doing so meant the CiC had to develop the main attack alone.

Still, the battle did not start badly for the Saracens. The Crusader right was hanging out in space somewhat short of the brush anchoring that flank, providing the Saracens a line of approach along the major water feature, through the brush and into the Crusader rear. Mitigating this potential weakness in the Crusader position was a close order crossbow unit actually forming the right flank; any movement through the brush would be subject to a raking fire from these crossbows as there was little room to maneuver. In addition, a large unit of knights was held nearby in reserve, clearly available to meet any outflankers.

The Saracens pushed two units of Ghulams forward into the brush, with at least six units of heavy cavalry (or better) moving up into a support position. As this transpired, the Ghazis advanced in the center (taking fearfully heavy casualties as they did), and the Crusaders -- as anticipated -- reacted strongly and headed off the feigned flanking movement on their left.

The Crusaders themselves precipitated the decisive point of the battle. Jeff pushed forward his CiC and a second large unit of knights to support the imperiled crossbow on his right. Soon thereafter these knights -- Military Order (if I remember right) -- and two units of Toassins slammed into each other in the clear area in the Crusader right center. The factors slightly favored the Crusaders, but the units locked for several turns.

A second melee developed when Jeff's original unit of knights on the right and another pair of Saracen units, Ghulams and Mamluks, slammed into each other somewhat forward of the crossbow and to the right of the first cavalry melee. At this critical point the Saracens had a positional advantage on the Crusader right. The two units of Ghulams in the brush on the Crusader extreme right were poised within charge range at right angles (i.e. at least one unit had a clear flank attack) to the axis of advance of the Crusader knights embroiled in the second melee.

But those units, having skillfully maneuvered themselves into position under duress (those pesky crossbows), never got the chance to deliver the possibly decisive flank attack(s). The heroes of the day, the crossbows holding the Crusader right, single-handedly collapsed the Ayyubid left! This transpired as follows. The crossbows pumped a (last?) volley into the leftmost Ghulam unit in the brush, killing off a stand and forcing a morale check, which it failed catastrophically, breaking and fleeing to the rear. The second Ghulam in the brush, seeing its companion break, thereupon tested morale and also failed miserably, breaking and fleeing to the rear. A third Ghulam -- this one embroiled in the melee with the knights -- also tested morale, failed and broke to the rear. The Saracen left was shattered!

Fortunately for Saladin, the Gore …err... god of war called it a day and the battle promptly ended. Another turn and the collapsing Saracen cavalry would have given up the ghost in the fights against the Crusader knights. Jeff won, 4-3, caught just short of a much bigger win.

An immediate post mortem of the battle revealed several things to the young Sultan. First, the army needed to be reorganized into larger units, which it promptly was in preparation for the impending contest against the Mongols. The shock cavalry was brigaded into Toassin and Ghulam units of 6 stands each, a Mamluk unit of 4 stands, and (as before) each general was assigned a stand of Mamluks as bodyguards; the army's unit count was thereby reduced from seventeen to twelve. Second, the army should have had three generals. In the heat of a campaign (tournament), nothing could be done about this. Lacking additional command resources, the Ayyubid foot are better left to their own resources, a notion that would be put to the test against the Mongols. And finally, the Turkomans never made use of the Fire and Flee rule, which could have been used to draw the Holy Order fanatics out into the open.

A trend started in this battle that would not be obvious to Saladin until later was the continuous misuse of the Mamluks; battle after battle the key role was assigned to Ghulam or Toassin HC, while the Mamluk FMC were either held in reserve or employed in less critical roles. In addition, the generals commanding two of the four Mamluk units were also held out of the action -- one needs to attack with a general if the Mamluk regulars are to go frenzied, which certainly would have helped the melees against the Crusader Holy Order fanatics. If the elite FMC Mamluks are not used aggressively to spearhead the Ayyubid attack, the army will not perform up to its potential.

More Saladin at Historicon

Introduction
Late Crusaders: Crossbows and Knights
Mongols: Long Spears(!) and Artillery
Feudal English: Knights and Longbows
Post Mortem