Westview Press, Boulder, CO.
ISBN 0-8133-2940-X.

This effort is meant by the author to "reconstruct the evolution of warfare", a worthy and by no means easy task. There are three major themes to the study; 1) the moral issue, or the use of warfare as an instrument of justice, both "human and divine", 2) warfare as an instrument of foreign policy (the Machiavellian and Clausewitzian view), and 3) warfare as an instrument of internal societal policy as well as for revenge.

Premodern thinkers, Dawson asserts, "assumed warfare as a normal and natural feature." Primitive war enforced tribal solidarity, with the motivating forces being a quest for honor more than gain, and for revenge. Primitive war endows benefits to certain tribal individuals, but also benefits the community as well with the residual effects of material gain and pride of belonging to a strong, cohesive and successful social group.

The theories of Hobbes and Rousseau are discussed at some length, with an argument being made for the Hobbesian view based upon 1970's reports of "male chimpanzees practic(ing) organized hunting of small animals and conduct(ing) lethal raids against neighboring chimpanzee bands...uncannily like (war)." The unaggressive primitive model so in vogue a few years back is heartily assaulted as Dawson states that in hunter-gatherer societies "over 60% of the groups included in the sample went to war at least once every two years."

One of my criticisms of the book at this point deals with the organizing. There are many sections to the book, and each section perhaps should have been given numbers, etc. to make it easier to correlate with other parts within the same chapter. After primitive societies, Dawson delves into Chiefdoms, States and Empires, noting causes of war are more complicated and motives are more distinguishable as they become ideological, economic and political. Breakthroughs from primitive warfare include 1) the invention of culture, 2) the rise of big-game hunting, and 3) the intensification of revenge warfare into a balance of power situation which brought militarism into the fore as the "common and expected feature of human society." War leaders had become chiefs.

In this period, the author believes that warfare is becoming a Clausewitzian instrument (strenuously argued against by John Keegan in his History of Warfare). Armies with specialized warrior classes developed, as did rituals, war gods, and the concept of glory in war. But, chiefdoms did not usually survive the chief. This point is most assuredly true, evidenced by Alexander's empire and Robert Guiscard's Italian, Sicilian and Greek conquests, both of which fell apart after the death of the charismatic leader.

The rise of the state took the prevailing balance of power, enjoyed by primitive societies, to a new, political level. Warfare changes from a ritual to a balance of power struggle between rulers. Armies could be organized and maintained at state expense and in numbers of tens of thousands.

There is a very brief survey of the Art of War in early history, with tactics, chariot warfare and the rise of armor use and organized infantry warfare touched upon. Dawson proceeds to explain that "primitive and ancient societies all thought of war as an act of human and divine justice, as the avenging of wrongs." Greek warfare developed infantry shock tactics, relying on a given, set piece battle to decide disagreements between the growing city-states.

A reading of Hanson's The Western Way of War allows a very credible understanding of Greek hoplite warfare. Dawson gives a synopsis of Hanson's views and notes that hoplite offensive warfare developed as an answer to the Greek citizen warrior need to "defend the soil." Light casualties (although not always, I would add) and limited areas of warfare (hoplites could not campaign successfully in rough terrain) helped the Greeks maintain their honor and lands without destroying the farming population.

The Persian and Peloponnesian wars changed this limited warfare forever. There developed new tactics, using combined arms (cavalry, missile troops and various armed and armored foot), as well as the use of ships to transport troops, and even fight a sea battle as if on land, I might add. Specialized and well trained professional fighters became the mainstay of the armies of Philip and Alexander of Macedon.

Though I would have preferred a more in depth look into the actual styles of warfare, the author turns the page and delves heavily into Greek moral and ethical concepts of war as well as the emerging idea of the Just War, which continues through to our own recent Gulf conflict.

Roman war, Dawson explains, was not an individually influenced system, but rather a complete military system, building and improving on the Greek style of warfare. The Romans adapted Greek warfare tactics to their own situation, relying once again on the stolid heavy armored foot. The author claims that the Romans "never develop the combined arms tactics perfected by Alexander". Scipio Africanus nor Julius Caesar, I would quickly argue, do not fit this limited parameter of Dawson's thesis.

The author goes on to compare early Roman military history as akin to primitive tribal warfare rituals, with successful generals awarded triumphs, and war viewed as a profitable business, supplying slaves, goods and lands. Rome warred constantly having "the highest rate of military participation known in any pre-industrial society except those of Prussia under Frederick the Great and Napoleonic France."

Rome had a religious connection to war, akin to Neolithic times, Dawson argues, with sacrifices, a pantheon of war gods, symbolic ceremonies, augeries, etc., all giving the Roman war machine a primary place in the evolving culture of the Roman Republic. Success also came because of Rome's system of requiring service and not booty from its allies. add to this the ability to continue fighting year after year, loss after devastating loss (the 2nd Punic War) and the war machine proved difficult to resist.

As with the author's study of Greek warfare, there is much discussion of the morality and ethical questions of war, yet the Roman writers treat Greek trickery in battle as contemptible, while following Greek distinctions between the actual causes of war. Roman history was written, not in the epic military terms such as Herodotus and Thucydides utilized, but rather in personal, chronicular fashion. Reading Caesar's Gallic Wars reinforces this observation. Roman history also focused on the Roman senate as well as on Rome (note that Rome was the Senate), simply because the writers were members of the senatorial elite.

Later Roman generals, Dawson writes, did not think in terms of territory, but of people, cities and armies. He then dismisses any later Roman "grand strategy" (a popular theme in the 1970-1980's Roman historiography), as "what looks like a coherent defense system can be as easily be explained as the result of a series of ad hoc reactions to crises..." and the "frontiers arose where the legions stopped...like a tank that breaks down in the desert and is converted into a block house." This makes sense and is reflective of some of the newer research coming to light as archaeological studies of Roman frontier settlements appear in journals such as Archaeology and the Smithsonian.

The book concludes with short chapters dealing with warfare in Medieval thought and warfare in Renaissance thought. The paradox of Church canon law which exempted certain groups from being victims of war cannot be reconciled with the orgy of destruction visited upon Moslem cities during the First Crusade. The author notes that the exemption of non-combatants from being attacked has been figuratively, if not literally retained, "Though in the twentieth century this...has been increasingly difficult to enforce."

Dawson finishes with a short discussion which states that tactics throughout history have remained essentially the same, but that the intrinsic ideal of glory in war has been lost along with any concept of moral warfare. War, he concludes, can only be justified as a protection for the innocent or to defeat the wicked, yet utilitarian arguments now "all rest upon the cost-benefit analyses." We cannot afford to ignore the lessons of classical traditions.

This is a very interesting and thought provoking book. I recommend it for its insights and viewpoint. Some ideas are definitely arguable, yet all in all, a well done effort.

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