The following reviews are extracted from Perfidious Albion.

PERFIDIOUS ALBION - A magazine of boardgame & wargame design and review edited by Charles Vasey, 75 Richmond Park Road, East Sheen, London, SW14 8JY. Send to Charles to subscribe.

The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe (Ed Jeremy Black for John Donald)

Like the varnish adverts say, this book does just what its title says. Jeremy Black has hewn himself out an area of strength in the 17th and 18th centuries and this collection of essays contains some real gems. Steven Gunn deals with the French wars of Henry VIII. Henry can be seen trying a number of policies in line with Henry V (his hero) and Edward III's attempts to seize the French Crown.

Stewart Oakley reviews the imbalances that caused wars in the Baltic from 1550 to 1790. David Parrott gives a splendid account of the beginnings of the Franco-Spanish War of 1635. I also enjoyed Paul Sonnio's exposition of the changing policy of Louis XIV over his long reign. There are other excellent essays on wars in the Balkans, the Spanish, Polish and Austrian Succession Wars and a very clever essay on the war that did not happen - the Anglo-French peace from Utrecht to the fall of Walpole. In fact I only detected one duffer, Karl Schweizer's leaden piece on the Seven Year's War.

What is particularly good about these articles is the way they view matters in a contemporaneous fashion. Did you know that Peter the Great's Russia had a population of about the same as France and less than Poland-Lithuania? In considering the position of Richelieu and Olivares in 1635 the ultimate defeat of Spain is not considered. Rather we see a Spain fresh from the great victory of Nordlingen deciding to call the French bluff and obliging France to declare war, Richelieu having done quite nicely (thank you) until then from belligerent neutrality. Just because Henry VIII failed to establish an imperium in France does not prevent his attempts as being seen as they were -serious military activity treated in that fashion by both the French and the English. The movement of Louis XIV from a France where the power of Spain must be contained, to one of greater power than Spain had in one lifetime is well explained, and particularly effectively from his own Memoires. This one joins the design heap!

The Battle of Hastings (Ed. Stephen Morillo for Boydell)

A handy-dandy primer, or Bluffer's Guide, on this important battle that aims to provide you with a good range of sources, opinions and room for thought from a new series edited by Matthew Bennett (of Society-of-Ancients and annoying Robert Hardy fame). Armed with this wee paperback any of you can jag your knowledge up to top levels without having been left with only one side of the argument. But as most if not all of the pieces are reprints you completists may encounter duplication.

The five sources are William of Poitiers' Gesta Willelmi, William of Jumieges' Gesta Normannorum Ducum, three of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicles, Florence of Worcester, the Carmen de Hastingae Proelio, and the Bayeux Tapestry. These are, of course, only extracts but very valuable for all that.

The Interpretations section is split into three categories: The Armies, The Campaigns and the Battle. Richard Abels and Marjorie Chibnall give their views on (respectively) bookland and fyrd obligation and on pre-Conquest Norman military obligation.

The Campaigns section has a splendid piece by John Gillingham on the style of war under William that analyses matters clearly with supporting evidence. A so-so piece of historical accounting to establish the logistics for the invasion piece. Finally the Grainges give an excellent summary of the naval strategies that both sides pursued within the confines of Channel shipping conditions.

The Battle section has David Hume's original account, E.A.Freeman's pro-Saxon account, J.F.C. Fuller from Decisive Battles, Richard Glover's English Cavalry interpretation, Bernard Bachrach on the feigned retreat, R. Allen Brown going pro-Norman and Stephen Morillo sweeping up. Morillo's theory is that the standard of both sides was very high and he notes how many unusual features the battle had (length for one thing).

Remarkable value.

Infantry Warfare In The Early 14th Century (Kelly DeVries for Boydell)

Snappy title heh? Yes, its Medieval Month here at Birch Bottom (Ancestral Home of the Duffers). Kelly (eldest child of the House Harkonnen Mentat as many of you will know) is not exactly an exciting writer, he has decided that repetition of detail from one battle after another is the best policy and then he confronts us with his theory at the end. This can mean that one drops into confusion with much of the early stuff as the band plays 'The World Turned Upside Down'. It also means that you look at each battle on its own merits and its own events. Furthermore it also allows DeVries the chance to discuss the different views of the relevant chronicles. One gets sixteen battles: Courtrai, Arques, Mons-en-Pevele, Loudon Hill, Kephissos, Bannockburn, Boroughbridge, Cassel, Dupplin Moor, Halidon Hill, Laupen, Morlaix, Staveren, Vottem, Crecy and Neville's Cross (plus the ambushes of Morgarten, Auberoche, and La-Roche-Derrien).

In nearly all of those battles the winning side was on foot (infantry for this purpose even if mounted infantry elsewhere) yet this is, so the Clever Dicks tell us, The Age of Chivalry. But the real common thread is not that the winner is on foot, but that the winner is the side that obliges the other to attack. The winner usually inhabits the field before the loser gets there, he often prepares the field with traps and canalising measures, he always maintains the better order.

The loser is usually the side that loses its composure first and advances to the attack (at Cassel Philip VI - later defeated at Crecy and therefore a Stupid Aristo- induced the Flemish foot to charge him and won the battle, but of course Al Nofi would tell you that this is impossible). The loss of composure often occurs amongst the chivalry affronted by these ghastly proles in serried ranks assembled. Often but not always. To DeVries the English longbow is not the 'fifteen rounds rapid' killing machine but a form of canalising fire from which men flinch or delay and its real use is not in killing men but in disordering the attacks (by killing horses for example).

Is the message therefore Attacking Bad, Defending Good? It probably is, although to tidy things up DeVries should have looked at a win for the Attacker.

It all returns to the fact that simulating battles is often simulating the last act of a three act play, it is what happens before the battle that is important in determining who is left with no option but to attack. Rather as in Roman warfare many a campaign was decided by the careful outflanking of camps and cutting them off from supplies so that the losers withdrew rather than fight a losing battle. Indeed read with a different mind-set I am reminded of Napoleonic warfare, cavalry can only win if they get lucky, catch a flank, or catch the infantry moving. Not quite the panzers of the Middle Ages.

More Book Reviews:

The Sack of Rome
Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy
Suleiman the Magnificent
A City in Conflict: Troyes
Perfidious Albion Reviews