by Dean N. Essig
Limited Foretell is a concept that originated by accident. When we first started design work on the CWB, we determined that Command and Control would not only be an important facet of our games, but that it would be the hook we would hang our games on. As design work proceeded (with numerous explorations into the obscure, I'd prefer to forget such concepts as "Mood Levels" and "Mood Points"...), the existing system which lives in the CWB took its current form. Happy with the result, I set about creating the system for the TCS. One of the things that first made an appearance there was relatively extensive prep times for op sheets. In terms of game turns, some great number of turns would flow by before a given new op sheet was accepted. Unbeknownst to me, I had created a game with "Limited Foretell." Many gamers express a desire for some form of limited intelligence to exist in their games. This desire is based on a belief that since the real commanders did not know all that much about their situation, a game that portrayed this would be more "realistic" than others where "players know all." The typical way to bring this about was an effort to hide the enemy units such that only when friendly units "bumped" into them would a player be aware of their location. With the exception of some efforts on computer and games with the luxury of umpires, such efforts were categorical failures. Most involved too much referencing to off-map "groups" or some sort of hidden movement routine. Double-Blind even required two separate games to be played with a "sunk your battleship" feel. Regardless of the skill of the designer, these were all defeats when viewed by the solitaire gamer. When I started design, I generally believed that limited intell really wasn't worth the expense in playability it asked. The idea of limited foretell was unknown and only reared its head when I observed games such as Bloody 110th in play. Here's how it works: player A looks at the situation and makes out an op sheet. Player B (whose op sheets have been percolating for turns) implements a new one and starts to execute it. Five turns (more?) later, player A's plan kicks in. By this Lime, the original plan may look pretty foolish. Player A has just become a victim of limited foretell." Because of the time lag involved between the writing of an op sheet and its execution, the value of a player's all-knowing eye in the sky has fallen drastically. While the player has a good idea of where units are-right now-he has little idea where they might be in five or more turns. Better yet, since he doesn't really know when his own plans will kick in, he may not even be sure of where his own units will be then. The enemy, for his part, is biting his nails hoping his attack order shows up before his opponent figures out that force X has no orders. Hence the term "limited foretell," the player is not inhibited from knowing about right now, and can be assumed to know little about the future. This accidental effect is actually one of the strongest facets of the TCS command system. It is also present to a lesser degree in the CWB. While we didn't know we were doing it, the effect was watered down in the original CWB due to the quickness of order acceptance and the ease of getting initiative. After the publication of the TCS and the shocking discovery of what I had created, we revised the CWB so as to invigorate its effects. While still not as virile as the version in the TCS, the change generated some of the desired effects. We also noted, with satisfaction, that when played on a large map area (such as our inhouse game of Pipe Creek, 12 maps, or the forthcoming games on the Seven Days, 9 maps in total when linked) the effects became very apparent and interesting. Additional limited foretell situations are developed in such games. Not only does it take a while to get troops started in a direction (and hard to redirect them once they are going), but with such large map areas relative to the usual movement rate, once troops have spent some time moving south, its going to take them a large amount of time to march to meet a threat in the north. A player who commits in a direction had better be right-hedging his bets will be very hard, if not impossible. Inability What limited foretell provides is the ability to know a lot about the enemy now, but an inability to do much about it. The usefulness not the extent of a player's knowledge is affected. For instance, hill Y is lightly defended. Seeing this weak spot, the player makes an op sheet to go take it. Turns pass. The enemy reinforces the hill. The attack, designed to sweep asmall force off hill Y is out- matched by the defenders. "Ok," you say, "so the attack slows to a halt or I execute my failure instructions. So what?" The point isn't that you have to butcher your troops against the hill, but that you wasted precious timeprepping for an attack against it and troops were tied up for no good use. The opposite can also happen. You see the weakly held hill Y and do the above. However, this time, before you show up, the enemy force up and leaves. So what? Let's assume your opponent is a cut above the average (mine always seem to be) and left hill Y as a bait for a number of turns. The troops on it had orders to hold the hill till 0900 and then pull back a kilometer to link up with Counterattack Force Zulu--which just happens to be a reinforced Panzer Division named Lehr. Zulu's orders are to await until enemy troops occupy hill Y and then to crush them. I, of course, would take the easy bait and capture the hill. (I can't pass up a freebie.) Within minutes, my conquering legion is cowering as the world falls in on its head. I'm now sitting on a useless piece of turf, without orders, and preparing to run for my life. Junior Guderian (the slimebag I'm playing) didn't plan a limited operation to retake hill Y, oh no, that would be too simple. He has planned a deep operation which will pursue my troops all the way off the map, crushing them, putting an end to Operation Overlord and setting back the Allied war effort three years... Luckily, this nightmare has yet to happen. (And I'm on the lookout for it, if you're out to find a sucker.) The point is that in neither case was the player intent on taking hill Y able to react to the changing circumstances-only to what he knew way back when. In the first case, he wasn't able to reinforce his attack as he watched new enemy troops show up. In the second, he wasn't able to instantly assume a dug in posture and reinforce to absorb the blow. Dangerous Capture The single most dangerous time in an attack is the instant the objective is captured. I don't want these words minced-- the MOST, period. I've seen this myself. Picture if you will a forced minefield crossing. I'm a follow-on rifle platoon leader. The first platoon has butchered itself breaching the mines and in making a small inroad into the defensive position on the other side. My platoon punches the other side, taking heavy losses, and starts to reconsolidate. I've got 12 men left. First platoon reports 8 live bodies. A report shows up that the company commander was killed. Congrats, I'm CO. I have my RTO (Radio Telephone Operator) start switching to battalion's freq. My platoon sergeant shows up and wants to know what to do with the wounded since there are more of them than there are of us and the closest place to medevac anyone is on the other side of the minefield. I, on the other hand, know that if this "company" is going to finish its mission (an objective more than 5 kilometers away), we would have to move out right then. Since we have destroyed the first line of defense (and ourselves with it) if we were to have a hope of making it, we had to leave now. Fortunately this was training and not reality. In reality, the wounded would have come first. While my 20 men were busy tending to the 50+ wounded, how much of a fight do you think we could have put up if the enemy had counterattacked strongly? Typically, when an attack succeeds (at least for WW2 Americans) the attacker's guard is dropped a little and a number of things take more importance (unfortunately) than carefully watching for the enemy reaction. Painless The best thing about limited foretell is that it is absolutely painless. It comes as a free dividend from using the basic orders system in these games. It just happens. If any of you are clairvoyant (let me know, I have some stocks to ask you about) it won't work for you. Since most of us aren't, and that sly mug across the table isn't talking, it will work just fine. On some days you might be able to dupe an opponent into doing what you want him to (see the above Counterattack Force Zulu thing), on others you won't. Most times you'll have an idea of what might happen, even an idea of enemy probable courses of action, at which point your opponent will do Something completely illogical that will trip you up. And, that is what real commanders have to deal with. Where does this leave the solitaire player? Limited foretell still has its effects, but they are more subtle and can be defeated by a player who is intent on beating the system. In the solitaire case, limited foretell will come about if the player makes his op sheets based on his best ideas for the side he is playing just then using the situation as it now stands. He shouldn't make plans based on the fact that he knows that the enemy is prepping for an attack against something. The solitaire player must rely on his judgement about what each side might know and what they might want to do about it. The limited foretell part of the operation happens because no player can foresee when op sheets might kick in (unless he cheats) and it would take a lot of careful study to interpret the interactions of several op sheets from both sides all of which are kicking off at unpredictable times. If you take the time to analyze these interactions and make your plans accordingly, you are trying to defeat the system and will probably succeed. Congratulations. If you do this, please don't complain to me that the system doesn't work. Limited foretell isn't perfect. A player still knows more about the current situation than he really should. No "boogy" man will jump out from behind a hill, While I feel that this "current" information will be of limited utility in battling the murk surrounding the future, a couple of simple rules of behavior will keep things from getting out of hand. First off, players should never be allowed to examine the stacks of the enemy to see what they contain. Players shouldn't go out of their way to study such things as the enemy order of battle roster and reinforcement schedules. If you play the game enough, a certain familiarity with the forces of both sides will result. That knowledge is fine-it is the same as a division staff learning about the capabilities and TO&E of the enemy the hard way. The point is that you shouldn't be looking over the reinforcement schedule to remind yourself of what "he's" getting next turn. With limited foretell and the few restrictions above, board games (contrary to popular myth) can give a decent level of limited intelligence. And all without having to resort to an unplayable abomination like double-blind. Back to Table of Contents -- Operations #4 Back to Operations List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master List of Magazines © Copyright 1992 by The Gamers. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |