The Battle of the Wilderness was fought on May 5-6, 1864, between the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia and the Union Army of the Potomac. Despite a nearly 2-1 Union strength advantage, the Rebels were able to hold their own and even administer a bit of a tactical licking to the Federals. However, the Yankees won a clear victory in the strategic sense.

The critical nature of this battle is easy to see. If Lee can force Grant to withdraw from the Wilderness, the 1864 campaign will be derailed. There would be a good chance that the new Union generalissimo would be discredited, the 1864 presidential election may have turned out very different if the campaign in Virginia had looked as if it was getting nowhere. And then there is the case of the thousands of Union troops who are reaching the end of their service-- would they re-enlist if the war seemed to be stalled. Would Sherman's campaign in Georgia go according to plan if Grant turned back? Or would he be more cautious and hesitant. A major Confederate victory in the Wilderness would probably prolong the war for another year and would go a long way toward winning the South's independence.

Bloody Roads South, one of the rare attempts to treat the Battle of the Wilderness as a game, is my first design. Given that the basic game system was well-established by the Gettysburg, Antietam, and Manassas games (joined lately by the very good Chickamauga game), and that Dean Essig sent me the maps, my contribution was mostly in the research and details of the battle itself. Nonetheless it was a very difficult task.

The basic problem in doing a Wilderness game is that the Federal forces out-numbered the Rebels by about 2-1, yet the strategic situation puts the burden of attack upon the Confederates. Moreover, the dense terrain imposed a greater than usual fog of war upon the two commanders. In short, a straightforward imposition of the CWB game mechanics on the Wilderness OB would result in a game thatthe South probably could not win, and the first playtests confirmed this fear.

The simplest Union tactic was an 1864 version of the human wave assaults of the modern era, in which the large Yankee brigades boldly marched up to the Rebel lines and went into Close Combat; even if the attacker was defeated in the individual assaults, the Rebel defenders were so badly mauled that they could not stand a second attack.

The solution was to use the terrain effects to limit the ability of the Union troops to maneuver and fight in the woods. Basically, Union brigades move slower and suffer minor automade morale effects in the woods. The Historical basis for this is that the very large Union brigades, many operating under inexperienced commanders, would be harder to control in the dense wilderness. Confederate brigades, by and large, were smaller and were operating under more experienced commanders, and so are exempt from the penalties. In addition, the Union suffers under a set of mild attack stoppage penalties which tend to prevent them from being able to sustain a cohesive attack with a large force. There is also an "accidental flank fire" rule to simulate that common occurrence of units being unwittingly enfiladed, often with great effect.

The net result of these changes, together with a subtle biasing of the brigade wreck levels, was to make the Union army more brittle and at the same time less effective in the woods. The Northern player must now skillfully employ his numerical edge in order to win; he can't just bludgeon his way to victory.

There are a few special rules governing the Union command structure; basically, we impose a "Burnside is a doofus" rule, together with a minor penalty on Union order acceptance based on the awkward Grant-Meade command structure. Personality sheets exist for both Meade and Burnside, in addition to Grant, since they were, in a sense, independent commanders.

In order to keep the game a manageable size we were not able to put the Todd's Tavern area on the map, hence the cavalry is not included. This was also part of the game balance decision, since the tactical use of the Union cavalry in the actual battle would probably have been devastating to the Confederates.

The game begins with the initial Union attack at 1p.m. on May 5th (many folks think this battle opened with an attack by Lee upon Grant, but such is not the case) and continues through the quiet day of May 7th, when no combat took place. There are three short, single map scenarios depicting small action, plus scenarios for each single day and the entire battle itself. Variants include the arrival of Pickett's division and more flexible Confederate arrival hexes. (The Union 2nd Corps kept an entire division out of its May 6th attack because of concern about possible Rebel troops on its left flank.)

One of the "theses" of the game is that both sides won. This is reflected in the victory conditions. Victory is measured at two levels, tactical (which measures battlefield losses and shortterm ability to continue the fight) and strategic (which measures position and long-term ability to continue the fight.) Historically, Lee won a clear tactical victory because he was able to maul Grant's army without suffering excessive losses himself. But, Grant won a major strategic victory because he was able to continue the campaign southward. In order to prevent the Union strategic victory, the Rebels must inflict more damage or hold a position which blocks movement off the south map edge.

In most playtests, the historical outcome was produced. The tension in playing the game exists because the degree to which the Rebels win at the tactical level has some influence upon the strategic outcome; if Lee is sufficiently successful tactically then he may be able to win a strategic victory as well.

Two issues which were at one time part of the design have been omitted for simplicity's sake and will probably find their way into this magazine at some point. One is a random events table, which, I think (this is a personal comment), is one of the best gaming rules but is rarely used. The second concerns an alternate starting time for the battle.

Historically, Grant issued orders for a Federal attack as early as 10:00 a.m. on May 5th, but was unable to get the ball rolling before 1:00 p.m. Starting the game at 10:00 gives the players a much more open situation to play with, but also gives the Union player more time to bring his legions to bear.