Flushed with victory from the first day's battle of Gettysburg, General R. E. Lee made preparations to continue attacking the Union Army on the 2 July 1863. By daybreak, most of his army was concentrated in the Gettysburg area. Though unprepared for a dawn attack on the Union position, Lee was hoping to strike as soon as he could get his troops in position.

Richard Ewell's 2 Corps was in possession of the town and stretched out to beyond Benner's Hill. A. P. Hill's 3 Corps would cover the ground from the Lutheran Seminary to the northern end of Pitzer's Woods. The 3 Corps was at reduced strength because Heth's battered division had to be put in reserve near Herr Ridge. Pender's Division held the left of the line while R. H. Anderson's fresh division deployed to the right. One and one-half divisions of James Longstreet's 1 Corps would be arriving soon from Marsh Creek, four miles from Gettysburg.

Meanwhile, Lee looked to his flanks as the place from which to deal a decisive blow to the Union Army and dislodge its hold on Cemetery Hill. However, his plan would depend on the coordinated cooperation of his scattered corps. To achieve this coordination, he would personally meet with each corps commander to assure that they understood his intentions.

Morning Reconnaissance

With the Confederate left flank and center already in place, the first order of business was to determine exactly where the Union left flank was located. To gain that information, Lee ordered scouting parties off to the right under Colonel Armistead Long, General William Pendleton, and Captain Samuel Johnston, his engineer. Colonel Long's primary interest was the placement of artillery. General Pendleton's party seemed to have gone as far as the Wheatfield Road or the Emmitsburg Road.

However, the General himself appeared to have gone no farther than Spangler's Woods. The only Union troops that were encountered were two cavalrymen, who were captured by the Ravine Road along Willoughby Run as the party returned to their original position. General Pendleton's trip caused Lee to believe that an attack on the Union left might succeed because of the absence of enemy troops and the fact that they had found an approach route.

The greatest impact of the reconnaissance came from Captain Johnston's report. Johnston, Major John Clarke, Longstreet's engineer, and a few others set out at about 4:00 am. They headed south, crossed the bridge over Willoughby Run north of Pitzer Schoolhouse, turned left at the schoolhouse and proceeded up the west slope of Seminary Ridge. Opposite them was Sherfy's Peach Orchard, the position of Buford's Cavalry and the 2nd US Artillery Battery A. However,

Johnston's party saw no Union troops! The scouts went farther south and crossed the Emmitsburg Road and headed east to the Round Tops, arriving at Little Round Top. Here the scouts found no Union troops either! Immediately they started back southwesterly down the hill toward Warfield Ridge. As the scouts approached the Emmitsburg Road, they had to wait for four Union cavalrymen to pass by. Johnston's party then proceeded north and directly to Lee's headquarters.

When Johnston finally found Lee, near the Seminary Building, Lee, Longstreet, and Hill were in conference. Lee, pointing to a map, asked Johnston if he had been to Little Round Top, to which Johnston replied that he had. The conference broke up and Lee talked to Johnston about the area's topography. Lee then sent Johnston to accompany Longstreet's command as a guide.

Federal Lines

Within the federal lines, from daybreak on, there was a lot of activity. Johnston and Pendleton's parties should have seen the Union cavalry at the Peach Orchard or detected units of the Union 3 Corps moving along the Emmitsburg Road that morning. Geary's Division probably had pulled out of the Little Round Top area by the time Johnston and Clarke arrived. But they should have heard the noise of the Union 2 Corps moving up the Tanneytown Road, even though the trees on the east slope of Little Round Top blocked their view.

Also, the scouting party should have heard the sounds of the camp of the Union 3 Corps units that were in the fields north of the hill, even though a morning mist concealed the bivouacs. The failure of Johnston's scouting party to detect Union troops between the Peach Orchard and the Round Tops and on the lower end of Cemetery Ridge caused Lee to formulate an attack plan that was based on an incorrect report. This mistake, combined with an inflexible adherence to Lee's plan, was to have dire consequences later in the day.

Meade Takes Control

The disorder in the Union lines that marked the end of fighting on 1 July turned into a series of troop movements that would ultimately solidify the Union position on the hills and ridges south of Gettysburg. Sometime before dawn on 2 July, General George G. Meade, along with Generals Howard and Hunt and Captain Paine, rode along Cemetery Ridge noting terrain and present troop positions.

Captain Paine, who was drawing a map, fell behind the rest of the party. Meade rode almost to Little Round Top, then north again, and then over to the Culp's Hill area as far as Rock Creek. Meade told Paine where to place the corps positions on Paine's map, then ordered a copy sent to each corps commander. General Hunt was to go along the entire line after daybreak to see to the placement of the artillery.

At this time, the Union line stretched as follows: from Culp's Hill (Wadsworth's 1 Corps division), across Cemetery Hill (the entire 11 Corps of Howard), then left along Cemetery Ridge to Zigler's Grove (Robinson's 1 Corps division); from there the line was vacant for about half a mile to the position occupied by four brigades of Sickles's 3 Corps, finally ending at Little Round Top (Geary's division, 12 Corps).

Large Map (slow: 136K)

Meade also had two reserve units, one massed behind Cemetery Hill (Doubleday's 1 Corps division), and the other east of Rock Creek (Williams's 12 Corps division). As the rest of the Union Army came up, the line would be filled in and compacted. The first change was the withdrawal of Geary's Division from Little Round Top, sometime before 5:00 am, to their new position on Culp's Hill.

The next change came with the arrival of the 2 Corps, at 6:00 am. John Gibbon met with Meade and was instructed to place the 2 Corps along Cemetery Ridge, thus relieving Robinson's Division and also connecting with the 3 Corps position. Meanwhile, the 3 Corps was ordered to extend from the left of the 2 Corps to Little Round Top and to occupy Little Round Top itself, if practicable. The original line and these changes made the Union position resemble the letter "J" with good defensive terrain along the entire line. The remaining Union units would go into reserve and be afforded the advantage of interior lines to facilitate movement.

With his position intact, Meade ordered a change in command of 1 Corps. Meade had no confidence in Doubleday's ability. So he replaced him with John Newton, 3rd Division, 6 Corps. Meade also asked his son, Captain Meade, to go see if Sickles's Corps was in position and to inform Sickles of the location of Meade's headquarters. Captain Meade went about half a mile to a single tent that marked the 3 Corps HQ.

He found only one officer, Captain Randolph, who said Sickles was in the tent resting. Randolph met with Sickles and informed Meade that the 3 Corps was not in position because Sickles was in some doubt as to where the men were to be placed. Meade was surprised by this news and hurried back to report to his father. When Captain Meade arrived at headquarters, his father was in conference with other officers. Upon seeing his son, General Meade stopped to let him report.

On hearing that Sickles's men were not placed yet, the General strongly ordered his son to ride back and repeat the morning orders to extend the 3 Corps from the left of the 2 Corps up to the line occupied by Geary's troops the night before and that this should be done as soon as possible. Captain Meade, upon returning to 3 Corps headquarters, found Sickles and repeated the orders.

Sickles stated his corps was in motion but complained that the exact position of Geary's troops was unknown to him. Randolph requested the aid of Hunt in the placement of artillery. At 7 am, or a little later, the 3 Corps was going into position along Cemetery Ridge up to the foot of Little Round Top. At about 8:00 am, Sykes's 5 Corps was beginning to mass in reserve behind Culp's Hill.

Staging the Confederate Assault

At about the same time the Union Army was moving into place, the divisions of Hood and McLaws were arriving on Herr Ridge. McLaws's troops halted about a hundred yards from where Lee was located. Lee, holding a map, conferred with McLaws about how McLaws was to set up his division at the juncture of the Emmitsburg Road and the Wheatfield Road. McLaws said he understood, but wanted to scout the ground himself. Longstreet, who was nearby, came up to McLaws and, after denying his request to go forward, stated that he wanted McLaws's division placed at the same crossroads but in a different direction than Lee had indicated.

Immediately, Lee broke in and said that Longstreet was wrong and told McLaws to face a northeasterly direction at the crossroads. McLaws was also told that Captain Johnston would guide the troops by a concealed route. McLaws returned to his division but also noted that Longstreet was visibly upset by what had just transpired. Longstreet's irritation was the culmination of an ongoing argument he had been having with Lee since the day before.

On 1 July Lee, while not wanting to engage at Gettysburg, felt compelled to stay and fight because a part of the Union Army was in front of him and without information as to where the rest of the Union forces were located, he could not afford to move and chance being caught in the open without a proper cavalry screen. Longstreet believed that a sudden move to the right, toward Washington, would force the Union Army to follow and that the Confederates could choose good defensive ground and defeat the attacking enemy. Lee told Longstreet that the battle would be fought at Gettysburg and that Longstreet was to bring up his corps. This disagreement would surface in various forms for the rest of the battle.

After the conference with McLaws, Lee rode through the Confederate lines, over to the 2 Corps headquarters. Ewell was not there because he was scouting possible avenues of attack for the 2 Corps. Upon Ewell's return, Lee and Ewell discussed whether to move Ewell's troops over to the Union left or to leave it in position on the Union right.

Decision

It was decided that the 2 Corps would cooperate with 1 Corps' attack by creating a diversion on the Union right. Ewell was to attack at the sound of Longstreet's guns. Lee, accompanied by Colonel Long, started back to Seminary Ridge about 9:00 am or a little later. By 10:00 am, Lee remarked that Longstreet should be in position and the attack should be starting. Even though Lee was still formulating his plan, he a least expected the 1 Corps to have moved into position. The Confederates had watched all morning as more and more Union troops appeared on the ridge south of town. Longstreet was delaying his movement to await the arrival of Pickett's division. Before Lee met with Ewell, Hill had Anderson's division moving into position to replace Heth's, but it was nearly noon before they were fully deployed.

This deployment was defensive in nature because Wilcox's brigade was bent back at a right angle to Anderson's line and it occupied a part of Pitzer's Woods and thus protected the army's flank. Finally, about 11:00 am, Lee told Longstreet it was time for 1 Corps to get moving. Longstreet asked permission to await McLaws's brigade, which did not arrive until just before noon. This was the last delay before the 1 Corps began its movement. The artillery took a more direct route while the infantry took the longer route.

Sickles Chooses His Ground

As Longstreet's troops began their march, the area of the Peach Orchard, which had been an active position of the Union Army all morning, was about to become the cause of great concern to General Sickles. The 66th Pennsylvania (Graham's brigade) and the 4th Maine (Ward's brigade) had set up picket lines west of the Emmitsburg Road, upon arrival on the battlefield. This was also the area where Buford's cavalry and the six 3-inch guns of the Horse Artillery (Battery A, 2nd US) were guarding the Union left flank. Six of these troopers were the same ones encountered by the Confederates scouting parties.

Sickles had assured Captain Meade that the 3 Corps was moving into place. However, this placement turned out to be a broad interpretation of General Meade's instructions. Birney, (1st Div, 3 Corps) ordered two more regiments, the 3rd Maine and the 99th Pennsylvania, to the Emmitsburg Road. Thus while three of Ward's line regiments were posted on the picket line, the other three were posted behind a stone wall, in the woods near the Wheatfield. This was forward of their prescribed position as envisioned by Meade.

Also, Bucklyn's and Clark's batteries were brought forward to Birney's advance position, with the rest of the 3 Corps artillery soon to follow. Graham's five regiments advanced to support the two batteries, and formed behind them with three regiments in the front line and two in the second line.

About 10:00 am, Calef's horse artillery battery was in position to the right of the Peach Orchard, with the 5th Michigan, Detrobriand's brigade, in support of the battery. Detrobriand's and Burling's brigades and two batteries had been left behind at Emmitsburg when the rest of the 3 Corps left to go to Gettysburg on 1 July. These two brigades and two batteries did not arrive at Gettysburg until between 9:00 and 10:00 am on 2 July. They were warned not to march on the Emmitsburg road beyond Marsh Creek, because of the danger of encountering Confederate troops. However, these instructions were ignored and they marched right up the Emmitsburg Road, turning east at the Wheatfield Road.

Operating in front of the Peach Orchard was the 1st US Sharpshooters Regiment. The 1st and 2nd Sharpshooters formed a demi-brigade under Colonel Berdan assigned to Ward's brigade. Major Stoughton, 2nd US Sharpshooters, deployed his companies as skirmishers on the left of Birnery's line. Guarding a ravine near Little Round Top, one company was placed on the brow of a hill and another across the ravine itself. This could have been the Plum Run Valley area.

Four other companies were placed across the Wheatfield Road, probably in the Wheatfield area; the last two companies were held in reserve. Berdan had three companies of the 1st US Sharpshooters near the Rogers House, where they cooperated with the 4th Maine and the 99th Pennsylvania. Walker, 4th Maine, reported that in Spangler's Woods there was a large concentration of enemy troops. When it was decided that the enemy should be pushed back, Walker and Berdan decided that a move by the flank was safer than to march directly ahead.

While Sickles was making his deployments, Tremain, Sickles's senior aide, went to visit Meade. Tremain informed Meade that no troops were located on the left flank of the 3 Corps. Meade told him that the cavalry would guard that part of the line. As time passed, Sickles and Birney grew more concerned over what they considered the ill placement of the 3 Corps line that Meade had ordered. The only 3 Corps units even near the originally prescribed position were those, of Humphrey's division, which were massed on the west slope of Cemetery Ridge, east of the Trostle Farmyard. Sickles felt that Meade did not comprehend the dangerous position that he believed his corps was in, so Sickles and Tremain went to Meade's headquarters to meet personally with the commanding general.

Shape of the Coming Fight

Meade had been busy, during the morning hours, exploring the possibility of an attack by the Union right against the Confederate forces facing them. At 9:30 am, Meade ordered Slocum and Warren to scout the ground in front of Culp's Hill for avenues of advance. This attack was to be led by the 12 Corps and supported by the 5 Corps and the 6 Corps upon its arrival to the battlefield. Slocum and Warren reported to Meade that the terrain on the right was unfavorable for the type of attack he had planned. With this in mind, Meade ordered the 5 Corps moved from behind Culp's Hill to a more central location, between the Baltimore Pike and the Tanneytown Road.

At about 11:00 am, Sickles and Tremain arrived at Meade's headquarters. Sickles reported to Meade that he still was not sure where to post 3 Corps. Meade took Sickles outside and pointed to Little Round Top, which was to be the left flank of the 3 Corps and also said that their right was to be connected to the left of the 2 Corps. This was at least the fourth time that Sickles had received orders for the placement of his corps. Sickles asked Meade if he was authorized to place his men as he saw fit. Meade replied that Sickles had the authority to work within the limits that Meade had given him.

Sickles also wanted a staff officer to accompany him for the purpose of selecting the artillery positions. Meade told Hunt to go with Sickles. As they rode from headquarters, Hunt asked Sickles what the problem was. Sickles stated that the low ground on the southern part of Cemetery Ridge on which he was to place his corps was lacking in good artillery positions and was commanded by the high ground to his front, the Peach Orchard area which Sickles wished to occupy.

Hunt told Sickles that though he agreed with Sickles about the commanding ground of the Peach Orchard area, an advance to this position by the 3 Corps would pose three dangers. First, there was the salient that would be formed by such a line. Second, there were not enough troops in the 3 Corps to adequately cover the forward line. Last, the connection to the 2 Corps would be broken, thus leaving both 3 Corps flanks in the air. During this ride through the 3 Corps position, Hunt noted that part of Sickles line was already advanced forward of where Meade had intended it to be placed.

When Sickles asked Hunt for permission to move from the Plum Run line to the Peach Orchard area, Hunt stated that he did not have the authority to grant Sickles's request and that he would report the situation to Meade. With this Hunt left Sickles.

About this time, Buford, who had asked Pleasonton for permission, started leaving the Peach Orchard area with two brigades of cavalry to return to Westminster (MD) to refit and assist in guarding the army's trains. Buford also took Calef's battery with him, thus leaving only the infantry to guard the area. Sickles sent a courier to Meade to protest this loss of a cavalry screen.

Meade ordered Pleasonton to replace Buford's troops. Pleasonton ordered David MCM Gregg, commander of the 2nd Division of the cavalry corps, to dispatch a regiment as soon as possible to the Peach Orchard area. The regiment never arrived. Sickles's concern grew because of the reported Confederates in Spangler's Woods. After Hunt left, Sickles ordered a reconnaissance sent into the woods.

Berdan and Captain Joseph C. Briscoe, Birney's aide, led companies D, E, F, and I, 1st US Sharpshooter Regiment (about 100 Men) and the 3rd Maine Regiment (about 210 men) south along the Emmitsburg road. This column was in plain view of any Confederates who might have been on the ridge opposite them. Berdan formed his men in Biesecker's Woods and pressed forward.

The Union force encountered an Alabama infantry regiment, of Wilcox's Brigade, in Pitzer's Woods. As the Union troops fell back to the Peach Orchard area, Sickles dispatched Tremain to report this encounter to HQ. About this time, Hunt was making his way back to HQ, by a different route, to report that Sickles was out of position.

Skirmish

As the men of Longstreet's command marched to the right of the Confederate line, the sound of the skirmish at Pitzer's woods had little effect on them. Major skirmishing had been going on all morning. About 6:00 am, a fight had broken out in front of Cemetery Hill and lasted two hours. A little after 7:00 am, there had been firing heard toward Culp's Hill, and artillery was constantly being heard up to the time 1 Corps had started its movement. Captain Johnston, who was leading the column, had been told by Lee to avoid being seen by a Union signal station that had been set up at Little Round Top. Johnston and McLaws, just after passing Black Horse Tavern, ordered the column halted. As the two rode to the top of a crest they determined that the column would come in view of the signal station.

While they discussed this problem, Longstreet, who had been riding with Lee and Hood, demanded to know what the delay was. It was stated that an alternate route was to be used, which Longstreet then approved. However, Hood, in his haste, marched his division into the rear of McLaws's division. This added a traffic jam which delayed the counter march and infuriated McLaws.

By noon, Lee's battle plan had fully matured. The Union force at the Peach Orchard area was expected to be two regiments and a battery. J. B. Kershaw's brigade was to strike the Union force at the Peach Orchard, turn to its left, and then form in line to the east along the Wheatfield road with its left near the Emmitsburg Road. William Barksdale's brigade would form on Kershaw's left. They would be followed by P. J. Semmes's and W. T. Wolford's brigades. Hood's division would form up behind McLaws's division. Law's brigade was to be on the right and Robertson's brigade on the left. They would be followed by Benning's and Anderson's brigades.

The 1 Corps artillery was to unlimber on the high ground, in the Peach Orchard area. The infantry was to move northeast up the Emmitsburg road until it hit the flank of the Union army, which was believed to be the left of 2 Corps on Cemetery ridge. This belief was based on the hours-old reconnaissance of Johnston.

Lee's plan was not confined to 1 Corps. Anderson's division, of Hill's corps, was to be on the right of 1 Corps, and was to continue the assault against the Union center. Wilcox's brigade was out of line for the echelon attack planned for Anderson's division. The Confederate right was also to participate in the assault. Ewell's troops were to attack at the sound of Longstreet's guns. Edward Johnson's division was to attack Culp's Hill, even though Walker's Stonewall Brigade was extended guarding a portion of the Hanover Road. Early's Division was to attack east to Cemetery Hill, though Hay's and Avery's brigade were the only ones in position. Rodes' division was to push forward to engage the Union forces on Cemetery Hill. All the attacks by Ewell's corps were designed to stop Meade from reinforcing the Union left. If the situation became available, Ewell had orders to attack any weak point he found in the Union line. The entire assault that Lee had planned would require a type of coordination that the Confederates had yet to demonstrate at Gettysburg.

Given Lee's reluctance to give direct orders, he would be placing the initiative of his assault in the hands of three corps commanders who, on this day, did not have it in their hearts to aggressively pursue this attack. Hill had been unwell the day before. Ewell was showing extreme caution. Longstreet was stricken by Lee's refusal to heed his council and felt that Lee had turned over his tactical deployment to McLaws. Thus as he left Lee, who returned to HQ, Longstreet seethed with the determination to follow Lee's plan, no matter what the consequences.

Union Reaction and Adjustments

Following the report of Buford's withdraw, Meade's HQ became a hive of activity. Tremain arrived there first and informed Meade of Berman's fight in Pitzer's Woods. Meade told Tremain to return to Sickles and inform him that a cavalry detachment was ordered to his front. Next, Hunt arrived and informed Meade that a portion of Sickles's Corps was out of position. This was too much; Meade had to go see this for himself. It was 2:45 pm when Meade stormed out of his HQ.

Since his favorite horse, "Old Baldy", was not readily available, Meade accepted Pleasonton's offer to use his horse. Meade and his staff rode south. As they passed along Cemetery Ridge, Warren pointed out to Meade that this was where the 3 Corps should have been. Meade stated it was too late to place it there. Meade sent Lt. Reese, Warren's aide, to Sykes with orders to bring the 5 Corps to the left of the line. Warren was sent by Meade to Little Round Top to see if it was posted with troops. As Meade's party left Cemetery Ridge, they passed through Humphrey's Division. Some of the soldiers cheered as the commanding general rode past. Sickles had not called Humphreys forward yet. Meade found Sickles and his staff just south of the Trostle Farm.

Sickles was directing the placement of the 3 Corps artillery. Meade exploded and demanded to know why Sickles had abandoned his original position. Sickles explained that the original ground offered no artillery position. Meade stated that Sickles could not hold this position without support. Sickles said he would return to his original position. Meade informed him that it would not be possible because firing was being heard from the Peach Orchard area. Meade told Sickles to finish deploying his corps and sent Ludlow, of Meade's staff, to order Humphreys's division to move up to the Plum Run line. Mackenzie, of Warren's staff, arrived to inform Meade that Warren found Little Round Top undefended. Mackenzie was sent by Meade to have Sykes send one division to Little Round Top.

Next, Meade sent an aide to Hancock to have Caldwell's Division extended south on Cemetery Ridge. Also, Meade sent an aide to Slocum to ask him to dispatch one or two divisions from Culp's Hill to reinforce Caldwell. However, at least one brigade had to be left behind to help defend Culp's Hill. While Meade watched the picket line melt back from the Emmitsburg Road, he knew the 5 Corps would soon be arriving on the left and that the 6 Corps was on its way to Gettysburg.

Longstreet Follows His Orders

The picket line at the Emmitsburg Road was falling back from the pressure of Kershaw's brigade. At 3:25 pm, Longstreet and McLaws rode with Kershaw's brigade up the west slope of Seminary ridge. The counter march was just about over. Longstreet asked McLaws, "How are you going in?"

McLaws said, "That will be determined when I can see what is in my front." Longstreet noted, "There is nothing in your front; you will be entirely on the flank of the enemy." McLaws said, "Then I will continue my march in columns of companies, and after arriving on the flank as far as is necessary will face to the left and march on the enemy." Longstreet said, "That suits me," and rode away to meet with Hood. Kershaw's troops emerged from the woods that ran along the crest of Seminary ridge.

To cover his deployment, he sent skirmishers forward rapidly to engage the skirmishers of the 3 Corps, who were west of the Emmitsburg Road. The rest of the brigade advanced in a series of company columns, in which each regiment presented about 15-20 files across and 20 ranks deep so that they could deploy quickly into the standard two-rank fighting line. The 3 Corps troops melted back from this tide of Confederates. As McLaws hurried the rest of his brigade forward, Kershaw's men watched the Union force disappear into Rose's Woods. Some of the men commented that it was a Yankee trick to draw them off from the unprotected Union flank. Other men wondered what those woods really contained. One of the men was Hood, who was on the ridge with Longstreet.

When Hood voiced his concern of forming in the open without having Rose's Woods scouted, Longstreet simply replied, "There is no time for that; we must obey the orders of General Lee."

Bibliography

Coddington, Edwin B., The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons Paperback Edition, New York, 1984.
Downs, David B., "'His Left was Worth a Glance': Meade and the Union Left on July 2, 1863," The Gettysburg Magazine 7, July 1992.
Luvaas, Jay and Nelson, Harold W., Eds., The US Army War College Guide to the Battle of Gettysburg, Harper & Row Paperback Edition, New York, 1986.
Pfanz, Harry W., Gettysburg--Culp's Hill & Cemetery Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1993.
Pfanz, Harry W., Gettysburg--The Second Day, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1987.
Sauers, Richard A., A Caspian Sea of Ink: The Meade-Sickles Controversy, Butternut and Blue, Baltimore, 1989.

Plum Run Scenario