While the Civil War, Brigade Series has met with overall approval, there are some minor controversies that never seem to go away. One of these is the effect of woods on fire combat, and why units don't receive defensive benefits on the fire CRT when shot at in the trees. After all, the argument ran, other games had such effects. Ergo, the CWB needed them too. So where are they?

Despite a brief effort to explain our logic in the designer's notes of Thunder at the Crossroads, the questions still come in. This time I'll try to explain our rationale more fully, and provide a few historical examples of combat actions to justify our reasoning.

The Gamers' rationale in first designing the CWB was to provide a vehicle for portraying Civil War combat at the brigade level without drowning the system in complicated clutter, while providing sufficient detail to hold one's interest. We wanted a game that was a simulation, but also playable in two to three sittings.

Among the numerous questions that demanded attention in the design were woods effects. While we knew that most other tactical Civil War games had them, we questioned the need for their inclusion. In the final design, tree effects were omitted, since the woods benefit was just not borne out by examining historical losses.

Woods Benefit?

Initially, I personally considered a defensive woods benefit worthwhile, and easily done (a simple die roll modifier or column shift). However, as time went on, I began to closely study combat situations to try and determine what effect woods did have on combat, and formed a new opinion. Study suggested to me that unit losses failed to decline when a unit formed line in the trees.

The reason was that Civil War units maintained their battlelines even inside the tree lines, in order to preserve that most vital of combat functions: command control. (Except when skirmishing.) Additionally, combat occurred at much closer ranges, where the greatly increased lethality of the weapons offset any protective factor from tree trunks. Combat at 10 to 30 yards was common in the woods, a range which was all but suicidal (and almost unheard of) in the open.

In examining situations, I looked for easily isolated circumstances where combat occurred in both open and wooded terrain. I also tried to find situations where the action was of short duration, 1 to 2 hours (two to four turns), and where most or all of the appreciable loss of thc units involved for that battle occurred during the particular event chosen. Ultimately, I chose three actions, Brawner's Farm, McPherson's Woods, and Little Round Top, to substantiate my contention.

Before embarking on an examination of these three actions, I should spend a moment defining terms. Distances of over 200 yards are considered two hex range, of 200 to 50 yards are 1 hex range, and of less than 50 yards to bc close combat, or same hex, range; assuming clear terrain. Woods constricted combat dramatically, to less than 50 yards for the most part. Close combat in the woods is defined as combat at about 15 yards.

Brawner's Farm

Brawner's Farm occurred on the evening of August 28th, 1862, a prelude to the battle of Second Bull Run (see August Fury). The Union Iron Brigade -- the 2nd, 6th & 7th Wisconsin, plus the 19th Indiana -- along with the 76th New York and 56th Pennsylvania of Doubleday's brigade, same division, were attacked by five brigades of Jackson's Left Wing.

The whole battle lasted about three hours and was divided into three phases: from 6:00 until 6:40, (1 turn) the Federals deployed with minor losses. The Rebels brought up their own infantry and for the next 90 minutes (3 turns) a firefight raged, with the lines between 70 and 100 yards apart. Finally, darkness brought the acdon to an end, though random firing continued until 9 p.m. (2 more turns). The serious fighting and major losses resulted from the three turn firefight between the infantry, conducted at 1 hex range. The closest distance reported by any of the participants was 70 yards.

The Federals had approximately 2487 men engaged in the firefight, 1937 from the Iron Brigade and 550 from Doubleday's two regiments. The Federal line was about 1000 yards long (5 hexes), though not solid, for a gap of at least 200 yards was left in the center to meet the Rebel line, which initially overlapped both Union flanks. The Confederates made no real effort to exploit this gap or take the Union troops in flank, but contented themselves with linear exchanges of volleys. The Union lost 961 of the 2500 engaged. Of this figure, only a very few were lost in the first and last portions of the fight. For example, the 95th New York, which received only artillery fire and was not involved in the firefight, reported a loss of 16 men.

Final results: 25 strength points, occupying four hexes, lost 9 strength points (rounding down to account for the above mentioned artillery inflicted losses and other casualties not specifically incurred during the firefight) in three turns. All units involved were exposed in open fields.

Confederate losses are not so easily determined. The Rebels ultimately commined portions of six separate brigades (6400 men) to this action, and certainly suffered losses in equal proportion to the Federals. Regiments of the Stonewall Brigade, for instance, reported losses of up to 40% in their small units.

However, most of these troops also bore the brunt of heavy fighting for the next two days, in the 2nd Banle of Bull Run. Separating losses for individual firefights embraced within the larger action of the three day battle (counting Brawner Farm as the starting point) would be nothing more than guesswork.

McPherson's Woods

The second action occurred on July 1st, 1863, at Gettysburg. Again the Union Iron Brigade was involved, this time against Archer's Brigade of Heth's Division. It was a meeting engagement, with the Federals arriving to replace Union dismounted cavalry in opposing the advancing Rebels.

The Union regiments deployed into line and advanced up the east side of McPherson's Ridge, which was partially covered by an irregularly shaped grove of trees and orchard. The Union troops met the Rebels at the crest of the ridge, two units inside the trees and the other two regiments in the open fields around it. Archer's troops were surprised and fell back in disorder. The Yankees pursued, advancing several hundred yards, across the small valley containing Willoughby's Run and halfway up another ridge.

As with the Rebel losses at Brawner Farm, both forces here were involved in heavy fighting later in the battle. Fortunately, however, these actions are more readily broken down into discreet incidents which can be used to infer losses.

The Federals numbered 1470, and lost at least 450. Of these, losses in the woods amounted to 205 of 666 men or 30.8%. In the open, 804 men lost 245 or 30.5%. The Southerners took 1197 men into the fight. Due to incomplete reports, it is unclear which units fought in the woods and which were in the clear, but at least half of the brigade was in the trees.

The brigade losses for the action number at least 342, 28.5% (and were probably much higher, closer to two thirds of the three-day total, 456 or 38%. I have chosen the smaller figure as a minimum.) The entire action lasted less than one turn, and each line occupied between 300 and 400 yards of front, two hexes. In game terms, the Federals clearly launched a close combat. As can be seen, the numbers here indicate no lower losses for those men fighting in the trees.

Little Round Top

Little Round Top, July 2nd 1863, was also a brigade sized affair, with half the force in and half out of the woods. This was a bloody action, involving both one hex combat and close combat as well. Also, this fight was the only real fighting done by any of the involved regiments, I Northern or Southern, at Gettysburg, and so the losses suffered here by each side can be determined with greater precision.

Little Round Top is one of the most famous actions of the war, pitting Vincent's Union brigade (reinforced by the 140th New York of Weed's Brigade) against elements of Law's and Robertson's Brigades. The Union forces were deployed in line along the southwest face of Little Round Top, posted to meet the rapidly approaching Rebels. Vincent's men, 1300 strong, held a 400 yard line. The regiments were posted in the order described above, running from left to right. All of the 20th ME and half of the 83rd PA were in the woods, the rest of the troops were in the open, on the rock-strewn but exposed face of the hill. There was no time for Union troops to significantly improve their position with breastworks.

The time question is more difficult to determine, especially since so many conflicting descriptions of the action exist. The fighting probably lasted about 90 minutes, three turns of game time, but there may have been some significant pause between specific Rebel attacks as those forces regrouped. The Rebels advanced to their first attack, the 4th ALA, 4th and 5th Texas striking first at the center of the Union line, near the juncture of the 83rd PA and the 44th NY, and then spreading northwards.

The first Rebel attack did not seem to come closer than 50 yards, ending in a repulse. Then the three CSA Regiments fell back to about 500 yards distance to reform. The second attack swept forward, this time including the 15th and 47th AL, who maneuvered to flank the 20th Maine's Line. This time the lines closed further. In the open end of the line, reports indicated that the men closed to within 30 yards; over in the woods the distance closed to 10 yards, with perhaps some hand to hand fighting.

At the peak of this second attack, the 140th NY arrived to reinforce Vincent's right flank. On the left, the 20th ME refused its flank and repulsed the Alabama troops. The Rebels fell back a second time, the Texans to about 300 yards distance and the Alabamans, in the woods maintained tenuous contact with the Yankees at about 50 yards. Finally the Rebels prepared to withdraw, having concluded that they could not take the Union position. At this moment, the 20th ME attacked and forced the 15th and 47th AL to retreat precipitously. This counterattack brought the action to a close.

As previously stated, none of the engaged troops fought any other significant action at Gettysburg. The Federals numbered 1336 in Vincent's Brigade, with the 140th NY adding 447 more men, for a total of 1783. They occupied an initial position 400 yards in length (two hexes). This line contracted due to losses but was also extended by the arrival of the 140th, probably not exceeding 450 yards overall.

For at least 150 yards, all of the 20th ME and half the 83rd PA were in the woods. The Union line breaks down as follows: open, 1247 men over 250 yards; woods, 536 men over 150 yards. Losses: total, 485 or 27.2%; open, 332 or 26.6%; woods, 153 or 28.5%. Now for the Rebels. The South had 2016 men deployed over about the same frontage, 450 yards. The 140th NY overlapped the Rebels a little on the right, but the left, in the woods, saw the Rebels extended a little past the 20th ME's line.

In the open, the CSA deployed 1007 men over 200 yards, and in the woods, 1009 over 250 yards. Losses in open, 366 men or 36.6%; in the woods, 259 men or 25.7%. The first attack consumed no more than one turn, followed by a short pause, and then the second phase probably lasted two more turns. Considering that on both sides the men in the woods were engaged for only about two thirds as long (two turns instead of three, because of the 15th and 47th AL lagging behind the others) losses were even proportionally higher in the woods than on the open slope. I found it especially interesting to note that the Rebel losses broke down well into a roughly 12% per turn loss rate, despite terrain differences.

Treelines

I also searched for an action in which one side defended a treeline while the enemy assaulted across open fields, since comparison of such statistics would be the clearest proof of the validity of a woods modifier. So far, I have been unable fo find such an action that fits the above requirements in order to provide clear analysis.

There is an interesting reverse example I found, in looking at the position of Thomas' Union 14th Corps at Chickamauga. Thomas' men were placed in a semi-circular line east of the Lafeyette Road, around a large cleared field. The Union battlelines were placed well within the treeline, and the Rebel assaults also came through the trees, but the enemy was unable to fire on the cleared area and this greatly facilitated the shifting of Union reserves, etc.. That clearing was one of the major, if unheralded, strengths of Thomas' position.

In more general terms, I can find no evidence that the presence of trees in and of themselves had a significant and beneficial impact on losses. Both Chickamauga and The Wilderness were fought in largely wooded areas, and overall losses do not seem significantly lower than for other actions. It was far more common for troops to be deployed in open terrain wherever possible, even if a wooded area was close at hand, since command and control difficulties increased exponentially in even lightly wooded areas.

Having come all this way, however, I will bow to the inevitable and propose a woods modifier of sorts -- but not the one you were expecting. My reading in this regard has convinced me that the significant impact of woods was not in any defensive benefit, but rather the increased measure of confusion and loss of control they caused.

When any unit is fired on in the woods, I suggest that one be added to the straggler die roll, increasing the straggler loss accordingly. This is a purely optional rule, and simulates the much greater degree of disorganization to be found when fighting in the woods. In partial woods hexes, ignore the modifier since it can be assumed that the defending troops would form up in any available open terrain.

Last Word on Woods Effects (Op2)

Replies: Letters to the Editor (Op5)