Author: Rory Muir
Pages: 466
Illustrations: 16 black and white reproductions of period English satirical cartoons.
Maps: Eight small-scale half-page maps depicting the areas of campaigns with little detail.
Footnotes: 804, mostly referential, a few annotated.
Appendices: None
Bibliography: About 300 published secondary sources, almost 100 published primary sources, and nearly 300 unpublished primary sources such as official papers of key politicians and diplomats, collections, etc.
Index: Approximately 1,900 entries and sub-entries.
Publisher: Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut
Publication Date: 1996
Binding: Cloth (hardbound)
ISBN: 0-300-06443-8
Price: $45.00
Summary: Rory Muir's book Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon 1807-1815 is a valuable and detailed history of British political and diplomatic activity during the Napoleonic Wars, specifically covering the period after the fall of the Grenville government when England stood alone in 1807, until the final defeat of Napoleon.

Most histories of the Napoleonic era focus on military campaigns, with acknowledgment of the political and diplomatic aspects only as far as they impacted the immediate formation of strategy. Rory Muir takes a different approach in Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, examining the British political situation in detail while narrating only briefly the conduct and outcome of resulting military and naval operations. The result is a valuable work that goes far to explain why Britain conducted the wars the way it did, covering from the formation of the Portland government in March 1807 to the signing of the Second Peace of Paris in November 1815.

After setting the scene with a helpful introduction, Muir's book moves in rough chronological order describing the political, diplomatic, and military events of the period beginning with the Copenhagen Expedition of 1807. He provides fascinating details on the choice of commanders for various campaigns, such as Portugal in 1808 (initially, Arthur Wellesley) and Walcheren in 1809 (Lord Chatham).

He clears up some of the ambiguity surrounding the decision to recall Major General Wellesley to London after the future Duke of Wellington's victory at Vimiero in 1808. However, although he provides ample information on the various ministers's reactions to the subsequent Convention of Cintra which was highly favorable to the defeated French, Muir fails to illuminate the conduct of these negotiations (presumably because they were conducted by generals and not diplomats).

Beginning with negotiations with the various Spanish juntas in 1808, Muir also describes the diplomatic coalition-building that the British undertook. He includes little-known (at least in America) information on Mediterranean aspects of British strategy, such as intrigues in the Bourbon court at Palermo, Sicily, and Lord William Bentinck's attempts to intervene in Italy (Bentinck was envoy to the court at Palermo and commander of British forces in Sicily).

There is a good, succinct analysis in a chapter and a half on the causes, conduct, and impact of the American War of 1812. Also, the book emphasizes the importance of South America in the political decisions of the Spanish Cortes (parliament), although Muir is frustratingly remiss in never describing the revolutionary activity in that region.

Muir's narrative emphasizes diplomatic activity even further once the balance begins to tilt against Napoleon in 1812. Muir downplays the impact of nationalism as a romantic myth fostered later to bolster national pride. Instead, he highlights the role played by King Frederick William's advisors in taking Prussia back into the Sixth Coalition against France. While there is little new in Muir's explanation of the fundamental differences in British, Russian, and Austrian war aims in 1813, he is careful to distinguish what is known from what is speculative (particularly regarding Tsar Alexander's intentions).

Muir decidedly admires British diplomat Robert Castlereagh, Foreign Minister from 1812-1822 under Lord Liverpool, who planned Wellesley's expedition to Portugal in 1808, and masterminded two major coalitions against France. However, he also includes the activities of lesser diplomatic figures as well, and stresses the importance of their personal relationships.

For example, here are some observations about the chief British diplomats during the 1813 campaign in Germany: "Cathcart was too phlegmatic, too lazy and too ready to accept Russian assurances, while Stewart lacked experience, authority and skill in diplomacy". Stewart's feelings about his associate are noted in a letter quoted by Muir: "Lord C[athcart] takes two days to consider a despatch, and two to write one, and he never begins to think till other people have done . . . . [He] will be more of a Russian than an Englishman soon, he is so bigoted to his Emperor [Tsar Alexander]."

Possibly since it is already the most well-known, there is a lengthier description of Waterloo than of any other campaign in the book. In his explanation of British government decisions during this period, Muir quite clearly subscribes to contemporary social scientist Arno Mayer's theory of the Primacy of Domestic Politics. He provides numerous examples of political decisions motivated by the self-aggrandizing ambition of the principles rather than the perceived good of the state (Richard, Marquess Wellesley, brother of Arthur, being his primary target). Tellingly, his narrative reveals that the politicians of the age were concerned with playing off one another, with only passing regard for the sentiment of the electorate.

This book also examines, without getting bogged down in detail, Britain's difficulty in financing the wars for the eight years it took to secure final victory. Muir concludes that maintaining faith in the British government and economy was critical in enabling the government to secure loans with which to continue to fight, since direct revenues were never sufficient.

This in turn contributed to some of the more conservative policies of the government, since continued prosecution of the conflict required a widespread perception that the British were not losing, rather than a conviction that victory was near.

Nonetheless, Muir stresses that British financial resources were stretched as far as they could go in 1811-12. If the British had suffered defeat in their Salamanca campaign of 1812, or if Napoleon had achieved victory in Russia that same year, Britain might have been forced to accept peace for want of funds. Even after the disastrous French retreat from Russia: "The incident [Napoleon makes a peace overture in April 1813] is interesting, for it suggests that Britain might have been willing to make peace with a far stronger France than had existed in 1802-3 or even 1806."

One of the few weaknesses of the book are the few maps which lack detail, and do not include a number of key features mentioned in the narrative. In stark contrast with the deficiency in maps is the extensive bibliography, complemented nicely by an invaluable six-page "Bibliographical Essay". The latter is nothing less than an annotated critical bibliography of the major sources for this subject, and is highly useful for anyone seeking further information.

This is an important work for those seeking a broader knowledge of how Britain sustained its numerous coalitions and eight-year war against Napoleon. It is a recommended reference for all students of the period.

More book reviews:

The Dream-Hunters of Corsica
Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon 1807-1815

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