Author: Donald D. Horward
Pages: 439
Illustrations: 42; 8 black and white reproductions of period portraits, 33 black and white photos of the battlefields and structures as they look today, and 1 diagram of fortress and siege defenses.
Maps: 13, including 3 plans of forts, 3 battle maps denoting units down to regimental level, and 7 showing Spain and the various campaign areas.
Footnotes: 545, about three-quarters of them containing only citations, the rest annotated.
Appendices: None per se, although there is one glossary containing 100 foreign terms used in the book, many of them siege-related.
Bibliography: 122 works enumerated, plus reference to 12 manuscript collections in Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal. Also listed are 56 published memoirs, diaries and correspondence, 42 secondary sources, 3 newspapers, and 24 more recent works.
Index: Very complete; 14 pages, with 1,044 entries.
Publisher: Greenhill Books, Lionel Leven-thal Limited, London. Available in the U.S. through Stackpole Books of Mechanic-sburg, Pennsylvania.
Publication Date: 1994 update of a 1984 edition copyrighted by the Board of Regents of the University of Florida
Binding: Cloth (hardbound)
ISBN: 1-85367-183-5
Price: $40.00 US
Summary: Napoleon and Iberia is a nicely balanced narrative of the sieges of Cuidad Rodrigo and Almeida and their overall significance within the context of the Peninsular War. The story of the sieges is enhanced by an excellent series of maps and photographs of the fortresses. The photographs in particular help the story come alive.

Pity poor Marshal Ney. As one of the great captains of Napoleon's army, he was adept at the split-second decision-making needed to snatch victory on the battlefield, although his administrative skills were indifferent. Sent to Spain in late 1808 as part of Napoleon's planned offensive into Portugal, he found his combat skills minimized and his administrative shortcomings magnified.

The problem Ney faced was a familiar one to the French in Spain. The limited forces available to French commanders could be dispersed into tax-collecting and police duties, in which case major enemy forces were unopposed; or, they could be concentrated to fight the main enemy forces, in which case food and money quickly ran out. Compromise, with some forces concentrated and others dispersed, meant that neither problem was adequately solved.

Ney complained, "Despite all the measures I have taken to destroy the bands of guerrillas, we have not yet succeeded. The brigands continue to torment us, intercepting our convoys and cutting off our isolated weak detachments. It is almost impossible to attack them for they are protected by the villages where they receive information, recruits, and horses." When ordered to take the offensive, as Ney was in 1810, the French rear areas were quickly overrun by guerrilla bands and bandits.

By the beginning of 1810, it was clear that another invasion of Portugal would be needed to eliminate the British base there which was supporting the Spanish insurgency. In order to succeed, the French needed control of a major road through the mountains separating Spain and Portugal, along which they could pass supplies and reinforcements. Two such routes existed, but both where fortified.

In the north, the Spanish fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, and its companion Portuguese fortress of Alameida, blocked the French. In the south, the much larger fortress of Badajoz and its companion Elvas posed an even bigger problem. Napoleon decided to tackle the smaller fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Alameida. As the closest French commander, Ney got the job of taking them.

Horward's book is more than just a narrative of these twin sieges. It is an attempt to place the sieges in their overall context, and explain how and why the sieges went as they did. In doing so, he ties together a large number of threads into a cohesive skein that explains not just what happened in this campaign, but makes the assertion that this particular campaign had a decisive influence on the outcome of the war in the Peninsula.

Of the fifteen chapters in this book, seven cover the twin sieges. Others cover French plans and dilemmas, the Allied situation, the war over logistics, and operations that occurred in the time between the two sieges, plus a concluding chapter. The story is told in straight, chronological fashion.

As Horward details, Ney's perceptions of the difficulties he faced were accurate. The French in the Peninsula seemed strangely unable to grasp the need for a single, coherent plan of operations, and instead relied on local commanders to deal with their own problems, largely unaided by a central command. The situation needed a Napoleon to resolve, and Napoleon was not available.

Instead, the army had to settle for a lesser sort of Bonaparte, brother Joseph, on the throne of Spain. Ney recognized the difference. He wrote to Napoleon: "I wish the Emperor would come to Bayonne to regulate the principal operations and give each army corps positive instructions on the conduct to be followed. It seems to be the only way to avoid hereafter all the orders and counter orders that constantly arrive from the King's headquarters which are almost always as impractical as they are contrary to the interests of the Emperor."

Massena

To help resolve the problems faced by Ney and his fellow commanders, and command the expedition, Napoleon named Marshal Massena as the Commander in Chief of the Army of Portugal. Although the choice seemed timely, given Massena's brilliant performance the previous year in the Danube Campaign, the fact was that the 1809 campaign had been the last flare of a fading star. Massena had neither the energy nor the strength left to impose his will on his highly independent subordinates, the nearly impossible logistics situation, and an enemy who had been given the time to prepare for the French blow at a natural strong point.

Ciudad Rodrigo was important to the Spanish: "Strategically located, [it] was a constant threat to isolated French units operating in the province of Salamanca; it was a temporary headquarters for the Spanish army and the guerrilla bands posted on the Portuguese frontier, a depot for military supplies, and the seat of the Revolutionary Junta of Old Castile. As the last hope of Spanish resistance in Old Castile, the fortress served as a psychological rallying point for the people in northern Spain...and a possible base of operations for Wellington's army during attack on Salamanca, Valladolid, or even Madrid."

The fortress and its Portuguese companion work at Alameida were vital to the British as well. Wellington had insufficient British troops to face the French in the open. He needed time to train the Portuguese army and construct the Lines of Torres Vedras that protected the approaches to Lisbon. A lengthy French siege of the two fortresses would buy him that time.

The Spanish were determined to hold Ciudad Rodrigo. The fortress boasted "an ancient stone and red brick wall 29 feet high, 30 feet thick, and almost a mile in circumference." It had a garrison of over 6,000 men, and 120 cannon and howitzers. It had a food supply sufficient for six months, and a commander, Lieutenant General Andres Perez de Herrasti, who understood the significance of his position, and labored mightily to make it as strong as possible. If the French wanted his fortress, Herrasti was determined to make them pay dearly for it.

Indeed, so formidable was the fortress that Horward questions why Napoleon simply did not mask it and proceed with an invasion of Portugal. Victory in Portugal would have made the position of the garrison untenable. Napoleon had apparently tired of shoestring operations and the inefficient manner in which his corps commanders had chased the enemy over the countryside.

He wrote to Massena that "the summer must be spent taking Ciudad Rodrigo, and afterwards Almeida;...the campaign must be managed methodically, and not by disconnected expeditions." There would be no more gambles. Horward regards this as a strategic blunder: "If Massena had been free to mask the fortresses, invade Portugal, and march on Lisbon, the campaign might have been different."

This is the only one of Horward's contentions with which I took issue. Massena had only a limited number of men, and could not afford to have a substantial portion of his force tied down defending against sorties from enemy fortresses. Leaving enemy garrisons across his own supply lines would cause Massena great difficulties.

Furthermore, the extent of British efforts to fortify Lisbon was not known to the French. Either French strategy was risky. Taking the fortresses seemed to Napoleon (and, even in hindsight) to be the best military option available.

Siege Forces

The French committed substantial forces to the siege. Ney's 6th Corps was reinforced by two massive siege trains, with over 43 siege guns, 1500 horses, 250 wagons, and a vast array of siege equipment and supplies. Massena brought the 8th Corps to provide cover against a sortie by Wellington's troops just over the border in Portugal.

The arrival of the 8th Corps provided an example of why the French strategy in Spain was failing. Horward notes, "When units of the 8th Corps were moved forward into the province of Salamanca, Taupin's troops seized the [6th Corps] magazines at Zamora which had been gathered 'with great difficulty' by Loison's division. Ney complained to Massena indicating that the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo would have to be renounced unless he gave 'the most stern orders that our magazine be respected.' "

At the point where the campaign got underway, the viewpoint of the book shifts from the strategic to the operational and tactical. In the four chapters on Ciudad Rodrigo, the reader learns much about the theory and practice of siege warfare in the Napoleonic era. In essence, the idea was to use the spade to dig trenches that would allow sufficient firepower (in the form of siege artillery) to get close enough to the walls to make a breach. Once this was accomplished, the fortress could be taken by storm if it did not surrender.

The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo followed this script. The French began their works on 15 June 1810. The bombardment commenced on the 25th and breached the wall by 8 July. A storming effort had been prepared for the 10th. On that day, the Spanish commander "yielded to the voice of reason...and decided to capitulate."

Best Part of Book

The result of the siege may have been foreknown, in the absence of a relief effort, but the best part of Horward's book is his description of the various plans and stratagems used by both sides to advance or retard the progress of the siege. The stoic heroism of the men of both sides through the bombardment becomes especially clear, and there are moments of remarkable valor as well.

When it came time to determine if the breach was fortified, "Ney appealed for volunteers to make one last reconnaissance....He told them, 'You will be killed, but you will die as honorable men.' From the 100 men who stepped forward, Ney chose [three]. Pelet wrote in his journal, 'Those three grenadiers were superb, marching like heroes, and proudly announcing to everybody that they were opening the path to glory. They were electrifying, and they electrified me....' Ney was hard pressed to restrain the assault columns."

The siege of Almeida stands in stark contrast. After the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, some sharp skirmishes and one small battle (all well-covered in the book) were required to establish a French position under which they could besiege Alameida. Again, the French trenches were begun. Again, the siege batteries were pressed forward. Again, the engineers and troops on both sides labored with stoic bravery. But this time, there was a difference.

On the first full day of the bombardment, 26 August 1810, there was a spectacular magazine explosion that destroyed much of the ability, and almost all of the will, of the garrison of Almeida to resist:

"At approximately 7:00 PM, one or perhaps two charged bombs from Ebla's Battery No. 4 landed in the courtyard before the castle. [Accounts differ but] according to a Portuguese artillery officer, 30 artillerymen were working in the magazine to transfer barrels of powder to the expense magazines on the ramparts so the great doors to the castle were open. The charged bomb rolled down the steps of the building into a subsidiary magazine and ignited 4,000 charged projectiles, which instantly ignited 150,000 pounds of gunpowder and over a million infantry cartridges....The entire building erupted in a massive explosion....According to Ney's chief of staff, 'The explosion was dreadful but the effect was even greater. Massive blocks of stone were thrown into our trenches....Cannon of large caliber were thrown off the ramparts and thrown far across the countryside....A great part of the town disappeared, and the remainder was in rubble."

The garrison suffered heavily, and, even worse, was now denied all but a pittance of ammunition. The governor, British Colonel William Cox, was determined to hold out until Wellington had the opportunity to relieve the fortress, but it quickly became clear that the Portuguese officers of the garrison considered their position untenable and were unwilling to risk the fate of a contested assault (which generally ended in the slaughter of any garrison which resisted after an assault was practical). Cox surrendered the fortress of Almeida on 28 August, after a twelve day siege.

Eighteen days later, Massena marched his troops off on their doomed expedition into Portugal. By the time the French arrived in front of Lisbon, the Lines of Torres Vedras had just barely been completed. The French had lost their race against time, slowed as they were by the fierce resistance of the defenders of Ciudad Rodrigo.

Horward's book offers invaluable insight into how strategy and tactics, terrain, logistics, fortune and human errors mix in determining military success in Napoleonic siege warfare. In the end, no single factor determined the relative success or failure of the French and Allied efforts. It is the unique interplay of these various factors that is important to the outcome, a phenomena I cannot remember encountering so well described anywhere before. This is a thoroughly enjoyable book for anyone with an interest in the Peninsula or in siege warfare.

More Book Reviews:

Napoleon and Iberia
Napoleon and English Romanticism
Representations of Revolution

Related:

Interview with Donald D. Horward

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