[p, 13] From 1792 to 1814 the Austrian army was the largest force continually engaged against the French Revolution and Napoleon and carried most of the burden of the war on land. Though repeatedly defeated, it always rose again. In 1809 it inflicted the first setback on Napoleon himself and in 1813 contributed the largest contingent to the allied effort in Germany. Even so, the army has been neglected by English- speaking historians.... ... As all armies, the Habsburg army was a reflection of its society and, perhaps, more than most, it never freed itself from the influence of the political, economic, and social system of its day... [P. 35] Austrian strategy conformed to the prevailing school of military thought that tried to reduce the conduct of war to a methodical, precise, and predictable pattern. Moreover, it was held that in war against western European armies the issue of victory or defeat no longer depended primarily on the ability of the commanders or the quality of the troops, but, to a large extent, was a question of coincidence and logistics. Therefore Fieldmarshal Lacy advocated the so-called "cordon system,"' a defensive deployment attempting to be equally strong on all sectors of the front, reinforced by fortresses such as Theresienstadt, Josefstadt, and Kbniggratz in Bohemia. Moreover, the strategy appealed to Lacy's orderly mind because it left control entirely in the hands of the army commander. In a very large army a senior general sometimes might command a detachment, Armee Abtheilung, but he had no independence and initiative was discouraged .... Overall, the cordon system was brittle and already had failed against the Turks in 1788-9; it would prove even less effective against the mobile French revolutionary armies because it left the army outnumbered at any point this enemy chose to concentrate. [p. 171] A major problem was the slow rate of advance. To sunder the enemy before he could concentrate, and Charles was confident that he could not do so before 18 April [1809), it was necessary to reach the Danube in eight marches.... Austrian sources frequently blamed the bad roads and weather for the slow pace of advance, but conditions were no better for the French. The reasons were more complex. Fearing to provoke popular resentment and concerned about discipline, Charles never accepted the system of direct requisitioning practiced by the French. Then too, the corps commanders were not used to march troops in corps formations and continued to use the old order of march. Their formal columns were too wide for the available roads, while the inclusion of the brigade batteries in the column led to frequent traffic stoppages....That night troops bivouacked badly mixed up and their condition was not improved by an order for a general issue of a half-liter of wine to all. "Unfortunately,"' the official history records, "there was no wine to be issued." More Rothenberg From Fighting Nazis to Teaching Napoleonic History Excerpts: The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon Excerpts: Napoleon's Great Adversary: Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army 1792-1814 Back to Table of Contents -- Napoleon #14 Back to Napoleon List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1999 by Napoleon LLC. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. The full text and graphics from other military history magazines and gaming magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com Order Napoleon magazine direct