Bagration vs. Lannes

Commentary and Conclusion

by Chris J. Hahn

COMMENTARY

This solo-wargame was called just a single turn before its planned conclusion. As related above, the Russians had run out of cavalry and were beginning to feel the pressure of the more numerous, if reduced in strength, French battalions. Additionally, the south end of the Russian line had folded with the withdrawal of the horse batteries. The Guard Fusiliers had essentially taken themselves out of the battle when they entered Blasowitz. On both flanks, the French had the distinct advantage in the mounted arm. On the south edge of the field, there were a total of six cavalry regiments under command of Murat. The majority of these were classed as heavy horse. Far to their left on the north end of the plain, d'Hautpoul had four regiments: two of heavy (his own) and two light from the ad hoc light cavalry division under Fauconnet.

In some respects, the wargame reconstruction proved faithful to the historical event. For example, the cavalry action on the southern portion of the field. In the wargame however, Caffarelli's infantry played no part in the destruction of the Russian cavalry from V. Column. In other respects, most notably in casualties taken and caused, the reconstruction proved more a bloody wargame wherein both commanders rolled a lot of sixes when it counted.

Totaling up the SHAKO ratings from the orders of battle, one arrives at the following figures: The Russians had approximately 48 MR in cavalry, 62 MR in infantry and 27 MR in artillery. At the end of the wargame, the Russians had no cavalry left, as mentioned previously. Forty-eight "points" or "factors" were a complete loss. Two regular Jaeger battalions were destroyed in addition to the one Guard Jaeger unit. That's 13 infantry "factors" right there. The Musketeer Battalions of the three main regiments lost a number of men in the fight with the French; one might put this number at 18 "factors," or half of their original strength. In contrast, the artillery arm of this Advance Guard did not fair too poorly. One half-battery was destroyed and a few others suffered the loss of one or two pieces. In the main, the Russian guns were the least affected arm on the wargame table. As a final note, only one of the Russian higher-echelon commanders, Maj. General Voropaitzki was rendered hors de combat.

The French totals show the following: 65 MR in cavalry, 88 MR in infantry and roughly 24 MR in artillery. With respect to losses, the French suffered about 22 "points" in terms of the mounted arm, or one-third. Additionally, Kellermann and Nansouty were both wounded. French artillery did not experience any loss at all. The majority of losses were taken by the infantry commands, and especially those units making up the 1st Division. In this command alone, out of 42 "factors" present on December 01, only 17 "factors" were counted immediately after the engagement. The 3rd Division experienced some loss as well, though this was minor by comparison and concentrated in Beker's command.

In still other resptecs, these losses seem too severe. I recall the one point during the wargame when the Russian Hussars lost 80% of their regimental strength in a single turn of melee. Any surviving trooper and commander for that matter - in their right mind - would have decided that enough was enough and made for the quickest exit from the field. And yet, I do detect some purpose behind the SHAKO rules governing unit effectiveness or ability to withstand punishment and losses. Perhaps the overall MR of a unit is a number representative of that point at which self preservation takes precedence over unit cohesion and morale. The loss of four (4) MR points or factors in a five (5) rated unit does not mean then, that the unit has lost 80% of its number. It simply means that the unit is very close to losing heart and very close to leaving the field.

In his narrative of the battle, Bowden relates how, in the matter of moments, the vaunted Uhlan Regiment from V. Column lost 400 men of an original compliment of 950 to the Frenchmen of Caffarelli's Division. (398) But then, based on the history of the battle and on the above situation, it seems to me that it might be worthwhile to explore or experiment with a kind of morale roll in the SHAKO system. Instead of having units fight until the last man (moral rating point), they would have to roll against what losses have been taken to see if the stand, withdraw or retreat completely.

There were a few other points during the wargame when the previously listed rule amendments did not cover the occasion. In these cases, rules were made up "on the spot" though they were not codified. As suggested above, these rules would need to be worked out in more detail.

For example, the SHAKO rules state that cavalry are not allowed to breakthrough after attacking (destroying) a battery of artillery. (Section 11.3 on page 23) As related in the wargame narrative, a brigade of French horse did succeed in routing enemy guns and then found themselves very near the flank of an infantry line. Realistically, I could not come up with any valid argument as to why the horse could not continue and fall upon the infantry. Therefore, the breakthrough was allowed and conducted. The French were penalized for subsequent disorder, however.

Along similar lines, it seemed logical (in the interest of promoting more of a solo kind of play and taking even more control out of my hands) to dice for breakthrough movement and/or recall and recovery. In that way, Nansouty may not have been able to control his brigades of heavy horse. In that way, either the French or Russian horse may have acted like the British Guard Regiments at Waterloo some 10 years later. All to the perfect chagrin of the commander (player), of course.

The SHAKO rules also prohibit unit interpenetration(s). More specifically, "formed units or guns may not interpenetrate each other except when cavalry are in Recall or when units and Divisions are in retreat ..." (Section 8.10, page 13) Following the historical deployments in Bowden's text, the Russian battle cavalry in the second line would have to do a lot of maneuvering in order to get around the infantry in the first line. Better, I think (and here again, it's not been fully tested or drawn up as a rule revision) is to let formed units conduct interpenetration or "passage of lines." Perhaps a penalty to movement allowance could be assessed? Perhaps the units doing this kind of move could "earn" a temporary disorder marker? There is historical evidence for consideration. Turning yet again to Bowden's narrative, he relates how Cafferelli's infantry "opened up their intervals as coolly as if they had been on a parade ground." Kellermann's horse withdrew between those intervals, disordering neither foot nor cavalry regiment. (399-400)

CONCLUSION

This wargame reconstruction of The Battle of Austerlitz (northern flank of the field), did not run completely true to the historical event. That is to reflect, the Russians weren't out-generated or out-maneuvered or out-fought by the French. Though the cavalry engagement on the south end of the field went pretty much as it did almost 200 years ago, the rest of the battle was "up for grabs." This was especially evident in the contest between infantry formations in the center. At the same time, I think it can be argued that the reconstruction did not devolve into a "simple" wargame with no heed paid to the historical course of the day. In my opinion, and I realize that it is not without its bias, the wargame was a very good blend of both history and of wargame. Featherstone might well agree.

SOURCE MATERIAL

Austerlitz 1805: The fate of empires, by Ian Castle.
Battle Notes for Wargamers, by Donald Featherstone.
"It All Began with Austerlitz," Chapter 24 in Napoleon Bonaparte, by Alan Schom.
SHAKO. Rules and Army Lists for Napoleonic Wargaming, by Arty Conliffe.
"It is Impossible to Make a Good Omelet Without breaking a Great Many Eggs!" The Epic Battle of Austerlitz, Chapter VIII in The Glory Years 1805-1807 Volume 1: Napoleon and Austerlitz (An Unprecedentedly Detailed Combat Study of Napoleon's Epic Ulm-Austerlitz Campaigns of 1805), by Scott Bowden.

    From the above text, the following appendices:
    Appendix H: Page 496, Lannes 5th Corps; page 497, Murat's Cavalry Reserve Appendix I: Page 502, V. Column (Russian Cavalry); page 503, Advance Guard of the Army - Major-General Prince Bagration

"Fire & Fury for the Napoleonic Wars," by A. N. Other. Wargames Illustrated 143, August 1999, (30-33).
"Austerlitz: Virtual battlefield Tour," by William Peterson. In Reader's Articles: Wars, Campaigns & Battles, from NapoleonSeries.org.
PIQUET: Master Rules for Wargaming, 2nd Edition, by Bob Jones. (Specifically, page 23 on Commanding Officer Ratings.)
"Quatre Bras Considered: The Research and Development of a SHAKO Solo Wargame," by Chris Hahn. MWAN 107, September / October 2000.
"Piquet Regimental," by Jim Getz. MWAN 117, May / June 2002.

Bagration vs. Lannes Shako Treatment of Right of Austerlitz

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