The Organization of
The American Army of the
War of 1812

Militia

By Greg Novak

It had been a hallmark of American political thought that the existence of an organized militia, controlled by the state authorities and not the federal government, was considered essential to the well being of the new government. After all, it was the power that would prevent a budding young Napoleon or Cromwell from seizing control of the national government with the end of the standing army. Though considered so necessary on paper, the usefulness and readiness of the militia varied on a state by state basis. Some states were able to turn well-equipped bodies when requested - other state could only turn out an unarmed mob. Yet it was on this force that Madison pinned his hopes of mustering a force large enough to march on Canada.

In 1790, Henry Knox laid out for Congress a proposal for a militia organization, which Knox named the "Legion. States were to form "Legions" as needed with the following organization:

The Legionary Staff

    1 Legionary or Major General
    1 aides de camp (Major)
    1 Quartermaster (Major)
    1 Inspector and Deputy Adjutant General (Lieutenant Colonel)
    1 Chaplain

Two Infantry Brigades, each with

Brigade Staff

    One Brigadier General
    One aide de camp

Two Infantry Regiments, each with

    Regimental Staff
      1 Lieutenant Colonel Commandant 2 Majors 1 Adjutant 1 Paymaster 1 Quartermaster

    Two Infantry Battalions each with:Four Infantry Companies, each with 1 captain 1 lieutenant 1 ensign 6 sergeants 2 musicians 64 privates

Two Companies of Riflemen, each with:

    1 captain 1 lieutenant 1 ensign 6 sergeants 2 musicians 64 privates

One Battalion of Artillery, with: Four Companies of Artillery, each with

    1 captain 1 captain lieutenant 1 lieutenant 6 sergeants 12 artificiers 52 privates

One Squadron of Cavalry, with:

Two Troops of Cavalry, each with

    1 captain 2 lieutenants 1 cornet 6 sergeants 1 saddler 1 farrier 1 trumpeter 64 dragoons

Those states with larger populations would form more than one legion, those smaller states were to reduce the organization in proportion. This plan remained the basis for the organization used bv the militia in the War of 1812.

States modified the above plan as needed, with the term division being used in the place of the term "Legion", except in the Mississippi Territory. New York organized its mounted troops on paper into nine regiments of cavalry in three brigades. Massachusetts for example added battalion staffs to the artillery battalions, and Maryland formed rifle battalions. Virginia added a grenadier and light infantry company to each regiment. Western states tended not to organize artillery units. Though minor changes to Knots plan for a Legion were commonplace, yet the basic organization tended to remain the same through the states.

States also tended to change and modify the rank structure. The post of Lieutenant Colonel Commandant were often changed to the rank of full Colonel, and many states also added the rank of Lieutenant Colonel as well. Additional lieutenants were added to the different companies. General officers were not forgotten, with the eighteen states, five territories and District of Columbia having at the start of the war no less than 62 major generals and 229 brigadier generals commanding some 694.73 officers and men.

The above organization was tempered by the existence of "volunteer militia" companies All states and territories had laws, which allowed citizens to form their own militia units, and the right to self regulate the membership of these formations. The "young bloods" or other social group could then arrange to serve among friends, and not among lessor folk in the regular militia In return for this privilege. the members of the "volunteer militia" provided their own weapons, equipment and uniforms. Through the use of these "volunteer militia" units, states were often able to provide their needed rifle, artillery, and cavalry units without the state having to pay for them.

Some states counted these "volunteer militia" formations as part of existing units, while some states used them as "flank" or elite companies and attached them to existing regiments. These "volunteer militia" were an important part of the system, as they tended to be the best equipped and best trained formations that could be put into the field.

In theory all of the able bodied men in an area between the ages of 16 and 60 would semi c in their local militia or "volunteer militia" company. If an area's population was large enough, it would boast multiple companies. Thinly settled areas would have problems in raising a single full strength company. In either case, the actual militia companies would only be called up for service in the event of an enemv attack on their area. Any other calls for militia would be made by either asking for volunteers, or drafting men out of existing units into new formations usually on the basis of age.

This is where the great confusion with the militia of the War of 1812 begins. Throughout the war the Federal government requested the call up of militia units from the various states. Unless it was a case of the British being "at the gates", the Washington - Baltimore campaign of 1814, the actual existing militia formations were not called up. Rather the governors of the states would call for volunteers among the senior officers to raise a unit. That officer would be commissioned into what was effectively a provisional unit, and repeat the call for volunteers among company officers in part or all of the state. The chosen company officers in turn would call for local volunteers in their respective areas. If sufficient men could not be found to fill the ranks, the company commanders could draft men out of the local companies

Each state could set up its own system to ensure fairness among the militia which were to be drafted if volunteers could not be found. Ohio for example divided its militia into 8 groups or classes of men. All of the members of one class would have to serve before members of the next class could be called up. Other states worked out systems of rotation as well, and all states allowed for the use of a substitute if a drafted militiamen did not wish to, or could not serve in the field. State law could exempt certain occupation or age groups, but rarely was a draft on the militia unfilled.

One of the best examples of the demands that the militia service could make was noted in the new frontier state of Ohio. The prewar census of 1810 found 39,426 white males between the ages of 16 and 45 within the state, of which 35,275 were enrolled in the militia. During the war Ohio was called on to furnish 3 Infantry Regiments of Militia for Federal service, as well as have numerous units called up for local defense from raids by Native Americans and for the protection of supplies moving north.

The final report for Ohio has 26,280 militiamen being called up for duty, serving as follows.

    In the 1st Ohio Infantry Regiment: 108 infantry companies
    In the 2nd Ohio Infantry Regiment: 85 infantry companies
    In the 3rd Ohio Infantry Regiment: 56 infantry companies
    Unassigned: 185 infantry companies, 25 mounted infantry companies, 13 troops cavalry, 1 battery artillery

Not all of the companies served at the same time - some served for as little as a month_ others - in particular those mustered into Federal service - served their six months. The infantry regiments never had more than ten companies serving at any time_ but had a constant stream on units rotating in and out of service. In Ohio, where the war was seen as a matter of self-defense, it was possible to carry on in just a manner - but in other states such backing by the populace would be lacking.

There were several major problems with the militia system, two of which were self inflicted by Madison's administration. To start with, the plans as drawn by Knox assumed that the militia would serve for a maximum of three months. At the start of the war, Congress changed the term of service for the militia called into Federal service from three months to six months. Thus those who volunteered for state service only had to serve three months, those who ended up as militia in federal service served six months For most militiamen, the three-month service was far more popular and preferred to service with the Federal government.

Second, in early 1813 the new Secretary of War, James Armstrong. changed the size of companies called into Federal service. Before the companies were accepted into Federal service. the were ordered to be reorganized to a new establishment with:

Late war Militia Company: 1 captain 1 first lieutenant 1 second lieutenant 1 third lieutenant 1 ensign 5 sergeants 6 corporals 100 privates

With states still calling up the old size militia formations, it quickly became necessary to merge three "old style" companies into two "new style" companies. Militiamen who had volunteered to serve under officers of their own choosing suddenly found themselves serving under different ones. Companies sent off to represent their local area with honor found them removed from the order of battle. While neither of these issues was enough to destroy the militia system, the effect of both harmed it was discouraging militiamen from volunteering for duty.

The most serious problem with the use of militia was the tug of sear between the states and the Federal government over the use of militia. One very unanswered question that plagued the militia from the start of the war was the question as to whether or not a militia formation could be made to lease the United States and enter Canada or other foreign territory. In fact, there was some debate as to whether or not a militia unit could be made to leave its state that was not settled by the Supreme Court until 1827_ Add to this the refusal of the Madison's administration to cooperate with the Federalist Party - which controlled New England. and the stage was set for a bitter fight over the militia.

The New England area was considered to have some of the better-equipped militia in the nation. A call up of these forces was considered necessary for any invasion of Canada. However all of the senior officers of the militia were Federalist. and the Madison's administration was unwilling to do anything that might promote the career of an opponent. When the first call for Massachusetts troops were made, no less than 41 separate company sized formations were called for, but no officer higher than that of lieutenant colonel was requested. When the same procedure was repeated in other New England states. the Federalist governors responded by refusing permission for their militia to leave the state.

The fight between states and the Federal government continued for the rest of the war Those states, which supported the war, were willing to allow their militia to be called up for service - those states, which did not support the war refused to cooperate. As the war went on, and the size of the Regular Army grew, the need for the creation of special militia formations for active service along the Canadian frontier lessened. Conversely, as the British brought more pressure to bear on the American coastline, the actual militia formations found themselves increasingly being called up to repel the British thrusts and defend their homes.

The Organization of The American Army of the War of 1812


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© Copyright 2002 Hal Thinglum
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