The Great Saxon War 1756

Part 4

By Steven Verdoliva

In the West Cumberland (26SP) spent early June sitting in Munster studying the situation. Meanwhile the French armies reversed their marches and started back North and West, D'Estrees (30SP) to Kleves and then Wesel, Contades (21SP) to the Palatinate and on to Kleves. As Contades entered Kleves, Cumberland decided he must force march his army to catch D'Estrees before Contades could join him. Cumberland issued his orders and the Hanoverian camp began to break up and start the march to Wesel.

The Battle Of Wesel

The battlefield at Wesel was a matter of chance as both armies stumbled into each other while using the same road from opposite directions. The terrain description is from the French side. On the right was an unfordable river which could be used by either side to protect their flank. Feeding into the river was a slow but steep sloped stream. It entered the river equidistant to both armies and curved back towards the French center. It was fordable at three places each ford at about the center of one third of the stream length. By the ford nearest the river, on the Hanoverian side, was a small walled farm. On the French left was a small forest and a couple of small rises. none of which had any influence on the battle. Bisecting the battlefield and crossing the stream at the middle ford, was the road on which both armies had traveled.

The French commander D'Estrees (30SP) knew he slightly outnumbered Cumberland (26SP) on the field but also knew that Contades (21SP) was only a good march away and could easily reinforce him it needed. D'Estrees decided then to attack all across his front holding a reserve under his personal command. On his right he put a wing of heavy cavalry in one line under General Chevert, with their flank anchored to the river. To the left of this was General Beaujoli with the grenadiers and most of the better infantry from the foreign units in two lines. To the left of this was General Artois with most of the French infantry in two lines. Most of Artois' command was recruits, whose main purpose was to pin the enemy in front of them while Beaujoli conducted the infantry assault. On the French left was another heavy cavalry wing, under General Broglie, formed in two lines. The Hussars formed a flank guard, while the light infantry was placed to the right of their cavalry. D'Estrees placed himself arid the small reserve behind and between the commands of Artois and Beaujoli.

The Hanoverian deployment looked much like the French. Their far left under General Clauswitz was a mixture of heavy and light cavalry in two lilies. General Angus was next and deployed in two lines with his left infantry touching Clauswitz but his right hanging open. A large gap of roughly one halt mile separated Erbprinz Karl from Angus which put his left in the air as he deployed his infantry in a single line. On Karl's right was General Zastrow with one halt of his infantry in line facing the French The other half was in a large column and intended as a reserve. Behind Zastrow was Cumberland with the elite grenadiers arid guards as a reserve under his personal command. Making up the right of the Hanoverian army was General Braust. His command was a mixed force of light infantry, which touched Zastrow's right. and a refused line of heavy cavalry. Backing up both of these was a line of infantry. Cumberland's plan was to fight a defensive battle. He Would count on the overall quality of his troops to stand an attack and then counter attack.

The battle is best described by starting at the flanks and ending at the center, The French heavy cavalry on their right engaged their Hanoverian counterparts in an almost separate battle that by the end of the day would see the Hanoverians very disordered and pushed back towards the river away from their infantry. Its main point for both sides was that it contained each others cavalry but for the French it also covered Beaujoli's advance.

On the French left their cavalry advanced and attempted to work their way around and behind the Hanoverian right. The Hanoverians countered by trying to pass their cavalry behind their infantry supports but this caused some confusion and the French were able to attack the rear of some of the retiring cavalry and overrunning a couple of infantry battalions. This forced Cumberland to deploy his elite reserve to restore his line. Cumberland saw a chance to counter attack and cut off the French left wing by attacking their light infantry. This was covering the gap between their cavalry arid infantry. To do this he ordered his own light infantry and some of his redeployed cavalry to attack. Command problems hampered the Hanoverians at this point which only produced a weak attack which was held off by the French light infantry until their left wing cavalry could come back to support them. The attack had failed to cut off the French but had stopped their movement against the Hanoverian right. This would be the basic situation for what remained of the day.

As the battle opened Cumberland did not notice the gap between his left cavalry and his infantry center. Unfortunately for him the French did and it could not of been in a better place. Looking straight at the gap was that darling of the French army, Beaujoli and his grenadiers. (Note: In all fairness it must be admitted that the author was Beaujoli)

Beaujoli moved forward as quickly as possible to take advantage of the gap. As tie passed the engaged French cavalry, Beaujoli detached two battalions of his right to support the cavalry and stop any interference with his own attack. Advancing his grenadiers the furthest until they passed Karl's line, the entire French center looked to be attacking in echelon leading with its right. Karl's only response was to attempt to pull back his exposed flank but it was to little to late as they were attacked in a flank assault arid either driven off or destroyed. Beaujoli's remaining infantry advanced and pinned Karl's right hand infantry in place with a musket duel.

Zastrow, seeing Karl's predicament, shifted his reserve column to where Karls left had been and engaged the grenadiers in a fire fight. Artois meanwhile had only slowly advanced to keep in touch with Beaujoli's left. D'Estrees slowly shifted the reserve to the left due to the increasing gap between his infantry and left cavalry wing.

Beaujoli's men were getting the better of Karl's in their fire fight as some of Karl's battalions started withdrawing. Zastrow saw this and started side stepping his front line over to but behind Karl's battalions. This caused Zastrows troops to be screened from firing and gave Karl's men no way to retire and reform. Worse however was to follow. The movement of Zastrow to the left and Cumberland's attack against the French light infantry had opened up another gap in the Hanoverian lines. D'Estrees immediately ordered Artois to push forward while the reserve covered his left and would it needed reinforce him. Beaujoli renewed his assault with the grenadiers, pushing back and disordering Zastrow's infantry. His other battalions destroyed what was left of Karl's right and closed in on Zastrow's supporting line.

Cumberland looked around him and was discouraged. The battle was seven and one halt hours old and not a thing had gone right from the start. His army had been driven into three separate pockets, no reserves were available, and most important in Cumberland's mind was the fact that there was only one Hanoverian army and its total destruction could not be risked. He sent out his couriers ordering a general retreat.

"What shall I tell my father the King?" Cumberland thought to himself.

D'Estrees saw the enemy leaving and ordered his Army to halt. There would be no close pursuit, a true gentleman would not do such a thing. "Besides" though D'Estrees, "The enemy was much abused and we'll pick up many of their fellows as they desert a lost cause." D'Estrees turned to his aides de camp, true toadies one and all, and asked "What do you think my reward from the King will be? I'm already a Marshal of France. How about being a Duke? Duke D'Estrees. I like the sound of that. Fetch pen and paper, I must write to Madame Pompadour and the court at once."

D'Estrees observations of the Hanoverian army were correct. They had suffered heavily on the battlefield and suffered almost as heavily from desertion. So disordered was Cumberland's army that he could not move it from the Wesel area without causing further damage. D'Estrees casualties had been amazingly light. It was indeed a glorious day for France. (Fr -1SP vs Han -6SP cas and -5SP cap)

In mid-June, a little over a week after the Battle of Stettin, Brunswick (11 SP) could see the spires of Stralsund. As he approached he watched Hamiltons Swedes (9SP) march out and deploy a short distance from the city.

Battle of Stralsund

The terrain and Hamilton's deployment was virtually the same as at the earlier Battle of Stettin. His center was based on a low hill with both wings bent back and the cavalry on his right. Brunswick's deployment was almost a repeat also. His left was made up of heavy cavalry, infantry in the center facing the Swedes on the hill, and the light cavalry on the right with a couple of heavy cavalry units supporting them.

Hamilton's plan was also the same as before, pass his cavalry to his left between the two armies and, with infantry support, destroy the Prussian right. Brunswick's plan was an all out attack while keeping a close eye on his losses. To many losses and Brunswick would not have enough men to besiege Stralsund.

As the battle started Hamilton passed his cavalry over to his left as planned and drove back the Prussian right but did not destroy it. Hamilton needed to make a decision whether to follow after the cavalry and destroy it or press on into the flank of the infantry. Hamilton, hoping to inflict maximum casualties, attacked the infantry but not before the Prussians had put together a line to face them. Hamilton launched an uncoordinated attack on it but made only a slight impression. Brunswick meanwhile had continued the advance of his left wing cavalry and the left halt of his infantry. In a well coordinated attack they were pushing back and destroying the enemy right. As the left pushed forward and the infantry on the right held against the Swedish attack, the Prussian right wing cavalry reformed and attacked the exposed flank of the Swedish left. They quickly mauled it forcing it to retire back to the hill.

As Hamilton's left and right were now retiring he ordered a retreat into the fortress of Stralsund. He had lost almost one quarter of his forces in a five hour battle and had not inflicted enough losses on Brunswick to stop a siege. It was a dark day for the last of Sweden's Baltic empire. (Losses- Swd -1SP cas and -1SP cap vs Pr -1SP)

Brunswick was content with the battles result. He had pushed Hamilton's Swedes back into Stralsund and had not suffered enough to prevent his besieging them. Brunswick ordered up his siege train and gathered his engineers to start the siege of Stralsund.

By mid-June of 1757 Europe had seen five major battles fought and the capture of an army. For the Prussians and French it was two months of glory. For the Hanoverians, Austrians, Swedes, and the Empire, it was best forgotten.

More Great Saxon War 1756


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