by Gen. Sir Edward Hamley, K.C.B.
The drama now shifted into a new act, in which the Allies
were to be themselves attacked, and forced to fight for their
foothold in the Crimea.
Jumbo Map: Upland Plans (extremely slow: 510K)
Immediately after he quitted Sebastopol,
Menschikoff had been joined by the remainder of his forces
in the peninsula, hitherto beyond the sphere of action, being
stationed in its south-western corner. These amounted to
12,000 men, and he also received the further reinforcements
which, as already said, were on their way from Russia. In fact,
the troops which might come to him from thence had,
practically, no other limit than the means of transporting
them. He therefore drew closer to the place, and while
keeping his main force beyond our ken, had begun on the 7th
October to send parties down to the Tchernaya. Soon
afterwards his lieutenant, General Liprandi, established his headquarters
at Tchorgoun, on the further bank, and the force of all arms
placed under him began to assemble about that place. It
gradually grew till it reached, according to Russian official
accounts, the number of 22,000 infantry, 3400 cavalry, and
seventy-eight guns, when it was considered strong enough for
immediate action.
It has been said that the valley between Balaklava and
the Tchernaya is crossed by a line of low heights, stretching
from the foot of the plateau to the village of Kamara, and that
along their course lies the Woronzoff road. Four of these
hills had earthworks on their summits--mere sketches with the
spade; a donkey might have been ridden into some of
them--and they had been armed with, in all, nine
twelve-pounder iron guns. The extent of this line of works
was more than two miles. Their garrisons had no support
nearer than the 93d regiment, and the Turks and marines
immediately around the harbour, who were 3000 yards off.
The Russians had, of course, observed this, and also the
weakness of the works, from the high hills above Kamara, and
at daybreak on the 25th October their attack began. Crossing
the Tchernaya from the Traktir Bridge upwards, and keeping at
first altogether on the side of the valley nearest Kamara, their
advanced guard came rapidly on, brought ten guns into
positions commanding the hill (known as Canrobert's Hill)
most distant from us and nearest Kamara, and began to
cannonade it. Liprandi's main body was coming up, and he at
length brought thirty guns, some of them of heavy calibres, to
bear upon Canrobert's Hill and the next to it. These
replied from their five twelve-pounders; and about this time a
troop of our horse-artillery and a field battery, supported by
the Scots Greys, were brought up to the ridge, and joined in
the artillery combat, till the troop, having exhausted its
ammunition, was withdrawn with some loss in men and
horses.
When the formidable character of the attack was seen,
our First and Fourth Divisions, and two French brigades, were
ordered down to the scene of action. Reaching the point
where the Woronzoff road descends from the plateau, the
First Division made a short halt. If its orders had enabled it to
march down to the plain there, followed by the other troops
mentioned, the enemy must have hastily withdrawn over the
Tchernaya, or have accepted battle with his back to the Kamara
Hills. Instead of this, it was marched along the edge of the
heights towards the other road down from the plateau at
Kadikoi. Moving at a height of several hundred feet above
the valley, it saw the plain spread out like a map, and what next
occurred there took place immediately below it, and in full
view. The Russians had just captured the two assailed
outworks. That on Canrobert's Hill was occupied with a
battalion of Turks and three of the guns already mentioned, the
other with half a battalion and two. After silencing the guns,
the Russians had stormed Canrobert's Hill with five battalions,
the Turks, thus outnumbered, maintaining the combat so
stubbornly that 170 of them were killed before they were
driven out Pushing on, the enemy captured more easily the
next and smaller work: and
the garrisons of the others, thus menaced by an army, and
seeing no support anywhere, hastily left them and made for
Balaklava, pursued by the cavalry, who rode through the
feeble earthworks with perfect case, seven of the nine guns
remaining in the hands of the Russians.
Near these hills the ground on either side rises to a
ridge which forms their base, thus dividing the valley into two
plains, the one on the side of Balaklava, the other stretching
to the Tchernaya, and it was these that presently became the
scene of two famous encounters.
Charge of the Heavy and Light Brigades
The Heavy Brigade of Cavalry, under General
Scarlett, had joined the army. It included the 4th and 5th
Dragoon Guards, and the 1st, 2d, and 6th Dragoons (Royals,
Scots Greys, and Inniskillings), and formed with the Light
Brigade the cavalry division commanded by Lord Lucan.
Our two cavalry brigades had been maneuvering so as
to threaten the flank of any force which might approach
Balaklava, without committing themselves to an action in
which they would have been without the support of infantry.
The Light Brigade, numbering 670 sabres, was at this moment
on the side of the ridge looking to the Tchernaya; the Heavy
Brigade, say 900 sabres, on the side towards Balaklava.
Its commander, General Scarlett, was at that moment
leading three of his regiments (Greys, Inniskillings, 5th
Dragoon Guards) through their camping ground into the plain;
a fourth, the Royals, was for the moment behind, at no great
distance, while the 4th Dragoon Guards was
moving at the moment in the direction of the Light Brigade.
Having witnessed the hasty retreat of the Turks, the many
spectators on the Upland, consisting of the French stationed
on it, and the English marching along it, next saw a great body
of Russian cavalry ascend the ridge. Scarlett, unwarned
till then, wheeled the Greys and half the Inniskillings into
line; the 5th Dragoon Guards and the other squadron of the
Inniskillings were in echelon behind the flanks; the Royals,
galloping up, formed in extension of the 5th.
The Russians, after a momentary halt, leaving the Li'ght
Brigade unnoticed, perhaps unseen, on their right, swept down
in a huge column on the Heavy Brigade, and at the moment of
collision threw out bodies in line on each flank; the batteries
which accompanied them darting out and throwing shells, all
of which burst short, against the troops on the Upland. just
then three heavy guns, manned by Turkish men and officers, in
an earthwork on the edge of the Upland, were fired in
succession on the Russian cavalry, and those troops nearest
on the flank of the column losing some men and horses by the
first shot, wavered, halted, and galloped back.
At the same moment the mass slackened its pace as it
drew near, while our men, embarrassed at first by the picket
lines of their camp, as soon as they cleared them, charged in
succession. All who had the good fortune to look down from
the heights on that brilliant spectacle must carry with them
through life a vivid remembrance of it. The plain and
surrounding hills, all clad in sober green, formed an excellent
background for the colours
of the opposing masses; the dark grey Russian column
sweeping down in multitudinous superiority of number on the
red-clad squadrons that, hindered by the obstacles of the
ground in which they were moving, advanced slowly to meet
them.
There was a clash and fusion, as of wave meeting wave,
when the head of the column encountered the leading
squadrons of our brigade, all those engaged being resolved
into a crowd of individual horsemen, whose swords rose, and
fell, and glanced; so for a minute or two they fought, the
impetus of the enemy's column carrying it on, and pressing
our combatants back for a short space, till the 4th Dragoon
Guards, coming clear of the wall of a vineyard which was
between them and the enemy, and wheeling to the right by
squadrons, charged the Russian flank, while the remaining
regiments of our brigade went in in support of those which
had first attacked.
Then--almost as it seemed in a moment, and
simultaneously--the whole Russian mass gave way, and fled,
at speed and in disorder, beyond the hill, vanishing behind the
slope some four or five minutes after they had first swept
over it.
While this was going on, four of the enemy's
squadrons, wheeling somewhat to their left, made a rush for
the entrance of the harbour. The 93d were lying down behind
a slope there; as the cavalry approached, they rose, fired a
volley, and stood to receive the charge so firmly that the
horsemen fled back with the rest of the column.
All this had passed under the observation of Lord
Raglan. He does not seem to have made any comment on
the strange inaction of the Light Brigade, which was
afterwards explained to be due to Lord Cardigan's impression
that he was expected to confine himself strictly to the
defensive.
But Lord Raglan sent the following written order to Lord
Lucan: "Cavalry to advance and take advantage of any
opportunity to recover the heights. They will be supported by
the infantry, which have been ordered to advance on two
fronts." The last sentence referred to the two English
Divisions on the march, and still at some distance.
This order did not commend itself to Lord Lucan's mind
so clearly as to cause him to act on it. He moved the Heavy
Brigade to the other side of the ridge, where he proposed to
await the promised support of infantry, and this, under the
circumstances, was not an irrational decision. After a while a
disposition seemed manifest on the Russian side to carry off
the captured guns, which might very well seem to signify a
general retreat of the forces.
Therefore a second written order was sent to Lord Lucan,
thus worded: "Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance
rapidly to the front, and try to prevent the enemy carrying
away the guns. Troop of horse-artillery may accompany.
French cavalry is on your left. Immediate."
This order was carried by the Quartermaster-General's
aide-de-camp, Captain Nolan, author of a book on cavalry
tactics, in which faith in the power of that arm was carried to
an extreme.
He found Lord Lucan between his two brigades,
Scarlett's on the further slope of the ridge, Cardigan's beyond
the Woronzoff road, where
it ascends to the Upland, drawn up across the valley and
looking down it towards the Tchernaya. D'Allon-Ville's
French brigade of cavalry had descended into the plain, and
was now on the left rear of the Light Brigade.
In order to appreciate the position of the Russian
army at this time, it is necessary to note an additional feature
of this part of the field. Rising from the bank of the
Tchernaya, close to the Traktir Bridge, and stretching thence
towards the Chersonese upland, but not reaching it, is a low
lump of hills called the Fedioukine heights. Their front
parallel to the ridge, at about 1200 yards, forms with it the
longer sides of the oblong valley leading to the Tchernaya.
Menschikoff had sent a force of the three arms to co-operatc
with Liprandi, but not part of his command; and these troops
and guns were posted on the Fedioukine heights.
The situation, then, was this: the defeated Russian
cavalry had retreated down the valley towards the Tchernaya,
and was there drawn up behind its guns, a mile and a quarter
from our Light Brigade; Liprandi's troops were posted along
the further half of the Woronzoff ridge, enclosing, with those
just said to be on the Fedioukine heights, the valley in which
the hostile bodies of cavalry faced each other ; eight Russian
guns bore on the valley from the ridge ; fourteen Russian guns
from the Fedioukine heights; Russian rifleman had been
pushed from those slopes into the valley on each side ; also on
each side were three squadrons of Russian lancers, posted in
the folds of the hills, ready
to emerge into the valley; and in front of the main body of
the Russian cavalry were twelve guns in line.
Probably anyone viewing the matter without
prepossession will think that Lord Raglan's orders to Lord
Lucan were not sufficiently precise. For instance, in the last
order, "to the front " is manifestly vague, the enemy being on
several fronts.
Lord Raglan, in a subsequent letter, explains his
meaning thus: "It appearing that an attempt was making to
remove the captured guns, the Earl of Lucan was desired to
advance rapidly, follow the enemy in their retreat,
and try to prevent them from effecting their objects." But the
enemy were not removing the guns at that time, and not
retreating, and the order, thus given by Lord Raglan under a
mistake, did not apply.
Here was plenty of room for misinterpretation; and
on receiving this order, Lord Lucan, by his own account, read
it "with much consideration--perhaps consternation would be
the better word--at once seeing its impracticability for any
useful purpose whatever, and the consequent great
unnecessary risk and loss to be incurred."
He evidently interpreted "the front" to mean his own
immediate front, and was presently given to understand that
"the guns" were those which had retired along with the Russian
cavalry. For when he uttered his objections, Nolan undertook
to reply, though there is no evidence that he had any verbal
instructions with which to explain the written order. "Lord
Raglan's orders," he said, "are that the cavalry should attack
immediately."
"Attack,sir! attack what? What
guns, sir?" asked Lord Lucan sharply.
"There, my lord, is your enemy, there are your guns,"
replied the believer in the supreme potency of cavalry,
pointing towards the valley, and uttering these words, Lord
Lucan says, "in a most disrespectful but significant manner."
Very indignant under what he held to be a taunt, Lord
Lucan thereupon rode to Lord Cardigan, and imparting to him
the order as he understood it, conveyed to him the impression
that he must charge right down the valley with his brigade as it
stood in two lines (presently made three by moving a
regiment from the first line), while the Heavy Brigade would
follow in support.
And it certainly was impossible for Lord Cardigan to
know what he could advance against except the cavalry that
stood facing him; and though he shared and echoed Lord
Lucan's misgivings, he at once gave the order, "The brigade will advance!"
With these words the famous ride began. But the
brigade was scarcely in motion when Captain Nolan rode
obliquely across the front of it, waving his sword. Lord
Cardigan thought he was presuming to lead the brigade; his
purpose could never be more than surmised, for a fragment of
the first shell fired by the enemy struck him full in the breast.
His horse turned round and carried him back, still in the
saddle, through the ranks of the 13th, when the rider, already
lifeless, fell to the ground. Led by Lord Cardigan, the lines
continued to advance at a steady trot, and in a minute or two
entered the zone of fire, where the air was filled with the
rush of shot, the bursting of shells, and the moan of bullets,
while amidst the infernal din the work of destruction went on,
and men and horses were incessantly dashed to the ground.
Still, at this time, many shot, aimed as they were at a rapidly
moving mark, must have passed over, or beside the brigade, or
between the lines. A deadlier fire awaited them from the
twelve guns in front, which could scarcely fail to strike
somewhere on a line a hundred yards wide. It was when the
brigade had been advancing for about five minutes that it came
within range of this battery, and the effect was manifest at
once in the increased number of men and horses that strewed
the plain. With the natural wish to shorten this ordeal, the
pace was increased ; when the brigade neared the battery,
more than half its numbers were on the grass of the valley,
dead or struggling to their feet; but, still unwavering, not a
man failing who was not yet disabled, the remnant rode
straight into the smoke of the guns, and was lost to view.
Lord Lucan moved the Heavy Brigade some distance
forward in support of the Light; but finding his first line
suffering from a heavy fire, he halted and retired it, not
without considerable loss.
Further Movement
At the same time another and more effectual
movement took place. General Morris, commander of the
French cavalry, directed a regiment of his chasseurs
d'Afrique (the 4th) to attack the troops on the Fedioukine
heights, and silence the guns there. The regiment ascended
the slopes, drove off the guns, and having accomplished their
object, retired, with a loss of ten killed and twenty
eight wounded. Thenceforth the retreat of our cavalry. was
not harassed by the fire of guns from this side of the field, and
the good comradeship implied in this prompt, resolute, and
effectual charge of the French was highly appreciated by their
allies, and has received just and warm praise from the
historian Kinglake.
What the Light Brigade was doing behind the smoke
of the battery was of too fragmentary a kind to be here more
than touched on. The Russian gunners were driven off, and
parties of our men even charged bodies of Russian cavalry ;
and that these retreated before them is not only recorded by
the survivors of the Light Brigade, but by Todleben. But the
combat could end but in one way, the retreat of what was left
of our light cavalry. They rode back singly, or in twos and
threes, some wounded, some supporting a wounded comrade.
But there were two bodies that kept coherence and formation
to the end. On our right, the 8th Hussars were joined by
some of the 17th Lancers, when they numbered together
about seventy men. The three squadrons of the enemy's
lancers, already said to be on the side of the Woronzoff
heights, descended from thence, and drew up across the valley
to cut off the retreat of our men. Colonel Shewell of the 8th
led this combined party against them, broke through them
with ease, scattering them right and left, and regained our end
of the valley. A little later, Lord George Paget led also
about seventy men of the 4th Light Dragoons and 11th
Hussars against the other three squadrons of lancers on the
side of the Fedioukine heights, and passed by them with a
partial collision which caused us but small loss. The
remaining regiment, the 13th Light Dragoons, mustered only
ten mounted men at the close of the action. The mounted
strength of the brigade was then 195 ; it had lost 247 men in
killed and wounded, and had 475 horses killed, and forty-two
wounded.
The First Division, after its circuitous march by the
Col, was now approaching the Woronzoff ridge, followed by
the Fourth. It could see nothing of what was occurring in the
adjoining valley; but it presently began to have tokens of the
charge, in the form of wounded men and officers who rode by
on their way to Balaklava.*
Close to the ditch of the fieldwork on the last hill of
the ridge on our side lay the body of Nolan on its back, the
jacket open, the breast pierced by the fatal splinter. It was but
an hour since the Division had passed him on the heights,
where he was riding gaily near the staff, conspicuous in the
red forage cap and tiger-skin saddle cover of his regiment.
It was now believed that a general action would begin
by an advance to retake the hills captured by Liprandi, and no
doubt such an intention did exist, but was not put in practice.
The Russians were left undisturbed in possession of the three
hills they had captured, with their seven guns. At nightfall the
First Division marched by the Woronzoff road up to the
plateau, and thence to its camp.
It was long before that road
was used again, for the presence of Liprandi's troops and
batteries rendered it unavailable during great part of the winter.
It is easier to point to the faults of the Allies than to
say how they should have been remedied. To post men and
guns in weak works commanded by neighbouring heights, and
having no ready supports in presence of an enemy's army, was
to offer them up as a sacrifice. But where were the supports to
come from?
Then it has been said that the most effective way of
bringing the Allied Divisions down from the upland would
have been by the Woronzoff road. But that is on the
supposition that it was intended to bring the Russians to a
pitched battle. That, however, if the English general thought of
it, formed no part of Canrobert's design. He believed that his
part was at present limited to pushing the siege towards the
grand object of the expedition, and covering the besieging
army from attack; and he was not to be drawn into doubtful
enterprises outside of these.
This accounted, too, for the failure to attempt the
recapture of our outworks--to what purpose retake them when
it was proved that we had not troops enough to hold so
extended aline? The ruin of the Light Brigade was primarily
due to Lord Raglan's strange purpose of using our cavalry
alone, and beyond support, for offence against Liprandi's
strong force, strongly posted; and it was the misinterpretation
of the too indistinct orders, sent with that very questionable
intention, which produced the disaster.
And yet we may well hesitate to wish that the step so
obviously false had never been taken, for the
desperate and unfaltering charge made that deep impression
on the imagination of our people which found expression in
Tennyson's verse, and has caused it to be long ago
transfigured in a light where all of error or misfortune is lost,
and nothing is left but what we are enduringly proud of.
It has been said that another blot besides Balaklava
existed in the Allied line of defence. In front of the Third,
Fourth, and Light Divisions, encamped on the strips of plain
lying between the several ravines, were the siege works, and a
direct attack made on them would be so retarded that the
Divisions could have combined to meet it. But, in the space
between the last ravine (the Careenage) and the edge of the
Upland, the circumstances were different.
A force might sally from the town, and ascending the
ravine, or the adjacent slopes, without obstacle, would then be
on fair fighting terms with whatever troops it might find
there. Or the army outside, descending from the Inkerman
heights, and crossing the valley by the bridge and causeway,
would find itself on ground well adapted for traversing the
space between the ravine and the cliff and entering the Upland
at that corner. And the result of the establishment of the
enemy's army there would be to open to it an advance which
would cause all our Divisions engaged in the siege to form to
meet it with their backs to the sea, and, in case of being
overpowered, to fall back towards the French harbour (if they
could), abandoning the siege works, with all their
material; in fact, sustaining absolute defeat, possibly destruction.
The post-road going along the causeway, and
ascending these slopes, reaches the Upland at a final crest,
from whence it passes down and across the plain to join the
Woronzoff road. It was on our side of the final ridge that the
Second Division was encamped across the post-road.
A mile behind it was the camp of the First Division.
Then came a long interval of unoccupied ground, to the French
camp on the south-eastern corner of the Upland, where
Bosquet's covering corps may be said to have been employed
in "gilding refined gold and painting the lily," by constructing
lines of defence along the edge of cliffs, several hundred feet
high, above an almost impassable part of the valley. Accepting
the broad principle that a commander can only be expected to
make good the deficiencies of an ally so far as may be without
throwing a heavy strain upon his own troops, still, in this case,
it was the common safety that was threatened, and it was a
common duty to provide against the danger.
By leaving a small force only in observation on the
impregnable heights, and placing the main body near tile really
weak point, the labour and the forces of the French,
superfluous where bestowed, might have rendered the position
practically secure. Kinglake rightly characterises the
disposition of Bosquet's corps as an example of the evils of a
divided command.
Return of the First Division
The return of the First Division to its camp may have
been unnoticed by the Russians, taking place as it
did at nightfall. They may have calculated that the advance of
Liprandi would cause the weak point on the plateau, for the
moment, to be unoccupied; otherwise it is not easy to account
for the enterprise of the day following the action of Balaklava.
At noon a force of six battalions and four light field-guns,
issuing from the town, ascended the ravine and slope which
led to the Second Division. Our pickets fell back fighting,
when the Russian field-pieces coming within range, pitched
shot over the crest, behind which the regiments of the Second
Division were lying down, while their skirmishers maintained,
with those of the Russians, a desultory combat in the hollow.
The two batteries of the Second Division now formed on the
crest, and were presently reinforced by one from the First
Division, and before their fire the Russian guns were at once
swept off the field.
The enemy's battalions then came on successively in two
columns, and these, too, were at once dispersed and driven
back by the overpowering artillery fire. The men of the
Second Division, launched in pursuit, pressed them hard, and
they never halted till they were once more within the shelter
of Sebastopol. Evans, not knowing of what force these might
be the precursors, had determined to meet them on his own
crest, and he was not to be drawn from thence till the action
was already decided.
General Bosquet sent to offer him assistance, but he
declined it with thanks, as the enemy were, he said, already
defeated. The Russians lost in this action, by their own
estimate, 250 killed and wounded, and left in our hands eighty
prisoners. We had ten killed and seventy-seven wounded. The attack,
therefore, could not be characterised otherwise than as weak
and futile.
Nevertheless, it had an object. Todleben says it was
intended to draw our attention from another attack on
Balaklava. But he is, unfortunately, so unreliable in his
statements and views that, with another plain interpretation
before us, supported by facts, we need not be drawn aside by
him. No further serious attack on Balaklava was intended, but
preparations for the battle of Inkerman were then well
advanced, and it was with these that the attack was connected.
The Russians had brought out entrenching tools with
them to Shell Hill, and, could they have established and armed
a work there, they would not only have immensely
strengthened their position in the future battle, but would also
have provided for another highly important object, namely,
the safe and unmolested passage of the troops outside
Sebastopol, across the long causeway in the valley and the
bridge of the Tchernaya. That the present attempt was not
made with a larger force was probably owing to the desire to
avoid bringing on a general action, and so anticipating
prematurely the great enterprise which took place ten days
later. But the operations of the Russians for opening that
memorable battle will be seen to prove how great would have
been their advantage had they possessed a strong lodgment on
Shell Hill.
The attack on Balaklava, and its partial success, in
depriving us of the hills held by our outposts, had effected its
purpose of weakening the forces on the Upland. The two other regiments of the Highland Brigade joined the 93d before Balaklava; some companies of the rifle battalion of the Second Division were also posted there; and
Vinoy's brigade of Bosquet's corps was so placed as to
prevent the enemy from forcing a passage to the Upland by
way of the Col. The whole of the forces under Sir Colin
Campbell now executed a complete line of defence,
strengthened with powerful batteries, around Balaklava, which
might at last be regarded as secure. Seeing what a source of
weakness the place was to us, by causing the great extension
of our line, and the absorption of so much of our
outnumbered forces, the question had been seriously
considered of abandoning it, and supplying our army from the
French harbour of Kamiesch, which would have infinitely
lightened our toils and diminished our risks. But the Commissary-General declared that without Balaklava he could not
undertake to supply the army, and the necessary evil was retained.
It was in this interval, between the sortie of the 26th
October and the battle of the 5th November, that a work was
thrown up by us on the field which, useless as a defence,
became the object of bloody conflict. It was observed that the
Russians were constructing a work on the other side of the
valley to hold two guns (probably to support the coming
attack), the embrasures being already formed, and the gabions
placed in them. On this being shown to General Evans, he had
two eighteen-pounders brought from the deppth of the siege
train, not far off, and a high parapet with two embrasures, made solid with sandbags, was thrown up on the edge of the cliff to hold them. It was placed about 1400 yards from the enemy's intended battery.
In a few rounds the Russian work was knocked to pieces,
and our guns, as being too far from our lines to be guarded,
were then removed from what became afterwards a point, in
the history of the battle, known as "the Sandbag Battery."
On the 4th of November the French infantry in the
Crimea numbered 31,000; the British, 16,ooo; the Turks, who
were not permitted to develop their value, 11,000. They must
have been very different from the Turkish soldiery of the
present day if they were not equal ill fighting quality to any
troops in the Crimea, and superior to all in patience,
temperance, and endurance. But it was a tendency of the time
to disparage them, partly from their abandonment of the
outposts at Balaklava, the valorous defence made by a great
part of them being, from some accident, unknown at the time;
and they were employed in ways which gave them no
opportunity of helping us in battle.
On both the Allied and the Russian side it was known
that a crisis was now rapidly approaching; but only the
Russians knew that it was a race between them for delivering
the attack. The French siege corps, comparatively strong,
close to its base, and protected on both flanks, on one by the
sea, on the other by the English, was now retrieving its
disaster of the 17th October, by diligently pushing its
approaches in regular form upon the Flagstaff Bastion. We
were strengthening our batteries and replenishing our
magazines; as has been said
the Russian daily loss in the fortress far exceeded ours in the
trenches. We were ready to support a French attack which
would now be made over a very short space of open ground.
On the 4th November the Allied commanders had
appointed a meeting on the 5th for definitely arranging the
cannonade and assault which, they hoped, would at length lay
the fortress open to us. The Russians were, of course, alive to
the peril. But, on the 4th they had completed the assembly of
their forces for attack.
For long the corps d'armee stationed about Odessa had
been in motion for the Crimea. It had repeatedly sent
important reinforcements to the fortress, and the whole of
those, which had reached the heights beyond the Tchernaya by
the 4th November, raised the total of Menschikoffs forces in
and around Sebastopol, according to Todleben, to 100,000
men, without counting the seamen, so that not less than
110,000 to 115,ooo men were confronting the 65,000 which,
counting seamen and marines, the aggregate of the Allied
forces amounted to.
Of the Russian troops which took actual part in the
battle of Inkerman, 19,000 infantry, under General
Soimonoff, were within the fortifications of Sebastopol;
16,000, under General Pauloff, were on the heights beyond
the Tchernaya. These were to combine for the attack,
accompanied by fifty-four guns of position and eighty-one
field-guns.
On their left was the force which had been Liprandi's,
now commanded by Prince Gortschakoff, stretching from the
captured hills outside Balaklava, across the Fedioukine
heights, into the lower valley
of the Tchernaya. The remainder of the troops formed the
ample garrison of the works of Sebastopol. Long before the
November dawn of Sunday, the besiegers heard drowsily in
their tents the bells of Sebastopol celebrating the arrival in
the camp of the young Grand Dukes Michael and Nicholas,
and invoking the blessings of the Church on the impending
attack, towards which the Russian troops were even then on
the march.
Chapter VII: Battle of Inkerman
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