The officer upon whom the conduct of the siege operations of the English fell, and who, as we have seen, had already been called on to advise in more than one important crisis, was Sir John Burgoyne. He was the oldest officer in the Crimea, born in 1782. He was the son of the General Burgoyne known in history as the commander who surrendered at Saratoga, and in dramatic annals as the author of the comedy of The Heiress.

In the first years of the century the son had served in many climes; afterwards was with Sir John Moore at Corunna; at the passage of the Douro; helped to construct the lines of Torres Vedras; at the sieges and assaults of Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo; wounded at Burgos and at St Sebastian; present at most of the great battles in the Peninsula; and finally at New Orleans.

His mind was of the sedate, deliberative order, keeping a strong hold of facts and principles, and most unlikely to be swayed by the sudden impulses of those around him. As an engineer he had a sound judgment, ripened in an uncommon degree by thought and his large experience. He was entirely and, as preceding pages have endeavoured to show, rightly, in favour of employing our siege trains before attempting to assault, and he also believed that their effect would be such as to render an assault possible.

Although so advanced in years, his capacity for military service was hardly impaired. The statue in Waterloo Place is an excellent likeness, though one peculiarity, an upstanding and disordered fell of hair, could perhaps hardly be expressed in bronze. The conditions of the task that lay before him will now be briefly described.

One who approaches from the south the hollow in which lies the harbour of Sebastopol, finds the ground rising to heights that form an outer line to those on which stood the Russian works. Between these two lines was an interval of about two miles. From our side the slopes descended for more than half way, and then rose again to the opposing ridges. These slopes were cut into longitudinal slips by the ravine which descend from the plateau to the basin in which lies the great harbour. It has been said that the largest of these divides the Upland, descending the head of the inner harbour.

To our right of it another, which came to be known as the Valley of the Shadow of Death, running into the great ravine 1400 yards from its end; and it was near this point of junction that the left of our earthworks rested on the chasm. It was an average distance of 500 yards to the right of the combined ravines another cuts the plain, ending, lit them, at the head of the inner harbour; in this lies the Woronzoff road as it enters Sebastopol.

It was across the strip of plain, called by us Green Hill, between the great ravine and that of the Woronzoff road, that part of our first batteries, with their connecting line of trenches were constructed, known, from the engineer in charge c the works, as Chapman's Battery, and later as the firs parallel of the Left Attack. The system of fortification which had been created by the science of Louis XIV engineers had, with some modifications, endured down to this time.

It was based on the range of artillery and musketry, and the rules prescribed that the first parallel with its batteries, should be traced at 600 yards from the enemy's works. Chapman's Battery was at a much greater distance, and for this reason: The ground sloping constantly downward, was more and more commanded by the guns on the opposing heights, therefore the parapets must needs be higher in proportion as the works descended the hill.

The ground here was stony and a rocky substratum lay very near the surface; hence the labour of trenching was very severe, rendering the construction of high parapets extremely difficult, and advantage was therefore taken of a terrace on the face of the slope to place the battery at 1300 to 1400 yards from the Redan.

But the distance was of the less consequence, as our siege-guns were far more powerful than those of an earlier day, and the old rules could not therefore be now considered as applicable. Another cause of difficulty, affecting the English, but scarcely the French, was the power which the Russians possessed of placing guns in position, in the ground between our right and their fortifications, which would enfilade our trenches in proportion as they were pushed forward.

On the other side of the Woronzoff ravine, on the slope between it and the Docks ravine, which, like the other slope, varied from 400 to 600 yards in width, was traced the work called, after the engineer who constructed it, Gordon's Battery, and known later as the first parallel of our Right Attack. The name of the slope was Mount Woronzoff, and this slope or ridge was the only one that led direct to the Redan without intervening obstacles.

Again, on the next slope, which lay between the Docks ravine and the Careenage ravine, our sailors made and armed with heavy guns a work called the Victoria Battery. It was not less than 2000 yards from the enemy's works, at which distance its guns were well within their own range, and almost outside that of the opposing artillery. It was also known as the Lancaster Battery, because armed with Lancaster guns.

Of these batteries, part of Chapman's guns, which were forty-one in number, fired across the great ravine upon the Flagstaff Bastion and its dependencies, that lay between the French attack and the city; part across the Woronzoff ravine, on the faces of the Redan, at the works in extension of it on its proper right. Gordon's guns, twenty-seven in number, bore in parts, according their position, on the left face of the Redan, on the Malakoff, and on the ships in the inner harbour and the Careenage Creek. The naval battery bore on the Malakoi which stood on the continuation of the same slope, ar one gun was directed on a ship in the Careenage Creek.

French Task

The task of the French was much easier. The ground on their side was much more easily trenched and trenches there were not exposed as ours were to be enfiladed (fired into lengthways) by guns outside the fortress. A hill which they named Mount Rodolph gave them the means of opening their trenches against the Central and Flagstaff Bastions at somewhat shorter range than ours, being about 1000 yards, and the proximity of their base enabled them to bring up their siege train with comparative facility.

But, of course, none of the trenches, French or English, were begun till the work of bringing up the siege- guns, and their supplies of ammunition, to depth near at hand, was well forward. It was not till the night of the 9th of October, when a fresh wind from the northeast favoured the enterprise, by preventing the enemy from hearing the men at work, that the French broke ground on Mount Rodolph, and by morning had made a trench there 1100 yards long. On the nights of the 10th and the 11th the English opened their works on Green Hill and Mount Woronzoff. Each day the Russians cannonaded heavily the works of the night, and each night these works were repaired and pushed steadily forward till, by the evening of the 16th, all the siege batteries were complete in guns and ammunition. The French placed fifty-three guns in battery, making with ours 126 in all. To these the Russians opposed 118; besides which, 220 pieces would bear upon attacking troops.

The cannonade which was expected to usher in the final act of the war was therefore to begin on the morning of the 17th. And now a question had arisen which must always be of interest when (as is so commonly the case in England's wars) the navy is in close co-operation with the army. It appeared to the military commanders that the fleets might greatly aid the land attack by standing in and engaging the sea-forts.

Writing to Admiral Dundas, on the 13th October, Lord Raglan says, "I know no way so likely to insure success as the combined efforts of the Allied naval and military forces."

After pointing out that the recent success on the Alma had led all to believe that the capture of the place would be accomplished, he ends thus: "Not to disappoint these universal expectations, the combined efforts of all branches of the naval and military service are necessary, and none, I am sure, will be withheld. Excuse my pressing these considerations on your attention."

Every reader can perceive how difficult it must be for a commander to resist such an appeal. Dundas consented, but, as he himself said, "with reluctance." In a conference of the Allied admirals, on the 15th, it was resolved that all their ships should make a simultaneous attack upon the sea-forts. But all the English captains considered that the attack of the fleets should be made not at the time of the preliminary cannonade, but at the moment of the intended assault. The judgment of the admirals on this point was that it should be left to the military commanders to say in what stage of the conflict the navy should render the aid of its broadside, whether all at the time of the land cannonade, all at the time of the assault, or partly at each of these stages.

The military commanders replied on the 16th. They chose the last alternative; they applauded the conclusion the admirals had come to as "a great resolve and expressed their belief that "moral and mated effects" would be produced which must "insure the success of the attack upon Sebastopol."

Now the primary object of the fleets had been render the passage of the Black Sea security. This had become less pressing since the scaling up of the harbor, nevertheless the possibility still existed, and must be provided against, of giving to the Russian Fleet still afloat the opportunity of sallying out upon a foe so broken Iin conflict as to be open to defeat. And the prospects of an engagement between ships and such forts as defended the harbour, solid edifices of hard stone, with casemates for the guns, and armed with a numerous and powerful artillery, were not hopeful for the ships.

If such an attack were pushed home by them, no limit could be placed to the damage they might suffer. The chances of being riddled, sunk, set on fire by shell or hot shot, ruined as steamers, and disabled by damage to structure or by loss of men, were absolutely indefinite. On the other hand, the probability of ruining the walls of the forts might to some considerable extent be calculated beforehand, and was not promising.

Only a very close fire could accomplish this, and that could not but mean unknown damage to the ships. Nevertheless, it might well be worth while to run great risks if the success ot the assault could be clearly seen to be thereby assured. But it is impossible to gather from the language of the generals what it was they expected from the co-operation of the fleets.

"If," says Lord Raglan to Admiral Dundas, "the enemy's attention can be occupied on the sea front as well as upon that of the land, there will be a much greater chance of making a serious impression upon their works of defence, and of throwing the garrison into confusion."

Again : "Their (the fleets') presence would go far to make all feel that victory would be nearly a matter of certainty," and the Allied generals had, as we have seen, talked of "moral and material effects" to be produced by combined action, which must insure the success of the attack. But this brings us, and could have brought the admirals, no nearer to the actual results to be expected.

The only way in which the assault could be facilitated would be by causing the withdrawal of Russian troops from the threatened land fronts. But troops could be of use against an attack by ships upon sea-forts, and such withdrawal would have taken place. It may be that the gunners would thus be detained in the sea-fight who might otherwise have reinforced those employed the land batteries. But that might have been effected equally well only by the menace of a naval attack. Thus the naval commanders must have been, and were conscious that their fleets were about to run a great risk for no definite end, and with the likelihood of be compelled to appear to suffer defeat.

Kinglake, who knew both Dundas and Lord Raglan and who was then in the Crimea, thinks they might have come to a more satisfactory conclusion in a personal interview. But they were not on cordial terms and had not met for some time.

On the other hand, Sir Edmund Lyons, the second in command in fleet, was in constant communication with the Gene We have seen that he offered advice both as to expediency of attacking the north side, and of an imediate assault after the flank march; it was owing to counsel that we took Balaklava for a base; and now it was he who urged that the fleets should join in attack. It was very unfortunate that he enjoyed such credit with Lord Raglan as to be listened to even was giving opinions about the operations of the armies, concerning which Lord Raglan had legitimate adviser hand. He was always in favour of unhesitating adventurous action, a course to which he may have been inclined, more than he was conscious of, by a chance similarity of person to the commander whose whole life was an example of valorous resolve.

He was very like Nelson, and was naturally proud of the resemblance, though Nelson was no beauty, and may have secretly felt that a conformity in spirit also would be becoming. In these earlier stages of the war, his rash desire to do something effective rendered him Lord Raglan's evil genius, and how rash his impulses could be was shown a little later when he succeeded Dundas in the command of the fleet; for he who now so hotly urged a naval attack never made the slightest attempt on Sebastopol when he had become responsible for such an action, and had found by experience how fruitless it would be. Dundas must have felt himself placed at a great disadvantage with such an associate, as any commander must feel in having a too self-assertive subordinate, who wants to take the lead, and who fancies he has a popular repute to maintain.

Naval Attack

The naval attack was not, however, executed as had been arranged. At the urgent instance of the French, a change was made in the morning. It was decided that the French Fleet should approach to within 1600 to 180 yards of the coastline, from Cape Cherson to the middle of the mouth of the roadstead, and anchor there, firing on the Quarantine Fort and Alexander; and that the British should prolong the line so as to include in their fire Fort Constantine and the Telegraph and Wasp Batteries, on the coast of the north side. Several hours were occupied in thus anchoring the ships, and the land attack began without them.

Both sides had received reinforcements during the period of preparation. Menschikoff had by the transfer of troops from his army increased the number of soldier in the garrison by 25,000. On the other hand, the Allied Fleets had sent men, guns, and ammunition to hell the armies. More than 3000 seamen and marines wen landed by Dundas, and the sailors became, as the Naval Brigade, a well-known feature of the siege.

Of the gun: already enumerated as arming the English batteries twenty-nine were manned by the sailors. The French received from their admiral aid of the same kind.

One other circumstance of this period remains to be noticed. The Russians had pushed their outposts considerably in advance of their line of works on the side of the Malakoff, and Sir John Burgoyne had therefore desired for the better security of his siege batteries (established at such a distance from enemy's works due to these advanced posts) to push the investing armies nearer to enemy lines.

Our generals of division did not concur. They considered that a more advanced position could only be maintained at a perilous risk. But the French took advantage of the shelter afforded by Mt. Rudolph to establish close behind it a brigade of infantry, and thus their batteries were strongly supported, and the troops which would form the head of their column of assault were as near as possible to the Flagstaff Bastion.

At the earliest dawn on the 17th, the Russians, as they descried the embrasures in the hitherto blank faces of the batteries, began a desultory fire uporn them. At the concerted hour, half-past six, three French shells from Mount Rodolph gave the signal, and the Allied batteries opened throughout their extent, the Russian works replied, and spectators gathering from the camps in rear looked down upon the most tremendous conflict of artillery which, up to that time, the earth had ever witnessed.

For four hours it continued almost un-abated, while the onlookers could draw no conclusion from the incessant streams of fire which crossed between the opposing works. For although the English batteries had ruined the Malakoff Tower, dismounting the guns on its roof, and disabling the batteries below by the fall of its fragments, and though considerable damage had been done to all the Russian works, yet all except the Malakoff maintained their fire, and on the side of the French attack no superiority had become evident.

It was about ten o'clock that an explosion took place on Mount Rodolph. A shell had blown up the principal magazine, killing about fifty men, and silencing the fire of the nearest battery. On the remaining French guns the Russians concentrated their fire, and at half-past ten the batteries of our allies were reduced to silence.

Henceforth the hope of delivering a general assault had vanished, and the fire of the English batteries was maintained only to cover the discomfiture of their allies.

On our side things had gone, and continued to go very well. Great havoc was wrought on the parapets and gorges of the opposing works, on their guns and gunners, and on the battalions drawn up in support.

At half-past eleven Admiral Korniloff was mortally wounded in the Malakoff. The batteries in the earth works around the tower gradually ceased to fire. By three o'clock a third of the guns in the Redan were silenced, and very soon afterwards we blew up a large magazine there, reducing great part of the parapet and embrasures to a shapeless ruin, killing more than 100 men, and silencing the rest of its guns.

Todleben says the defence in that part of the lines was completely paralysed, and that an immediate assault was expected while the troops drawn up to meet it in rear of the works had become so demoralised that they fell back and sought the shelter of the scarped edge above the inner harbour.

It will be seen, then, that the purpose of establishing the siege batteries had on our side been accomplished. All that was expected from them had come to pass the way was cleared, so far as it lay in them to clear it by opening a passage for our troops into the Redan and silencing its supporting work the Malakoff. But the disaster to the French had put an end to all thoughts of an assault by them on the Flagstaff Bastion, and that two attacks being interdependent, the design could no be executed. Our fire continued till dusk, and then the cannonade ceased everywhere.

The event had thoroughly justified the foresight of Sir John Burgoyne. The Russian heavy batteries opposed to us had been extinguished by our fire, and the assault would probably have been delivered in the hour before dawn next day, or possibly just before nightfall on the 17th, when it seems more than probable that the first step in the capture of the place would have been accomplished, namely, a secure lodgment on the enemy's main works.

Had the French been equally successful in clearing the way to the Flagstaff Bastion, the success of the enterprise would have been assured so far as undertakings can be which are so largely imbued with the element of chance.

Our losses were slight, that of the French in killed and wounded about 100 men, the English forty-seven. The Russians lost more than 1100; not only were whole detachments repeatedly swept from the guns by our shot, and ioo men destroyed by the explosion, but their casualties were vastly increased by the necessity of keeping ready behind the works the troops which were to meet the expected assault, who could not be sheltered from the storm of missiles which swept over the fortified line.

As the ships effected nothing which could influence the fortunes of the day, it has not been essential to describe earlier the part they took. At one o'clock they had taken up their positions. The British ships prolonged the line across the outside of the harbour until met by a shoal between them and the coast of the north side. Inside that shoal a channel was found, and was entered by Lyons in the Agamemnon (brought out of Balaklava for the action), followed by the Sanspareil and London.

These ships approached Fort Constantine to from 800 to 1000 yards, and their broadsides speedily destroyed the batteries on its roof. But they made small impression on its casemates, and found themselves under a fire from the batteries on the cliff which the: were powerless to return. Many other ships entered the channel to help them, but all experienced the power these small, high-placed batteries, which they were unable to reach with their fire.

Nearly all were set on fire, some in many places. All suffered great damage and considerable loss of men, and all were compelled to withdraw from the action. It was with these facts before him that Todleben ventured, in enumerating the advantages with which, according to him, the Allies would have attacked the north side, to assert that the ship could have silenced the very works which inflicted this damage with impunity, and could also have brought their fire to bear on the Star Fort, 1000 yards farther inland.

Recuperative Power of the Russians

After the cannonade had lasted about four hour and a half, the fleets withdrew out of action. They had brought 1100 guns to bear; the forts replied with 152. The French ships lost 203 men; the English, 317; the Russian garrison, 138.

On the 18th the French batteries were still unable to reopen fire, while the English works and guns, little damaged, once more asserted their superiority over the Redan and Malakoff. But dawn had disclosed a new feature in the problem. At nightfall we had looked on works reduced to shapeless heaps, on ruined batteries and disabled guns. Before morning the parapets had been rebuilt, the batteries repaired, and fresh guns from the inexhaustible supplies of the ships and arsenal had occupied the embrasures; and the Allies could now begin to realise how formidable was the opponent who could thus, as chief engineer, wield the resources of the place.

The recuperative power of the enemy, taken along with the failure of the French batteries, diminished indefinitely the chances of taking the place by assault. Nevertheless the hope of achieving that result was far from being abandoned, and there was yet a space of time in which the operations of the Allies were concentrated on the preparation for a renewal of the cannonade as the preface to a combined assault on the chief works between the French and the town.

It should be noted, to the credit of our engineers, siege artillery, and seamen, that while explosions frequently took place in the French and Russian batteries, our magazines remained intact; while their works and the occupants of them suffered severely from enfilade, our losses continued to be slight.

On the 18th, 19th, and 20th, when we met single-handed the whole weight of the enemy's fire (the French being for so long unable to resume the contest) our aggregate loss in killed and wounded was only seventy-five men. Up to the 25th October our daily average loss was seventeen, while at the same date the aggregate of Russians killed and wounded in their works amounted to 3834 men.

Chapter VI: Attacked at Balaclava and the Upland