by Gen. Sir Edward Hamley, K.C.B.
The land which the armies were about to invade was that
known to the ancients as the Tauric Chersonese. It was quite
beyond the range of the ordinary tourist, it led to nowhere, and
had little to tempt curiosity.
Jumbo Map: Crimea (extremely slow: 498K)
Thus it was as completely an unknown country to the
chiefs of the Allied armies as it had been to Jason and his
Argonauts when they voyaged thither in search of the Golden
Fleece. It was known to contain a great harbour, and a city with
docks, fortifications, and arsenal ; but the strength and
resources of the enemy who would oppose us, the nature of
the fortifications, and even the topography, except what the
map could imperfectly show, lay much in the regions of pure
speculation.
It was believed, however, that any Russian force there
must be inferior to that of the Allies, that the country would
offer no serious impediments to the march, and that, with the
defeat of the defensive army, the place would not long resist
the means of attack which would be brought to bear on it.
There was no thought of a protracted siege; a landing, a march,
a battle, and, after some delay for a preliminary bombardment,
an assault, were all that made part of the programme,
These anticipations were by no means so ill-founded
as, after the many contradictions by the event, they were
judged to have been. It was unlikely that a large Russian army
should be permanently kept in a spot not easy of approach by
land, and where its supply would be difficult, at a time when
Sebastopol was not imminently threatened ; and, since the
sudden cessation of operations on the Danube, there had been
little time for preparation against so formidable an attack as was
now impending. The command of the sea conferred on the
assailants inestimable advantages, and there was very fair
reason to expect that, long before Russia could bring her huge
numbers to bear, the conflict would be decided in closed lists
by the armies which should at first enter them. In any case, it
would have been very difficult to point to any more vulnerable
spot on Russian territory.
It must not, however, be thought that no siege of
Sebastopol was contemplated. Immediately after the Russians
retreated from the Danube, the Duke of Newcastle, Secretary
for War, wrote thus to the Commander of the British Forces, on
the 29th June 1854:
"The difficulties of the siege of Sebastopol appear to
Her Majesty's Government to be more likely to increase than
diminish by delay; and as there is no prospect of a safe and
honourable peace until the fortress is reduced, and the fleet
taken or destroyed, it is, on all accounts, most important that
nothing but insuperable impediments, such as the want of
ample preparations by either army, or the possession by Russia
of a force in the Crimea greatly outnumbering that which can be
brought against it, should be allowed to prevent the early
decision to undertake these operations. . . .
"It is probable that a large part of the Russian army
now retreating from the Turkish territory may be poured into
the Crimea to reinforce Sebastopol. If orders to this effect have
not already been given, it is further probable that such a
measure would be adopted as soon as it is known that the
Allied armies are in motion to commence active hostilities. As
all communications by sea are now in the hands of the Allied
Powers, it becomes of importance to endeavour to cut off all
communication by land between the Crimea and the other parts
of the Russian dominions." This despatch had been preceded by a private letter
containing this passage:
To Siege
A siege, then, was in the programme, but it is certain
that even a probability that it would last through the winter
would have put an end to the project.
While awaiting embarkation, the troops were employed
in making fascines and gabions for the siege works, the
material for which, abundantly supplied by the woods around
them, might not be found on the plains before Sebastopol ; and
great quantities of these were collected, ready for conveyance, on the south side of
Varna Bay.
It was at this time, while the armies were expecting to
begin the enterprise, that the cholera broke out among them.
Cases had occurred among the French troops while on the
voyage from Marseilles; the pest followed them to their camps,
and late in July it reached the British army. Out of three French
divisions, it destroyed or disabled io,ooo men, and our own
regiments in Bulgaria lost between five and six hundred. It then
attacked the fleets, which put to sea in hopes of thus baffling it,
but it pursued them, and reduced some ships almost to
helplessness. This was a main reason, among others, why the
stroke, which could not be dealt too swiftly, was delayed.
Meanwhile the preparations went on. In order that the
guns might be available immediately on landing, it was
desirable that they should be conveyed complete as for action,
and, to this end, boats, united in pairs, were fitted with
platforms bearing the guns ready mounted on their carriages;
and steamers were bought and chartered for the transport of
other material. And now the naval resources of England
showed forth in their superiority.
The French, in default of sufficient transport, crowded
their war-ships with troops, thus unfitting them for battle; so
did the Turks; while the sea was covered with the small sailing-vessels of both loaded with material. But in one great compact
flotilla of transports, in which the steamers were numerous
enough to lend the propelling power to all, a British force, of all
arms, namely, four divisions of infantry, the Light Brigade of
cavalry and sixty guns, with all that was necessary to fight a
battle, was embarked; and our warships, thus preserving all
their efficiency, were left in condition to engage the enemy's
should they issue from Sebastopol.
It was at Varna that the huge multitudinous business of
embarkation went on. Piers had been improvised by the
engineers, but of course the operation was accomplished under
difficulties vastly greater than would have been met with in
home ports. The troops moved down slowly from their camps ;
the poison in the air caused a general sickliness, and the men
were so enfeebled that their knapsacks were borne for them on
packhorses during even a short march of five or six miles, all
they could at once accomplish. As they were embarked,
they sailed for the general rendezvous in the Bay of Balchick,
about fifteen miles north of Varna. The mysterious scourge still
pursued them on board ship, and added a horrible feature to
the period of detention, for the corpses, sunk with shot at their
feet, after a time rose to the surface, and floated upright, breast
high, among the ships, the swollen features pressing out the
blankets or hammocks which enwrapped them.
After all were assembled, an adverse wind still delayed
them; but on the 7th September the whole armament got under
weigh in fine weather. Each British merchant steamer wheeled
round till in position to attach the tow-rope to a sailing
transport (most of these were East Indiamen of the largest
class), and then again wheeled till the ship in rear attached
itself to a second; then all wheeled into their destined positions for the voyage.
They were formed in five columns, each of thirty vessels,
and each distinguished by a separate flag; and the five
columns carried the four divisions of infantry, with their
artillery, namely, the Light, the First, Second, and Third,
complete, and the Light Brigade of cavalry. Few sights more
beautiful could be seen than the advance, and the maneuvres
which preceded it, of this orderly array of ships, all among the
largest in existence, on the calm blue waters, under the bright
sky. The French and Turks, notwithstanding the use of their
men-of-war for transport, were unable to carry any cavalry.
British Flotilla
Our flotilla was commanded and escorted by Admiral Sir
Edmund Lyons in the Agamemnon. Our naval Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Dundas, directed the British Force that was held
ready to engage the enemy, including ten line-of-battle ships,
two screw-steamers, two fifty-gun frigates, and thirteen smaller
steamers carrying powerful guns. The French fleet numbered
fifteen line-of-battle ships and ten or twelve war-steamers, and
the Turkish eight line-of-battle ships and three war-steamers.
The Russian fleet had, since the first entry of the Allies
into the Black Sea, remained in the fortified harbour of
Sebastopol. It consisted of fifteen sailing line-of-battle ships,
some frigates and brigs, one powerful steamer, the Vladimir,
and eleven of a lighter class. Considering the encumbered
condition of the French and Turkish squadrons, it seems clear
that if, with a fair wind and good officers, the Russian
armament had issued from its shelter, it might in a bold attack
(though of course at heavy cost) have inflicted tremendous
havoc on the transports and troops.
British Land OOB
It is to be noted that the Fourth Division of infantry,
the Heavy Brigade of cavalry, and five or six thousand baggage
horses belonging to the English army, were still at Varna
awaiting embarkation, and the siege train was also there in the
ships which had brought it from England. Of these the greater
part of the Fourth Division was immediately embarked, and
landed in the Crimea in time to advance with the army.
Our five infantry divisions were formed each of two
brigades, each brigade of three regiments, and each division
numbered about 5000.
The First Division was commanded by the Duke of
Cambridge, and was formed of the brigade of Guards, viz., a
battalion each of the Grenadiers, Scots Guards, and Coldstream,
under General Bentinck; and the 42d, 79th, and 93d
Highlanders, under Sir Colin Campbell; with two field batteries.
The Second Division was commanded by Sir De Lacy
Evans, and composed of the brigades of Pennefather, 3oth,
55th, 95th, and Adams, 41st, 47th, 49th; with two field
batteries.
The Third Division was under Sir Richard England,
with Brigadiers Campbell and Eyre, 1st, 38th, 50th; 4th, 28th,
44th regiments; with two field batteries.
The Fourth Division was at first incomplete, its 46th
and 57th regiments being still en route. It was under Sir George
Cathcart, having the 20th, 21st, 63d, 68th
regiments, and the first battalion of the Rifle Brigade; with one
field battery.
The Light Division was commanded by Sir George
Brown, with the 7th, 23d, and 33d, under General Codrington;
and the 19th, 77th, and 88th, under General Buller; also the
second battalion of the Rifle Brigade; with one troop of horse
artillery, and one field battery.
The Light Brigade of cavalry, under Lord Cardigan,
included the 4th and 13th Light Dragoons, the 8th and 11th
Hussars, and the 17th Lancers; with one troop of horse
artillery.
Commanders
Lord Raglan, Commander of the English Army, was sixty-six years old. He had served on Wellington's staff, and lost his
arm at Waterloo. Since those days his sole military experience
had been in the office of Military Secretary at the Horse
Guards. He was so far well acquainted with military business,
but he had never held any command, and while no opportunity
had been afforded to him of directing troops in war, his life, for
forty years, had been no adequate preparation for it. But he
was a courteous, dignified, and amiable man, and his qualities
and rank were such as might well be of advantage in preserving
relations with our Allies.
Sir George Brown had distinguished himself in the
Peninsula as an officer of the famous Light Divisionthe reason,
perhaps, for now giving him the command of it-and had been
severely wounded at Bladensburg; since when his military life,
like his chiefs, had been passed chiefly in office work. He had
held many
posts, including that of Adjutant-General at the Horse Guards.
Sir De Lacy Evans had a brilliant record from the
Peninsular, American, and Waterloo campaigns, and had been
Commander of the British Legion in Spain in two very
honourable campaigns and many battles.
Sir George Cathcart had in his youth, as aide-de-camp
to his father, British Commissioner with the Russian Army,
been present at the chief battles in 1813. He was also on
Wellington's staff at Quatre Bras and Waterloo. He was
favourably known as the writer of commentaries on the
campaigns of 1812 and 1813 in Russia and Germany; he had
commanded various regiments of cavalry and infantry; and, as
Governor of the Cape, had recently conducted successful
campaigns against the Kaffirs and the Basutos. On these
grounds, his reputation stood so high that a "dormant
commission" had been given to him, entitling him to command
the army in case Lord Raglan should cease to do so.
Of the Brigadier-Generals the best known was Sir Colin
Campbell, who had established a great reputation as a
commander of large forces in our Indian wars, after very
honourable service in the Peninsula.
Most of the French generals had seen much active
service in Algeria. St Arnaud was a gallant man, experienced in
the warfare suited to that country, but frothy and vainglorious
in a notable degree-and much too anxious to represent himself
as taking the chief part to be a comfortable ally.
Though part of the English army had seen service
in India, though a large portion of the French troops had made
campaigns in Algeria, and though the Russians had for years
carried on a desultory war in Circassia, yet the long European
peace had left them all with little except a traditional knowledge
of civilised war.
No change of method had taken place since the
Napoleonic era. But the British and French had both
abandoned the musket for the rifle, ours being the Mini6; both
it and the French arm were muzzleloaders; some Russian
regiments had a rifle, but a, large proportion of them were still
armed with the old brass-bound musket which had served them
throughout the century ; the artillery also of all remained as before.
As the fleets sailed eastward from Varna across the
Black Sea, their course was crossed at right angles by the
coast on which they were to land, and of which they might
almost be said to know as little as knight-errants, heroes of the
romances beloved by Don Quixote, knew of the dim, enchanted
region where, amid vague perils, and trusting much to happy
chance, they were to seek and destroy some predatory giant.
Crimean Geography
Crim Tartary, better known now as the Crimea, forms
part of the Government of Taurida, a province of Southern
Russia. From the coast of the Euxine it stretches southward, as
an extensive peninsula, into the midst of that sea. Its neck is
the Isthmus of Perekop, five miles wide, and its length from
thence to Balaklava at its southern end is, in direct line, 120
miles.
All the northern and middle portion is a flat and and
steppe, where are sprinkled at wide intervals small villages
inhabited by Tartars, whose possessions are flocks and herds;
but the remaining and southern end of the peninsula is
different indeed in aspect, and in climate. Here begins a
mountain region sheltering from the northern blasts the slopes
and hollows, the lesser hills of which, covered with pine and
oak, enclose valleys of bounteous fertility. Multitudes of wild
flowers spring up amid the tall grass; the fig, the olive, the
pomegranate and the orange flourish, and the vine is cultivated
with success on the southern slopes.
The seaward end runs out into capes resting upon high
cliffs, and is indented on its western side by the deep and
sheltered harbour of Sebastopol, which, as the chief and
indeed only large and safe harbour of the Black Sea, had by the
work of generations been converted into a great arsenal and
dockyard, defended towards the sea by strong forts, and
affording ample anchorage for the Black Sea fleet, and around
these works had sprung up a city. The area of the whole
peninsula is nearly twice that of Yorkshire, and its population
at the time of the invasion numbered something short of
200,000.
Going along the road from Sebastopol to Perekop, the
first considerable town reached, sixteen miles distant, is
Bakshisarai, "the Garden Pavilion," and in another sixteen
miles, where the road quits the hills for the steppe, is
Simpheropol, the nominal capital. The part of the country with
which the reader has at present to do is included in a parallelo.
gram, one side of which is a line outside the western coast
from Eupatoria to the level of Balaklava, and the
opposite side passes through the hill region, south from
Simpheropol to the sea.
In this region the mountains have subsided into hill
ranges of some 400 feet high, and through these the watershed
pours five streams flowing westward into the Black Sea, all of
which formed features in the campaign. The first of these is the
muddy rivulet called the Bulganak; seven miles south of it is
the valley of the Alma (Apple River) ; another space of seven
miles divides the Alma from the Katcha; four miles further the
Belbek is reached; and five miles from that the Tchernaya,
northwesterly in its course, flows into and forms the head of
the harbour of Sebastopol.
The distance from Varna to Eupatoria is about 300 miles.
The armament arrived on the 9th at the rendezvous first
assigned, "forty miles west of Cape Tarkan." It remained
anchored there throughout the 10th, while Lord Raglan and
General Canrobert, with the Commanding Engineer, Sir John
Burgoyne, and other English and French officers, naval and
military, reconnoitered the coast for a landing-place, and
observed its character throughout.
At dawn, in a swift steamer, the Caradoc, escorted by
the Agamemnon, they were off Sebastopol, and could look
through the entrance of the inlet upon the forts, the ships, and
the city; then, rounding Cape Kherson, they passed the cliffs
on which stood the olateau destined to bear the camps of the
besiegers, and arrived off the inlet of Balaklava, deep down
between its two ancient high-perched forts. Then, turning back
north, they took note of the rivers already enumerated, from the
Belbek to the Bulganak, and the coast thence to Eupatoria,
when the space for the landing was fixed on, south of that
town, in Kalamita Bay. All the 11th and 12th the Turkish and
French fleets, great part of which was not propelled, as was
ours, by steam, were drawing together, and on the 13th nearly
all were opposite the beach, while those still at sea were coming
on with a fair wind.
The considerations which had been main elements in
the question of the selection of a point of disembarkation were,
first, a space sufficient for the armies to land together, and in
full communication with each other; and secondly, that the
ground should be such as the fire of the ships could protect
from the possible enterprises of the enemy. Ship's guns are so
formidable in size and range that no batteries capable of rapid
motion can hope to contend with them.
No ground fulfilling these conditions was found on the
southern coast, where the cliffs stand up steep and high out of
the water, nor did the mouths of the rivers afford the necessary
advantages. On the other hand, the western coast north of
Sebastopol offered no harbour of which the armies could make
a secure base, or even a temporary depot; while, south of
Sebastopol, the inlet of Balaklava, though small, was deep and
well-sheltered, where large steamers could unload close to the
shore, and the small bay of Kamiesch was capable of being
made a base. These facts will tend to throw light on some
questions raised during the progress of the war.
The piece of beach selected to land on, five or six
miles north of the Bulganak, was very happily adapted for the purpose.
Two small lakes at the foot of the sea-banks are
separated from the sea by strips of beach, and from these
strips roads went up the banks. Thus, when the troops were
landed here, no attack could be made on them (by night, let us
suppose) except bypenetrating into the narrow and easily
defended space between the lakes and the sea; while, on the
other hand, full facilities existed for their movement to the
plains above.
Here the disembarkation, quite unopposed, began on
the 14th, the French and Turks landing about two miles lower
down the coast, on a similar strip. In the afternoon a ground
swell arose, to a degree so violent that many boats were hurled
on the strand, and several rafts were dashed to pieces, the
troops, drenched with rain, making fires of the fragments. Next
day the surf abated, but it was not till the 18th that the whole
of the forces were landed, and in condition to advance.
The Fourth Division having arrived and landed, the
British force numbered about 26,000 infantry, sixty guns, and
the Light Brigade of cavalry, about 1000 sabres. The French
had 28,000 infantry, and the Turks 7000, with sixty-eight guns,
but with no cavalry. In order that the men might march lightly,
especially when so many were still low in strength from the
effects of the atmosphere, the knapsacks of the British were left
on board ship, the more indispensable articles being taken from
them and carried by the soldier, wrapt in the blanket which was
to cover him at night.
No tents were landed except for the sick and for general
officers. Except such part of the packhorses as could be
conveyed in the flotilla, there was no transport landed, but
some convoys of the enemy were intercepted, and a number of
country vehicles were procured from the Tartars. In this way
350 arabas (the wagons of the country, a rude framework of
poles surmounting the axle) were collected and a thousand
cattle and sheep, with poultry, barley, fruit, and vegetables.
Chapter III: Battle of the Alma
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