The new Constitution fixed the monarchy as the form of government, but there was no monarch, nor did there seem to be an early prospect of finding one. It was therefore expedient to give a solidity to the Provisional Government which would enable it to act as a bridge to the future monarchy. On the 6th of July Olozaga presented a resolution for the appointment of General Serrano as Regent with the title of Highness and with all the powers conferred on the Regent by the Constitution, except that of sanctioning laws and suspending or dissolving the Constituent Cortes. The Constituent Cortes, being the representative of the sovereignty of the people, could only be dissolved or suspended by its own act.

This proposition was combated not only by the Republicans but also by certain Liberal Unionists who were in favour of the Duke of Montpensier, a ready and willing candidate for the throne, whose prospects would be injured by delay. The Republicans presented a number of hopeless amendments, that the government should be carried on by an executive council of five persons, responsible to and removable by the Chamber; that there should be a Regency of three appointed by the Chamber; that the Regent should be responsible to and removable by that body. All were summarily rejected.

The Liberal Unionist Navarro Rodrigo and the Progressist Cantero opposed the proposition on the ground that the election of a monarch should not be any further postponed. Cantero argued that if a vote was taken at once, although there might be no election on the first or second ballot, a decision would finally be reached, and there would be a king. The difficulty of the search for a king was plainly stated in the speech of the Minister of War, who admitted that when he and his friends were conspiring in exile the downfall of Isabella II., they had not considered what dynasty to substitute.

With no less frankness he stated the difficulty of finding a suitable candidate for the throne. "In a country which is in this state of uncertainty, in a country which is in a period of reconstruction, in a country where there have occurred events such as we have ourselves seen, yesterday a fight in Cadiz, the next day another in Malaga, then another in Jerez ; in one town a governor murdered in a church, in another the town council attacked, - in a country where such things happen, which have little significance for us because we are accustomed to them and to worse, but which are exaggerated to an extraordinary degree as soon as they pass the frontier, is it strange that all the princes who may be candidates say, ` Who is going to establish himself in a country where such events occur?'"

The proposition for the Regency was carried on July 10 by 195 against 45 votes, and the 18th was fixed for the presentation of the Regent to the Cortes and the taking of the oath. The ceremony was attended with as much display as the promulgation of the Constitution. The public buildings were decorated, the troops paraded.

Extraordinary Session

The Cortes met in extraordinary session. The President ordered the law establishing the Regency to be read by one of the secretaries. A committee of fifteen Deputies then left the Chamber to receive the Regent, who, standing at the right of the President, took the oath to the Constitution of 1869. The Regent then delivered a short address, in which he stated that the period of grave danger had passed; that the time had come for developing and consolidating the conquests realised by the Revolution, and that during the interregnum the Constitution must be loyally executed, and individual rights peaceably exercised, in order that the new monarch might begin a happy and prosperous reign. The President of the Chamber spoke to like effect. The Regent and President then embraced, and the latter withdrew amid cheers for the Regent, the Constitution of 1869, and the national sovereignty.

The Presidency of the new Cabinet naturally fell to Prim, who retained the War Department. While the honours reverted to Serrano, the real governing power remained with the Minister of War; and this gave rise to Castelar's famous saying that "General Serrano had been shut up in a golden cage." Each was fitted for his post; for Prim was the only man who could hold together the discordant elements of the majority, and Serrano's brilliant career and noble presence made even his enemies admit that there was no one so well suited as he for the duties of the high position which he was called upon to fill.

The members of the Provisional Government, with two exceptions, remained in office under Prim. In the place of the Unionists Romero Ortez and Lorenzana, Martin Herrera and Silvela of the same party assumed, respectively, the Departments of Justice and Foreign Affairs. The political complexion of the Ministry was therefore unchanged. The Progressist party held the same position as in the previous Government, except that its leader was now the head of the Cabinet. As before, there was no representation given to the Democrats, whose leaders made no attempt to conceal their dissatisfaction.

The programme of the Government which Prim presented to the House in a speech on June 19, was in the usual strain. The Constitution should be guarded, public order preserved, friendly relations with foreign nations, and especially with the SpanishAmerican Republics, should be fostered, and every attempt made to remedy the financial woes of the country. He especially recommended harmony to the three parties which formed the majority. The Republicans he advised to be patient, and not to go too fast; to be contented with the liberty they enjoyed. By a process of tranquil evolution they would in the end reach the realisation of their ideals. Let them learn a lesson from the speaker, of the advantage of taking things easily. In 1866, in his retreat from Villerejo to Portugal, he had crossed the Portuguese frontier without the loss of a single man, because he had, in a race which lasted twenty-two days, never once broken into a run for a single instant.

Circulars of the Ministers of the Interior and of Justice issued to the provincial governors and judges, during the month of June, were attacked by the Republicans, as an infringement of Article 1 of the Constitution, and gave rise to an acrimonious debate.

The object of these circulars was to suppress Republican demonstrations, or, as stated in the circular of Martin Herrera, "all demonstrations inconsistent with the solution which has been adopted in reference to the form of government, whether such demonstrations have a Republican, Absolutist, or falsely socalled Legitimist significance, are to be punished without weakness or hesitation, since there is no legality except that established by the sovereignty of the nation." The reactionary attitude of the Minister of Justice, Rios Rosas, who regarded himself as the vehicle for the policy of his party and its leader, also increased the dissatisfaction of the already dissatisfied Democrats. A decree of the same Minister on the organisation of the courts gave this fraction of the Chamber a pretext for appearing in open opposition.

On July 7 a resolution was brought forward by the Democratic leaders requesting the Cortes to declare the decree null and void, "as attacking the prerogatives of the Constituent Cortes." In the debate on the resolution, the Republicans held aloof in an attitude of masterly inactivity, while the policy of the Minister of Justice was unsparingly attacked by the Democrats, whose leader, Martos, bade farewell to the Progressists with the words, " Good-bye, I am going," -words which drew a somewhat plaintive remonstrance from the President of the Council of Ministers. The Minister of Justice was sustained by 144 to 95 votes on the resolution, the Democrats voting with the regular opposition.

Prim was alarmed at the threatened union of the Democrats and the Republicans, and believed that there was less danger from discontented Unionists than from dissatisfied Democrats. Only a week after the policy of Martin Herrera had been supported by a majority of the House, he modified the Cabinet in a Democratic sense. The Unionist, Martin Herrara, and the Progressist Minister of Finance, Figuerola, left the Cabinet. Ruiz Zorilla was transferred from Public Works to Justice, while Public Works and the Colonial Department, which had been previously administered by Topete in addition to the Navy Department, were entrusted respectively to the Democrats Echegaray and Becerra. This was the first Cabinet since the Revolution in which the Democratic wing of the majority was represented.

In reply to an interpellation on the causes of the Ministerial crisis, Prim declared that the modification of the Ministry meant no change of policy, but was only the result of the long-felt necessity of giving a representation to that division of the majority which had been so long unrecognised.

On the question of a monarch as well as of policy, there were radical differences between the factions, which were sure to become active at the first opportunity. On July 15 -- the day after the Ministerial change -- the Cortes, after appointing a permanent committee to hold over the recess, adjourned until October 1.

In the meantime the National Republican party had not been idle. In the month of May, in order to secure a better organisation for the summer campaign, the Republican committees of the provinces lying within the limits of the ancient crown of Aragon met at Tortosa. The result of their proceedings was the agreement known as the Pact of Tortosa, to the effect that an alliance should be formed between the three ancient provinces of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, including the Balearic Islands, for the purpose of pursuing an identical policy on all questions affecting the Republican propaganda. Local committees should be established in every judicial district, a provincial committee in the chief city of each separate province, and a state committee in the cities of Barcelona, Valencia, and Tarragona, to represent, respectively, Catalonia, Valencia, and Aragon. The fact that the Constituent Cortes had established the monarchy as the form of government, did not of itself warrant an appeal to arms, so long as the principles proclaimed by the Revolution were not openly violated. On June 10 an assembly of delegates from Andalusia, Estremadura, and Murcia met at Cordova to give their adherence to the Pact of Tortosa.

Pact of Valladolid

The Castilians followed with the Pact of Valladolid, which included the provinces of Old and New Castile. The rest of the country was brought into the union by a meeting at Corunna, of the representatives of Galicia and Asturias. By this method of organisation the principle of the Federal Republic was extended throughout the nation.

In the beginning of July there appeared a manifesto of Don Carlos (Nephew of the first pretender of that name.) in the shape of a letter, dated Paris, June 30, to his brother Don Alfonso de Bourbon, in which he attempted to enunciate his principles of government. The Catholic religion must at any price be kept as the religion of the State; but as the Spanish people showed a fondness for decentralisation, he would try to leave each province in control of its internal administration. Home industries were to be protected, and only what was absolutely necessary should be imported from abroad. This proclamation, which was received with ridicule in the capital, was followed by risings of Carlist bands in Catalonia, Aragon, and especially in the province of Ciudad Real.

This disturbance and the fear of Republican agitation of a like character determined the Government to have recourse to the drastic law of April 17, 1821, in reference to procedure in cases of conspiracy and open attack upon the Constitution. The members of the Republican minority present in Madrid protested against the revival of this law on the ground that it was an amendment of Article 2 of the Constitution, which prohibited the establishment of extraordinary courts to investigate criminal charges, and an infringement of Article 3 because it was a virtual assumption by the Government of legislative powers. This protest was sent to the permanent committee of the Cortes, but produced no effect. A feeling of sullen dissatisfaction began to spread through the party. An event which occurred at Tarragona gave the Government opportunity for dealing more energetically with the Republicans.

On September 20 General Pierrad, one of the leading Republican Deputies, was received at that city by a Republican procession with banners. The Secretary of the Government acting as provincial governor in the absence of his chief, appeared on the scene, ordered the banners to be removed, and prohibited shouting in favour of the Republic. He was attacked by the crowd and beaten to death.

The Government immediately ordered the two Deputies, Pierrad and Serraclara, to be arrested, and proceeded to disband the militia of Tarragona, because it had not prevented the assassination. A meeting of a number of commanders of volunteer battalions in Barcelona to protest against this act, was followed by the order from Madrid for the disarmament of the militia of that city. This was the signal for an outburst in Barcelona. Barricades were erected, and the volunteers occupied the public buildings. The fight began on September 26 at ten o'clock in the evening, but the insurrectionists were scattered before morning by the Government troops.

The Government, now having complete control of the important capital of Catalonia, lost no time in following up its advantage by suppressing the Republican clubs in the other towns of the same province. Scattered Republican risings which followed this measure were easily suppressed. By an organised and simultaneous insurrection through the provinces, the Republicans, who were very numerous, could have placed the Government in a critical position, but instead of acting in concert the insurgents had neither plan nor system. Saragossa rose after Barcelona, and Valencia after Saragossa, each independent of the other, so that the Government without difficulty quelled both insurrections with the same troops.

With the capture of Valencia by the Government troops on October 16, after a bloody street fight, and with the extinction of more unimportant disturbances in Reus, Teruel, Corunna, and several points of Andalusia, the Republican party lay completely prostrate. A number of their Deputies, among whom were Suner y Capdevila, Paul y Angulo, Joarizti, Blanc, Castejon, Serraclara, were in prison or exile. Guillion, another Deputy, had been shot during the troubles. The prestige which the party had claimed as the party of order and peaceable propagandism was gone; discipline was shattered and distrust rife between the masses and the leaders, who were not men of activity nor fitted to carry their followers through that ordeal of fire which every Spanish political party had been compelled to pass.

The feeling of disgust at the ill success of their experiments at insurrections was portrayed in a letter published by Suner y Capdevila from Tours, where, according to his own account, he had arrived, "tired, dirty, poor, and sad." The somewhat naive repentance depicted in the following extract shows the natural discomfort felt at the horrors of war by a scholarly politician whose experience had been limited to forensic combats.

"Mad agitation," said the writer, "barricades, shouting, arson, and assassination will always benefit the Government more than us. With violence it will be impossible ever to gain the rich and conservative classes for the Federal Republic; but they will come to us on the day that we prove that the Republic is peace, justice, and order, and I know only one method to prove this : to plead our cause calmly in the press and the clubs, and above all to forsake bullets and arm ourselves with ballots. I do not know what the party has decided, but I know what I have decided. . . . The recent occurrences have proved to me that war is a wretched resource, and that some members of my party have not yet laid aside the instincts of primitive man. Neither my physical strength, nor my intellectual tastes, nor my moral inclinations dispose me to destroy. I have had enough of war, and if I may advise, my advice is that the party has had enough also."

The reunion of the Cortes in October, 1870, found the Government relieved of its most dangerous opponents. In consequence of the disarmament and dispersion of the militia, no further armed resistance was to be feared, and the state of siege proclaimed in the insurgent provinces prohibited manifestations and manifestoes. The Republican opposition in the Cortes itself was sadly reduced. Not more than twenty deputies of the party appeared, and they represented its moderate section. Among these, however, were the leaders Figueras, Castelar, Pi y Margall, and Orense. The rest were too seriously compromised by the late events. In view of the disorganisation of the party through the country, these leaders, despite their ability and eloquence, could make nothing more than an academic opposition.

The Government at once brought in a bill for the suspension of Constitutional guaranties and authorising the Government to proclaim a state of siege in any part of the country where it seemed to be advisable. In vain the leading Republican orators thundered against the suspension of the guaranties which the Minister of the Interior, Sagasta, admitted to have weighed upon him "like a mass of lead" during the late troubles. Castelar expressed the solemn determination of the minority to retire from the Legislature, "a determination in obedience to inevitable reasons of dignity which history will some day justify." This threat, which when the Republican party was in its full strength would have created alarm among the monarchists, as meaning a resort to the secret conspiracy or open insurrection which followed every retraimiento, (An ominous word in Spanish politics, meaning the withdrawal of the representation of a party from the Cortes and the abstention of its voters from the polls. Such action almost invariably means conspiracy, followed by an appeal to arms.) now excited no apprehension. The Republicans were no longer to be feared.

The first clause of the bill suspending the guaranties granted by the Constitution was passed with a vote of 154 to 14, and to the second clause, authorising the state of siege, there was practically no opposition. After the passage of the bill on October 6, the Republican minority withdrew in accordance with Castelar's assurance. Since the state of the party after its defeat in open warfare gave no hope of success in any further attempts at insurrection, the Republican minority soon saw the uselessness of remaining absent from the political stage, where they at least had the opportunity of keeping before the people and attracting attention by their oratorical achievements. They therefore, on November 24, issued a manifesto, which declared their intention to return and take part in the debates in order to secure the cessation of the state of siege and the dictatorship, and asserted that it "was suicide to set up the retraimiento as a law of conduct."

Three days after this proclamation the Republicans re-appeared in the Cortes with a resolution condemning the Government for its method of enforcing the law suspending guaranties; Pi y Margall, Castelar, and Figueras hurled an avalanche of eloquent sarcasm upon the Ministerial heads, but the Government and the majority knew that these speeches no longer echoed through the country; that they only made the debates more lively, and gave to the Assembly the air of being the genuine representation of the whole nation. It was not, therefore, through any fear of the Republicans, but because there seemed to be no further cause for anxiety, that on December 11 the state of siege was raised by a unanimous vote.

The demoralisation of the Republican party naturally gave the prospect of an early solution of the monarchical question, but this prospect was not realised. The three parties of the majority were all in alliance against the Republic, but there was no unanimity as to who the monarch should be. Dissatisfaction with the candidacy of the Duke of Genoa proposed by Prim produced a Ministerial crisis early in November, which resulted in the retirement from the Cabinet of the Unionists Silvela and Ardanaz, who supported the candidacy of the Duke of Montpensier, and in the refusal of members of the same party to become their substitutes. Topete also gave in his resignation, but fearing the loss of prestige consequent upon the retirement from the Government of one of the three chiefs of the Revolution, the Regent refused to accept it.

Prim made every effort to retain him in the Cabinet, and even went so far in his speech of November 2, on the crisis, as to say that if Topete disappeared from the Ministry, the consequences might be fatal to the cause of liberty and to the consolidation of the conquests due to the Revolution of September; and that if Topete persisted in his determination, he would place his own resignation in the hands of the Regent. Topete did persist in his determination, but General Prim concluded that he would not resign, after all. In a candid speech he asked the House whether it was the opinion of the members that he ought to resign because he had said he would.

On receiving the answer "No! No! " from the Deputies of the majority, he stated that he was satisfied, and that he would still continue at his post, "to serve the Revolution and to serve Liberty." The Democratic leader, Martos, succeeded Silvela as Minister, Figuerola returned to the Treasury in the place of Ardanaz, and Prim took charge of the Navy Department himself. The Unionists were, therefore, entirely eliminated from the Government. In Spain, the President of the Council of Ministers usually takes no portfolio. Prim, in addition to the Presidency, now combined in himself the War and Navy Departments.

These events did not strengthen the prestige of the Cabinet, nor was that prestige heightened by the attitude of the Monarchists when Figuerola proposed the appointment of an investigating committee to inquire into the disappearance during the Bourbon regime of certain jewels belonging to the Crown, a proposition which provoked a long and animated debate, and was bitterly denounced by the Alfonsists - Elduayen and Canovas del Castillo. The Unionists openly charged the President of the Council with intentionally prolonging the interregnum and obstructing a solution through motives of personal ambition.

Prim now sought to calm this irritation by an oscillation in the direction of the Unionists, while the official refusal of the Duke of Genoa to become a candidate for the throne brought on another Ministerial crisis in January, and caused the exit of Martos and Ruiz Zorilla, who had been distinguished supporters of that solution. Sagasta was shifted from the Interior to the State Department; Rivero, the President of the Chamber, took the Interior, and Topete was persuaded to return to the Navy.

The Progressist, Montero Rios, was appointed to the Department of Justice. The disposition to a conciliatory policy toward the Unionists, which was marked by the re-entry of Topete into the Cabinet, was more clearly shown by Prim's speech against Castelar's bill, declaring all the members of the House of Bourbon, both of the elder and younger branch, "to be disqualified from exercising the lofty dignity conferred upon the chief of the State by the Constitution of 1869." The object of this proposed law was to attack the Duke of Montpensier, the Unionist candidate, and to sow dissension between the factions of the majority. Prim's speech was very conciliatory, and of a character to leave hopes in the breasts of the Unionists that the Duke of Montpensier might, after all, be a possible candidate.

He explicitly declared that his celebrated exclamation of "Never! never! never!" and "Impossible! impossible! impossible!" was applied to the restoration of Isabella II and Prince Alfonso, and went no further.

The remarkable position occupied by General Prim was largely due to his policy of giving to every one something to hope from him. Each party hoped to gain him for its candidate, for in politics, as was said of him by an opponent, he was like a cipher, to be placed either at the right or the left of a figure. If, for example, a candidate in the political exchange were quoted at nine and General Prim were placed at his side, or, in other words, he were given the support of General Prim, the candidate rose to ninety; subject him to the opposition of the President of the Council, or, in other words, place General Prim on the other side of him and he dwindled to a decimal. It was by such a policy that Prim succeeded in maintaining a certain coherence in the discordant elements of the majority, and this success was possible only because he possessed a quality rare in this nation of talkers: he knew when to keep silent.

The best picture of the wonderful influence wielded by the President of the Council is drawn by Castelar in his speech of March 12, 1870, on the foreign and home policy of the Government. " Observe," said he, "what passes in this Chamber - and what passes in this Chamber passes in Spain. In this Chamber no one speaks, no one wishes to speak, upon the policy of the Government. Suppose I should attempt to force the leaders of the different groups to speak: it would be foolish for me to undertake it, because no one will speak. I may say the most monstrous things about them, - they will continue to keep silent. I will attribute to them the most extravagant projects, the most absurd plans, - they will continue to keep silent. I will allude to them by name. I will say nothing to Senor Canovas; I do not need to do so, because he occupies a position somewhat apart, but I will allude by name to Senor Posada Herrera, who is his friend and his enemy, and who is in a position that is indescribable and impossible. Senor Posada Herrera will not ask for the floor. He will wrap himself in a mysterious silence. I will then allude to the most impetuous of all the orators of this House; to him who delights to engage in combat because he knows that he will come forth the victor. Despite my littleness and his colossal stature, although I challenge him to come out of his tent to contend with me, his tent will remain closed. I cannot succeed in exciting into speech even that most eloquent orator, Rios Rosas."

Then turning to the Progressists, "There are," continued the speaker, "in this majority, in the Progressist party, orators who are in a state of latent hostility to the Government. For example, Senor Mata leads a fraction which on several occasions has given anxiety to the President of the Council of Ministers. I will name him and he will not speak. I will give Senor Madoz an opportunity to shout 'Long live the Duke of Victoria!' and, like all the rest, Senor Madoz will keep silent; although his most distinctive characteristic is frankness, he will not take the floor."

Then, addressing the Democrats:

"I will now go to the benches where sit my former friends, and I will ask Senor Rodriguez, who is likewise of a warlike temperament, why he resigned the Vice-Presidency of the Chamber, why he has abandoned his friends. Although he can scarcely restrain himself, and the words 'I ask the floor' wander over his lips, he will not ask the floor. I will then address Senor Martos. He is my friend, but he does not honour me with his political confidences. I know and divine his ideas by his mysterious attitude. This assembly in reality appears an assembly of shadows. Here no one speaks, and there are but two things that are frank and open, my speech and Admiral Topete's face. Senor Martos is disgusted, profoundly disgusted, with this situation. He has said with perfect sincerity that the Government cannot escape from the great and extraordinary obstacles which encompass it, except by inclining to the Left. The Government determines to incline to the Right. Senor Martos sees this with pain and disgust. Why does he not speak? Why does he not display his banner? This leader will do the same as the other leaders; he will envelop himself in silence. His party will do the same as the other parties, envelop itself in mystery. Do you wish the key to this strange enigma? I will give it to you. All are silent because all hope something from General Prim for their respective solutions. And what occurs in this House occurs outside of the House.

I know many supporters of the Bourbon restoration who say, without reason, I suppose, but justified by so much mystery -that General Prim is waiting for Prince Alfonso to grow up. I know many partisans of another candidate whom I will not name, (The Duke of Montpensier) who believe that General Prim is waiting to overcome certain objections to this candidate in the Progressist party; that he would have overcome them before this if it had not been for the tenacity of Ruiz Zorilla. More than this, I know some Republicans who are capable of contending against me a thousand times -- against me, who am so constant in my defence of the Republic -- rather than against General Prim, who is so fierce in his attack upon it. Why? Because, as the Jews awaited their Messiah from the indifferent, implacable Jehovah, they hope to find in General Prim that Messiah of the Republic."

Prim's readiness to forsake when necessary his policy of conciliation of the different factions was discovered by the Unionists in an over-confident attempt to throw down the gauntlet to the Government. The Minister of Finance brought forward a bill for the negotiation of Treasury bonds in the possession of the Government; an amendment was offered signed by seven prominent members of the Liberal Union. The Government accepted the challenge and made the rejection of the amendment a Cabinet question. The debate on this question took place on March 19, and was known afterwards as the debate of St. Joseph's night. The Unionists could count on the support of the Republicans, Carlists, and Alfonsists, whose respective leaders all opposed the Government bill. The result looked doubtful, and turned on the Radical vote, as the combination of Democrats and Progressists was just sufficient to give the majority to the Government.

Prim charged the Liberal Union with scheming for his downfall. He had done his best, he said, to prevent this split in the ranks of the majority. "The gentlemen of the Liberal Union know the difficulties that I have had to traverse, the charges that have been made against me, the counsels and supplications that I have addressed to them. I have asked the gentlemen of the Liberal Union to take all this into consideration, but I have not been fortunate enough to succeed in my efforts. These gentlemen have begun the battle; there is nothing left for me but to say, Radicals, to the rescue! Let those who love me follow me!"

His speech was received with the greatest excitement by the Chamber. Topete demonstrated his discontent by leaving the Ministerial bench. The Unionists made every effort to represent their attitude as not one of hostility to the Government, but the vote on this question reduced itself to decisive conflict between the Liberal Union and the Radicals. The latter won by only 122 to 117 votes.

Early in June, the committee having the matter in charge reported the bill providing for the method to be followed for the election of a king. The most important change was the one determining that the number of Deputies present should be equal at least to the number required for passing a bill. In opposition to this clause was a minority report and amendment which, as will be seen, had a blighting effect upon the candidacy of the Duke of Montpensier.

One of the most striking events in the debate on the bill was that the banner of the Bourbon restoration was unfurled for the first time since the Revolution of September. Canovas del Castillo, the leader of the five or six Alfonsists in the Chamber, made a powerful speech, in which, for the first time in the Constituent Cortes, the cause of the fallen dynasty was openly advocated. He began by admitting that he was no friend of the Revolution of September, and that he had contributed nothing to its success, but that he could understand a reason for it and appreciate the force of circumstances which brought it about; he should, moreover, be reconciled to its results if these results were for the good of the country.

The Monarchical party was divided into three different classes: those whom the impatience characteristic of the nation and the desire of finding at all cost a remedy for the situation, had carried over to the Carlist party, which was supposed to be dead; those who formed the three parties of the majority in the Chamber; and finally, "the great and powerful elements in the country which still adhere to the fallen dynasty."

Undisturbed by the murmurs of the Assembly, he declared that if the monarchical question could be solved by the sympathies, by the decision, of a single man, he should not be afraid to say, "Here in my heart, in my spirit, in my conscience, there is but one single sympathy, and that sympathy is for Prince Alfonso." He was willing to renounce his personal preferences, and to give loyal support to any prince who might be elected and who should have sufficient strength and breadth of view to consolidate order with liberty; but "you cannot doubt," concluded the speaker, "that there is something behind me in the country; that there is not merely something but much in the country which answers my own views; and if I have not many companions here, my supporters in the country are not as few as they are here. There are in the country many, very many, public men who hope for this, who desire this; who desire before everything the prosperity of the country and will support whoever labours with good will to secure this prosperity, but without for this reason sacrificing their preferences and their sympathies for Prince Alfonso."

The impression made by this speech was increased by a manifesto of the former Prime Minister, Miraflores, which declared Alfonso to be the true national king, and denied that the Revolution of September had begun with the cry of "Down with the Bourbons."

Isabella Abdication

The beginning of the campaign in favour of a Bourbon restoration was made more impressive by an event which took place at Paris on June 25. On that day Queen Isabella, at the Palace Basilewski, surrounded by many Spanish grandees and the members of her family, solemnly abdicated in favour of her son. The document proclaiming the abdication, which was published broadcast through the country, began by a painful retrospect of her thirty years' reign and her twenty months of exile.

"In this review I cannot accuse myself of the woes for which I am held responsible, nor for the misfortunes that I have not been able to remedy. Twenty months have passed since I set my foot upon a foreign land. . . . In those twenty months my afflicted spirit has not ceased to listen with breathless eagerness to the echoes of the cries of grief which come from my never-forgotten Spain. Full of faith in its future, anxious for its greatness, for its integrity, for its independence, grateful for the good wishes of those who were and are faithful to me, and forgetting the wrongs inflicted upon me by those who misunderstand or assail me, I aspire to nothing for myself; but I do desire to embody the impulse of my heart in an act that will be received with rejoicing by those loyal Spaniards to whose chivalry and noble sentiment I entrust the fate of the dynasty of tradition and of the heir of a hundred kings. Here is the act of which I speak; here is the last proof that I can give and wish to give of the affection with which you have always inspired me.

"Know then, that in virtue of a solemn written declaration prepared at my residence in Paris, and in the presence of my royal family, of the grandees, dignitaries, generals, and public men of Spain, named in the document itself, I have, without any kind of compulsion, and of my own free will, abdicated my royal authority and all my political rights in favour of my beloved son, Don Alfonso, Prince of Asturias. In accordance with the laws of the nation, I retain all my civil rights as well as the state and personal dignity which they and especially the law of May 12, 1865, concede to me. I shall, therefore, keep Don Alfonso under my protection and guardianship as long as he resides abroad, and until proclaimed by a government and by a Cortes representing the legitimate will of the nation. Although my motherly heart must endure bitter pain, I shall then deliver him up to you in accordance with my ardent hopes and aspirations. In the meanwhile I shall endeavour to instil into his intelligent mind the generous and noble sentiments which so well accord with his natural inclinations, and will make him worthy, I trust, of wearing the crown of St. Ferdinand, and of succeeding those Alfonsos, predecessors from whom he, as well as his country, has received a legacy of imperishable glory. From this time, therefore, Alfonso XII. will be your real king, a Spanish king, and the king of the Spaniards, not the king of a party. Love him with the same sincerity with which he loves you; respect and protect his youth with the invincible strength of your knightly hearts, while I, in fervent supplication, pray to the Omnipotent for long days of peace and prosperity for Spain, and to grant at the same time to my innocent son wisdom, prudence, and righteousness in his reign, and greater fortune on the throne than fell to the lot of his unfortunate mother, who was once your Queen."

The partisans of the abdication and the supporters of Alfonso laid great stress upon the assurance that he would be not the king of a party, but the king of the Spaniards.

In the words of one of their most accredited organs in the press, "If some, more Royalist than the King himself, should reject these noble words and feel disgust because the Prince is not to be a king for them alone, so much the worse for them, and so much the better for the cause of the innocent boy who is the only hope of a political future of peace, liberty, and order." The time had not yet arrived for the candidacy of the young Prince to be taken seriously by the masses, and as the question of a monarch had been inextricably entangled with the course of politics and with the Ministerial crises during the year 1869-1870, for the sake of clearness it becomes expedient to give a slight sketch of the various candidacies which, in the search for a king, were agitated in the Constituent Cortes, until the problem was for the moment solved by the election of the Duke of Aosta.

The Monarchists of the Revolution were divided among themselves as to the choice of the monarch. The Liberal Union wished to continue the Bourbon dynasty by placing on the throne the Infanta Louisa Fernanda and her husband, the Duke of Montpensier; a certain portion of the Progressists demanded a king from the nation itself, and brought forward the name of the aged Espartero, while the remaining elements headed by Prim looked anxiously for the new monarch among the princes of a foreign dynasty. The fraction of the Liberal Union which had refused to take part in the Revolution under the direction of Canovas del Castillo supported the restoration of the young Prince Alfonso.

With many candidates the question of their acceptance was the difficulty, but there was no danger of a refusal on the part of the Duke of Montpensier. The difficulty that presented itself to his supporters was not to secure his acceptance, but to make him acceptable. The Duke made no secret of his desire for the throne. He had been expelled from the kingdom in 1867 by his sister-in-law; he had advanced funds in aid of the Revolution, he had offered to the movement the encouragement of his presence ; and he had hastened to take the oath to the new Constitution before the Spanish charge d'affaires at Lisbon, where he was residing. From his abilities and knowledge of Spanish affairs he was admirably fitted for the throne.

There was behind him the support of the Liberal Union, with two of the three leaders of the Revolution. But besides being a foreigner, he was a Bourbon and he was unpopular. In the Constituent Cortes he was continually subjected to the attacks of the Republicans, who directed their shafts against him for two reasons, because his unpopularity in the country made him an excellent mark for attacking the monarchical institution in general, and because they hoped to produce a dissension between his supporters and his opponents in the majority.

On March 8, 1869, they induced a debate on the subject by an interpellation of the Minister of War as to whether the Duke of Montpensier was still regarded as a captain-general in the Spanish army. An affirmative reply occasioned several speeches from the Republican leaders to the effect that the Duke of Montpensier was a Bourbon and was a captain-general for no other reason than his marriage to the sister of Isabella, and that he ought to leave the country with the rest of the family. This drew from Admiral Topete the declaration that between Montpensier and the Republic he preferred Montpensier, when his attention was called by the Republicans to the fact that one of the organs of the majority -- the Iberia -- stated just the contrary, that it preferred the Republic to Montpensier. The manifest impossibility of the selection of Montpensier was well described by Castelar in his speech on the proposition to establish a regency.

"Whenever I hear any one speak of the Duke of Montpensier I always think of a device employed in the universities. Whenever we reject a candidate for graduation or for one of the higher degrees, we inform the beadle, who goes out and says to the rejected candidate, ` You are a man of great merit, but I regret to inform you that you do not please these gentlemen.' Well, the Duke of Montpensier does not please these gentlemen. There are about seventy or eighty Republican Deputies, all of whom I assure you will vote against the Duke of Montpensier. There is the Progressist party, with a hundred votes, which, in consequence of the engagements contracted with the electors, will all be thrown against the Duke of Montpensier. There are thirty Democrats here who, although they have felt it their conscientious duty to make great concessions, will, I am sure, all vote as one man against the candidacy of the Duke of Montpensier. You see, then, that the Duke of Montpensier is a man of great merit, but he does not please these gentlemen."

An event which happened outside of the Chamber had also an injurious effect upon Montpensier's candidacy. For a long time there had been bad blood between him and his cousin, Henry de Bourbon, Duke of Seville, who seems to have had some aspirations for playing the role of a Philippe Egalite of the Spanish Revolution. Montpensier came to Madrid in March, 1870, for the purpose of carrying on his campaign, and on the day after his arrival there appeared in the papers a violent attack upon him addressed to the Montpensierists and signed by the Duke of Seville.

Montpensier had nothing to gain by a duel; if he fell, his opponents would be effectually relieved of his candidacy, and if he killed his adversary he would be forced to leave Madrid. In any case the loss of prestige by a quarrel between two members of the same family would be much greater to him than to the Duke of Seville, who had no particular character to lose. Anger, however, got the better of reason. A challenge was sent by the Duke of Montpensier, and on March 13 a duel was fought on the outskirts of Madrid, in which the Duke of Seville was killed on the spot at the third fire.

The candidacy of the Duke, shattered as it was by this episode and by the philippics of the Republicans, was finally removed from the field of possibilities by the vote on the Monarchical election bill. The bill reported from the committee, provided that an election should be valid if one more than half the members took part in the votes, and that the candidate who received an absolute majority should be regarded as elected; one hundred and seventy-one votes would therefore be sufficient to make the vote valid.

It was estimated that about sixty Republicans would take part in the vote, and that Montpensier would have a majority over Espartero, at that time the only other candidate mentioned. The Progressist Rojo Arias declared that it would be unworthy to elect a king in this way, and he proposed an amendment that an election should be valid only when a single candidate received more than half the whole House. The vote on this amendment took place on June 7, 1870, and the supporters of the Duke strained every nerve to defeat it. They knew that it would be impossible to unite 171 votes on their candidate. In spite of their efforts, the amendment was carried amid great excitement by 106 to 98 votes. This vote decided the fate of Montpensier as a candidate, and Rios Rosas, in the name of the Liberal Union, declared they would be satisfied with any candidate of the majority.

Jockeying for Power

As early as 1866, after the first unsuccessful revolutionary attempt of General Prim, a meeting of Progressists and Democrats who believed the Revolution to be inevitable was held at the house of Olozaga, and it was decided that the best solution for the country was to substitute the House of Braganza for the dynasty of the Bourbons. It followed that after the Revolution a number of the leaders were in favour of offering the throne to Ferdinand, ex-King Consort of Portugal, of the Catholic branch of the House of Coburg. This candidacy was especially popular with certain Spanish statesmen, who dreamed of Iberian Unity, and was advocated in a pamphlet by a prominent Progressist, Salazar y Mazaredo, who afterwards became a conspicuous figure in the Hohenzollern negotiations.

But the ex-King of Portugal was even precipitate in declining. He caused a telegram to be sent to the Portuguese Minister in Madrid, to inform the members of the Provisional Government that he would not accept the throne of Spain, and that he should be unable to receive the deputation which was reported to be coming to offer it to him. This telegram caused no little criticism, and was made the subject of a question in the Constituent Cortes in the session of April 7, 1869.

The Minister of the Interior replied that, as the form of government had not yet been decided, the throne of Spain could not have been offered to any one, but that it was true that the substance of the telegram referred to had been communicated to the Government. The subject again came up ten days later on an interpellation. The Minister of Foreign Affairs requested that the interpellation be not pressed, as the Portuguese Government had given frank and loyal explanations in response to the communications which the Spanish Government had addressed to it on the subject; that King Ferdinand had personally expressed his regret to the Spanish Minister in Lisbon, and had sent an autograph letter for transmission to the President of the Provisional Government.

In this letter, "although reiterating his firm and invariable purpose not to accept the Spanish crown, he explained in the terms the most seeming for Spain the meaning of the telegram referred to." This discussion and declination should have effectually relieved Ferdinand of any further attempts and removed him from the list of candidates.

The candidacy of the aged Espartero, Duke of Vittoria, ex-Regent of the kingdom and hero of the first Carlist war, was undoubtedly the most popular through the country; but it was not attractive to General Prim, who held the key to the situation. After failure in other directions had made the outlook for the discovery of a monarch a gloomy one, he wrote to General Espartero on May 13, 1870, expressing the desire to know whether he would accept the throne if the Cortes should elect him.

" The Government," said the letter, "does not support any particular candidate, leaving as it does the fullest liberty to the Assembly; but it must avoid the unprofitable excitement of the passions which might result from a refusal to accept on the part of the candidate chosen by the Cortes."

From the tone of this letter it might be inferred that its aim was rather to draw out a negative from Espartero than to present his candidacy in a serious light. If so, the object was effected. Espartero replied: "A duty of conscience obliges me to state that it would not be possible for me to accept the high office because my many years and my feeble health would not permit me to discharge its duties."

After the reception of this letter, the Government regarded Espartero as eliminated from the list of candidates, but his partisans still continued to agitate the question of his acceptance to the point of sending a committee to Logrono, where he resided, for the purpose of persuading him. The Deputies who supported him published on May 30, 1870, a manifesto to the nation, in which the signers declared that "Espartero king is Spain with honour."

The old soldier, perhaps from memory of his stormy regency, (1840-1843) which might well have impressed him with the uneasiness of a crowned head, persisted in his original negative, and requested his supporters not to bring forward his name, but "to give their votes to the candidate they judged to be the most worthy of occupying the throne."

General Prim's personal preference was for a candidate from the House of Savoy. He had early begun negotiations with a view to securing the candidacy of the Duke of Genoa, the nephew of Victor Emmanuel, a boy of sixteen, or the Duke of Aosta, the son of the King; but his proposals were received without enthusiasm. As has been already stated, much of the remarkable influence wielded in the Cortes and throughout the country by the President of the Council of Ministers, was due to his inscrutability. In a political arena where everybody was ready to speak, he alone knew how to keep silent. It was by enigmatical reticence like that of an ancient oracle that he held together the discordant elements of a majority which had little love for one another. We may readily believe, however, that the mysterious silence in which he enveloped himself was not entirely a matter of choice. He could not speak because he did not know where to find his king.

The throne of St. Ferdinand seemed to be going a-begging, and an examination of the Almanach de Gotha in search of . eligible princes had proved unprofitable. There was therefore a crowded house on June 11, 1870, before the suspension of the session, to hear the expected speech of the Prime Minister.

General Prim began by defending himself from the charge that he was responsible for the continuance of the interregnum, and that he intended to be the General Monk of the Bourbon restoration. He then described almost pathetically the difficulty of his task. "You are all public men," he said, "and you know that making kings is more difficult than appears at first sight, and on this point I admit that I too was mistaken. . . . We did not believe that when the immense difficulty of bringing the Revolution to a successful issue was overcome all the rest would be easy, but I must say that it did appear to me perfectly easy to replace the dynasty we were about to overthrow. Since that day, experience, mankind's great teacher, has shown me how difficult it is to make a king."

The speaker went on to recount his abortive efforts with King Ferdinand of Portugal, with the Duke of Aosta, and with the Duke of Genoa. The Duke of Genoa had placed himself at the orders of his guardian, King Victor Emmanuel, and of his mother. The King was in favour of his accepting, but messages reached the Duchess of Genoa "painting in blackest colours the situation of the country and arousing her anxiety with stories of the dangers to which her son would be exposed."

People had even gone so far as to say, "Madame, if you send your son to Spain, pray for his safety." In spite of these disappointments, the Government was not disheartened, and had fixed its eyes upon a fourth candidate. "The gentlemen of the House doubtless expect me to pronounce the name of this fourth candidate, but they will allow me to refrain from doing so, because it would be indiscreet; it might produce complications, and in addition to this, I have given my word of honour to conceal it for the present."

Dissolution

This dissolution of the Cortes in 1870 left the country and the House in a state of excited uncertainty as to who this fourth candidate could be. No one dreamed of the far-reaching effects of this negotiation with the Unknown; that it would kindle another war of the Spanish Succession which would cost France milliards and provinces; for General Prim's candidate was Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern.

It has been alleged that the candidacy of the German prince was the result of a deep-laid scheme of vengeance of Prim against the Emperor Napoleon growing out of the Mexican invasion. This supposition has been rejected both by his friends and enemies. If there was one important event of his life upon which General Prim could look back with relief and satisfaction, it was his action in the Mexican invasion. His letter of March 17, 1862, to the Emperor, and that of March 23 to the French Admiral, and his speech in defence of his conduct before the Spanish Senate in the session of the same year, show such a precise estimate of the circumstance, and foretell with such accuracy what really took place, that they make up one of the most admirable episodes in the career of this remarkable man.

Napoleon III might have felt against Prim for the withdrawal of the Spanish troops the dissatisfaction which it was human to feel against a man who had warned him in time and whose warning had been disregarded; but there was certainly no reason for Prim to feel any enmity against the Emperor. On the contrary, in his search for a king, Prim had shown himself from the beginning attentive to the wishes of the French Government and anxious to come to an arrangement with it. Nothing that he had thus far proposed had been satisfactory to the Tuileries, which in the first place had been displeased with the Revolution itself. The success of Montpensier appeared a danger to its dynastic interests, while the advent of an Italian king would have given an opportunity to the opposition in the French Chamber, where the Emperor was already charged with having given too much aid and comfort to the House of Savoy.

The only solution which suited the Emperor would have been the restoration of Queen Isabella, and this could hardly be asked. The French Government therefore, while declaring that it had no intention of interfering in the affairs of the Peninsula, and that it respected the right of Spain to regulate its own destinies, affected an air of reserve; but discontent was clearly seen, and the real attitude of the Government resembled a malevolent neutrality.

The Progressist Deputy Salazar y Mazaredo is generally credited with the reputation of having been the first to bring the candidacy of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern to the attention of General Prim. He had been an ardent supporter of Iberian unity and the Portuguese candidacy, which he had sustained in a pamphlet; but after the refusal of King Ferdinand, he selected in his own mind as the most satisfactory substitute the German Prince, who was married to a Portuguese Infanta. Prim, who was at the end of his resources and determined to discover some solution before the reunion of the Cortes, jumped at the proposal, and instructed Salazar y Mazaredo to proceed to Germany to sound the Prince and his family on the subject.

His reception was not encouraging, and he was able to bring only an evasive answer to Prim from Sigmaringen. In view of his determination to discover a king somewhere, Prim resolved to make another effort, and sent Salazar with a letter to Bismarck, in order to gain the latter's co-operation. Salazar did not have a personal interview with Bismarck, but he left the letter; and in March, 1870, the answer came to Prim that perhaps an understanding could be reached. Salazar then made another journey to Berlin, and the result of the negotiations was that he returned to Madrid in the latter part of July, 1870, with the Prince's acceptance of the Spanish crown.

True to his policy of remaining on good terms with the Tuileries, Prim had guarded the greatest reserve in the negotiations and had instructed his agent to do the same. It was his intention as soon as the acceptance was obtained to have an interview with the Emperor Napoleon, who was expected at Vichy, and to endeavour to bring him over to his own views. Unfortunately, several days before the arrival of Salazar in Madrid, Prim went on a hunting expedition on his estate near Toledo. Salazar, on reaching Madrid and finding Prim absent, could not keep the secret, nor could he refrain from making to several of his friends the exultant announcement, "Ya tenemos rey."

When Prim returned, all Madrid and all Europe knew the issue of the negotiation that he had so carefully concealed. Two of his friends went to meet him at the railway station to congratulate him on having found a candidate who accepted. Prim frowned, and twisting the glove which he held in his hand, exclaimed: "Labour lost, candidate lost, but God grant that this may be all!" (Victor Balaguer, Memorias de un Constituyente)

The only thing left, however, was to proceed as if nothing had happened. In an interview with the French Ambassador, Mercier de l' Ostende, he attempted to persuade him to use his influence with the Emperor; he also sent instructions to the same effect to Olozaga, who was ambassador at Paris.

A Cabinet council was held at La Granja, where the Regent was residing, and it was unanimously decided to summon the Cortes for the 20th of the month and to present the name of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern to be voted on for the throne of Spain.

The King of Prussia had from the beginning taken the position that the acceptance of Prince Leopold was a family question, to which his consent had been asked, not as King of Prussia, but as head of the House of Hohenzollern.

As Bismarck stated in the Bundesrath on July 16, 1870, the proposition had been brought in an unofficial way to the knowledge of the King of Prussia on the express condition that it should be kept secret. Since it was not a matter that concerned either Prussia or the North German Confederation, this condition was accepted, and the King made no communication to his government on what he regarded as a family matter.

In France, where there had been much jealousy of Prussia since the war of 1866 with Austria, this view was not accepted. The Emperor said to Benedetti, the French Ambassador at Berlin : " The candidacy of the Duke of Montpensier is directed against my dynasty. It concerns me and I can put up with it. The candidacy of the Prince of Hohenzollern is directed against the whole French nation; the country would not endure it, and we must provide against it." Even if the French Government had been disposed to a peaceable solution, it would have been difficult in the face of the popular excitement and of the war feeling which ran riot in the press, the Chambers, and even in the streets and cafes of Paris.

The Duke de Grammont, in reply to Cochery's interpellation on July 6, said: " We do not believe that consideration for the rights of a neighbouring people compels us to allow a foreign power, by placing one of her princes upon the throne of Charles V., to disturb the balance of power in Europe and to endanger the interests and the honour of France. This we firmly hope will not come to pass. To prevent it, we count upon the wisdom of the German and the friendship of the Spanish people. Should it be otherwise, strong in your support and that of the nation, we shall know how to fulfil our duty without hesitation and without weakness."

This declaration and the attitude of the French people and press aroused Spanish susceptibilities, and the Spanish Government was determined to cling to its candidate in spite of all dangers. The Duke de Grammont wrote to Benedetti, the French Ambassador at Berlin: "If the head of the Hohenzollern family has hitherto had nothing to do with this question, we request him to observe this attitude no longer; we request him, if not by his command, at least to intervene with the Prince with his advice, and to cause to disappear the deep disquiet which has been everywhere aroused by the plans that Marshal Prim has formed for this candidacy. Use every effort to bring it about that His Majesty advise the Prince of Hohenzollern to withdraw his acceptance."

To this Benedetti replied by giving an account of several interviews at Ems with the King of Prussia, who persisted in his attitude that the candidacy had no relation with the Prussian Government. Benedetti wrote privately: "His Majesty gives me to understand that the Prince of his own motion will renounce the crown, and that the King will not hesitate to approve of his resolution." This anticipation was soon realised. On July 12 Prince Antony of Hohenzollern telegraphed both to Prim and Olozaga that in view of the late developments he withdrew his son's candidacy in his name. The notice was also given to the German press that "the Prince of Hohenzollern, in order to give back to Spain complete freedom of choice, renounces his candidacy for the throne, being firmly resolved not to allow any casts belli to result from what he regards as a family matter."

The question was thus restored to its former status. The King of Prussia had refused to connect himself politically with it. He had approved of the acceptance and he approved of the renunciation.

This did not satisfy the French Government. On July 12 the Duke de Grammont informed Benedetti: "In order that the renunciation of Prince Antony, in behalf of his son, may have its full effect, it seems necessary that the King should unite in it and give us the assurance that he will not again approve of this candidacy. Will you go immediately to the King and request this declaration from him, which he cannot deny if he really harbours no after-thought. In spite of the renunciation, which is now known, the excitement is so great that we do not know whether we shall succeed in getting the better of it." ( Lauser, Geschichte Spaniens, chap. vi. p. 245)

The war party had carried everything before it, and an interpellation was announced by Duvernois as to "the securities which the Cabinet had demanded or had decided to demand in order to prevent the recurrence of like complications with Prussia." The Government was afraid to recede in the face of the frenzied excitement in Paris. The King of Prussia refused to deviate from the line of conduct he had hitherto pursued, that the question was not political, that it was a family matter, which was now closed by the voluntary withdrawal of the Prince ; he therefore could and would give no guaranty. The result was the Franco-Prussian war.

On July 13 the Spanish Government informed the powers that it had received the notice of the withdrawal of the Prince of Hohenzollern. The meeting of the Cortes which had been convoked for the election of the king was postponed.

On July 26 the Government declared its neutrality in the FrancoPrussian war. In this declaration the Government reported its efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the question between France and Prussia, at the same time expressing its belief that with the withdrawal of Prince Leopold every cause of difference between the two countries had disappeared. "

The efforts of the Spanish Government have been in vain. Vain also the noble intent of other nations, who with greater influence, if not with greater zeal or determination than Spain, have endeavoured to prevent a collision of incalculable consequences. Spain, which has no national interest in the strife, which has seen its perfect right recognised to constitute itself in its own way, and has received the assurance that its borders, its independence and dignity will be respected, must also adopt the neutral attitude which the remaining powers of Europe have decided to observe."

The Hohenzollern candidacy was therefore only a spark to create a great conflagration, and Spain still remained without a king, and General Prim without a candidate. He then turned again to the House of Savoy. Victor Emmanuel had always favoured the acceptance of the Spanish Throne by one of his family, and he had given his approval both in the case of the Duke of Genoa and of the Duke of Aosta. In the projected movement against the Pope, it would be a great advantage to have the most Catholic country in Europe governed by one of his own House. In that case there would be no danger of a repetition of the events of 1854. In a letter of July 29 Francisco de Paula Montemar, Spanish Minister at Florence, mentioned to Prim that the King had said, "Le Due d'Aoste est ebranle." ( Ricardo Muniz, Apuntes Hist6ricos sobre la Revoluci,n de 1868, vol. ii.)

On the strength of this phrase, Prim instructed Montemar to re-open the negotiations with a view to securing the acceptance of the Prince. This was in the month of August.

On September 29 Montemar telegraphed that he had had an interview with Victor Emmanuel; that the King was entirely in favour of his son's acceptance, and that nothing was left but to overcome the resistance of the latter. On the 11th of the next month he telegraphed that he had just seen the Italian Prince, who had instructed him to advise General Prim to sound the Powers as to whether the acceptance of the Duke of Aosta would be well received, and that, if their answers were favourable, there would be no further hesitation on his part.

Prim objected to this on the ground that Spain had the right to offer, and Italy the right to accept, the crown without consulting any one, and that such action would always have "the appearance of submitting the autonomy of two nations to the convenience or caprice of foreigners."

The Florence Court was determined, however, not to have a repetition of the Hohenzollern firebrand, and insisted on an explanation of the views of the Powers as a condition of the Prince's acceptance. Prim finally yielded. The French Government of National Defence at Tours replied that the candidacy of the Duke of Aosta was, from a monarchical standpoint, the most agreeable of all that had been hitherto suggested.

The Prussian note said: "We were the first who recognised the right of Spain to decide her own future. We will not to-day deviate from that principle, and we will not imitate the example which France gave before the war, of interfering in the internal affairs of Spain and making their solution depend upon the assent of France."

On November 2 Montemar telegraphed the official acceptance of the Duke, which was in these words " With the consent of the King, my father, I authorise you to reply to Marshal Prim that he may present my candidature if he believes that my name can unite the friends of liberty, of order, and of constitutional government. I will accept the crown if the vote of the Cortes proves to me that it is the will of the Spanish nation."

Election of a King

November 16 was the day fixed for the election of a king. It was expected and feared that there might be disturbances in Madrid. Every precaution was taken to suppress any attempted disorder, and troops were stationed at different points of the capital. The Congress presented an animated appearance. None of the Deputies was absent, except three who were detained through illness. One Deputy appeared with a broken arm, the result of an accident three days before, and one had come from the Canary Islands for the purpose of giving his vote. General Prim, calm and smiling, assured his friends that there would be no disturbance in the capital.

The beginning of the session was tumultuous. The Republican minority attempted by every device to delay the entrance into the order of the day. One demanded that the article of the Constitution should be read which provided that no foreigner, unless naturalised, should hold an office in Spain; another read the names of those who in 1854 had voted for Isabella, and then the names of those who on the same occasion had voted for the Republic. Figueras and Castelar insisted on the right of discussion. This was refused, first by the President and then by a majority vote. Laughter greeted the Carlist Vinader, when he requested that the Papal Bull excommunicating Victor Emmanuel should be read. All attempts of the opposition to obstruct the business in hand failed before "the impassibility of Prim, who never opened his lips, and the energy of Ruiz Zorilla, the President of the Chamber. The roar of the Republican minority was heard, it was seen at times to rise like a monstrous wave, but like a wave to fall and to break at the feet of the President." (Victor Balaguer, Memorias de un Constituyente.)

The result of the vote was 191 for the Duke of Aosta, 60 for the Federal Republic, 27 for the Duke of Montpensier, 8 for the Duke of Vittoria, 1 for the Duchess of Montpensier, 2 for Prince Alfonso de Bourbon, 3 for the United Republic, and 19 votes in blank. The President then declared that the Duke of Aosta had been elected King of the Spaniards. A committee of twenty-four Deputies was appointed to go to Florence to convey to the Prince the official notification of his election to the Spanish throne. It was also agreed, in view of the absence of the President and Secretaries with the committee, that the sessions should be suspended until its return.

The session closed at ten o'clock in the evening, after a speech by the President, in which, addressing himself directly to the leaders of the Monarchists who had opposed the Duke of Aosta, he urged them to give to the elected monarch their hearty support. The Montpensierist Topete, on leaving the chamber, exclaimed: "No one will be more loyal than I to the new monarch, but God grant that those who are bringing him here may never repent of it; " while Castelar cried out to a group of Deputies: "They are mad, they are mad, they are mad! "

The official acceptance of the Duke of Aosta was received at Madrid on November 21, and on the 24th the committee left Madrid for Carthagena, which was to be the point of embarkation, whence the Mediterranean squadron, consisting of the frigates Numantia, Vitoria, and Villa de Madrid, was to convey the deputation to Genoa. In accordance with the custom in Spain, where a man's friends, political and private, always assemble at the railway when he is going on a journey, the station was filled with Deputies, the authorities and friends of the members of the committee.

In taking leave of Balaguer, General Prim said: "When the King comes all this trouble will end. There will be no other cry than `Long live the King!' We shall suppress all these men who dream of plans for destroying liberty, and who confound the word ' progress ' with the word `disorder,' and liberty with license. Bring the King; bring him quickly! When he is here, woe to the evil-doer! Long live the King!" (Victor Balaguer, Memorias de un Constituyente)

The deputation landed at Genoa on November 30, and was welcomed with royal honours. On December 4 it was received at the Pitti Palace in Florence by the King of Italy. There were present Prince Humbert, the Council of Ministers, the dignitaries of the Court, the representatives of the Italian Chambers, the municipality of Florence, and the representatives of the foreign powers. Ruiz Zorilla first addressed the King of Italy as head of the family, requesting that his permission be given the committee to offer to his son the throne of Spain. The King gave his consent, and expressed the hope that the Prince might fulfil his lofty mission in a manner that should redound to the prosperity and greatness of his adopted country. Ruiz Zorilla then read an address to the Duke of Aosta, to which the latter replied in the following effective speech:

"With a spirit of gratitude, I will briefly explain why I have decided to accept, as I do accept in your presence, with God's aid and the consent of the King, my father, the ancient and glorious crown which you have come to offer me. Providence had already granted to me an enviable lot. Scion of an illustrious dynasty, I shared in the glories of my ancient House and in the destinies of my family without the responsibilities of government. I saw opened before me an easy and fortunate road, where there would not have been wanting, as there have not hitherto been wanting, opportunities of doing good service to my country. You have come to open before my eyes a wider horizon; you summon me to fulfil a duty, arduous always, but still more arduous in the times in which we live. Faithful to the traditions of my ancestors who have never avoided duty or danger, I accept the noble and lofty mission which Spain desires to entrust to me, although I am not ignorant of the great difficulties which it offers, or of the responsibility which I assume before history by this acceptance. I trust in God, who sees the rectitude of my intentions, and I trust in the Spanish nation so justly proud of its independence, of its great religious and political traditions, which has given so many proofs of its ability to harmonise its respect for order with its indomitable and passionate love of liberty.

"I am too young -- the acts of my life are too unknown -- for me to be able to attribute to my own merits the choice which the noble Spanish people has made. I feel sure that you have believed that Providence has granted to my youth the most useful and most fruitful instruction: the spectacle of a people reconquering unity and independence as a result of its intimate union with its king, and of the faithful adherence to free institutions. You wish that your country, on whom nature has showered all her gifts and history all her glories, should likewise enjoy that happy union which has made, and I hope will always make, the prosperity of Italy. It is to my father's glory and to my country's good fortune that I owe my election; and to be worthy of it, I cannot do less than loyally follow the example of the constitutional traditions in which I have been reared. Soldier in the army, I shall be the first citizen before the representatives in the nation.

"The annals of Spain are full of glorious names of valiant cavaliers, of bold navigators, of great captains, and of famous kings. I know not whether I shall attain the fortune of shedding my blood for my new country, and whether it will be given to me to add another to the innumerable pages which celebrate the glories of Spain; but in any case I am quite sure -- for this depends upon myself and not upon fortune -- that the Spaniards will always be able to say of the king whom they have elected, `His loyalty has risen above the struggle of parties, and he has no other desire than national harmony and national prosperity.'"

This speech and the Prince's manly bearing won the sympathies of the Deputies, some of whom became enthusiastic upon the brilliant prospects of the new reign. It was decided that eight of the committee should remain in order to accompany the King, whose departure was fixed for December 18, while Ruiz Zorilla and the remaining members should return to Madrid in order that the Cortes might resume its session and vote the necessary laws before the King's arrival.

All difficulties had not yet vanished. Many of influence in the Florentine Court attempted to throw obstacles in the way of the King's departure, alleging as a pretext the delicate state of the Duchess of Aosta and the consequent advisability of waiting until the new year. From Madrid, also, newspaper caricatures and libels were constantly received for the purpose of making the King change his purpose. The mission of the members of the deputation who remained was therefore difficult and delicate, and their embarrassment was not decreased by the reception, on the 14th, of a telegram from the Government, instructing them without explanation to defer the journey.

The King was visibly dissatisfied at the delay. Anonymous letters full of threats and forebodings still kept coming from Madrid. Finally, to the great relief of the committee, on the 19th, a telegram was received fixing January 1 for the King's arrival in Madrid, and naming Carthagena as the port of landing.

On December 27th, in stormy weather, King Amadeo set sail from Spezia with the committee. Had he known what had taken place in Madrid on that day, he might still have hesitated. The following words from the journal of Balaguer, one of the committee and Prim's intimate friend, seem almost prophetic "I know not what King Amadeo felt on seeing the fair coast of Italy grow dim in the distance, and with them his native land, his family, the memories of his childhood, his wife and his children, who remained there until they could go to Spain. For myself, I can say that although Italy was not my country, although I was returning to my native land, although I was leaving no memory, no tie, but was, on the contrary, going to meet my own people, I felt my soul afflicted by the most profound sadness. We had come in search of a young, generous, and valiant prince. We were tearing him from the arms of his family, perhaps against his own wishes, to carry him to an unknown country, agitated by the tempest of political passions, the most furious and the most horrible of tempests. An immense responsibility weighs upon us. What glory if Providence crowns our labours ! But, on the other hand, what great sadness, what eternal regret, if political tempests, evil passions, or our own madness prevent us from realising the end and aim of our efforts!" (Victor Balaguer, Memorias de un Constituyente)

Chapter IV: Experiment of Amadeo and the Democratic Monarchy