Several years ago, during my last few years on active duty in the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army had prepared a "chain teaching" program to declare that "there will never be another Task Force Smith." As I listened to the presentation, I wondered a bit about who this referred to, and looking around, I discovered that I was not alone. This prompted me to study the battle that was named after the American officer leading the unit that was America's first ground force to fight the North Koreans on July 5th, 1951.

Lt. Col. Charles B. Smith and his troops from the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, were a part of the Army that had been known as Occupational Forces Japan, largely made up of inexperienced soldiers and junior officers, with some World War II veteran sergeants and field grade officers. Many of the weapons they possessed were leftovers from that war. M-1 Garand and carbines were the mainstay, with a few obsolete bazooka rocket launchers. On mobilizing from Japan, Task Force Smith was given just under half of all the HEAT ammunition in Occupational Forces Japan for the 105mm howitzers that would meet him on the road. That gave him six rounds of reliable antitank ammunition.

Smith's trip across the Sea of Japan to the area they were assigned did not go well. Many of the transport planes had to turn around and return to Japan, including the one Smith was traveling on, due to heavy cloud and rain over the assigned air fields in Korea. When he did get all his troops assembled, there was trouble with transport. When they arrived at Taejon by train, they narrowly missed being blown up by friendly aircraft, sent to destroy another ammunition train that was parked nearby before it could be captured by the advancing North Korean Army. Trucks to move forward had to be commandeered from fleeing South Korean units and civilian refugees.

When Smith arrived at his deployment area, he was greeted by his Assistant Division Commander, who told him that the key reason they were there was to show the colors. The sight of American uniforms would surely cause the North Korean Army to turn around and head north again. Anyone who watches the M.A.S.H. reruns knows that didn't happen. Just five years after the end of World War II, the military was filled with overconfidence.

According to an account written by the unit chaplain, Maj. Patrick Hyde, the main body set up on Osan hill on the night of July 4-5 and dug fighting positions. (Chaplain Hyde's account was written in 1970 and is a bit off from some of the historical account, but relates much of the flavor of the battle). Just after daylight, they were attacked by North Korean infantry in trucks with tanks interspersed in between them. (Chaplain Hyde has apparently mixed his memory of the tanks coming through about 30 minutes prior to the infantry follow-up).

Chaplain Hyde and a few men had gone down to the bottom of the hill to prepare some breakfast for the troops using a medical heater when they heard a tank near the hut they were using. They left the hut for the cover of a ditch nearby just as the hut was machine-gunned by the passing T-34/85. Unhurt, they rejoined the main force on the hilltop just as the North Korean troops deployed from the trucks in overwhelming numbers. In a few hours, over half the force was dead or wounded, and no medical attention was available with the unit. Smith and his men fought from their positions until around 3 pm before falling back, under cover provided by a lieutenant and a few volunteers. Some of the wounded were brought out with them, but the worst cases had to be left behind.

According to all other accounts, a group of about 33 T-34/ 85 tanks, unaccompanied by infantry, overran the unit without stopping to fight. Smith's troops were able to destroy three of the enemy tanks with the 105mm HEAT rounds before another T-34 overran the 105 set up in an antitank role. The rest of the 6-gun battery was set up in support with landline communication, but did not participate in the following infantry attack due to the line apparently being severed by the tanks running through the area. All bazookas seemed to be the early World War II models and were completely ineffective against the armor of the Sovietmade tanks.

In retrospect, problems encountered in those opening days of the Korean Conflict came from the postwar drawdown and major budget cuts in defense. The Occupational Forces, Japan, was in large part a "party army," doing their service for America while enjoying the oneyear tour in Japan. Only one in six had any combat experience. Most of the M-1s that were sent into combat with them were still packed with preservatives, and nobody had fired their assigned weapon since joining the unit. The 2.6 inch bazookas were very obsolete, having been replaced in the Army in World War II in 1944. Since Japan was not allowed tanks during the occupation period, it wasn't considered that anyone would need antitank weapons. With all these problems, there was a "winner stagnation" period following the winning of World War II -- a feeling that nobody would dream of messing with the U.S. Army. This overconfidence fed into the total problem of lack of combat readiness.

The Korean Conflict is often overlooked by wargamers, yet is very easy to game using rules and figures from World War II. The U.S. Army looked very much like the U.S. Army of the closing days of the war, generally because no new uniform or equipment was considered as needed. For the North Koreans, Russian troops and tanks are very good. If available, Chinese troops in winter gear also do well.

More Task Force Smith Korean War

Introduction
Order of Battle