Hearing of a strong enemy force assembled at Tamai 16 miles south-west of Suakim, General Graham sent the Black Watch (623 officers and men) on 10 March to secure a zariba site 8.5 miles out of Suakim, on the Sinkat road. In the evening of the following day, the rest of the force, plus a new battery of Royal Naval 9pdrs joined them. On 12 March they marched out in two squares with cavalry scouts around them, the guns and R.N.’s were in a 25 pace interval between the regiments forming the front face of each square; as at El Teb, the guns were hauled by ropes by the Naval Brigade.

Next Morning the force set off in two squares again, in echelon from the left, with Davis’s 2nd Brigade leading and Buller’s 1st Brigade on its right rear; each square had a 200 yard front and a 100 yard flank, and the formations were about 600-900 yards apart. Cavalry sections were in front with the rest of the cavalry echeloned to the left-rear of the 2nd Brigade. The composition of the force and its numbers were much the same as at El Teb, plus the new R.N. Battery; also, there were 66 camels bearing 96 rounds per gun, and 107 Egyptian Artillerymen as camel-leaders; the Scottish Division R.A. had 52 mules, carrying 86 rounds per gun.

It was believed that the Ansar army, commanded by Osman Digna’s cousin Mahsud Musa, was about 9/12,000 strong, some in a big ravine, others hidden in bushes to the right of the British squares. There were only about 150 riflemen, untrained and ineffective. The entire force was hidden from view of the cavalry and Graham’s Abyssinian scouts, so that when the leading square was some 200 yards from the ravine, it was suddenly assailed by large numbers of tribesmen in fierce rushes.

Frantically, the infantry opened fire and, despite bugle calls and orders, could not be persuaded to aim steadily or reserve fire, causing dense clouds of smoke to hang in the still air, allowing the enemy to creep up unseen. Sent to charge the ravine, the Black Watch advanced, firing independently to right and left when 30 yards from the cleft; although not ordered to do so, some of the 65th followed the Highlanders, causing a gap to open-up in the face of the square and leaving the Gatling and Gardner guns outside the formation. Under cover of the smoke, large bodies of enemy burst from the haze, hitting the Black Watch in the flank and causing the guns to be abandoned – the Naval Brigade locked the Gatlings and the Gardner guns before leaving them; the Marines were hit and the square sent reeling back about 800 yards to the east. Little groups fought back-to-back, disputing every inch of ground, gradually checking the withdrawal, until rallying and reforming to the orders of officers and N.C.O.’s.

Five hundred yards away to the right-rear, Buller’s square was being attacked in the same furious manner, but blew away the approaching enemy by sheer weight of firepower; they then turned their fire on the tribesmen attacking Davis’s square. At the same time, the cavalry galloped round to the left flank of the square, dismounted and opened fire with carbines so catching the attackers in a crossfire. After about 20 minutes the attacks were repulsed and the 2nd Brigade reformed, with Marines on the right, 65th in the center, and the Black Watch on the left; the Naval Brigade formed in their rear. After halting for about 15 minutes, Graham moved his force forward; the 1st Brigade on the right firing at close range retaking lost ground and abandoned guns; the enemy had dumped one down a ravine and set an ammunition limber on fire.

The 2nd Brigade turned their machine-guns on the enemy in the ravine and drove them out; moving amid wounded tribesmen laying in the thick scrub who fired or slashed at anyone within reach, the 2nd Brigade took a ridge above the village of Tamai and the battle petered-out.

Battle of Tamai 13 March 1884 by Don Featherstone

Introduction and Battle
Contemporary Account (monstrously slow: 1.09Mb!)