1941-1943
by Franklyn G. Prieskop
Hungary, following its participation in the Yugoslavian campaign, had demobilized its armed forces in order to insure the success of its wartime economic and industrial expansions, as well as the upcoming agricultural harvest. Only the 1st Alpine and 8th Border Brigades had retained their infantry units fully mobilized for service on the Ruthenian frontier with the Soviet Union. Even these two commands had demobilized their artillery and support units to their peacetime levels. By mid-June, 1941, the Hungarians were convinced that war between Germany and the Soviet Union was imminent. General Henrik Werth, the Hungarian Chief of Staff, and a strong supporter of alliance with Germany, requested a general mobilization so that Hungary could be a full participant in the campaign. The Hungarian government, aware of the Hungarian Army's training and equipment shortcomings, mobilized only the VIII Army Corps and the two brigades on the Ruthenian frontier to their wartime strengths for frontier defense. Three days after the beginning of "Operation Barbarossa" a Soviet plane strafed a Hungarian train on the frontier at Korosmezo. The news was suppressed in order to avoid exciting public opinion. On the following day an event occurred which could not be ignored: the towns of Raho, Munkas, and Kassa were bombed by unidentified aircraft. While the nationality of the planes has never been conclusively established, the bombing of the towns, combined with mounting political pressure from her Axis allies, caused Hungary to enter the "Crusade Against Bolshevism." War was declared, the Ruthenian frontier forces were ordered to cross the Soviet border, and Hungary's most modern field force, the "Mobile" Corps, was mobilized for participation in the campaign. The VIII Army Corps, under the command of Lieutenant General Ference vitez Szombathelyi, was designated as combat "Group Carpathia", and given command of the Hungarian expeditionary forces in the Soviet Union. On July 3, 1941, the 1st and 2nd Motorized Brigades and the corps troops of the "Mobile" Corps crossed the frontier, and the units of the "Carpathian Group" advanced upon the towns of Stanislau and Kolomea. On July 9, 1941, the "Carpathian Group", joined by "Group Ankay" (the 13th Bicycle Battalion), the advance element of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, was subordinated to the German 17th Army. The 1st Alpine and 8th Border Brigades were assigned to occupation duties in the territory captured by the Hungarians. The remainder of the Hungarian units, including all the corps troops, were assigned to combat duties. On August 2, 1941, the remainder of the 1st Cavalry Brigade joined the advancing troops of the "Carpathian Group", bringing the total Hungarian forces on the eastern front to about 42,000 men. The equipment of the Hungarian Armed Forces was, for the most part, hopelessly out of date. This was especially true in the case of the army's artillery, motorized transport vehicles, and tanks. Only Hungary's "Mobile" Corps could be expected to keep pace with Germany's blitzkrieg campaign. Even this "modernized" force contained obsolescent artillery pieces from the late 1920's, and motorized transports which were requisitioned agricultural and civilian vehicles. Over half of its armored vehicles were the 3.5 ton Fiat- Ansaldo tankettes, which had proved inadequate when the Italians used them in the mid-1930's in Ethiopia and Spain. Advance From the positions at Stanislau and Kolomea, the Hungarian expeditionary force fought its way to Rogozna on the Bug River on July 22, 1941. Thereafter, the Hungarian units advanced down the shores of the Bug River to Nikolayev on August 17, 1941. After advancing through Krivoy Rog, the Hungarians took up positions along the Dnieper River around Zaporozhye between August 31 and September 6, 1941. On September 6, 1941, the two most ardent supporters of Hungarian participation in the campaign, General Henrik Werth and his Chief of Operations, were removed from their positions for promising the Germans to secure a greater level of military participation on the eastern front. Lieutenant General Ferene vitez Szombathelyi and Major General Janos Voros (the commander of the 2nd Motorized Brigade) were recalled from the eastern front to fill these positions. Both of these men believed that "the blitzkriegs were over on the eastern front", and wanted to remove Hungary from active participation in the campaign. Three days later, the Hungarian government requested that its forces be withdrawn, citing the need to replace their casualties (478 killed, 1,354 wounded, and 132 missing), and more importantly, their 50 to 80% losses in equipment. The German authorities, afraid of the effect this would have on the morale of the other Axis allies, refused to allow a total withdrawal. Finally, an agreement was reached: Hungary would replace the two brigades on occupation duties with two permanently assigned occupation divisions, dispatch an additional two occupation divisions to replace the "Mobile" Corps, and allow the "Mobile" Corps to remain in combat until the end of the operational season (mid-October). The Germans, on their part, agreed to furnish the "Mobile" Corps with some replacement equipment, and to provide Hungary with enough Panzer IV tanks to form a new Hungarian Armored Division upon the return of the "Mobile" Corps. Security Divisions Pursuant to this agreement, Hungary mobilized four "Security" Divisions. These units were formed by combining four peace-time brigade cadres with newly- mobilized older classes of reservists. To ease the impact of the mobilizations upon the civilian economy, the reservists were called up from throughout the country, rather than just from specific brigade recruitment districts. The divisional designations were purely arbitrary, as the units consisted of only about 8,000 men each, and the number 100 was added to the peacetime brigade numbers. Advancing their way through Dnepropetrovsk, the Hungarian expeditionary units fought their way to the Donets River at Izyum on October 28, 1941. The Hungarian 1st Cavalry Brigade and most of the corps troops were removed from combat duties on October 16, 1941, and began their return to Hungary. The two motorized brigades and the motorized units of the corps troops were retained in defensive positions at Izyum until November 15, 1941, at which time they were withdrawn as well. During December of 1941, a series of joint Foreign Ministry and General Staff meetings were held between Germany and Hungary. Hungary required that the security divisions be employed together, under Hungarian command, and therefore returned the VIII Corps and some of its corps troops to oversee the occupation forces. Designated as the "Hungarian Security Group", the corps, reinforced by an additional security division in January of 1942, took up occupation duties in the area around Kiev and Chernigov. Hungarian Security Command Order of Battle - January 31, 1942 "Hungarian Security Command" (VIII Corps)
105 Security Division 108 Security Divison 121 Security Division 124 Security Division Corps Troops:
88 Artillery Battalion 101 Engineer Battalion On December 19, 1941, Hitler, dissatisfied with the progress of the campaign, took personal command of operations on the eastern front. Determined to end the campaign during 1942, he set out to obtain the maximum Axis-allied reinforcements. Initially, Hungary was asked to mobilize its entire home army, contribute 15 combat divisions, and provide two additional security divisions. To insure compliance, Hungary was threatened with the loss of the territories gained in 1938 and 1940 to the Axis allies who were participating fully in the campaign, Slovakia and Rumania. After considering the severe equipment shortages, and the effect full mobilization would have upon Hungary's industrial and agricultural production, Germany, unable to make up the shortages from its own dwindling reserves, reduced its demands. Germany required nine combat divisions, two additional security divisions, and the Hungarian Armor Division. To alleviate the equipment shortages, a large number of captured weapons, especially Belgian and French mortars, howitzers, and 47mm anti- tank guns, were provided to the Hungarian Army. The Hungarian government, again trying to spread the burden of the mobilizations, called up individual battalions from the various recruitment regions, and assigned them to regimental staffs of the nine brigade cadres selected for service on the eastern front. The agreement with Germany required that Hungary provide nine combat divisions, a specification that Hungary circumvented by redesignating its brigades as "Light" Divisions. The Hungarian 2nd Army, commanded by Colonel General Gusztav vitez Jany, was selected to direct the Hungarian combat operations. The headquarters staff and army troops of the 2nd Army, as well as the corps troops of the III and IV Corps, set out for the front on April 11th. On April 22nd, they were followed by the divisions of the III Corps which, after stopping off to participate in an anti-partisan operation, were put into the combat front at Kursk. The divisions of the IV Corps and the Hungarian 1st Armor Division were dispatched to the eastern front by May 11th, and the final contingent, consisting of the VII Corps, left Hungary between May 30th and July 27th, 1942. The Hungarian 2nd Army participated in the advance from Kursk to the Don River, and thereafter went over to a defensive posture along a 186-kilometer front extending south along the Don River from Voronezh. The advance from the Don had cost the Hungarians some 14,522 casualties (2,413 killed, 11,549 wounded, and 560 missing), and the defensive combat between August 20th and January 9th, 1943, cost an additional 13,332 casualties. Most of the casualties during the defensive period were from unsuccessful attempts to eliminate the Soviet 10-kilometer-wide bridgehead over the Don River at Uryv. By January 12, 1943, the Rumanian 3rd and 4th Armies had been routed on either side of Stalingrad, and the German 6th Army had already been encircled. To the south of the Hungarian positions, two-thirds of the Italian 8th Army had collapsed, and the Soviet advance columns were proceeding north and west to encircle the Italian "Alpine" Corps. On this date, the Soviet Army launched a massive assault from the Uryv bridgehead. Within five days the situation had been turned into a complete debacle, with the entire Hungarian 2nd Army routed and being overrun. Of the 204,000 men of the 2nd Army and its support troops, approximately 115,000 officers and men managed to escape being overrun, and of these about 15,000 were wounded. It was estimated that about 30,000 officers and men were killed, and 50,000 more were captured in the encirclements at the Don River. More Germany's East Front Allies: Hungary Part 1
Carpathian Group Order of Battle: Aug 2, 1941 Field Formations, Arms and Equipment: Aug 2, 1941 2nd Army Order of Battle: Aug 1, 1942 More Germany's East Front Allies: Hungary Part 2
Security Group Order of Battle: April 15, 1943 Corps and Army Formations 1st Army Order of Battle: July 23, 1944 Field Formations: Arms and Equipment Back to Grenadier Number 4 Table of Contents Back to Grenadier List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2001 by Pacific Rim Publishing This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |