Rule 1: Historical Introduction

Winston Churchill was always looking for offensive measures to take against the Nazis. In the spring of 1942 he conceived a plan, called Operation JUPITER, to liberate northern Norway. Its purpose was to attack the Germans in a place they could not readily reinforce, aid the Russians in their struggle against Hitler and his minions, free the convoys carrying supplies to Russia from interference by German air and naval forces and, not least, liberate at least some Norwegians from the German yoke.

He first put it to the Chiefs of Staff on 27 May 1942 as an alternative to Operation SLEDGEHAMMER, the cross- Channel attack planned for later in the year. He envisioned it as a small-scale attack with only a division or two, most of which would descend on Petsamo (6B:1220), with the remainder landing at the head of the Porsanger Fjord to seize the airfield near Lakselv (6B:0729). The Chiefs of Staff were less than enthusiastic, but planning was initiated so that it could be discussed when Churchill travelled to Washington to meet with President Roosevelt in June. Although no firm decision was reached there, SLEDGEHAMMER faced intense British resistance, Churchill believing it the height of folly. This made operations on the fringes more likely, either in Norway or North-West Africa. Upon his return to Britain, Churchill ordered General McNaughton, commander of 1st Canadian Army, to begin detailed studies for Operation JUPITER.

A long series of meetings between the American and British Chiefs of Staff during July in London settled on Operation TORCH for a number of reasons. The Americans were disinclined to commit large numbers of troops under British command, as they had serious doubts about British tactical competency after their long string of defeats in the Middle East. For their part, the British were not eager to introduce American ground forces into the Middle East. Finally, and decisively, TORCH was the operation that both leaders preferred and both would accept.

In comparison to TORCH, JUPITER would have been a much smaller affair, requiring fewer troops and less shipping, Norway being significantly closer to Britain than North Africa. The biggest difference was that TORCH committed the Allies to a Mediterranean strategy, while JUPITER would have committed them to nothing, despite Churchill's comment about rolling the Nazis down from the top. The Allies would not have been forced to pursue a Scandinavian strategy at all if they didn't care to.

General McNaughton finished his report in August and concluded that 5 divisions, 4 battleships, an aircraft carrier and 15 cruisers would be required to make 3 simultaneous landings north of Trondheim. He cautioned that the chances for good weather were only 1-in-6, and that stormy seas could lead to a frightful military disaster. The report finished any prospects for JUPITER, except in Churchill's own mind. He would attempt to resurrect it the following year, but to no avail and with less strategic sense.

A detailed examination of the German defenses reveals that McNaughton's plan was viable, except that he seriously underestimated the numbers of carrier-borne fighters needed to protect the invasion forces from the large numbers of German maritime strike aircraft.

However, the experiences of PQ 17 during July would have driven home the need for more carriers. Operation PEDESTAL, the recent resupply convoy to Malta, showed that massed carriers were needed to get a naval flotilla through a gauntlet of Axis aircraft. By Fall, the Admiralty would undoubtedly have called upon every aircraft carrier west of Suez to provide air cover for an invasion of Norway.

The disadvantages of JUPITER lay in the extensive naval assets that would be required to sustain the operation. Large numbers of warships would have to perform shore bombardment duties for an extensive amount of time. The troops ashore would have to be supplied by sea indefinitely. The massive amount of shipping required might have been enough to affect the buildup for Operation ROUND-UP, the cross-Channel attack scheduled in 1943 should SLEDGEHAMMER be cancelled. Extensive losses might also have adversely affected Allied operations in the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters.

The benefits of a successful JUPITER operation are legion. A victory would greatly reduce the threat from German commerce raiders, even if significant portions of the Kriegsmarine escaped from Narvik and Alta to Trondheim. Allied aircraft and ships based in Norway would allow for much more extensive surveillance of the Norwegian ports and waters, greatly increasing the probability of detecting any incipient raids by the Kriegsmarine. Convoys to Russia would require only a minimal ASW escort and could take a more direct route to the Soviet Arctic ports, minimizing transit time. This would allow extensive redeployment of the Royal Navy to more critical theaters.

Soviet forces defending Murmansk could also have been redeployed to more vital areas. The Allies could have redeployed most of their ground forces back to the UK in readiness for further operations. Depending on the magnitude of the losses in ships and landing craft, TORCH could still have been executed in the early part of 1943.

Garrison requirements in Norway would have been minimal. Only a division or two would be necessary to fend off any German attacks along Norway's narrow mountainous spine. Hitler would have undoubtedly reinforced southern Norway given his paranoia about the theater, recently justified by the Allies, thus diverting troops from more important fronts.

The possible political ramifications of a successful conquest of northern Norway are intriguing to consider. The Swedes would not have stopped shipping iron ore and ball bearings to the Germans, but they might well have limited them. They were all too aware of the costs of a German invasion, even with Allied troops and aid through Narvik. Finland might well have decided that the writing was on the wall, especially after a major defeat like Stalingrad, and probably would have gotten far better terms than they did historically, what with the Western Allies ensconced in Norway.

This scenario presumes Stalin delayed the Volkhov Front Offensive scheduled for 27 August to coincide with the landings scheduled for September 11th at Churchill's urging during their meetings in Moscow that same month. This delay allows the Germans to begin movement of 3rd Mountain Division to Petsamo for an attempt to capture the Rybatchiy Peninsula. This scheme, Operation WIESENGRUND [Operation MEADOWLAND], was cancelled when the Soviets began their offensive.

Arctic Thunderbolt Operation Jupiter and the Return to Europe

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