This article complements John Astell's detailed analysis of the British Commandos and Special Forces found in TEM # 28. Together they cover almost all of the 'Special' formations and units which operated in the Commonwealth and Empire Armies. Note that this article also covers units employed in the war against Japan.

The British virtually ignored the possibilities of airborne units until the Germans forced them to take the idea seriously. When Churchill came to power he stressed the need to develop such troops, largely since he recognized that they would be the only way of striking at German-controlled Western Europe. Such units were, however, only designed for smallscale raiding. In that respect they were similar to the other Special Forces of the period. It was not until the German invasion of Russia, and especially the US entry into the war that serious consideration was given to the development of large airborne formations. At the same time, airborne units started to form for the war against Japan, both in India and in Australia. Canada also formed a parachute battalion, which in this OB is considered to be part of the 3rd Parachute Brigade.

The notes in the OB identify many of the issues involved in the creation of the airborne formations. However three points need to be discussed in greater detail.

The first is the general objection held by many senior officers of the British Army to the endless proliferation of special units of all types. It was felt, and probably correctly, that turning prospective officers and NCOs into airborne privates would have a serious effect on the regular units. These objections collapsed under the onslaught of Churchill's demands, and the initial units were formed from selected volunteers.

Good examples were the battalions of the 1st Parachute Brigade, and those of the Canadian and Australian Armies. As the demand grew for more units, the policy was often reversed. From 1942 on, many airborne formations were created by the conversion of existing infantry brigades and battalions, although unsuitable officers and men would be posted out and replaced by volunteers from other units. In practice these formations proved to be just as good as the 'elite' founding members of the airborne club--for example, the 6th Air Landing Brigade, whose regular infantry battalions carried out some of the most successful glider drops of the war.

Secondly, there was a problem with the Royal Air Force. When the OB is studied, it will be noted that there are often far more airborne units in existence than there are aircraft to carry them. In Germany the Luftwaffe controlled the airborne units and the aircraft and gliders required for them. The situation in Britain was quite different. The RAF high command was passionately committed to both strategic bombing and independent air power. The air marshals were most reluctant to allocate any air assets to the fledgling airborne forces.

It was only the direct intervention of Churchill that resulted in the creation of the pitiful transports (for much of the war a couple of squadrons of antediluvian Whitneys) that were finally provided. It was argued that if necessary, squadrons could be diverted from Bomber Command. On occasion this was done, but the lack of training often resulted in disaster. When Grand Europa is fashioned, the possibility of such resource diversions will need to be addressed. In the meantime, the OB shows the air assets actually provided. Note that these do not represent the usual 40 aircraft per counter, but rather the number required to airdrop 1/2 of an RE.

Finally the treatment of Glider units should also be noted. In this OB the traditional method of defining them in terms of production is discarded. Instead glider counters appear when sufficient are available to carry airborne cargo. More significantly, their appearance is also defined by the availability of trained glider pilots. Unlike other nationalities, the British glider pilots came from the Army. (In India they belonged to the RAF).

The men of the Glider Pilot Regiment were trained to both pilot the gliders, and to serve as combat infantry. There was always a limit to the number of such specialized pilots available, and the total assets of the Glider Pilot Regiment were only adequate for the gliders needed for a single airborne division.

An analysis of the OB will show that in June 1944, for example the total airborne capability in the ETO was: 1x Albemarle, 2x C-47, 1x Halifax, 1x Stirling, 3x Horsa and 1x Hamilcar. This allowed for the dropping of two parachute brigades, an air landing brigade and a parachute division HQ-in total, a single parachute division. At the time there existed two complete divisions (1 and 6), a separate parachute brigade (Poles) and two parachute battalions (1 and 2 SAS). In the MTO there were two C-47s, just sufficient for the single parachute brigade in the theatre (2).

British airborne formations had distinct characteristics and functions. The parachute brigades, normally composed of three battalions, were very lightly equipped, much more so than US units. Battalions were small, some 600 men, and lacked heavy weapons other than 3" mortars. They were not designed for long-term combat. However an air landing battalion was a powerful unit, some 1200 men strong, with heavy mortars, HMGs, AT, and AA guns.

An air landing brigade had three battalions, with the equivalent of a fourth formed from the glider pilots. A division had an artillery and an AT regiment, as well as a light tank squadron in addition to its two parachute and single air landing brigades. In Europa terms, a division can be most efficiently assembled from two 2-5 parachute and an air landing brigade. This leaves the two best parachute brigades, the lst and Polish, available for additional power.

The 52nd Air Landing Division requires some explanation. It is not a glider formation. Instead it was designed to be flown into a captured airfield. In many respects it is comparable to the German 22nd Division. When converted from a mountain division, it formed into two four-battalion brigades, each with an artillery regiment equipped with 3.7" mountain howitzers. These brigades were air-transportable. The remaining units were grouped into the 157th Infantry Brigade. This was the ground element, much of whose equipment could not be moved by air.

Finally, note the two SAS battalions. These formed from the various Special Forces employed in the desert campaign and are the ancestors of the present day Special Air Service Regiment. In Europa terms, they should be capable of the usual collection of tricks associated with the German Brandenburgers.

This Order of Battle covers British, Empire, and Commonwealth airborne units. In addition, relevant air transport and glider units are identified.

All ground units are British Army and air units Royal Air Force except for:

Aus Australian
Can Canadian
Ind Indian
Pol Polish
SA South African
US United States

Commonwealth Airborne Units

Overview
Europa Units 1939-1945