This fierce and relatively unknown battle has fascinated me for years, ever since I read Jack Radey's thought-provoking article on the campaign in TEM #7. [Since issue #7 is out of print and many readers may not have access to it, Mr Radey's article has been reprinted in this issue. -RMG]

This is not a popular battle in western histories. The Germans, having been clearly defeated, have not discussed it in detail, while the Soviet accounts of the battle have only recently drawn attention. The standard German authority on this battle is Maj. Gen. F.W. von Mellenthin. Von Mellenthin's book, Panzer Battles, while very educational with respect to the fighting against the Western Allies, is highly suspect and ideological when dealing with the Soviets.

For example, here are a few choice comments von Mellenthin makes regarding the Russians:

"The stoicism of the majority of Russian soldiers and their mental sluggishness makes them quite insensible to losses. The Russian soldier values his own life no more than those of his comrades ... life is not precious to him." (von Mellenthin, p.281.)

"No one belonging to the cultural circle of the West is ever likely to fathom the character and soul of these Asiatics..." (von Mellenthin, p.349).

"The Russian is completely unmoved when he steps over the dead bodies of hundreds of his comrades ... for him life holds no special value; it is something easy to throw away ... he lacks any true religious or moral balance..." (von Mellenthin, p.350.)

Presumably, this religious and moral balance of the western man as extolled by von Mellenthin is not that which guided the occupation policies of the Germans in Russia.

So, readers of von Mellenthin must take anything he says about the war in the East with a grain of salt. His racial views of Russians as soulless automatons differ only in degree, not in kind, to the views of Hitler himself and demonstrates how far Nazi ideology penetrated into the thinking of even the conservative German General Staff.

Despite all this, there is a lingering tendency even today to give the Germans endless credit for their wartime achievements while ignoring those of their opponents, particularly the Soviets. Typical of this pro-German weltanschauung is the reaction that Jack Radey received as a result of his fine article showing von Mellenthin's assertions of the conduct of that battle as the fiction that they truly are.

Jack Radey's political views are well known, and no doubt contributed to the criticism heaped on him. And make no mistake, I do not share Mr. Radey's political views--in fact, (as those who know me can attest) I would probably disagree with Mr. Radey on just about any political issue that I can think of.

However, politics aside, Mr. Radey's article was good history. And we should not let our political preferences determine and distort objective history. The fact that many of us do not admire the Soviet Union must not blind us to the very real and historical achievements of the Red Army in World War II.

Objectively speaking, the Germans, as good as they undoubtedly were, got caught with their pants down in November, 1943, and got their heads handed to them by the Soviets. The Soviets showed real flair in this battle at the operational level and succeeded not simply due to their numerical superiority, but by surprising the Germans and ruthlessly taking advantage of that surprise.

The Battle of Kiev of 1943 demonstrated the increasing Soviet ability at maskirovka, or deception. Late in the war the Soviets achieved many successes not only due to their undoubted quantitative superiority, but a growing expertise at generating surprise, considered by the Soviets to be the most important force multiplier. The Soviets created such conditions by deceptive deployments of mock tanks, artillery pieces, and false radio transmissions, all done in such a manner so as to take advantage of weather and terrain conditions. Soviet successes in these maskirovka techniques only came to light in western literature very recently thanks to the efforts of Col. David Glantz of the U.S. Army.

Col. Glantz' book, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War scientifically demonstrates the Soviet achievement in deception by comparing the German maps with newly acquired information of Soviet dispositions. His study shows that the Soviets used maskirovka to completely surprise the Germans by masking, if not their intentions, then their strength. Such deception succeeded in a spectacular fashion at Stalingrad and in the destruction of Army Group Center in 1944. Here, and elsewhere, the Germans simply had no clue what they were facing.

Maskirovka was the major factor contributing to the Soviet success at Kiev in 1943. The Soviets secretly moved the 21st and 23d Rifle Corps, the 7th Artillery Penetration Corps, 3rd Guards Rocket Artillery Division, 21st Anti-Aircraft Division, as well as the entire 3rd Guards Tank Army (375 tanks, 500 tractors, 3500 vehicles, and 250 guns by itself, not counting the other forces shown above) into the Lyutezh bridgehead north of Kiev prior to November 3 without arousing German suspicion.

Instead, the Germans, still fixated with the Bukrin bridgehead as a result of the excellent Soviet deception techniques, were completely bowled over when the new Soviet offensive exploded north of Kiev. Indeed, as Glantz' book details, the Germans underestimated the infantry forces in the Lyutezh bridgehead by 40%. Moreover, the Germans did not even detect 3rd Guards Tank Army as having left the Bukrin bridgehead for the Lyutezh bridgehead until 5 November, at which point it was operating well in the German rear!

The scenario attempts to simulate this by giving the Soviets a free set-up, the initiative, and special first turn surprise effects (i.e., artillery divisions attack at 150% printed value). However, the Soviets do not have it all their way. The Soviet OB does not include any NKVD with all their tricks.

The scenario rules prohibit advance after combat by artillery divisions to more accurately reflect the real sluggishness of these units and the major amounts of time required to bring their firepower to bear: artillery divisions were stunningly effective in a relatively static situation, but once they smashed open a hole, their ability to influence a mobile battle was limited at best.

Additionally, I included command and control limitations on Soviet use of armor because historically, the Soviets lacked the specialists to form endless numbers of tank armies the way they can under the current game rules. With 40-odd c/m corps, the Soviets can currently form an entirely ahistorical grouping of armored strength. In real life, these c/m units, with the exception of the six tank armies, operated within combined arms armies and rarely engaged in operations with other c/m corps.

This stands in stark contrast to the Germans, who possess the operational suppleness to concentrate any and all armor forces at will. The German player must use this advantage to stand even a prayer of a chance.

The Soviets may be somewhat ponderous, but their units are intact, and 3rd Guards Tank Army is truly fearsome with its three full strength c/m corps (6 and 7 Guards Tank Corps and 9th Mechanized Corp). If the scenario seems unwinnable for the Germans, remember that if the Germans can keep their army intact and deny any objectives west of Kiev to the Soviets, they can probably get a draw-the Soviets, in order to win considerable real estate will have to take some chances to achieve their goals within 4 turns, and this may open up some opportunities for German counterattacks (as happened historically).

A cautious Soviet advance will probably deny the Germans any real possibility at counterattacking, except at questionable odds, but will also probably fail to win the game--STAVKA wants those victory point cities more than it wants a picture perfect TO&E army, so the Soviet player must be willing to emulate Grant as opposed to McClellan! Besides, since when have the Soviets been overly worried about losses?

The Soviet must be willing to entertain a certain bloody-minded attitude towards his forces and avoid becoming overly emotional about his wondrous c/m corps and artillery divisions. Of course, too many losses will hurt the Soviet cause...

The German player must use his mechanized units' mobility to their fullest degree to both attack Soviet weak points and reform defense lines.

A word of caution to the German player: do not, if at all possible, remain adjacent to a Soviet artillery division at the end of the German player turn! The Germans do get to play with some powerful panzer units and even a few oddballs like the 18th Artillery Division.

This battle is a real slugfest and packs a lot of units and firepower into a small area. The unit density is high, especially on the Soviet side, and corps/army counters are highly recommended. Enjoy!

The Battle for Kiev, 1943 For Stalin and the Motherland!

Europa Rules
Axis Order of Battle
Soviet Order of Battle
Designer's Notes
Large Map (slow: 101K)
Jumbo Map (extremely slow: 381K)