by Jim Arnold
The Axis OB may be slightly overrated, as all of the units were understrength in October 1942. I've opted to factor artillery into the divisional strengths of the Italian infantry divisions to help justify their inclusion. You may, of course, adjust the Axis OB downward or even upward to suit your taste. The air units OB is based on a combination of my limited research and extrapolation from the order of appearance information in Western Desert. Although there were about 200 serviceable Italian aircraft in Africa, Playfair says that two-thirds were "scattered between Derna and Tripoli". The Allied air OB excludes two B24D counters, as these were apparently not used in direct support. When evaluating the Offensive Phase and Major Effort, consider the following: The Allies should be able to get 3-to-1 odds against hexes 19:2025 and 19:2026 with air support, and they have a -1 die-mod due to the forts (assuming less than 1/2 AEC is employed). They therefore have 4 chances in 6 (a 67% probability) of capturing each hex with the standard combat rules, but only a 44% probability of taking both in the same combat phase. So at best, without an additional combat phase, this still leaves the mobile reserves of the Panzer Armee intact at the end of the turn- unless they choose to counterattack in the Axis combat phase. Most likely, the Allies would only capture one hex, and they would then likely be driven back to the start-line by an Axis counterattack. Hence both an Offensive Phase and a Major Effort are needed to be assured of crippling the Axis forces, which is what happened historically. If we were to try to describe the historical baffle in game terms, "Operation Lightfoot" was the Offensive Phase, and "Operation Supercharge" was the regular combat phase, wherein the British armored divisions have joined some remnants from the MEs in the Offensive Phase in hex 19:2026 and are about to try to blast through the 15th panzer cadre and 133rd Armored Division at odds of roughly 3-to-1 with a -1 modifier. If the Brits succeed in this, and if the Axis make one last desperate counterattack, we would see a remarkably close simulation of the actual battle. How does the Major Effort affect play in general? At 1-to-1 odds with no modifiers, the ME would only make sense for the attacker in the most extreme circumstances. He has to roll a 1 or 2 to retain any possibility of forcing a retreat, and then he only has 1 chance in 6 of succeeding. The odds of success are thus only 5.6%; the odds of incurring losses instead are 33%. The defender at 1-to-1 has a pretty good chance of refusing a retreat and holding a hex with a ME (56%), but his odds of losses instead are a significant 17%. At 2-to-1 odds the attacker can overcome an AR or AS and take a hex 33% of the time, but with casualties 44% of the time. The defender at 2-to-1 can hold 33% of the time, but with casualties 50% of the time. So the Major Effort can be seen as a gamble ("dicey", you might say), one that will bleed an army to impotence if not used judiciously--just like the actual policy it simulates. The Major Effort is an example of what I'd like to see in a set of Europa "Master Rules" that would provide a greater challenge to players' abilities while adding to the realism and interest of the system-and without making the basic game too intimidating. It's a rule that can be ignored or exploited at each player's option, but its inclusion makes the outcome of a game that much more a reflection of the players' skills than the balance of the forces or the luck of the die. Playtesting the rule in other scenarios might lead to some better ideas to fine tune it, but I think you'll find in playing Alamein that whatever adjustments might be required, it heightens the drama and realism of the game without adding much to the burden of the rules. [I want to thank Greg Bartels for playtesting "El Alamein" and inspiring the following commentary. Both the concept of Major Effort and the Offensive Phase are appealing since they give players a measure of micro-management over battles (and the die rolls that go with them) that could conceivably win or lose an entire game. But, however appealing the concept, I believe that there's a big difference between having a neat idea, and actually making that idea work in Europa. Several concerns I have (and food for further experimentation) include:
With all that said however, I can think of no better way to end this commentary than by what Greg himself had to say. "El Alamein ... does well as a rules demonstration, and may be one of the most efficient ways of demonstrating new rules ideas in action.... I can envision many similar small presentations in TEM as a means of introducing and demonstrating new rules ideas. To me, it is a welcome alternative to the argumentative method, hitherto the standard way of selling new rules ideas to the Europa community.' -VAH] El Alamein Europa Demonstration Battle Number 1 Back to Europa Number 28 Table of Contents Back to Europa List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1992 by GR/D This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com |