By Rick Gayler
[Read the prosecution's case first-the defense always presents its case last. -RG] Opening Statement Thanks to the court for its assistance in this matter. If procedures can be defined that will forestall this sort of thing from happening (and it happens quite frequently), then they should be made available to the entire Europa community. That will at least make this mess a lesson with some lasting value. Now to state my case, proving the result is an AS. Point One One of the Soviet player's main arguments is that all previously detected combat errors were simply adjusted to reflect the updated information, regardless of who the outcome favored. Since the Germans have done most of the attacking (so far), the Soviets have gotten the short end of this. Now, just when it appears the Soviets can ream the Germans, I start howling. It doesn't seem fair, does it? But in the interests of fairness, what has gone on at Rostov can not be compared to these different kinds of attacks that transpired earlier in the game. These earlier attacks were all at high odds. The unique characteristic at the heart of this whole dispute is the low odds with which this particular attack was made. The "Rostov Incident" is the only case in the twenty-five turns of the game where a low-odds battle has had an ex post facto miscalculation determination. Point Two What else is there about this Rostov attack which makes it different and subject to this special arbitration? I had spent the whole month of June 42 preparing for the Battle of Rostov. I had moved in all my railroad and siege artillery and shifted the entire Me109 fighter force during the Jul I turn to the Rostov suburbs to establish air control for the upcoming battle-to commence in earnest on the Jul II 42 turn. My only idea behind the early attack was that since I had suffered no casualties so far in the turn, I could afford to soften up Rostov. By no means was the attack necessary. I was then, and would be today, willing to attack Rostov at 2.93:1 (-1) odds and 2 points of AA. It is debatable whether I would have made the attack with only 1 AA point, but it is absolutely certain that I would never have made the attack without the 1/7 engineers at 2.93:1 (-2). I don't think anyone would make that attack unless the whole game depended on it out of desperation. As stated earlier, this was clearly not the case. Point Three I was in the process of living with the preliminary result (AR), as painful as it was, when I remembered that I had not rolled the AA shot. Approximately 10 seconds had elapsed while I was actually retreating my units before I thought about the missing AA roll. The Soviet player declared his intention to disallow this AA roll, and so the dispute began. The night of the combat, the issue was whether the AA rolls would count. If yes, then the odds would become 3.47:1, and the incremental roll would cause the final odds to be rounded to 4:1, thus producing an AS. If no, then the 2.93:1 odds would have to be lived with, and the Germans forced to suffer an AR. However, by pointing out my own miscalculation of the engineers (which we both missed) I was dooming myself to destruction. Why would I do such a thing? Point Four As has become clear by now, my rate of play has produced some sloppiness. Since sloppiness rarely benefits the perpetrator, I can only assume that whatever other errors have occurred during the past 25 turns have hurt me at least as badly as they have hurt the Soviets. This is not to excuse any errors on my part, but the fact that we have discovered so few of them leads me to believe that they are either not happening very often or they are not of earthshattering importance. When it was pointed out that the first attack near Kalinin had been miscalculated by 6 factors, I went ahead and took my medicine like a man. There is a clear instance of my sloppiness costing me-those assets could have been applied elsewhere to good effect. The net result was that I deprived myself of two powerful corps for a whole turn--a big waste. In fact, between Moscow and Ivanovo I made several miscalculations that resulted in odds shifts in favor of the Soviets. The Soviet player has indeed made some mistakes that have had strategic consequences. And I have in most cases taken advantage of them. I commiserate with the Soviet player; I know from personal experience that it's tough in 1941-42. It seems the pounding will never let up, and believe me, the Soviets are taking a pounding as bad as any I've seen. This agony becomes more unbearable the longer it is prolonged. So I play fast knowing that at least the misery during the first two game years will be brief. Point Five Although I was the one making the roll, the Soviet player was not merely a passive participant. It takes two to play this game and if I announce an attack at stated odds, then not only am I bound to compute the odds as correctly as possible, it is also my opponent's duty and obligation to either accept or challenge them (as was done near Kalinin) before the roll. By allowing me to make that combat roll, the Soviets were tacitly agreeing with my calculations. Point Six A fundamental disagreement seems to operate from the premise that a roll is a roll is a roll--and once made is cast forever in the annals of history. Rolls can be taken back by human beings. Granted, they aren't in some tournament-level games due to the rigidity with which the games are structured. But I didn't think we were playing such a rigid game. It's alleged that if the roll had been a 6, 1 would have gleefully taken the exchange (leaving the Reds with two cadres in the hex by the way, and still in possession of Rostov) and not considered Soviet interests in the matter. If I had rolled a 6, then I probably would have taken the EX result, because there is every reason to believe that neither player would have even thought about the missing AA rolls at that point and none of what has followed would have happened. Both players would, in good faith, have believed that the roll was fair and square: I would be an infantry corps weaker and the Soviets would still hold Rostov. Point Seven It has been pointed out that my opponent cautioned me against attacking prematurely, and that I therefore should be willing to suffer whatever consequences befell. I can only say that at the time this caution was offered, the odds were thought to be 2.93:1 (-1) with a 2-point AA shot. And there's the rub. The Soviet is trying to stick me with the results of an attack nobody of sound mind would make. The AA, the sequencing problems, and the earlier precedents of high-odds combats all miss the fundamental fact that the engineer proportion was decisive in choosing to attack Rostov in the first place. The bottom line is the Germans should not have to suffer the consequences of an ex post facto analysis when it is clear that the attack would never have been made in the first place if the findings of the ex post facto analysis had been known beforehand. I should not be held accountable for a miscalculation that both of us missed (and was later discovered and pointed out by me), especially since, if known and corrected beforehand, it would have immediately resulted in postponement of the attack. Summation and Final Argument If any roll should stand at Rostov, it should be the 149.5 attack factors with 1/7 engineers and 2 points of AA against 43 defense factors (after the AA rolls). Forcing the Axis to accept the results of an ex post facto analysis as law is in effect saying that I would have made that attack no matter what the odds or conditions. This is not true. I contend my 2-point AA shot should be allowed, and thus the original result was an AS, before all the analysis. The result of all the retroactive analysis is also the equivalent of an AS, since there would have been no attack were the facts clearly known. Rules Court The Case of the Rostov Attack Rules Court The Verdict of the Rostov Attack: Part 2 Back to Europa Number 23 Table of Contents Back to Europa List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1992 by GR/D This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com |