What Groza Means to Me

I read Flavio Carrillo's and Jason Long's playtest report of their rendition of Operation Groza with great interest. By far, the most compelling data were the final casualty counts and the final positions as of Oct I 1941.

In a "typical" game of FitE/SE, the Axis can expect to eliminate 350 Soviet factors on Jun II 41 and roughly 150 factors per turn afterwards through September 1941. Their own losses are usually negligible on Jun II and run at about 50 per turn throughout the same period afterwards.

Thus, at the end of a "typical" summer campaign, the "average" losses will tally roughly 1250 strength points for the Soviets and 300 for the Axis. Also, at the end of this period, the Axis will normally be threatening Leningrad, Moscow, Kharkov, and Stalino.

However, the Carrillo/Long incarnation of Operation Groza ended with 1098 Soviet and a whopping 490 Axis casualties over the period Jul I through Sep II 1941. In addition, the Axis forces barely managed to capture Lwow while prying the Red Army away from the 1941 border.

Further, and probably of decisive importance, the Red Air Force was at full power. Flavio euphemized this situation as a "stalemate" with some potentially serious long-term implications for the Axis. Serious indeed.

Politically, Finland will likely remain neutral throughout the war. I also see favorable Soviet political repercussions in the Far East, possibly freeing even more forces than were historically committed to the west.

Militarily, one could expect the May 1942 campaign opening with approximately 2000 Soviet combat factors opposing 1600 Axis combat factors along a front from Riga to Odessa (about 65 hexes). The Soviets would be occupying a double fort line and, with an average strength of 30 points per hex of frontage (2000 + 65), taunting the weakness of the Axis.

These numbers are derived from the FitE/SE 1942 scenario, which begins with roughly 1800 Soviet factors facing about 1700 Axis and adjusting those numbers based on the situation at the end of the Carrillo/Long playtest.

From May 1942 to May 1943, the Red Army will grow by more than 3000 factors unless checked by the Axis forces--which they will be unable to do since they haven't the combat power.

Therefore, I conclude that the real situation at the end of the Carrillo/Long game was an absolutely overwhelming military and political disaster for the Axis--not merely a minor victory with serious long-term implications.

Indeed, I think it can be seen that by attacking first the Soviets can guarantee that they will win the war simply because they do not have to endure the Jun II 1941 Axis surprise attack.

Or, to rephrase in Europa-cardboard terms, Operation Groza demonstrates that it will always be in the interests of the Soviet player to attack the Germans at the earliest opportunity (even in 1939 or 1940). Why? Because regardless of the lack of military success in the initial offensive, the results will always be better (their factories will remain in place, their air force will remain at full strength, full mobilization will begin that much earlier, etc.) than suffering the Axis invasion on Jun II 1941.

Anyway, in an attempt to forestall a deluge of letters decrying the plausibility of Sharp's, Long's, and Carrillo's efforts, I would suggest that plausibility should not be made the main issue here. I, too, initially questioned (as did the designers and developers themselves) just how "reasonable" it was to design a scenario based on a coordinated Soviet preemptive strike against the Axis. An overwhelming list of questions and assumptions needed to be resolved. Among others:

• Given the fact that it took more than two years of combat experience against the Germans for the Soviets to figure out how to conduct a competently managed summer offensive against the superior tactical flexibility of the Germans (they, in fact, waited until the Germans had burned out that flexibility in 1943 at Kursk!), how could the purge-infected and poorlyorganized Soviet Army of 1941 do anything but get itself massacred (a la the Winter War) against the most combat-experienced and best-led (operationally) Army in the world?
• How could the Soviet buildup be kept secret from the Germans, who had been flying aerial reconnaissance for quite some time over Soviet territory in preparation for their own offensive?
• How could the Soviets have any idea of the size or location of the massive German forces arrayed against them since Stalin had forbidden Soviet overflights or ground patrols into German territory (there was a lengthy time lag between when espionage uncovered such information and when it finally got to Stalin, assuming he would believe it in the first place)?
• Even in 1944, the Soviets had a hard time sustaining an offensive for more than 2 weeks or 60 miles due to logistical inadequacies. Imagine what the situation would have been like given the incompetence present in the 1941 Soviet Army.

The list could go on and on. However, the bottom line is that this is the first time a major alternative scenario has been offered to the Europa community from a perspective other than the Axis. It is also admittedly (by the designer himself) a first cut at an extremely complicated scenario. And, as such, it undoubtedly leaves room for future investigation and change. But the point is that the start has been made, the precedent set.

As with all new enterprises, the first pioneers forge ahead with little knowledge of the ultimate results. Therefore, in that sense, and regardless of the relative "success" or "failure" of this initial venture, the intrepid individuals responsible have, in my opinion, earned our praise and applause.

Operation Groza Stalin's Thunderstorm

Introduction and Rules
Axis Order of Battle
Soviet Order of Battle
Designer's Notes
Developer's Notes
A Few Disclaimers More
From the Editor