By Paul V. Walsh
Other Installments Armoured Fighting Vehicles in Latin America: An Introduction: Part 2
Given the work which Bernardini had done in upgrading Brazil's light tanks, and Engesa's work with a wide range of armoured cars, it's not surprising that both firms would soon begin exploring the possibility of offering for sale a medium tank of their own design. Bernardini's model, the X-30, was a 30 ton medium tank armed with a 90mm gun, a design that clearly reflected their work with the M-41. Conceived as early as 1979, the prototype of the chassis appeared in 1982 and trials began in November of 1883. In April of 1984 the turret was fitted and further trials took place. The resulting A.F.V., christened the XMB-3 "Tamoyo" (the name of a fierce tribe of Brazilian Indians), was an intermediate class tank, equipped with the same transmission as the U.S. M-2 "Bradley" infantry fighting vehicle, and armed with a 90mm gun (though export versions may be fitted with a 105mm gun) (Olive 1986, pp.46-47, Bishop and Drury 1988, p.56). The rival A.F.V. from Engesa was the EE-T1 "Osorio" medium tank. In developing their version of a medium tank, Engesa enlisted the aid of a number of foreign companies, Vickers of Britain assisting in the installation of a variety of guns in the turret, while Dunlap, also of Britain, helped with the development of the suspension system. In 1985 the "Osorio", armed with a British 105mm gun, was demonstrated before Saudi Arabian officials, while the following year plans were made to install the French GIAT 120mm gun (Bishop and Drury 1988, p.56). Both Firm's tanks were intended to provide the basis for a variety of auxiliary A.F.V's. With the Brazilian Army's requirements for five hundred new medium tanks in the late 1080's, it's not clear as to which design has been or will be selected. While Mexico, with the help of firms in Brazil, Germany and Israel, has embarked on the design and production of her own A.F.V., unveiling the DN-3 armoured personnel carrier in 1984, the most important manufacturer of armoured vehicles in Latin America , next to Brazil, has been Argentina, who, after all, produced Latin America's first indigenous purpose built tank (English 1984, p.471). While "Plan Europa" resulted in the purchase and construction of light equipment from France and Switzerland, the Argentine Army's stock of M-4 Sherman medium tanks still needed to be replaced. But, since the weight of most standard European medium tanks exceeded forty tons, well beyond the weight limit of most Argentine bridges, a completely new design had to be developed (Bennett and Bennett 1983, p.14, Bishop and Drury 1988, p.31). In 1974 the Army turned to the German A.F.V. firm of Thyssen-Henschel for assistance. By 1976 the first prototype was completed, two more being produced the following year. The Tanque Argentino Mediano or TAM was based on the chassis of the "Marder" armoured personnel carrier in service with the German Army, a chassis which was also intended to provide the basis for an entirely new armoured personnel carrier, the Vehiculo Combate Infanteria or VCI (Miller and Foss 1987, p.93). Following a contract from the government of Argentina for two hundred TAM's and three hundred VCI's, a factory was established near Buenos Aires where the hulls were built and final assembly completed after the arrival of the drive trains from Daimler Benz in Germany and the CN 105-57 105mm guns and turrets from the Rie Tercero factory (Bennett and Bennett 1983, p.14). Unfortunately, because of economic difficulties in the early 1980's, the government terminated it's contract after a total of only three hundred and fifty vehicles were delivered, one hundred and fifty short of the original order (Bishop and Drury 1988, p.31). However, export orders helped to pick up the slack, Iran obtained one hundred TAM's, Panama placed an order for sixty TAM's (though these appear never to have been delivered), and Peru was considering the purchase of eighty TAM's (in addition, Thyssen-Henschel attempted to sell an upgraded version, the TAM-IV, to the German Army and Thailand) (English 1984, p.468, Miller and Foss 1987, p.93). In the late 1980's Argentina purchased twenty five Italian "Palmaria" 155mm self propelled gun turrets with plans to install them on an enlarged version of the TAM chassis (Bishop and Drury 1988, p.31). Limited Combat In 1982 a number of Argentine A.F.V's. saw limited combat, but these were not locally produced vehicles, rather they were foreign designs purchased from abroad. Of course, these A.F.V's. were employed in Argentina's attempt to retrieve the Malvinas/Falkland Islands (it's interesting to note that Second World War vintage A.F.V's. were already present on the islands, the British garrison having sold off it's stock of M-29 "Weasel" amphibions, Bren gun and Lloyd carriers to the inhabitants) (Nicholas 1972, p.10). On the morning of the 2nd of April, following the secret landing of Argentine commandos, the Batallon de Vehiclos Anfibios or Amphibious Vehicle Battalion, disembarked from the Landing Ship Tank (LST) "Cabo San Antonio" and landed a Marine contingent in the area which the British had designated "Orange Beach". The unit's vehicles included between 16 and 20 LVTP-7 amphibious armoured personnel carriers and 15 LARC-5 amphibious trucks, which landed in three waves, the vanguard of 4 LVTP-7's (in a diamond formation), the main body of LVTP-7's and a final wave composed of 1 recovery version of the LVTP-7 and all of the LARC-5's (ironically the LVTP-7 of the commander of the invasion force, which was in the main body, malfunctioned, so that it was obliged to land backwards) (Fowler 1982, p.24, Middlebrook 1989, pp.33-35, Van der Bijl 1992, pp.9-10). While the majority of the British garrison in Government House was surrounded by the Argentine commandos, those who had been assigned to defend the beaches opted to fight a delaying action against the LVTP-7's that were advancing onto the capital. After one of the LVTP-7's was detached to secure a nearby airfield, the vanguard advanced into the outskirts of Stanley, where they came under fire. Royal Marine anti-tank missiles were directed against the LVTP-7's' but, despite claims to the contrary (Fowler 1982, pp.6-7, Perrett 1984, p.38), none of the vehicles were knocked out or crews injured (Middlebrook 1989, pp.36-37, Van der Bijl 19992, p.10. This was the only fighting in which the Batallon de Vehiclos Anfibios participated, for, after hearing of their arrival, the British garrison wisely decided to surrender. During the first days of the occupation the LVTP-7's attempted to operate off road in the surrounding countryside, but they simply sank into the boggy ground (Van der Bijl 1992, p.10). As they were tearing up what little paved roads there were around the capital, they were soon replaced by the twelve Panhard AML-90 armoured cars of the Escuadron de Exploracion Caballeria Blindada 181, which reached the islands on the 7th of April. Fifteen additional Panhards arrived with the Escuadron de Exploracion Caballeria Blindada 10 (Fowler suggests that the additional A.F.V's. may have been part of a Marine Amphibious Reconnaissance Group instead) (Fowler 1982, p.24, Van der Bijl 1992, p.23). British AFVs It was the British, however, who deployed the next tracked A.F.V's. in the Malvinas/Falklands, though, unlike the Argentine LVTP-7's, these vehicles were specifically designed to operate in boggy ground. They were the CVR-T series of light tanks, which had a ground pressure less than that of an individual (on one occasion a crewman jumped off his vehicle, only to sink up to his knees in the ground over which his tank hadn't even broken the surface) (Blues and Royals….1983, p.63). The compliment of eight light tanks was part of a Medium Reconnaissance Group of the Blues and Royals Household Cavalry Regiment, this consisted of the 3rd and 4th Troops, each containing two CVR-T "Scorpions" (armed with a 76mm gun) and two CVR-T "Scimitars" (armed with a 30mm automatic cannon). In addition, the Group had one "Samson" armoured recovery vehicle (ARV) and a FV-180 combat engineer tractor (Blues and Royals…..1983, p.45). On May 21st the 3rd Troop landed in support of the 40th Commando at San Carlos, while the 4th Troop joined the 3rd Para. Fortunately the later group met with no resistance, as their designated landing place turned out to have overhanging rocks that prevented the unloading of A.F.V's. The men of the 3rd Para were forced to squeeze past the tanks in their Landing Craft Utility (LCU) and wade ashore, after which an alternative landing beach for the 4th Troop was located. Due to fuel constraints, neither Troop participated in the Battle of Goose Green, however, they both contributed to the advance on Stanley. The 4th Troop initially served with the Scots Guards during their assault on Mount Tumbledown, on the 11th of June. While the main force attacked from the west, the 4th Troop supported half a company in a diversionary attack along the most obvious approach from the south. Unfortunately, this route of approach was so obvious that the Argentine defenders had strewn a liberal number of mines around the area, so that the Troop commander's Scorpion struck one of them. The tank was lifted four feet in the air and the suspension system severely damaged, but the crew survived without a scratch (Blues and Royals….1983, p.62). After Mount Tumbledown had been taken, the 4th Troop was sent to support the Welsh Guards attack on Sapper Hill, their last operation of the War. The 3rd Troop's initial assignment was also to support the Scots Guards, rescuing one of their reconnaissance platoons that was pinned down by fire near Port Harriet house. They were transferred to assist 2nd Para in taking Wireless Ridge. Initial reconnaissance detected at least one enemy A.F.V. in a "hull down" position (with only the turret showing over the ridge line). Most likely this was one of the Panhards of the Escuadron de Exploracion Caballeria Blindada 181, which had been assigned to defend Wireless Ridge (Van der Bijl 1992, p.24). When the Troop was brought forward only two tanks were able to fire on the target at a range of 800 metres, before a snowstorm ended the only armoured engagement of the War (Blues and Royals…..1983, pp.48-49, Van der Bijl 1992, p.24.). The Scorpions and Scimitars provided fire support during 2nd Para's successful three phase assault on Wireless Ridge, afterwards, they accompanied 2nd Para as the first British force to enter Port Stanley. Following the surrender many a British soldier collected a souvenir of the war, but none was larger or more elaborate than that of the Blues and Royals, who took two of the Argentine Panhard armoured cars back to England as trophies (one of which is on display at the Bovington Tank Museum). Grenada A year after this War, the U.S. also launched an invasion of an island in Latin America, though this was Grenada, located in the Caribbean. Concern over internal upheaval and increased Cuban influence led the U.S. to initiate operation "Urgent Fury" on the 25th of October. The People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) of Grenada maintained a small number of A.F.V's., though delivery of 50 additional armoured personnel carriers had been scheduled for sometime between 1983 and 1989 (Adkin 1989, p.309). The majority of these, eight Soviet built BTR-60 armoured personnel carriers (though only seven were still in service by the time of the invasion), were organized into an elite Motorised Company, containing two Mounted Infantry Platoons (Adkin 1989, pp.59, 147, 164 - for crew uniforms see Russell and Mendez 1985, Plate "E", p.44). There were also two BRDM armoured cars (Adkin 1989, p.151, Haan 1989, p.11). It is interesting to note that the commander of the Motorised Company, 2nd Lt. Raeburn Nelson, had attended wintertime classes on the use of mechanised forces in Moscow, though, as the author of one study has pointed out "… the relevance of it all to the hills and heat of tiny Grenada was highly questionable". (Adkin 1989, p.147). Nonetheless, the Motorised Company, which was intended to serve as a centralised quick reaction force for the southern portion of the island, fought very well during the invasion. The most striking example of this was the battle for the Beausejour Transmitting Station. A team of U.S. "SEAL's" had seized the station, but a counter- attack of a PRA platoon, supported by an 82mm mortar and, most importantly, one of the BTR-60's (equipped with a heavy machine gun in a turret) forced the SEAL's to withdraw, swimming back to their ship (Adkin 1989, p.182). Similarly, while conducting a heli-bourne raid on Government House, another contingent of SEAL's were trapped by a group of PRA infantry supported by A.F.V's. (Adkin quotes one BTR-60, p.184-5, Egan states there were two BTR-60's, p.16, while Haan claims there were two BRDM's, p.11). Although at least one of the A.F.V's. was damaged by an AC-130 "Spectre" Gunship, the SEAL's were forced to remain in the house and await rescue. The PRA's most spectacular use of armour, however, was their attempted counter-attack at the Point Salines Airfield, that had been captured by U.S. Army Rangers. At 3.30, on the day of the invasion, three BTR-60's were seen racing towards the western-end of the runway. They fired on the Rangers, who replied with everything at hand. The volume of fire must have shaken the crew of the first vehicle, for it halted and reversed into the one behind. While the PRA crews were trying to untangle themselves, the Rangers managed to hit the two lead BTR-60's with anti-tank missiles, the crews bailed out, leaving two dead. The third vehicle managed to retreat, escaping the fire of the Rangers, but not that of a Spectre Gunship that was flying overhead (a fourth BTR-60 was found undamaged, but abandoned, near the airport) (Adkin 1989, p225, Haan 1989, p.11). In the words of one of the Rangers present during the action, the PRA armoured attack was a "…valiant, heroic, but stupid move." The U.S. forces did not introduce their own small contingent of A.F.V's. until later that morning, at 7.00. This consisted of the five M-60 medium tanks of the 3rd Platoon "A" Company, 2nd Tank Battalion, and between fifteen and thirteen LVTP-7's of the 4th Platoon, "A" Company, 2nd Assault Amphibious Battalion, who were both part of the 22nd Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) (Adkin 1989, pp.234, 246 & 250). The 22nd MAU initially intended to land it's forces on the eastern side of the northern portion of the island, but with the need to rescue the SEAL's at Government House, part of the 22nd MAU, including all of their armoured forces were landed at Grand Mal on the western side of the island. Impatient with having to wait for heli-bourne reinforcements, the Marine armoured column struck out on it's own. The column was led by a Reconnaissance Platoon, followed by thirteen LVTP-7's, with the M-60's bringing up the rear. Although most of the PRA troops surrounding Government House fled once the column made it's appearance, some accounts mention that one of the M-60's, using only a steel training round, destroyed a BRDM armoured car (perhaps this was the vehicle damaged by the Spectre Gunship, and was, therefore, unable to retreat) (Russell and Mendez 1985, p.22, Adkin 1989, p.256, Haan 1989, p.11). Panama Six years after the U.S. intervention into Grenada, Washington launched another operation in Latin America involving A.F.V's. This was "Just Cause" in Panama, an intervention of which the intention was the capture of the ruler of Panama, Manuel Noriega, who's Army, the Panamanian Defence Force (PDF), had a small stock of light A.F.V's. Among the four Platoons of the elite Battalion 2000 was the "Mecanizada" Platoon, equipped with nine V-300 Cadillac-Gage armoured cars (armed with a 90mm gun in a turret), while the 6th Mechanised Infantry Company boasted three platoons equipped with V-150 Cadillac-Gage armoured personnel carriers (13 vehicles in all) and a Fire Support Platoon equipped with V-300's (Donnelly and others 1991, p.190, Rottman 1991, pp.9 & 62). Unlike the indigenous armoured forces on Grenada, the PDF's A.F.V's. saw little action during the invasion. Operation "Just Cause" was extremely complex, as U.S. and PDF installations were intermixed in close proximity around the Canal Zone. As such, U.S. troops needed to be able to move swiftly, but safely, to their numerous objectives. Along with using paratroopers and heli-borne troops, U.S. forces made extensive use of M-113 armoured personnel carriers, supported by other, more powerful A.F.V's. In particular the assault on Noriega's central command centre, La Comandancia, located in the heart of Panama City, involved the use of a relatively large number of A.F.V's. The plan was to isolate the command complex by establishing a cordon around the general area, blocking off the intersections. After this was accomplished, La Comandancia would be "softened up" by heavy fire from aircraft and tanks, and then stormed and cleared (Donnelly and others 1991, pp.40-41). The mission was assigned to Task Force "Gator", this contained "R" and "D" Companies of the 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment each company was equipped with fourteen M-113's. Armoured support would be provided by a platoon of four Marine Corps LAV-25's. (Light Armoured Vehicles - wheeled armoured personnel carriers armed with a 25mm automatic gun) from "D" Company, 2nd Light Armoured Infantry Battalion, and a platoon of four M-551 "Sheridan" light tanks from "C" Company, 3rd Battalion, 73rd Armoured (Airborne) Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division (Donnelly and others 1991, p.147). These later A.F.V's., collectively known as "Team Armor", were included, among other things, out of concern for the PDF armoured cars which were known to be present in La Comandancia. The M-1551's were secretly smuggled into Panama on a Galaxy C5A transport four days before the operation commenced (Hamond and Sherman 1990, p.8). Their presence remained concealed so as not to alert the PDF, the crewmen going so far as to replace their shoulder patches with those of the 5th Infantry Division (Donnelly and others 1991, p.148). Although this was to no avail as the PDF got wind of the upcoming attack and established road-blocks on the streets surrounding La Comandancia. Nonetheless, the attack went forward as planned (though heavy casualties were expected, including the loss of up to seven A.F.V's.). The mechanised infantry were divided into two columns, responsible for securing two different halves of the perimeter. Despite intensive sniper fire and various road-blocks, both managed to secure their objectives (though two M-113's may have been hit by anti-tank fire) (Donnelly and others 1991, pp.142-146, Rottman 1991, p.49.). Team Armor was dispatched from Querry Heights to Ancon Hill, overlooking La Comandancia. Two sites were selected upon the hill, designated Bull 1 and 2, Team Armor took up positions at Bull 2, only to find that the smoke rising from the complex obscured their view, preventing them from providing fire support. The smoke was caused by the damage inflicted by Spectre Gunships, these were firing into the compound. Unfortunately, three M-113's had managed to enter the complex by the south-east corner, only to have two of their number knocked out by friendly fire from the Gunships. The wounded were loaded into the remaining M-113 and the assault platoon withdrew (Donnelly and others 1991, p.150). Sunrise coincided with the clearing of the smoke, so that Team Armor was able to provide fire support, the M-551's sending four rounds into the western end of the main building when a PDF soldier was spotted with a Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG - an anti-tank weapon). Later in the day Team Armor moved to Bull 1, from where they "softened up" the target with ten rounds from the M-551's and over one hundred rounds from the LAV-25's between 14.45 and 14.55 (Hamond and Sherman 1990, pp.9-11, Donnelly and others 1991, pp.155-156). Following the barrage from the tanks, AH-64 "Apache" attack helicopters fired into the compound, one pilot thought that he spotted a V-300 moving behind one of the buildings, and fired in the general direction, but no hit was confirmed. After this massive preparation, the Rangers assigned to clear the complex had no difficulty, as no one but the dead remained. Airdrop The most innovative use of U.S. armour during the invasion involved the airdrop of eight M-551's at Torrijos airport. The Army had calculated that parachuting the troops and equipment of the 82nd Airborne Division would only take a fraction of the time necessary to unload them by landing in their transport aircraft. The M-551 had been specifically designed light enough to be dropped by parachute (it's hull was constructed from aluminium), and this would be the first opportunity to do so in wartime. Once on the ground, the paratroopers would be lifted by helicopter to three separate objectives, while the M-551's would be divided into four pairs of tanks, one to remain at the airport, and the others to proceed to the three objectives to provide fire support for the paratroopers (Hamond and Sherman 1990, p.10, Donnelly and others 1991, pp.201-203, 215, Rottman 1991, p.32. Once again, it was concern over the presence of PDF A.F.V's. which necessitated the inclusion of U.S. armour in the operation. The 3rd Battalion of the 73rd Armoured (Airborne) Regiment (without the platoon from "C" Company that was at La Comandancia) was dropped by their C-141 transports east of the runway (so as not to damage it for the landing of future reinforcements). One M-551 was completely destroyed, while another was severely damaged, leaving six to carry out the support missions. Two M-551's were dispatched to Panama Viejo, but their progress was hindered by road-blocks and snipers to such a degree that they were forced to turn back (four V-300's were destroyed at Panama Viejo either by the paratroopers directly or by their air support, so it seems the M-551's were not needed after all) (Hamond and Sherman 1990, p.11, Donnelly and others 1991, p.226, Rottman 1991, p.32). The two M-551's sent to support the attack on Cerro Tinajitas had better luck, rescuing 18 paratroopers who had been pinned down by enemy fire at their landing zone (Hamond and Sherman 1990, p.12). As the third objective, Fort Cimarron. Was the home of Battalion 2000, the presence of the M-551's seemed particularly important. Once again, however, the PDF failed to use their A.F.V's. though when the installation fell to the paratroopers, they found one armoured car with it's engine running (accounts differ as to whether there were four or ten A.F.V's. discovered in Fort Cimarron, and how many of these were destroyed by Spectre Gunships) (Donnelly and others 1991, pp.227-229, Rottman 1991, p.32). Nonetheless, when the M-551's arrived, they contributed to the clearing of the buildings, firing no less than thirty rounds to "persuade" PDF die-hards to surrender (Hamond and Sherman 1990, pp.11-12). It seems that the only occasion when the PDF made any use of their A.F.V's. was during the Ranger assault on the Rio Hato garrison, when four Rangers had a brief encounter with a V-150 armoured personnel carrier that successfully escaped from the installation during the assault. When the compound fell, the Rangers captured the remaining sixteen A.F.V's. (Donnelly 1991, p.345, Rottman 1991, p.30). Following the collapse of organised resistance, the M-551's were delighted to "show of force" operations, in which they proved very successful. In the words of one U.S. soldier "The Sheridan, by this time, had gained a pretty good reputation in Panama. Guys did not want to mess with a Sheridan." (Hamond and Sherman 1990, pp.12-13, Donnelly and others 1991, p.368). It seems ironic that while the larger nations of Latin America have amassed considerable armoured forces, those mechanised troops which have actually fought in battle (with the notable exception of Cuba) have been from the relatively tiny forces of lesser nations, such as Grenada and Panama. Even Argentina could only deploy a small armoured force on the Malvinas/Falklands due to the terrain and logistical considerations. Overall, A.F.V's. have had only a minimal effect on the course of the various conflicts in Latin America during this century. Although the possibility of the use of the large armoured forces of, for instance, Argentina or Brazil, on the scale of "Desert Storm" may seem unlikely, no one knows what the future may hold. What is certain is that, if not in combat, then in other spheres such as the realms of foreign relations, military and industrial development, the presence of A.F.V's. has both effected and reflected the course of Latin American history. No doubt, it will continue to do so. SOURCES:ADKIN, Mark. (1989) Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada, pub. Lexington Books,
Lexington, MA. U.S.A.
Thanks Paul, for all of the time and effort that you must of put in to complete article, which must be looked upon as a good reference material source, just by putting it all together makes it that. Keep up the good work. T.D.H. ) Other Installments Armoured Fighting Vehicles in Latin America: An Introduction: Part 2
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