1. Cuba has the manpower to garrison her own bases, key facilities, and installations, as well as those established by the U.S. in Cuba. During World War II, she assisted in guarding U.S. property at Batista Airport and the Nicaro Nickle mines. From a total population of 5,422,000 it is estimated that 870,000 males between the ages of 15 and 49 would be fit for some form of service. Cuba has no mobilization plan, but its maximum mobilization rate is estimated to be 50,000 by M/30 and 100,000 by M/180.
Wartime defense of these bases and installations against sabotage and raids could not be effectively handled by Cuba alone. In the event of an attack, the Cuban Army would require assistance in protecting bases and facilities and would depend upon the United 5tates to bear the brunt of repelling the invader. There is no evidence of extensive Communist infiltration in the Army or National Police. The Cuban Army would be an aid to controlling subversion and a protection against extensive sabotage by Communists, but they could not prevent temporary dislocations of production and delivery of strategic and critical materials.
2. Army communications by radio and telephone are maintained between general headquarters and each of the major units throughout the country and between major units and each subordinate unit down to and including detached outposts. Equipment is modern and well maintained and under normal conditions the facilities are adequate. In appropriate areas, the Army communications system might be used to supplement air and sea facilities to support transport routes but alone, it is inadequate for effective service under war conditions.
3. The Cuban Army of 15,800 and National Police of 7,000 are organized and disposed for the primary purpose of maintaining internal' stability and order, which they are capable of doing at present. They are expected to maintain this capability under ordinary circumstance. Owing to the large Communist affiliation in Cuba (150,000 members) and the ample funds expended on espionage and on preparations for sabotage, she is extremely vulnerable to political and economic disruptions by the Communists. In the event of a war with the USSR, the Cuban Army would probably require outside assistance in controlling the inevitable local Communist disturbances. The size of any expeditionary force that Cuba might provide would not cause a serious economic dislocation, a drain on her military manpower potential, nor would it affect her ability to maintain internal security. A war situation which disrupted Cuba's sugar industry would cause serious economic dislocations and increase the problems of maintaining internal'security.
4. Cuba could dispatch a small ground force for overseas combat and, in fact, has already offered one infantry company to the United Nations for action in Korea. It is possible that the proffered unit may be increased to battalion size. It will take considerable time to prepare Cuban troops for modern combat. Cuban armed forces have never served away from home, have no experience in modern warfare, and cannot be expected to meet U.S. standards of combat effectiveness.
(What a difference 10 years made! TH.)
Related:
Cuba: Bay of Pigs Tank Battle
Back to Table of Contents -- El Dorado Vol VII No. 3
Copyright 1996 by The South and Central Military Historians Society