DECLINE UNDER GODOY The defeat of Cape St. Vincent in 1797 consigned the Spanish Fleet to an unproductive decade blockaded in port. From 1796 its incapacity to effectively challenge the British was compounded by Carlos Godoy, the de facto ruler of Spain, who prefered to direct revenues into reforming the army for action in Europe. As a consequence the navy's share of Treasury spending fell to an average of only 11.3% from 1798-1805 (although in real terms there may have been no fall due to greatly increased expenditure). In the latter year the defeat of Trafalgar effectively ended Spain's naval pretensions altogether, and five years of inactivity between 1808 and 1813 saw the great fleet built up by Carlos III disappear, to the great advantage of the Latin American independence movements. Year 1763 1774 1789 1794 1808 1813 Navios 37 58 76 79 42 17 Fragatas 18 26 51 53 30 17 IMPERIAL COMMUNICATIONS Communications within the Spanish Empire were maintained by a regular mail boat (paquebot or aviso) service from La Coruna founded by Carlos III. In 1789 La Coruna maintained thirteen fragata and corbeta paquebotes of between 430 tons (20x8pdrs) and 150 tons (12x4pdrs), and six bergantin paquebotes averaging 135 tons (12x4pdrs). These sailed for Havana once a month and for Montevideo once every second month. In Havana the mails were transfered to Havana's own fleet of ten unarmed bergantines and smaller vessels of 80-100 tons which distributed the mails for the whole Caribbean empire. Puerto Rico liad two unarmed goletas of 70-80 tons for servicing the smaller islands. Lima was serviced from the north via connecting paquebotes based at Panama. From Montevideo mail was distributed overland as far north as Lima. In 1802 the paquebot service was absorbed into the navy. In time of war Puerto Rico became vital to communications as it was the only Spanish Caribbean possession direct accessible across the open Atlantic and not screened by foreign possessions. COLONIAL TRADE In the first half of the 18th Century Cadiz sent an escorted convoy, known as the "Flota", to Vera Cruz every 2-4 years, and another, known as the "Galleones", to Cartagena and Portobelo. The former traded with the Viceroyalty of Nueva Espafta and the Philipines (which sent a single connecting vessel, the Manila Galleon, across the Pacific to Acapulco annually until 1790), and the latter with the Viceroyalty of Peru (the Pacific coast of which was serviced by a secondary maritime trade route between Panama, Callao and Valparaiso). The prevailing winds and currents dictated that the Caribbean was best entered through the Leeward and Windward Islands and then navigated in a clockwise direction, inevitably taking most vessels round the western edge of Cuba. Both Flota and Galleones would rendez-vous at Havana for escort back to Spain via the Bahamas. The Flota and Galleon vessels were few in number, perhaps only half a dozen per convoy, but large, exceeding 500 tons and often as big as a navio, and carrying anything between 24 and 50 guns. They were analogous to British East Indiamen, being bigger, better manned and more heavily armed than standard merchantmen. However, the war of 1739-48 badly disrupted the Flota and Galleon system and an increasing number of "Registros", similar large merchant ships specially licensed to sail independently and trade directly with a major colonial port, were dispatched. One registro navio at Havana in 1762, the San Zen6n, reportedly mounted 78 guns! The Galleones never resumed, and only four Flotas sailed between 1765 and the opening of Nueva Espafta to internal free trade in 1789, so the registros became an increasing component of trans-Atlantic trade in mid-century. However, convoys were still resorted to in wartime. The gradual introduction of internal free trade from 1765 saw increasing numbers of smaller vessels joining the trans-Atlantic trade. The composition of the merchant vessels in the Cevallos expedition of 1776 may (or may not) give an accurate representation of the typical vessels increasingly deployed across the Atlantic: Type No. Av. Tonnaae Largest Smallest Fragatas 31 310t 741t+ 129t Paquebotes* 12 142t 182t 86t Bergantines 10 124t 184t 70t Saethias 39 162t 248t 87t + Probably normally Registros. * Here "paquebot" essentially refers to bergantines. A fairly universal internal free trade only operated between 1732 and 1796, during which a little in excess of 4,116 Spanish ships traded with one or more colonial port; an average of 274+ per year. The average annual visits received from Spanish merchantmen between 1782-1796 give a good indication of the relative importance of each colonial port: Havana138 Callao 5 Santo Domingo 1 Vera Cruz42 Buenos Aires 3 Santiago de Cuba 1 Montevideo42 Puerto Rico 3 New Orleans 2 La Guaira29 Cumana 3 Maracaibo 2 Cartagena14 Omoa 3 Trinidad 1 Campeche11 Guayana 2 Other ports visited more occasionally were: Santa Marta, Guatemala, Maldonado, San Agustin, Montechristi, Trinidad de Cuba, Santa Marta, Guayaquil, Valparaiso. From 1765 internal free trade between colonies was also opened up. However, as they produced very little not produced by each other inter- colonial trade was slow to build up and mostly carried in small vessels. Nevertheless, the British took over a hundred private vessels at Havana in 1762 and 57 vessels between 100 and 1,000 tons at Montevideo in 1806. HAVANA Havana remained pre-eminent for three reasons. Firstly it became a rich sugar exporter under Carlos III, secondly it retained its strategic importance because the prevailing winds still carried most Caribbean-bound vessels round the western end of Cuba on their return to Europe, and thirdly it was the site of the major Spanish naval dockyard. When the British captured the city in 1762 Spain sued for peace as a direct result of its loss. Naval spending in the Indies did not come from the Spanish Treasury but was deducted at source in the Americas. In 1763-1782 and 17901801 spending on the Havana yard and naval station amounted on average to an additional 18.4% above metropolitan naval expenditures. This figure does not apparently include spending at other lesser dockyards and naval stations such as those at Montevideo, Callao and San Blas. Havana was central to excellent sources of high quality wood in Venezuela, Nueva Granada, Central America, Cuba, Luisiana and Florida. (In 1735 a single navio, the Nueva Espana (60), was experimentally built at Coatzoalcos in Mexico, the source of much of Havana's best wood, but Havana was found to be a more suitable site). Havana shipyard had begun to build navios in the 1700s and constructed 37% (74 out of 199) of all Spanish navios built in the 18th Century, 58.8% of these between the opening of Carlos III's reign in 1759 and 1796. In the latter year Godoy's army-based, Eurocentric policies effectively stopped production. At its peak the Havana naval yard was the largest in the world and its vessels, made of Caribbean teak, were the most durable and long lived of the times. Furthermore, in a Spanish fleet that placed greater emphasis than its rivals on massive three-deckers most such vessels were built at Havana (six out of seven in service in 1774). The Santissima Trinidad, the largest warship of its times, and on conversion the only four-decker in the world, was also launched at Havana in 1769. Apart from completed vessels from Havana, Cuba also forwarded to naval shipyards in metropolitan Spain the durable hardwoods necessary for the main structural members of their own warships. Conversely all the guns and most of the iron fitments of vessels built in Havana came from Spain. It is probable that by the late 18th Century up to half the weight of broadside in the Spanish Navy was carried in Havana bottoms. At a time when Spanish naval design was also arguably the world leader it is difficult to over-emphasise the importance of the Havana yard to Spanish influence and therefore to the wider European ballance of power. Havana dockyard also gave Spain a substantial naval advantage in the Caribbean over Britain which had no comparable facility available. Any Royal Navy vessels suffering substantial damage had to return to Britain for major repairs. Similarly Montevideo in the South Atlantic, Callao and Guayaquil in the South Pacific, San Blas in the North Pacific and Manila in the Philipines provided facilities uniquely available to Spanish warships. THE WEST INDIES SQUADRON The peacetime West Indies Squadron seems to have consisted of only a handful of small navios, supported by more numerous fragatas and bergantines. In 1774 it consisted of 3 navios (1x64,2x6O), 6 fragatas and corbetas (2x28,1x26,2x22,1x18), 2 Xebecs (30,26), 6 bergantines (12- 18guns), 4 bergantin paquebotes (2x18,2x16), 7 Urcas (10-26), a balandra and two goletas (12). Most were naturally based at Havana dockyard but others could find themselves deployed to Cartagena, Portobello or Veracruz depending on the seasonal requirements of the peacetime galleones and flotas. In anticipation of war it was expected to be reinforced by a major naval expedition from Spain such as the 12 navios (2x80,8x70,2x60,2x28) and 2 fragatas (2x28) of Don Jose Solano sent to the Caribbean in 1779. The three-decker navios built at Havana were intended for European waters and did not serve in the Americas. Thus the peacetime West Indies Squadron tended to consist of small and obsolescent two decker navios with 50-64 guns and its wartime reinforcements largely consisted of larger two-decker navios of 64-80 guns. The West Indies squadron appears to have been under independent naval command, whereas other lesser colonial squadrons were subordinate to the local Viceroy. SPANISH NAVAL LOSSES IN THE AMERICAS Quite apart from the manning problems of Spanish warships in Spain itself, those sent to the Caribbean suffered additional losses from tropical diseases and were almost always undermanned. At Cartagena in 1741, Havana in 1762 and Trinidad in 1796 not only were the Spanish vessels outnumbered but so severely undermanned that they could not have undertaken a major sea action with any prospect of success anyway. The result was a fearful loss of navios scuttled as blockships, burnt by their own crews to prevent capture, or surrendered in the capitulation of their port without ever putting to sea. Consequently, sailors, marines and naval gunners at the sieges Cartagena (1741) and Havana (1762), and to a lesser degree at Puerto Rico (1797) and Montevideo (1806), often played a more important role behind the fortifications than on board ship. The scale of these disasters is illustrated by the fact that only two navics were lost to the British in open battle in the Americas throughout the century (one captured, and one damaged and burnt to avoid capture off Havana in 1748), and one captured by the Portuguese off La Plata in 1776 but returned at the peace. More The Spanish Navy, 1762-1807 Introduction Carlos III and Sea Power Decline Under Godoy Major Spanish Warship Losses in the Caribbean: 1741-1796 Major Spanish Warship Types in Late 18th C. Back to Table of Contents -- El Dorado Vol V No. 4 Back to El Dorado List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by The South and Central American Military Historians Society This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com