The precise casualty figures of the 27 day long war are difficult to ascertain with any precision although an analysis of official figures indicates 107 Salvadorean and 93 Honduran military personnel killed in combat, with 66 acknowledged Honduran wounded and presumably a similar number of Salvadoreans. Although exact figures are lacking, it appears as if anything between 2,000 and 5,000 civilians were killed on both sides, the generally accepted approximate figure being 3,000. The value of the damage to property on both sides is conservatively estimated at not less than US$ 50,000,000 or approximately 3.3% of the combined annual GNP of both countries.

Tension between the two countries continued throughout the 1970s, with sporadic frontier incidents, almost escalating into full-scale warfare once more in 1976. Attempts at the solution of the differences between the two countries collapsed in 1973 but were renewed under the stimulus of the narrowly avoided resumption of hostilities in 1976, a peace treaty being ratified, under the auspices of the President of Peru, on October 30th, 1980.

Whilst the war had resulted in the condemnation of El Salvador as the aggressor, lumbered the already overcrowded country with some 100,000 refugees and failed to achieve either any compensation for the damages suffered by the Salvadorean minority in Honduras or any guarantee of their future safety, its most serious long-term effect was the closure of the safety valve of emigration to Honduras, thus exacerbating existing demographic pressures and leading to the escalation of guerrilla activity to the level of full-scale civil war from the late 1970s onwards.

Despite its serious shortcomings in the area of logistics, the Salvadorean Army had however demonstrated its clear superiority over that of Honduras during the brief inglorious little war and the Salvadorean mobilization system had been shown to work both smoothly and efficiently.

For its part, the defects in the organization and equipment of the Honduran Army were underlined although the Air Force reinforced its existing reputation as the best military air arm in Central America.

Each country subsequently embarked on a programme of rearmament, resulting in the purchase of large quantities of equipment of all kinds, principally from France, Germany, Israel, and Yugoslavia. The ratification of the Peace Treaty however finally removed any immediate threat of the resumption of hostilities and the growing menace of left-wing terrorism and guerrilla activity demonstrated that both governments shared a commonality of interests which overshadowed their mutual antipathies. Although a degree of mutual suspicion remained, detente between the two countries developed to the extent that Honduran troops co-operated with the Salvadorean Army in the containment of guerrilla activity in their mutual frontier zone during the early 1980s and several complete Battalions of Salvadorean troops were subsequently trained by the United States in Honduran territory.

SOURCES

Anderson,T.P. "The War of the Dispossessed", University of Nebraska, Lincoln, 1981.
English, A.J. "Armed Forces of Latin America", Jane's, London, 1984.
English, A.J. "The El Salvador-Honduras War", Strategic Survey 1969, Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1970.
Dienst, J. & Hagedorn,D. "North American F-51 Mustangs in Latin American Air Force Service", Aerofax Inc., Arlington, Texas, 1985.
Hagedorn,D. "Viva Corsario", Small Air Forces Observer, January, 1981.
Hagedorn,D. "Area Handbook for Honduras", The American University, Washington, D.C., 1971.
Hagedorn,D. "Area Handbook for El Salvador"; The American University, Washington, D.C., 1979.
Sohr, Raul, "Centroamerica en Guerra", Editorial Alianza, Mexico City, 1988.

El Salvador-Honduras Football War of 1969

Introduction
Part One: Background
Part Two: The Opposing Forces
Part Three: The Air War
Part Four: El Salvador Invades Honduras
Part Five: The Cost